On April 27, 2023, the European Commission published its proposal for a Council Regulation on standard essential patents. The proposal is controversial as one would expect given its potential impact on the balance between SEP holders and implementers in royalty negotiations, the methodology for assessing FRAND rates, and the role of Courts. In this article, we focus on one aspect of the debate, namely the motivation for the Regulation and in particular, whether the Huawei/ZTE framework for the negotiation of royalties is adequate. We find that the implementation of the Huawei/ZTE framework by Courts has evolved in such a way that there is a renewed concern about the risk of hold up, so that the balancing of interests of SEP holders and SEP implementers intended by European judges has not been achieved. We also find that that the interpretation of the implementers' willingness to license by German courts has effectively given patent holders control over the level at which licensing is taking place and, at least in the automotive industry, has shifted licensing to the level of car manufacturers. This is potentially inefficient when downstream manufacturers are less well informed than component manufacturers about the patents that read on a standard.