Last September Christelle Rigual defended her PhD thesis in International Relations/Political Science, entitled “(Non)Intervention: Inter-Polity Relations in Europe since the Seventeenth Century”, at the Graduate Institute. Professor Elisabeth Prügl presided the committee, which included Professor Keith Krause, Thesis Director, and Professor Emeritus Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, from Florida International University, USA. Her research brings a historical and analytical light to a highly sensitive and ethically charged issue: the dilemma on the use of force in international governance, sorely illustrated by the aftermath of the multilateral intervention in Libya and the lack of UNSC-authorised humanitarian intervention in Syria.

Can you tell us about the background of your research?

While inter-state conflicts are in decline, internationalised civil wars still represent extremely destabilising events for the international community. The effects of civil wars spill over well beyond their local and regional settings, impacting the lives of millions of civilians and refugees and disrupting international equilibriums. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has, since the end of the Cold War and the ease of the East/West deadlock, more fully relied on the range of possible options set out in the UN Charter to address these humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, ethical, political and moral issues continuously weight in on whether intervening in civil war is acceptable, tolerable, feasible, and effective in curbing the spread of violence. Failures of the international society to stop the Rwandan genocide in 1994, or the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, remain traumatic experiences that have encouraged the development of the “responsibility to protect” framework. Yet international interventions in the internal affairs of other states could conveniently hide strategic calculations such as positioning military bases or consolidating key economic partnerships (usually involving oil or arms sales). They are hence highly criticised for being biased, interested, ineffective, and for violating the right of non-intervention and the principle of sovereignty. The aftermath of the 2011’s multilateral intervention in Libya and the current inability to intervene to secure a ceasefire and access to humanitarian aid in Syria illustrate the two dark sides of the dilemma on the use of force in the contemporary international governance.

This thesis has its roots in this highly complex setting. It seeks to bring a more historical and analytical light to the highly sensitive and ethically charged issue of (non)intervention in the internal affairs of other states by investigating how the principle emerged and was (de)constructed over time, and to bridge a gap in the International Relations literature, which largely overlook the study of the principle of non-intervention.

What are your major findings?

In International Relations, traditional accounts on the emergence of the state system emphasise that the principle of states’ sovereignty and its corollary right of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states emerged in the seventeenth century in the context of the Peace of Westphalia, which settled the Thirty Years’ War in Europe. Unpacking this narrative from historical, legal and political perspectives, and drawing upon a wide range of archival material (treaties and legal documents, the doctrine, and the discourses of statesmen and representatives) within four historical European junctures (the Westphalian moment, the revolutionary era, the Concert of Europe, and the post–Cold War period), the thesis demonstrates that the principle of non-intervention did not emerge in a neat package during the Westphalian moment. Contrary to established assumptions, the principle of non-intervention was actually not connected to early conceptions of sovereignty, neither in the doctrine nor in the discourses of European statesmen. Rather, the contours of the principle of non-intervention fluctuated over time, and, for centuries, simultaneously held conceptions of non-intervention and intervention were not perceived as paradoxical or mutually exclusive, but rather coexisted both in the doctrine and in the political realm.

Overall, the thesis emphasises that the principle of non-intervention has actually been codified very recently, from the mid-nineteenth century, and more universally in 1945 with the adoption of the UN Charter and its Article 2.4 prohibiting the use of force at the international level – to the exclusion of actions undertaken by the UNSC in case of breaches of peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and self-defence under Article 51. It notes that this codification was a rather abrupt shift from precedent practices, where considerations of the balance of power and concerns for “peace and stability” constituted justifiable grounds for interventions in the internal affairs of other states up to the early twentieth century and the outbreak of World War I. While certainly grounded in a “never again” rationale in the aftermath of World War II, Article 2.4 hence departed from former modes of international governance and former, less absolute conceptions of sovereignty, probably explaining in parts (aside from more political and interest-driven rationales) why compliance to the norm is still largely contested in the political realm.

Is your thesis policy relevant?

Challenging traditional understanding on the emergence of the international norm of non-intervention, and more generally the restrain and use of force, this thesis contributes to put in perspective contemporary discursive practices on international interventions in cases of gross violations of human rights. While restrains on the use of force, as laid out in the UN Charter, are essential components of the contemporary international legal framework, keeping in mind that the rule of non-intervention was actually a rather brutal shift from past practices and ways of regulating international relations contributes to explain why the rule is still so fragile and its implementation uneven. Rather than crystallising around breaches of Article 2.4 as delegitimising effects on the UN Charter, this thesis encourages to acknowledge the paradoxical and fluid characteristics of (non)intervention and to work toward a more anticipated, flexible and democratically implemented global governance of intervention.

How will you remember your doctoral experience?

The International Relations/Political Science doctoral programme was an incredibly enriching experience. I have encountered exceptional intellectuals and scholars, and have had the chance to conduct research in lively academic environments in Science Po Paris, Oxford and the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. Gaining research experience at the Small Arms Survey and the Gender Centre also increased my analytical and research skills. While certainly challenging at times, I will remember my doctoral years as a unique intellectual and international journey across times and spaces.

What are you doing now?

I am dedicated to expanding the research agenda on the global governance of security opened up by this thesis, while coordinating a six-year r4d/SNSF research project on gender, conflict and peacebuilding at the Gender Centre. This project explores links between gender relations and conflict cycles at the microlevel in Indonesia and Nigeria. Its gender lenses highlight hidden but inspiring informal and local dimensions of conflict management and peacebuilding practices, thus further enriching perspectives on the complexities of the global governance of security.

Full citation of the PhD thesis: Rigual, Christelle. “(Non)Intervention: Inter-Polity Relations in Europe since the Seventeenth Century”. PhD thesis (summa cum laude) defended summa cum laude avec félicitations du jury, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2016.

Illustration: 19/52: Rwanda. Photo by Eric Constantineau, 7 May 2011, licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.