How did you come to choose your research topic?

During the drafting of my master’s thesis on the functions of punishment in international criminal law, which I completed here at the Graduate Institute, I came across the concept of the “cultural defence”, a controversial legal strategy, rather than a codified defence, occasionally employed in a handful of multicultural states. The rationale behind the defence is that individuals socialised in a minority culture should not be held accountable for violations of the law to the same extent as the rest of the population if their conduct is the product of deeply ingrained cultural norms. The topic is hotly debated in domestic literature, especially when referring to violations of the criminal law. Therefore, I started wondering if it could apply, and, if so, how, in our deeply pluralistic international society and to the commission of gross violations of human rights that amount to international crimes (i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression). 

Starting from these questions, I developed my research proposal and expanded it into a broader study of the role and impact of cultural norms in individual criminal responsibility in international criminal trials.

Can you describe your thesis questions and your methodology?

At its heart, my thesis sets out to investigate one question: does transgression of international criminal law motivated by compliance with cultural norms entitle the individual to a different response than transgression determined by other factors, such as greed or passion? 

The question can be deconstructed to comprise of two layers: first, does culture actually impact behaviour? Second, if so, should this have any consequences on the attribution of individual criminal responsibility? 

In order to answer my research questions, I first drew from anthropological research to work out the role that social and cultural norms play in forming individual identity, and the consequences that this entails in terms of individual decision-making. I then conducted doctrinal research into the rules of attribution of individual criminal responsibility to find out if, and how, cultural norms could be accommodated in determinations of individual culpability.

What are your major findings?

In my thesis, I argue that cultural norms are sufficiently significant to impact decision-making, and therefore culture should be taken into consideration in the attribution of individual criminal responsibility. To reach my conclusions, I first proved the premise and then applied it to legal rules of attribution of individual criminal responsibility in international criminal trials.

First, drawing from anthropological sources, I found that cultural norms are internalised by the individual throughout their life and they are the key through which the individual interprets the world, including their legal obligations. Situating my analysis within broader reflections on free will, I discovered that these cultural processes are essential to the development of cognitive abilities and moral reasoning, and they imbue the individual with moral agency. In other words, regardless of the specific cultural values that different groups hold, all individuals are cultural beings at their essence. 

At this stage, I set out to evaluate what the boundaries are for attribution of responsibility in the existing system. To this end, I conducted doctrinal research on rules of individual criminal responsibility and analysed the way in which individual agency is articulated in general principles of individual criminal responsibility and in existing defences. I found that the role that cultural background plays in individual decision-making is routinely dismissed as irrelevant. In other words, in the trial, it generally does not matter how cultural processes have influenced, or potentially determined, individual conduct.

However, the research conducted in the first part of my thesis convinced me that this exclusion is not conducive to evaluations of culpability that are genuinely reflective of the level of blameworthiness of the individual. If cultural values are so significant to the formation of the will of the defendant, should they not be taken into account? Here, I introduced the last stage of my reasoning. In order to accommodate the recognition of culture, I proposed a holistic reading of culpability in light of the goals of punishment. I concluded that culture should be acknowledged in the attribution of individual criminal responsibility in light of the crucial role it plays on the formation of individual agency, which rules of individual criminal responsibility in turn assess.

What are you doing now?

I am Teaching Fellow in International Criminal Law at Durham Law School, Durham University (UK).  

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Vera Piovesan defended her PhD thesis in International Law on 4 March 2024. Professor Vincent Chetail presided over the committee, which included Professor Paola Gaeta and Honorary Professor Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, Thesis Co-Supervisors, and, as External reader, Professor Mark Antonin Drumbl, Transnational Law Institute, Washington and Lee School of Law, USA.

Citation of the PhD thesis:
Piovesan, Vera. “Culture and Culpability in International Criminal Trials.” PhD thesis, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2024.
An abstract of the PhD thesis is available on this page of the Geneva Graduate Institute’s repository. As the thesis itself is embargoed until June 2027, please contact Dr Piovesan for access.

Banner image by SARATSTOCK/Shutterstock.
Interview by Nathalie Tanner, Research Office.