A political decision
That the EU upgraded Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to candidate status on 15 December 2022 did not come as a big surprise. The move had been signalled for some time, since the European Council in June 2022 instructed the Commission to prepare a new Opinion on the country’s preparedness. What was, perhaps, more striking was that nothing substantial had changed in the three years since the last assessment. At least nothing to do with BiH itself and its reform performance. Although BiH, like all Western Balkan states were given assurances of their eligibility for EU membership as far back as the Thessaloniki Declaration in 2003, which was reaffirmed in Brdo in 2021, the country had not been granted candidate status after applying for membership in 2016. It had instead been designated a ‘potential candidate’ together with Kosovo. In its first full Opinion on the application, in 2019, the European Commission listed 14 ‘key priorities’, a set of reforms that would, when combined, amount to a wide-ranging shakeup of the country’s governance structures, and would, in all likelihood, necessitate constitutional change. As was clear from the 2022 Commission Opinion, BiH did not make any particular progress on the 14 key priorities listed by the Commission in the 2019 Opinion, nor did the Council pretend that it had when it made its decision to change status. Although a firm date for starting negotiations was not set, the EU had nonetheless signalled a clear upgrade in relations. But if BiH itself had not changed, how can one explain the change of stance? Obviously, it was a political decision, as all such decisions inherently are. Moreover, it is not the first time that decisions of this nature have been made with little regard for the recommendations from the Commission or to specific conditions previously laid out. In this commentary, I will discuss the reasons behind the EU’s decision, as well as the continuing challenges the EU will face trying to embrace Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The contested Western Balkans….
As noted, the EU has long held out a clear promise of eventual membership to those Western Balkan countries that meet the established requirements (Copenhagen Criteria and acquis compliance). However, it has also for a long time succumbed to the highly negative rhetoric of ‘enlargement fatigue’; that it cannot bother with the eternal candidates. On the one hand, the fatigue is understandable: the big Eastern enlargement of 2004-2006 took up most of the Union’s political bandwidth for several years, as a new major round probably would again. Moreover, the Southern and Eastern European countries still outside the EU present such challenges in terms of socio-economic gaps, corruption and poor governance, that the reluctance to invest significant time and political capital in a slow enlargement process is perhaps understandable. On the other hand, there is no underestimating how awful the signalling effect has been. The EU has lost credibility with many in the region, who question whether EU statements are sincere. In this, the case of North Macedonia usually stands out as evidence of EU perfidy. Not without reason: After having had a positive assessment from the Commission as far back as 2005, North Macedonia was long blocked from accession talks by Greece over the ‘name dispute’. When that blockage fell away – after Macedonia became North Macedonia in order to soothe Greek sensitivities – Bulgaria took over the harassment, demanding that Macedonians acknowledge speaking a Bulgarian dialect, and being ethnic Bulgarians. All this without the Commission and other member states intervening or showing much interest. Although accession talks did begin in July 2022, Bulgaria retains the right to block progress at any stage.
This sorry saga has done little for the EU’s reputation. Never mind that most Western Balkan states have trouble meeting the democratic and administrative standards of the EU, the poor treatment of North Macedonia has provided a smokescreen for others to blame the EU for their own lack of progress. Not particularly fair in terms of their own disinterest in reforms, but a hard-to-counter allegation given the long period of EU disinterest. Russia’s war on Ukraine since February 2022 has forced a reassessment of EU strategy (or lack thereof) in the region. The supposedly magnetic pull of EU membership has failed to work its magic, and while the EU has been distant and passive during the past decade, it has seen increased competition from outside powers who do not share its interests or values. Russia’s relationship with Serbia goes back a long way, but Russian support for Serbia has encouraged its intransigence over relations with Kosovo. In a more general way, Russia has also invested significant resources in presenting its narratives in the media. China has inserted itself in the economies of several countries through financing major infrastructure projects, especially in Serbia and Montenegro. In the latter case, it led to the country being caught in a debt trap, from which the EU had to rescue it. More significant than the actions of these two powers as such, is how they show that physical distance need not preclude political influence. While in the EU’s case, it shows that physical proximity is not enough to make up for an absent political strategy.
…and the troubled Bosnia and Herzegovina
Thus, the region as a whole has become less stable over the past decade. None of this is in the EU’s interest, as the Union completely surrounds the Western Balkans. No rational state has ever had much interest in its neighbours falling far behind economically, or remain isolated black holes that others may seek to influence. Countries or unions of states will always be exposed to their neighbours’ problems, and have an interest in seeking to ameliorate these. This was the logic of the Stabilisation and Association Process since 2005, and the European Neighbourhood Policy before it. Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular exhibits these issues. Being located in the middle of the former Yugoslavia, the country already has a 900 km-long land border with Croatia, and conducts two-thirds of its trade with the EU. Should Montenegro join, BiH would be almost completely surrounded. Switzerland is completely surrounded by the EU, someone might argue, and is doing just fine. Alas, BiH is not Switzerland, not many can be. Instead, it is one of the least stable and least functional countries in Europe, and it has made precious little progress in its membership process. The Dayton Agreement ended the war in 1995, yet the country has remained fragile. Although its ethnicity-based – or consociational, if one prefers – constitution and state structure has provided a framework for maintaining an uneasy peace – which, naturally, is preferable to continued bloodshed – the system has never been popular, nor has it addressed the country’s underlying fissures. Part of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s problem is the weak sense of national identity. Each of the three main ethnicities – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats – have a strong sense of self, and each have their own historical narratives, yet the overarching national identity remains contested. Most Serbs and Croats identifying with neighbouring states (and often holding dual citizenship) rather than with the one in which they live only complicates this picture. The Dayton constitution provides too thin a national layer to help build much common identity. Moreover, as with most consociational governing forms following from deep ethnic divisions and/or a recently violent past, BiH is not one single polity. Instead, it has three distinct politics within each ethnic group, who do not talk much with one another. In recent years, leaders on all sides have deliberately dialled up the hostile actions, and the country once more teeters.
Most prominently, Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik has taken his secessionist rhetoric to new levels, constantly threatening to withdraw Republika Srpska from state institutions he considers illegitimate. Croat leader Dragan Ćović has pursued a policy of blockage in the institutions of BiH’s larger entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), the aim of which is to extract concessions for his HDZ party, both in terms of fiscal spending and especially in terms of securing government positions. The party generally advocates for a third entity, created especially for Croats, in which HDZ will reign supreme. Both Serbs and Croats have received some support from member states of the EU, without it being part of any wider EU strategy. Bosnian Croats have received strong political support from Croatia (the Bosnian HDZ is the official sister party to the Croatian HDZ, which currently governs the country), neighbourliness in this case being part of the problem. Serbia, naturally, remains supportive of RS, even if wary of the wilder secessionist rhetoric. Hungary’s government has also been friendly with the RS leadership.
Bosniaks, the country’s largest ethnic group (app. 50%), are the most internally divided, as they are split evenly between religious-conservative, nationalist, liberal and social-democratic parties. Among the more national-conservative, one does frequently hear rhetoric to the effect of centralising power and even resorting to war in order to bring especially the Serbs to heel. Moderate Bosniaks tend to favour a more inclusive, civic concept of citizenship rather than the ethnic form preferred by nationalists on all sides. While moderate Bosniaks look to the EU and US for support, the nationalists look more to Turkey and the Gulf states. BiH’s stasis is caused by what can best be described as ‘state capture’. It is one of the worst performing countries on economic growth and public sector corruption. However, the political elites are well entrenched, and have little incentive to reform a system that rewards them with well-paid jobs and gives rich potential for corrupt patronage. Meanwhile, Bosnian institutions are weak and extractive, unable to take on the obligations that come with EU integration. Similarly, BiH has been unable to make progress towards membership of NATO. The scale of the problem showed in the 2022 elections, where nationalists on all sides kept their hold on most parliaments. The elections were, in the words of the OSCE, marked by “distrust” and subsequently marred by severe accusations of fraud in the RS elections that saw Milorad Dodik installed once more as president of the entity. The international community chose to accept Dodik’s fait accompli. Once safely back in office, Dodik has taken several leafs out of the authoritarian’s playbook by introducing legislation to criminalise insulting public officials, as well as targeting NGOs and LGBT groups, earning himself a rare rebuke from the EU.
Which way forward?
Candidate or not, though, the fact remains that BiH is no more ready to undertake the rigours of an accession process than it was before. Unless the EU plans to drastically reduce the requirements, there is no conceivable way for BiH to join before the middle of next decade at the earliest. As the Commission made clear in 2019, the country does not meet any of the Copenhagen Criteria. The EU cannot allow a country to join while being so incompatible with the functioning of the single market and with its core values, especially not as it has already backed down on the political conditions more than once. The political system is deeply problematic from a normative perspective; its system of power sharing between ethnic groups made sense at the time, as a peace agreement. Almost thirty years later, the blatant discrimination against citizens not belonging to the main ethnic groups is just plain wrong, something the European Court of Human Rights held in a ruling as far back as 2009. That the system is also dysfunctional in terms of effective governance – and accounts for the stark failures on both the economic and administrative criteria – only underlines the need for root and branch reform. Yet, as noted, there is little incentive for entrenched elites to enact such reforms.
The onus for changing is clearly on the Bosnians themselves. What needs to happen is clear enough in the technical sense: The acquis itself, which BiH must implement, is not some guarded secret, and the broader reforms the EU wishes to see are clearly outlined in 2019 Opinion. Yet, there is no practical progress, and the EU seems to have little idea how to create a new dynamic. By granting candidate status, the EU has given nationalist elites something to brag about, but has added little pressure on them to actually act. Making matters worse, even those international actors supposedly on the EU’s side, are pursuing contrary agendas. The Office of the High Representative, led since 2021 by Christian Schmidt, has issued a number of controversial decrees over the past year, particularly the amended election laws for FBiH, that were issued on election night 2022, after the ballots had been cast but not yet counted. The timing of the change was problematic, as was the widely perceived favouring of Croats over Bosniaks in the impact of the change. It has since emerged that the Croatian government was consulted on these changes in advance. Most problematic, though, was the very attempt to reform a system based on ethnicity, which BiH needs to move beyond if it is move forward. By making reforms, the OHR has more likely entrenched the system than provided incentives for changing it. Considering that the ethnic discrimination of the current system needs to go before Bosnia and Herzegovina can hope to meet the political criteria, the OHR has made the climb steeper. There are no simple and easy solutions to BiH’s problems. As cannot be said often enough, lasting change can only come from Bosnians themselves wishing to move their country forward. The EU must continue making clear what needs to be done to achieve closer integration, and it must insist on its conditions being met. However, a few general observations can also be made on what the EU for its part can and must do if it wishes to bring a new energy to relations:
1. The EU must recognise that the long period of mixed messaging has led to a loss of image.
2. The solo initiatives of some members, pushing the agendas of some nationalist actors within Bosnia and Herzegovina, has undermined the overall effectiveness, and that cannot continue.
3. It needs to bring the OHR back in line with the objective of European integration, and enlist its help in changing BiH’s constitution towards European standards, or at least to help start that process.
4. The approach of dealing mainly with governments and political elites is not adequate, as there is too little pressure and incentive for them to change; the EU needs to communicate and engage much more effectively with civil society, if it is to create such pressure on political decision makers.
It is always easier to criticize than it is to offer an alternative. Even so, it is worse than naïve if anyone thinks that candidate status in itself will bring about change. Bosnian politicians only enact change when under sufficient external pressure. The EU has rarely been able to apply such pressure for long. Having now, by granting an undeserved candidate status, dangled the carrot once more, the EU needs to develop better ideas for how to use the stick too. It will not be easy, and the EU has not shown much aptitude of this kind in the past. Yet it must learn, as there is no real long-term alternative to bringing Bosnia and Herzegovina into the European family. Not for the region, nor for European security and stability.
Kristian L. Nielsen (PhD) is a research fellow at the Corvinus Institute of Advanced Studies (CIAS) - Corvinus University of Budapest. With a Ph.D. in Political Science and an MA in Contemporary History, his expertise lies in the external relations of the EU. He has also worked on transatlantic relations, soft power and Eastern Europe, British and Danish politics. Kristian teaches extensively on EU and IR-related topics.
Read more about our commentary series on the Balkans and the challenges of democratic transformation HERE.