This article is part of the series Governance, in Crisis.

Crises facilitate change: they remove obstacles which, in normal times, favour the status quo. Crises often strengthen existing trends which may have been slowed down by institutional inertia or political resistance. An event of the magnitude of the COVID-19 crisis is likely to have serious consequences in domestic as well as international politics. What will it mean for global governance? Which tendencies is it going to reinforce, which ones will it weaken?

Little on this can be said with any certainty, especially because much depends on events impossible to predict – events related directly to the crisis (how long will the crisis last where, how strongly will it affect which countries?) but also others (will Xi Jinping’s position remain strong, will Donald Trump be reelected in November?). Yet even if what follows involves an element of speculation, likely scenarios appear rather gloomy. Six conjectures:

Resource crunch. One of the most immediate consequences of the crisis will be a sudden rise in the level of public debt, due to the economic rescue and stimulus programmes countries are scrambling to put together, worth billions, even trillions of dollars or euros. In the years to come, governments will have to service an enormous debt burden – on top of the burden many still carry as a result of the financial crisis a decade ago (or from before). Once the immediate crisis with its exceptional turn to the state is over, many governments will enjoy little financial marge de manoeuvre and their attention is likely to stay inwards rather than outwards. International organizations, already subject to underfunding, will have to make do with yet more limited means – at a time when many more countries, especially in the Global South, will need help.

Anti-internationalism. Even if they disagree about the length and depth of it, economists agree that a recession is coming, and probably a deep one with a substantial rise in unemployment. In the past decade, frustrations from economic downturns have often found expression in populist politics – typically right-wing populism with a good dose of anti-internationalism and xenophobia. If we see more of it as a result of the current crisis, we should expect yet greater contestation of international institutions – of international institutions in general, but especially those defending access for foreigners, such as the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) or the European Union (EU) among its member states. Organisations protecting free trade, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), may well face a stronger backlash, too, if governments turn to protectionist means to strengthen their economies and might unclench a downward spiral on global trade (though whether this will indeed happen is less sure). And, yes, the World Health Organization (WHO) is already under attack – international institutions are also easy scapegoats for domestic troubles.

From West to East. For some time, China has been gaining ground in world politics and international institutions, driven by its own economic strength and the retreat of the US. This trend is likely to be reinforced (even if we were to see a more internationally engaging US administration in the coming year) – China is set on making a quicker recovery from the crisis than Europe and the US. Its economy is so globalized that it will still take a significant hit, but probably a more limited one than other economic centers. Global efforts at dealing with the crisis – through the international financial institutions as well as development organizations – will thus depend yet more than in the past on Chinese engagement, which will require giving China a greater say than Western countries have been prepared to accept in the past.

This is an excerpt. To read the full article, visit The Global.

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