A variety of mechanisms have been established over time to channel North-South flows of climate finance, resulting in a “spaghetti bowl” of overlapping institutions that constitute the climate finance regime. We offer a theoretical framework for understanding the preferences of developed and developing countries over the design of development and environment IOs. We apply this framework to the observed institutional outcomes and demonstrate a clear trend: while the early institutions matched the preferences of the large donor countries of the North, over time the preferences of developing countries were increasingly reflected in institutional design. We offer a tentative explanation based on the increased bargaining power of large developing countries and discuss broader implications for institutional design and effectiveness.
Alexander Thompson: Associate Professor of Political Science and a Faculty Associate of the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University.
Yixian Sun, Postdoctoral Fellow, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, affiliate of the Yale MacMillan Centre Council on East Asian Studies, affiliate of the Centre for International Environmental Studies at the Graduate Institute, Geneva.
A light sandwich lunch will be served from 12.15.
This event is part of the Global Governance Centre's Global Governance Colloquium series