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GLOBE

L'INSTITUT

Hoffmann Centre for Global Sustainability

DOSSIER

Elections – What For?

GENEVA GRADUATE INSTITUTE

IN MEMORIAM

Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou

1968-2024

Marie-Laure **Salles**
Directrice

Davide **Rodogno**
Responsable du programme interdisciplinaire

Le 17 septembre 2024, notre collègue et ami, le Professeur Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, nous a quittés, hélas bien trop tôt. Toutes nos pensées accompagnent son épouse et ses trois enfants.

L'Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement ne sera plus tout à fait le même sans Mahmoud. Nous perdons tout à la fois un grand chercheur en histoire et politique internationales, un enseignant exceptionnel, notre directeur de la formation continue et notre directeur adjoint. Avant de rejoindre l'Institut au début des années 2010, Mahmoud avait été chercheur associé à l'Institut Ralph Bunche sur les Nations Unies à New York, directeur associé du programme Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research à Harvard, ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Mauritanie et directeur adjoint du Centre de politique de sécurité, Genève.

Le chercheur lègue une œuvre académique et critique riche et très originale. Intellectuel brillant, il a poussé les frontières de la recherche sur des enjeux clés comme le terrorisme, la violence politique, les nouvelles formes de conflits, le *state-building*, les transitions démocratiques et l'histoire du racisme. Ses travaux lui ont valu le Prix de reconnaissance du Collège de France en 2017 et le Global South Distinguished Award de l'International Studies Association en 2021. Mahmoud savait partager largement son analyse et sa compréhension du monde : ses interventions dans les médias ou lors d'événements à l'Institut nous donnaient toujours l'impression d'être plus intelligents après.

Le professeur a marqué des générations d'étudiant·es mais aussi de professionnel·les. MMM (comme ses étudiant·es l'appelaient avec tendresse) était un enseignant passionné et passionnant, exigeant mais juste, un Maître comme on disait autrefois. Il prenait très au sérieux son engagement pédagogique et partageait sans compter son temps, sa profonde compréhension des dynamiques historiques et contemporaines, sa rigueur, son énergie intense et son humanité.

Cette humanité était sa marque de fabrique. Mahmoud était un homme d'une intégrité, d'une générosité, d'une authenticité et d'une élégance exceptionnelles. Comme il aimait à le dire : « Je suis gratuit. » Il incarnait la conception de la diplomatie qu'il défendait : ouvert au dialogue avec tous, toujours, il croyait fermement à la collaboration internationale et à la paix.

Farouchement engagé contre toute forme d'injustice, de discrimination et de racisme, il a fait valoir ses arguments bien au-delà du monde académique. Cinéphile, passionné de littérature, de musique mais aussi de football, il restera l'une des figures les plus marquantes, les plus aimées et admirées de l'histoire de l'Institut. Il va terriblement nous manquer, mais son héritage nous inspire et nous incite à continuer dans la direction qu'il a tracée.

Cet hommage a été publié dans *Le Temps* le 19 septembre 2024.

L'INSTITUT

Why Global Sustainability?

Celebrating the Launch of the Hoffmann Centre for Global Sustainability

On 23 September 2024, the Geneva Graduate Institute proudly hosted "Why Global Sustainability?", the launch event of the Hoffmann Centre for Global Sustainability.

Marie-Laure Salles, Director of the Geneva Graduate Institute, opened the event with a speech celebrating the origins of the centre, which traces back to the Centre for International Environmental Studies (CIES) and before it, the André Hoffmann Chair for Environmental Economics. The new Hoffman Centre for Global Sustainability (HCGS) hopes to build on this legacy, further developing its work to meet the unique challenges of our contemporary and ever-evolving world.

Of her hopes for the HCGS, she said, "I am convinced that the Hoffmann Centre and the collaboration with André Hoffmann are going to make it possible to expand the range, the reach, and the impact of the research and expertise we produce, but also of the talents that come out, each year, of the Institute in the form of our alumni and alumnae. This is an important combination – producing knowledge and expertise to help transform the paradigm that defines our relationship with nature and with each other and training new generations that carry this new vision into the world of international policy."

André Hoffmann, Vice-Chair of Roche and generous funder of the HCGS, and Peter Vanham, Editorial Director at *Fortune*, sat down for a one-to-one chat following Marie-Laure Salles' speech. The two co-authored *The New Nature of Business: The Path to Prosperity and Sustainability* earlier this year (Wiley). In their discussion, they explored how companies need to transform to achieve sustainable prosperity, as the current approach is failing and humankind's prosperity is not sustainable, in regards to longevity, humankind, and the planet. André Hoffmann underlined his hopes that the HCGS will serve the global community in providing a safe space for academics and students to find new solutions. "The Geneva Graduate Institute is an engine where you can fabricate new ideas," he said.

A panel discussion followed, moderated by Marie-Laure Salles and featuring André Hoffmann; Patrick Odier, President of Swiss Sustainable Finance and Chairman of Building Bridges; Dominic Rohner, André Hoffmann Chair in Political Economics and Governance and Co-Director of the HCGS; Mark Salway, Chief Operations Officer of International Union for Conservation of Nature; and Beatrice Weder di Mauro, André Hoffmann Chair of Global Economics, Climate and Nature Finance and Co-Director of the HCGS.

While all the panellists shared the enthusiasm for treating sustainability in the academic setting of the Geneva Graduate Institute, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Dominic Rohner especially emphasised the exciting potential of treating the topic academically, bringing an unprecedented concentration of interdisciplinarity together to study sustainability and find new, practical solutions. They also celebrated the enthusiasm of the Institute's students for the new centre.

L'INSTITUT

Création du Hoffmann Centre for Global Sustainability

Entretien avec
André **Hoffmann**
Vice-président de Roche

L'Institut a créé en 2008, grâce à votre généreux soutien, la Chaire André Hoffmann d'économie de l'environnement. Aujourd'hui, vous signez avec l'Institut ce nouvel accord pour créer le Hoffmann Centre for Global Sustainability (HCGS). De l'environnement à la durabilité – pourquoi faut-il désormais élargir notre approche ?

En 2008, avec la création de la chaire, notre objectif était de mieux comprendre les liens entre l'économie et la protection de l'environnement. À l'époque, les défis environnementaux étaient souvent perçus comme des problèmes distincts, que ce soit la pollution ou l'épuisement des ressources naturelles. Aujourd'hui, il est clair que ces défis sont profondément imbriqués avec des enjeux sociaux, économiques et de gouvernance.

C'est pour cette raison qu'élargir notre approche devient essentiel. La durabilité ne se limite plus à la protection de l'environnement ; elle englobe aussi les modes de vie, le bien-être des communautés et l'équité sociale. Le HCGS est donc conçu pour être un centre où ces dimensions interdépendantes peuvent être étudiées et appliquées ensemble.

Et il ne s'agit plus seulement de limiter les impacts négatifs, mais de créer des solutions viables qui profitent à l'ensemble de la société.

Quelles sont les frontières que vous identifiez aujourd'hui en matière de durabilité et d'intégration des enjeux environnementaux et sociaux ?

Les frontières de la durabilité aujourd'hui ne sont pas définies par la nature elle-même mais par les limites de notre système opérationnel et de notre contrat social. Depuis longtemps, nous avons tenté d'imposer une vision purement humaine de la planète, avec l'idée que la création de valeur à court terme pourrait résoudre la majorité de nos défis. Ce mode opératoire montre désormais ses limites, notamment en matière de résilience environnementale et de cohésion sociale.

La véritable frontière est donc celle de notre propre capacité à évoluer vers des modèles économiques et sociaux qui intègrent pleinement la valeur de l'environnement et des relations humaines dans les processus de décision. Nous avons besoin d'une approche où la création de valeur se mesure aussi en termes d'impact durable, que ce soit pour les écosystèmes ou pour les communautés. Cela signifie repenser notre façon de produire, d'innover et de collaborer, en favorisant des pratiques qui respectent les limites planétaires tout en renforçant le bien-être des individus.

L'Institut est un acteur académique clé inscrit au cœur de la Genève internationale. En quoi ceci est-il un atout pour le nouveau centre ?

Genève est véritablement un carrefour mondial où convergent des courants diplomatiques, de développement, d'innovation académique et de conservation de la nature. La présence des Nations Unies et de leurs agences, la communauté des ONG, ainsi que les universités et écoles de commerce de premier plan, en font un environnement unique pour aborder les questions de durabilité dans une perspective globale.

Ce microcosme genevois offre des conditions idéales pour un centre comme le HCGS. Ici, les idées et les modèles de société peuvent non seulement être explorés en profondeur mais aussi discutés avec des actrices et acteurs qui ont une capacité d'influence au niveau mondial. C'est un lieu où la qualité des partenaires et des auditeurs garantit que les discussions ne restent pas théoriques, mais qu'elles se transforment en actions concrètes.

Vous venez de publier avec Peter Vanham, directeur de la rédaction à *Fortune*, un nouveau livre intitulé *The New Nature of Business : The Path to Prosperity and Sustainability* (Wiley). Quels en sont les messages clés ?

The New Nature of Business aborde les actions essentielles pour atteindre une prospérité durable, indispensable pour notre survie sur la planète. Ces actions reposent sur trois piliers principaux.

Le premier pilier est d'élargir notre compréhension de l'impact de nos activités non seulement sur l'environnement naturel, mais aussi sur les capitaux humain et social. Il s'agit de prendre en compte le retour sur ces trois types de capital, car leur équilibre est fondamental pour un développement durable.

Le deuxième pilier est la nécessité de préserver la nature, qui constitue le socle même de la vie sur Terre. Pour cela, nous devons lui attribuer une réelle valeur économique, afin que la protection de l'environnement ne soit plus une option mais une priorité économique.

Enfin, le troisième pilier est d'encourager les dirigeant·es à prendre des décisions éclairées et équilibrées. En leur offrant un cadre qui valorise autant l'humilité que le courage, nous pouvons les soutenir dans la mise en place de choix audacieux, mais responsables.

Ce livre propose ainsi une feuille de route pour réconcilier croissance et durabilité, en ancrant nos décisions dans une vision à long terme bénéfique pour tous et toutes.

Scannez le code pour en savoir plus sur le HCGS.

L'INSTITUT

New Centre for Digital Humanities and Multilateralism

Digitising the Past, Aiming for a Better Future

Interview with
Grégoire **Mallard**
Professor of Anthropology and Sociology, Director of Research
and Academic Co-Director of the Centre for Digital Humanities and Multilateralism

Davide **Rodogno**
Professor of International History and Politics, Head of the Interdisciplinary Programme
and Academic Co-Director of the Centre for Digital Humanities and Multilateralism

A new research centre, the Centre for Digital Humanities and Multilateralism (CDHM), has just been established at the Institute. Why did you create this centre?

Grégoire Mallard (GM): The Centre for Digital Humanities and Multilateralism (CDHM) is founded on the conviction that multilateralism must be able to build on its century-old experience in Geneva to project itself with full confidence towards the future. We, along with Francesco Pisano, Director of the Library and Archives of the United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG), are fortunate to have an experienced, interdisciplinary team building a first-of-its-kind centre that is slated to become a world leader in applying digital humanities to the study of diplomacy, multilateralism, and international relations. In doing so, CDHM creates ample space to promote the rich intellectual and archival heritage of the Geneva Graduate Institute, the UN archives in Geneva, and the international governmental and non-governmental organisations of International Geneva and beyond.

What are the missions, objectives and values of CDHM for the Institute?

Davide Rodogno (DR): The Centre's mission is to preserve by digitising archives specific to the history of diplomacy and multilateralism in Geneva. We shall start with vast collections hosted by UNOG Library and Archives, the Institute library, and related archives – including those of international organisations (IOs) and academic and associative institutions, particularly of the Global South – while concomitantly creating a virtual Portal of Multilateralism. The idea behind this Portal is simple: access to the digitised archives will be optimised via the latest research tools, including data visualisation. We hope this will renew legal, sociopolitical, historical and interdisciplinary approaches to the study of multilateralism.

The Centre will structure a field of study and expertise: digital humanities applied to the study of IOs (whether governmental or non-governmental). Beyond bolstering scholarly activities for the Institute's 2027 Centenary, CDHM aims to shine a light on the potential of digital humanities and their interest for schools, higher education programmes, and for practitioners of multilateralism worldwide.

From left to right:
Grégoire Mallard
and Davide Rodogno.

Who are your partners and what is the advantage of these collaborations?

GM: Building on its core partnership with UNOG Library and Archives, which launched the digitisation of its own archives four years ago – including, but not limited to, the League of Nations (LONTAD project) – CDHM has the advantage not only of building firsthand on this successful proof of concept, but also of bringing its results into the world of research, by encouraging a networked approach to provide access to digitised archives. Together with Francesco Pisano's team, we are building new partnerships to improve storage and research solutions on digitised archives of other organisations. In this way, we hope the Centre's future Portal of Multilateralism will play a key role in establishing much-needed interoperability amongst university and IO libraries and archives, and we are also actively engaging with the digitisation of new archives, such as those of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Many other collections from different UN entities in Geneva are prospective partners for digitisation projects. Moreover, given the global reach and gravitas of Institute alumnae·i, CDHM will collaborate with depositories of archives related to the "academic diaspora" of former students, professors, and thought leaders the world over, re-establishing reflexive links to related scholarship in the Global South, for instance, as a key project focus.

An interdisciplinary team of historians, political scientists, sociologists, international law scholars, and digital humanities scholars are working on this project. How is work organised within the team?

DR: The project is organised in two "poles": a "digitisation pole" including the Institute's library and archives, archival and data experts, and external partners, all working to manage the physical material and its digitisation processes, and a second "research pole" whose members are part of an interdisciplinary team that intersects research methodologies to conceptualise, visualise, teach, and create dynamic outreach via "living" digital archives. The research pole itself is structured around synergistic "axes", dedicated to sociohistorical analyses based on the prosopography study of the Institute's luminaries; innovative methodologies: ethnographies of archiving practices within IOs; and digital archives relating to financial capitalism and multilateralism.

What is the place of archives in the multilateral world of the 21st century, and how will this project help to reinvent International Geneva?

GM: Multilateralism is a set of practices and institutions whose history is too often little known and in need of better understanding, especially at a time when multilateralism is being attacked by forces which ignore or misconstrue its operations. For a new generation of scholars, students and citizens interested in reforming multilateralism, the Institute can serve as a curator of knowledge to make these archives widely accessible, not only to researchers who come to Geneva, but, thanks to their digitisation, to the whole world.

Scan to learn more about the new centre.

L'INSTITUT

Pour un horizon commun

Marie-Laure **Salles**
Directrice

En juin 2024, l'Institut a publié en partenariat avec le journal *Le Temps* une série d'articles coordonnés par Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, qui nous a quittés en septembre dernier. Cette série pose la double question de la place de l'Occident dans le monde et de son rapport à l'autre. Intitulé *L'Occident et l'altérité : fractures, valeurs, déclins et convergences*, l'ouvrage s'ouvre par un éditorial de Marie-Laure Salles reproduit ici.

Poser la question de l'Occident et de son rapport au monde est inévitable aujourd'hui. Bien sûr, cette question n'est pas nouvelle. Mais les multiples crises qui bouleversent notre monde en ce moment se rejoignent sur des lignes de faille géopolitiques qui doivent beaucoup à l'histoire de l'Occident et de son rapport « au reste ». Et pour agir et faire face, il est nécessaire de comprendre, même si trop souvent aujourd'hui le temps de l'action ne semble plus pouvoir prendre en compte une telle nécessité.

Qu'est-ce que l'Occident ? Cette question seule pourrait remplir des livres – un espace géographique, une culture, un système de valeurs, un acteur géopolitique, une concentration de pouvoir économique et politique, un modèle particulier de relation à la terre et à l'humain ? Peut-on vraiment parler de *un* Occident (unifié) alors que l'histoire de cet espace (quelles que soient la définition et les frontières qu'on lui donne) a été marquée par les conflits et les déchirements parmi les plus violents et les plus extrêmes que le monde ait jamais connus ? Et si l'Occident est pluriel, l'opposition binaire entre l'Occident et les « autres » a-t-elle encore du sens ? Quant au reste du monde, il ne se définit plus, et depuis longtemps, simplement comme le « non-Occident ». Là aussi, penser un bloc est bien artificiel tant ce reste du monde, qui représente plus de 80 % de l'humanité, est complexe et divers. Lorsqu'on déplace la focale, il est donc difficile de se satisfaire de l'opposition simpliste « The West and the Rest ». Dans les transformations actuelles, on peut d'ailleurs voir les signes d'une géopolitique de plus en plus fragmentée et liquide où les alliances se font et se défont, se superposent, voire se contredisent en fonction des alignements d'intérêts, d'objectifs ou de valeurs.

Cela étant dit, il est indéniable qu'au-delà de la fluidité des dynamiques actuelles, notre monde est intensément marqué par un métaparadigme aux racines européennes et nord-américaines – et en ce sens occidentales. Ce paradigme, profondément et structurellement inscrit dans nos institutions politiques, économiques et sociales, est également au cœur de ce que nous sommes en tant qu'individus, que ce soit en Occident ou au-delà, et peut-être surtout dans l'espace international et multilatéral. On peut identifier au moins cinq dimensions constituantes de ce paradigme : modernité, domination, humanité, égalité et liberté. Simplement en les énumérant, il est possible d'anticiper certaines contradictions internes au système qu'elles constituent ensemble – contradictions qui, de fait, sont aujourd'hui au cœur des débats.

L'Occident comme paradigme est prométhéen. Il porte (car c'est un il) un projet de modernité qui passe par la domination – de la nature d'abord, mais aussi du « non-moderne », qui historiquement inclut les femmes et le « non-Occident ». Cette domination se justifie par le « progrès » à venir qui doit, selon le paradigme, bénéficier aussi aux dominé·es dans la mesure où la modernité promise est censée améliorer la condition humaine dans son ensemble. Car l'Occident comme paradigme place l'Homme (le terme est ici choisi) au centre, après avoir évacué la soumission au divin par le biais de la Réforme puis des Lumières. Certains diraient que Dieu est mort et que l'Homme a pris sa place. Cet Homme s'est donné à lui-même des droits mais aussi des règles. Il a instauré une forme d'autogouvernement qui tente de réconcilier le principe d'égalité avec celui de liberté.

La réalité, pourtant, ne s'est pas complètement alignée sur le paradigme – comme cela est d'ailleurs souvent le cas. Les idées mènent le monde mais ce dernier est fort rétif… Certes, le projet prométhéen a permis des avancées majeures qui se mesurent par l'augmentation significative de l'espérance de vie, la santé, l'éducation et la réduction de la pauvreté. Cependant, l'extractivisme étant au cœur de ce projet, il laisse notre planète exsangue et obère ce faisant le futur de notre espèce. Nous en avons maintenant pris conscience. Qui plus est, la promesse d'une amélioration pour toutes et tous n'a pas été tenue. Ces dernières années, les inégalités ont de nouveau explosé et les anciennes lignes de domination n'ont pas été effacées. Cette dynamique du progrès des inégalités et certains retours en arrière sur les avancées de la modernité entrent violemment en conflit avec la promesse d'universalisme et d'égalité. Parallèlement, on voit aussi que la tension entre liberté et égalité est problématique et que le jeu ici est bien souvent à somme nulle.

Ce sont en partie ces contradictions structurelles qui se jouent aujourd'hui dans nos institutions et nos interactions – que ce soit au niveau national, international ou multilatéral. L'approche académique qui informe les contributions qui suivent est faite pour donner les éléments d'analyse, de contextualisation, d'historicisation, et donc de compréhension située *(Verstehen)* qui sont si nécessaires pour éviter la polarisation du discours. Car aujourd'hui plus que jamais nous avons besoin de construire ensemble, sans remettre en cause ce qui ne doit pas l'être mais tout en reconnaissant les limites d'un système qui de manière structurelle ne délivre pas certaines promesses. Face aux enjeux existentiels qui lui font face, l'Humanité dans son ensemble, au-delà des frontières historiques et des oppositions symboliques, a besoin d'un nouvel horizon commun qui propose une modernité alternative, intégrant des dynamiques de régénération planétaires et humaines et prenant véritablement au sérieux la promesse d'universalisme inscrite au cœur de nos Nations unies : « Tous les êtres humains naissent libres et égaux en dignité et en droit. »

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Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou (dir.), *L'Occident et l'altérité : fractures, valeurs, déclins et convergences*. Geneva Graduate Institute et *Le Temps*, 2024. (Voir aussi page 48.)

L'INSTITUT

A Changed Global Scene

Unpacking the New Diplomatic World

As part of the new "From Diplomacy to New Diplomacies" summer programme, Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, Professor of International History and Politics, hosted on 12 July a high-level panel discussion on "A Changed Global Scene" with Marie-Laure Salles, Director of the Geneva Graduate Institute; Thomas Greminger, Executive Director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP); Michael Møller, former President of the Diplomatic Forum of the Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator Foundation, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG); and David Harland, Executive Director of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

The discussion brought together the different diplomatic perspectives and experiences of the speakers, and together, they gave students an invaluable opportunity to consider the unprecedented challenges of diplomacy in a changing world.

David Harland set the tone for the discussion by opening with a quotation from Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci: "The old world is dying and the new world struggles to be born. Now is the time of monsters." Gramsci wrote the famous words in the interwar period in 1929, but Harland aptly applied it to the current state of diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy, he established, is incapable of addressing the problems the contemporary world is facing: "We have forgotten to do what we used to know how to do well."

Michael Møller presented a more optimistic view of the world: humanity has never been as well off as it is today. Though diplomacy is no longer what it was, he argued that the present state of affairs is a time of transition, not a breakdown. In the face of this transition and the loss of power of traditional systems, it is important that every single person must embrace their individual responsibility to enact change in the world.

Thomas Greminger, for his part, focused on the polarisation of affairs, where states' preference for classical diplomacy has led to a paralysis of multilateral institutions. As he and his copanellists established, those multilateral institutions are the ones who can still make an effective difference on the international scene while public diplomacy is struggling, and thus it is crucial that international actors use both discourse and multilateral institutions to overcome stagnation.

Drawing from her background in education, Marie-Laure Salles insisted on the need for collaboration, not competition, and introduced the idea that a "mobilisation of emotions" is necessary to sustain a collaborative drive. While sustainability and technology are important new themes that future diplomats need to dive in, mental health should also be on our radar: the epidemic of loneliness that the world is facing and the associated growing tendencies towards separation and polarisation have all serious impacts not just on individual but collective levels on the global scene. She emphasised the need for new diplomats to have six important inner qualities that will equip them to face the changing future: courage, integrity, empathy, care, hope, and trust.

Together, the four speakers along with Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou agreed that changing not only the mindset of the global scene, but also its very language, is important to meet current and future demands.

From left to right: Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, Marie-Laure Salles and Michael Møller.

L'INSTITUT

Judge Hilary Charlesworth Opens the Academic Year and Receives the Edgar de Picciotto Prize

On 25 September 2024, Judge Hilary Charlesworth received the Edgar de Picciotto International Prize and delivered the opening lecture of the 2024–2025 academic year at the Geneva Graduate Institute on "Hopes and Fears for International Law: The Work of the International Court of Justice". Hilary Charlesworth is an Australian international lawyer, Judge at the International Court of Justice since November 2021, Professor of Law at the University of Melbourne, as well as Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University.

Director Marie-Laure Salles opened the event, affirming the Institute's steadfast belief in the importance of international law: "The Geneva Graduate Institute has it in its DNA, ever since its creation in 1927, to believe that the only hope for peace and justice lies in international collaboration and international law."

Judge Charlesworth's lecture considered the role of the International Court of Justice in the development of international law, sharing the crucial role optimism played in its history. The Court, established almost 80 years ago, is at its busiest-ever point.

Yet, enforcement is a constant challenge for international law, and as a result, the Court is sometimes dismissed as a toothless tiger. Compliance, according to Judge Charlesworth, is "a subject which typically evokes fears about the value of the institution".

"The Court isn't a panacea to international tensions and disputes, and its jurisdiction is limited based on state consent," she insisted. "And yet, at the same time, the Court is much more than the hapless creature of powerful states, and I think it deserves fine-grained analyses to understand its daily life and rituals, and the possibilities it offers, sometimes in the interstices of what it does to promote particular forms of international justice."

The Edgar de Picciotto International Prize was created as a tribute and token of thanks to Edgar de Picciotto who, along with his family, gifted a generous contribution for the realisation of the Edgar and Danièle de Picciotto Student Residence, which houses students coming from all over the world to study at the Institute. The Prize, awarded every two years, is intended to reward an internationally renowned academic whose research has contributed to the understanding of global challenges and whose work has influenced policymakers.

The prize was awarded the first time in 2012 to Amartya Sen, winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics; in 2014 to Saul Friedländer, Emeritus Professor at the University of California Los Angeles and recipient of the 2008 Pulitzer Prize; in 2016 to Paul Krugman, winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize in Economics; in 2018 to Joan Wallach Scott, Emerita Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University; in 2020 to Saskia Sassen, Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology at Columbia University; and in 2022 to Michael Sandel, Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of Government, Harvard University.

From left to right: Hilary Charlesworth and Beth Krasna, President of the Geneva Graduate Institute's Foundation Board.

L'ACTUALITÉ

As the 1949 Geneva Conventions Turn 75, We Might Ask Where Is Our Repugnance at the Suffering of Others?

Andrew **Clapham**
Professor of International Law

The Geneva Conventions are being violated as you read this. There is ongoing murder, torture, and sexual violence against those who ought to be protected, and bombardment of establishments that must be respected. We see repeated failures to respect schools and hospitals with devastating effects. The origins of the Geneva Conventions in 1864 lie in the idea that medical workers should be immune from attack and available to treat the wounded from all sides. Yet this very foundational idea is being shredded. Doctors and humanitarian workers are constantly under attack, humanitarian relief assistance is blocked, and the International Committee of the Red Cross continues to be denied access to many of those in detention.

The immediate and long-term effects of destroying medical facilities are devastating, not just for the sick and wounded killed, but for all those subsequently denied access to health care or prevented from working to stop the spread of diseases like cholera, hepatitis, and polio. These knock-on effects are being referred to in the literature as "reverberating effects". This concept captures not only the physical widespread effects of a blast, but also the consequences of bombardment for essential supplies of electricity, water, food, medical assistance, and the prevention and treatment of diseases.

Of course when Security Council members visited Geneva this August, we were reminded that the Council has a special responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. The representatives who make up the Council are often the last hope for millions of civilians being subjected to daily violations of the Geneva Conventions. Along with this special responsibility come special powers: the Council can demand a legally binding cease-fire; the Council can refer a situation to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC); the Council can impose a legally binding arms embargo.

Weapons, missiles, and ammunition not only directly kill people, they also facilitate the blockades and sieges that can lead to the denial of objects essential for the survival of the civilian population, even to starvation, or to conditions of life leading to the destruction of a people in whole or in part.

Today, politics often gets in the way, but the humanitarian message has to transcend that sort of politics. In fact, restricting arms is not the exclusive job of the Security Council. In the last few months, judges and governments have begun to recognise that they have such an obligation to prevent arms being transferred from their states when there is a clear risk that they could be used to violate the Geneva Conventions.

Similarly, prosecuting war criminals is not the exclusive job of the ICC. As a party to the Conventions, every single state in the world has a duty to prosecute grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions. This means searching for those alleged to have committed grave breaches and bringing them either before its own courts or handing them over to another court "regardless of their nationality".

It would be a great step forward for humanity if diplomats from around the world were infused with a bit of the "Spirit of Geneva". *L'esprit de Genève* (1929) is an essay by Robert de Traz which builds on Calvin, Dunant, and Rousseau and elaborates a mission to care for the oppressed and protect the dignity of every human being. Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his *Discourse on Inequality* (1755), dedicated to the Republic of Geneva, referred to a principle which he said should temper the ferocity of individual pride and desire for self-preservation, suggesting that as human beings we have "an innate repugnance against seeing a fellow creature suffer".

GAZA, Gaza City. Palestinians inspect the damage at Gaza's Al-Shifa hospital. 1 April 2024. Mohammed A HAJJAR / Middle East Images / AFP

L'ACTUALITÉ

What Gaza Tells Us about the International Community

Fuad **Zarbiyev**
Professor of International Law

One of the defining features of modern international law is that the international legal order has moved from a transactional model exclusively protecting the contractual interests of the parties to a system in which community interests also have a place. The concept of international community reflects such a shift. What it means in essence is that humanity is not a random collection of individuals divided into political communities in the form of states with nothing in common, but an integrated social structure with shared interests and moral conscience.

Judging by the common understanding of modern international law, this is not just wishful thinking, but a normative framework actually prescribed by the hard and fast rules of international law. While some rights exclusively pertain to a bilateral framework, others are of such importance that every state has a legally protected interest in their protection. No state can claim that mass atrocities committed against a civilian population at the other end of the world are not its concern.

The horrors that have been unfolding in Gaza since October 2023 are the quintessential example of crimes that should concern every human being and every state. Numerous statements issued at the highest level of the Israeli governmental apparatus immediately after the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas on 7 October showed that Israel held the entire population of Gaza responsible for the atrocities committed by Hamas and was determined to make that population pay a high price. The death toll as of the writing of this article confirms that this is not a speculation: more than 40,000 civilians have been reported as killed by Israeli operations in Gaza since October 2023.

Did we see the rest of the world act as an international community in response? The public opinion all over the world has expressed indignation over the human tragedy in Gaza, showing that humanity's moral conscience has an inalterable core in every corner of the world.

The case brought by South Africa against Israel before the International Court of Justice on the basis of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is another instantiation of the concept of international community – no state in the world can feel unconcerned by plausible allegations of genocide in any part of the world. Yet, the attitude of powerful Western countries has been shamefully deficient. Many continued to supply weapons that contributed to atrocities committed by Israel in Gaza, while the United States financially and militarily supports Israel, having gone so far as to repeatedly veto cease-fire resolutions at the UN Security Council through March 2024. The contrast with the situation of Ukraine – whose invasion these same countries were unanimous in strongly condemning while issuing wide-ranging sanctions against Russia – further aggravates the case.

The conclusion is one that the eminent international lawyer Charles de Visscher offered many decades ago: "There will be no international community so long as the political ends of the State overshadow the human ends of power."

GAZA, Beit Lahia. Palestinian child stands among the ruins of buildings destroyed by Israeli airstrikes. iStock

L'ACTUALITÉ

Pandemic Agreement Talks

Slow Progress and Ongoing Challenges in Geneva

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The COVID-19 pandemic exposed significant weaknesses in global health governance, leading to urgent calls for reform. A key element of these reforms is negotiating a Pandemic Agreement under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO).

Negotiations began in late 2021, with the initial goal of finalising the agreement by May 2024. However, this timeline proved too ambitious, and WHO Member States decided instead to extend the negotiations by up to one year. This outcome reflects the inherent challenges of crafting a new and far-reaching instrument covering the entire spectrum of pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response (PPPR). The draft agreement includes diverse and complex provisions on prevention and surveillance, research and development, technology transfer for health products, regulatory enhancements, and a system for the timely sharing of pathogens and related benefits.

To add to the complexity, and as expected in multilateral negotiations, the process has been characterised by political tensions that have slowed it down. These tensions are nuanced and cannot be oversimplified, but as an illustration, developing countries demand equity through broader, faster, fairer access to health products and technologies, more flexibilities on intellectual property rights, support for regional pharmaceutical manufacturing, and guarantees on financing. Developed countries have focused primarily on health security, seeking reform in areas such as strengthening surveillance and prevention and information-sharing obligations.

As WHO Member States resumed deliberations in September 2024 in Geneva, some marginal progress was made, though at a very slow pace.

What obstacles stand in the way of finalising the agreement? A significant unresolved issue is the Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing System. This system aims to ensure the timely sharing of pathogen samples and genetic information, alongside the equitable sharing of benefits arising from their utilisation. This system is considered critical for pandemic preparedness and access to health technologies during emergencies.

While negotiators agree on the necessity of such a system, key design elements remain contested: how do countries rapidly share pathogen samples and data? How do you govern access? What kind of benefits should be shared? What obligations loom over the pharmaceutical industry as it develops life-saving countermeasures?

Concerns regarding access to vaccines, drugs, and other health technologies continue to be highly contentious as well. Will Member States mandate private companies to transfer potentially valuable technology during emergencies? Or, will they accept additional flexibility regarding intellectual property protection?

Given these divides, experts warn that an extra year may not suffice to finalise discussions. Although the mpox emergency is generating momentum for international health cooperation, delegates still face a steep hill to climb.

A team of doctors in a lab for Covid research. Kobus LOUW / iStock

L'ACTUALITÉ

World Refugee Day

A Deceptive Incantation?

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World Refugee Day celebrates the strength and courage of refugees around the world. It was first celebrated in 2001, when the UN General Assembly decided to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. It falls each year on 20 June, a date coinciding with African Refugee Day, which was first established in 1975 by the then Organization of African Unity. Other institutions also celebrate the figure of the refugee: the Catholic Church, in particular, has observed the World Day of Migrants and Refugees every year since 1914 on the last Sunday of September.

In the years since the so-called "refugee crisis" of 2015, international organisations have tended to increase their efforts to politically coordinate their responses to forced displacement. The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016 and then the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees in 2018 were issued under the auspices of the United Nations. The Pact on Migration and Asylum was narrowly adopted by the EU in early 2024 after three years of complex negotiations. According to the EC Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, the new rules on migration "will ensure that the Union has strong and secure external borders, that people's rights are guaranteed, and that no EU country is left alone under pressure". They are a "historic agreement" and a "major breakthrough". However, the way the keywords "solidarity" and "protection" are embedded in narratives of "security" and "efficiency" suggests that state-centred concerns overcome people-centred ones. The refugee remains at the level of an abstraction or a problem, a victim of smugglers or a burden to be shared. And indeed, questions remain regarding the effects of these initiatives on the ground. For whom are these achievements historic considering that an estimated 30,000 people have died on their migration trajectories to reach the EU since 2015?

The refugee might indeed be the political figure of our times, as was the citizen during the French Revolution: it is a source of ontological anxiety for nation-states. The principle of non-refoulement, so central to international humanitarian law, represents a limitation on the prevailing doctrine of state sovereignty, based on the right to control a territory and its population and therefore to exclude non-nationals. Are charitable celebrations and non-binding declarations anything more than deceptive incantations, or can they be the catalyst for a real transformation of current asylum policies in Europe and beyond, ultimately triggering a more inclusive conception of what a political and social community is?

CHAD, Farchana. A gathering of refugees. yoh4nn / iStock

LE DOSSIER

ELECTIONS – WHAT FOR?

2024 is an exceptional year for elections, with half the world's citizens, including those from the eight most populous countries (Bangladesh, Brazil, Indonesia, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia and the United States), going to the ballot. However, this apparent success for democracy is tarnished by autocratic or illiberal governments seeking to misuse elections to veil their self-serving agendas under a thin cloak of legitimacy. It thus seems paradoxical that while elections are omnipresent, democracies are increasingly called into question. Yet, on a closer look, it appears that indicators measuring the quality of elections have also been declining over the past two decades. As the Economist Intelligence Unit illustrates, elections are far from fair in many countries, with an estimated 43 out of the 76 elections to be held in 2024 expected to be neither completely free nor representative. While authoritarian governments frequently revert to token elections in order to demonstrate their control over society and intimidate opponents, in more established democracies illiberal forces are seeking to win or cement majorities by discriminating against minorities, instrumentalising the media, and capitalising on the growing distrust of elites and democratic institutions more generally. The contributions of the present dossier probe further into the role of elections and their importance for democracy in 2024.

Dossier produced by the Research Office in collaboration with the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy and based on *Global Challenges* (no. 16, forthcoming).

→ **globalchallenges.ch**

TUNISIA, Tunis. Officials of Tunisia's High Independent Authority for Elections (ISIE) count ballots after the end of voting in the 2024 presidential election. 6 October 2024. Yassine MAHJOUB / AFP



ELECTIONS – WHAT FOR?

THE UNITED STATES: A MODEL DEMOCRACY UNDER THREAT?

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No national political contest gets as much global attention as the American presidential election. This has been the case at least since 1960 when John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon battled for the White House. In subsequent decades, with the help of increasingly global media outlets, the match-ups between various candidates auditioning to become the "leader of the free world" have captivated audiences across the globe. In 2024, the intense scrutiny of Donald Trump and Kamala Harris was indicative of the importance of the United States, symbolic of the nation's enduring status as a global superpower. However, the United States is not "only" the world's most powerful nation state. It is also the world's oldest democracy with a respectable record of peaceful transfer of power. It is a model democracy.

Herein lies the disturbing potential of the 2024 US elections. In the months leading to the election, one candidate, Donald Trump, repeatedly suggested that voter fraud would be the only possible explanation for his potential defeat in November. Because of what happened after the previous US presidential election it was difficult to simply shrug one's shoulders. Nor did the actual outcome, Trump's straightforward victory and hence his lack of complaints, dispel all the concerns about the way in which confidence in the electoral process had been undermined. American democracy is likely to survive – not least because of the gracious acceptance of defeat by Harris – but its continued appeal as a model for others rests on shaky ground.

ARIZONA, Gilbert. Supporters rally for US Vice President and Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris. 23 September 2024. Olivier TOURON / AFP

Proclaiming something unprecedented is a tricky business. Yet, it seems an appropriate term for the 2024 US elections. On 27 June, Donald Trump and Joe Biden held a debate that observers unanimously labelled as a disaster for Biden. On 13 July – only two days prior to the Republican National Convention (RNC) – Trump survived an assassination attempt. By this point, polls virtually unanimously suggested a victory for Trump. But everything changed on 21 July when Joe Biden announced his intention not to run. Instead of an octogenarian, Trump faced someone almost twenty years younger than him, Vice President Kamala Harris.

Trump would probably have managed to deal with the age issue; he had, after all, beaten many younger contenders in the past. Nor was running against a woman too daunting; Hilary Clinton had been defeated back in 2016. It was the other stuff that forced the Trump campaign to scramble: Harris was of mixed racial background and Trump's racist remarks did not endear him to anyone (except for his more right-wing followers). Branding Harris a "Marxist" did not resonate. Worse for him, Trump seemed unable to focus on the many issues – from immigration to the economy – that could have helped his campaign.

Trump's difficulty in adapting to a new opponent was evident during the 10 September presidential debate. While he went on about Haitian immigrants eating pets in Springfield, Ohio, and the size of the crowds in his campaign events, the former president appeared like a caricature of his caricature-like public persona. Still, there was no knock-out blow, for while Trump confirmed the worst fears of those who already disliked him, Harris remained essentially unknown to most American voters. As election day approached, the choice, as in 2016 and 2020, was between Trump and "anti-Trump". As in 2016 but with a wider margin, Trump triumphed.

What really was at stake in this particular US election? What made it unique? At one level, the public scrutiny of Harris and Trump was no different from some of the previous elections. Still, these two candidates and their differences – whether real or apparent – resonate far and wide. For the symbolism that defines the political personas of Trump and Harris represents the many fault lines found within virtually all transatlantic democracies in the 2020s, the seemingly irreconcilable views over such issues as race, gender, climate, and migration.

The Trump vision is, as it has been since 2016, about an America that will stay strong only if it embraces "traditional" values. By contrast, Kamala Harris's campaign made much of being future-oriented. In essence this means embracing globalisation; at least to the extent that is politically possible (open-door policy on migration is certainly not). There are, of course, many specific issues that differentiate the two (such as abortion). But ultimately, US presidential elections are not won on issues but on appearances and emotions.

When it comes down to appearances the contrast could hardly have been more striking. The big question was which side – which appearance and image – would ultimately emerge as the winner. The big surprise was that the result was not as close as most pundits expected. Kamala Harris (unlike Hillary Clinton in 2016 and Joe Biden in 2020) did not win the national vote. Because of the peculiar US electoral system, the outcome was decided by a relatively small number of voters in a few so-called swing states (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Wisconsin). Which way these states would lean decided the eventual balance of the 538-member electoral college, where the final vote will be held in December. This time around, Trump won all the swing states.

What really matters, though, is what happens next. For as we saw in 2020, our post-truth era allows any outcome to be contested and presented as fraudulent. The irony is that because the result came so quickly and because it was so decisive, Donald Trump will indeed enjoy the benefits of a peaceful and civil transfer of power. We can only speculate how different things would look should he have lost. The tensions already so visible after the 2020 elections would have exploded, with Kamala Harris's legitimacy questioned from day one of her presidency.

This election is not going to fix all the problems that have made America's political system – once the envy of the democratic world – an object of concern. To be sure, the outcome may have restored some faith in the electoral process. Democracy works only when winners and losers accept the outcome of the contest as legitimate; this time around, unlike in 2020, it seems to be the case. But the reality is that the future of democracy – American or otherwise – has not been settled by the election of Donald Trump, the same man whose campaign was based on undermining its very foundations.

> "The future of democracy – American or otherwise – has not been settled by the election of Donald Trump, the same man whose campaign was based on undermining its very foundations."

DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF "SHAM ELECTIONS" IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Christiana **Parreira**
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A November 2023 article in *The Economist*, titled "The Middle East Faces a Series of Sham Elections", characterises political regimes in the region as collectively consumed by an authoritarian sclerosis that renders them immune to any possibility of change via electoral institutions. "The elections will be farcical", the piece declares. "Results are decided in advance." The authors of this piece are by no means the first to make this claim: for decades, scholars and other observers have puzzled over why non-democratic regimes choose to hold elections, one core component of procedural democracy. Yet elections even in less-than-democratic contexts can promote intense political competition that sometimes brings about unexpected changes in the composition and power of the ruling elite.

The beyond-symbolic significance of elections under authoritarianism has been amply demonstrated by several elections held in 2024 throughout the Middle East. Various national elections held in the region this year also demonstrate wide variation in how elections shape regimes across different non-democratic contexts. In Iran and Jordan, for example, presidential and national legislative elections (respectively) were characterised by intense competition and, ultimately, the empowerment of opposition movements and actors.

Iran held two rounds of presidential elections in June and July 2024, following the death of former President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May. Iran's elections at the presidential and legislative levels are frequently competitive, but far from fully "free and fair" – the appointed Guardian Council vets candidates and has ultimate discretion over whether they are allowed to run. Despite this clear violation of democratic principles, the six candidates who ran in Iran's June elections represented a wide array of ideological positions, ranging from several conservative "hard-liners" (e.g., Saeed Jalili and Mohammad Ghalibaf) to more reformist or "moderate" candidates, chiefly Masoud Pezeshkian, who was backed by a variety of pragmatic reformist groups. The first round of elections produced a runoff between Jalili and Pezeshkian, while the second round resulted in higher turnout rates and, ultimately, a victory for the reformist camp, led by Pezeshkian.

Pezeshkian's victory came after three years of conservative rule under former President Raisi, which coincided with both an economic downturn and widespread anti-government protests. As such, his win can be interpreted as a clear public rebuke of conservative leadership on a range of economic and social issues. But more significantly, his victory demonstrates that elections even under severe constraints like those in Iran's institutional setup provide a potent, if limited, vehicle for public expression. This also helps make sense of why non-democratic regimes like Iran's would risk holding elections in the first place – they allow elites to "take the temperature" of the public and recalibrate accordingly.

Such temperature-taking also recently happened in Jordan, a monarchy where competitive elections also regularly occur. The September 2024 legislative elections brought about important changes in the distribution of what limited independent power is allocated to legislators. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Muslim Brotherhood's affiliated movement in Jordan, won 31 out of 138 seats in the legislature, tripling its numbers and making it the largest opposition group in the country by seat share.

> "Elections even in less-than-democratic contexts can promote intense political competition that sometimes brings about unexpected changes in the composition and power of the ruling elite."

The IAF's gains in the Jordanian elections have been widely interpreted as a reaction by the Jordanian public to the ongoing war in Gaza. This is not false, but does assume an overly simplistic linkage between this regional conflict and domestic support for Islamist opposition. Instead, following the start of the conflict, the IAF deftly positioned itself as supporting an end to the Jordanian government's peace treaty with Israel and promoted itself as the key protector of Jordan against Israeli aggression – contrasting itself with the government, which has suppressed pro-Palestine protests over the past year. In other words, the IAF's mobilisation strategy in the face of these unexpected regional events also played a key role in its success.

In summary, elections in the Middle East, like in much (if not all) of the world, exist in a complex grey zone between procedurally "free and fair" in accordance with democratic ideals and mere "sham". In places like Iran and Jordan, electoral politics are contentious and competitive, and they produce unexpected results that, while not overthrowing autocratic regimes outright, force them to recalibrate their balance of cooptative and coercive strategies.

IRAN, Tehran. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks to local and international media during a news conference. 16 September 2024. Morteza NIKOUBAZL / NurPhoto / AFP

LEGITIMACY UNDER PRESSURE: THE ROLE OF ELECTORAL OBSERVATION

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On 6 January 2021, supporters of then President Donald Trump attacked the US Capitol building in Washington DC, claiming that the election had been stolen. Two years later, on 8 January 2023, a mob of Jair Bolsonaro's supporters attacked Brazil's federal government buildings in Brasília (Praça dos Três Poderes, Three Powers Square) with a similar claim. Both scenarios share features: high affective polarisation and distrust of the electoral process. This could be devastating for democracy.

Elections are mainly a domestic affair. Democratic elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country and provides the basis for the government's authority and legitimacy. However, international observation can play, and on many occasions has played, a crucial role. Electoral observation missions (EOMs) are organised by independent actors, typically from another country or from international organisations or national non-governmental organisations.

EOMs do not prevent fraud, but they can serve as a conflict prevention mechanism by providing an impartial assessment of the elections, defusing tensions and deterring fraud by their very presence. The three fundamental principles of an EOM are impartiality, neutrality and objectivity. Elections must be inclusive, fair and competitive. Meeting these criteria requires observing the legal framework and practices not only on the voting day, but also during the campaign and until the results are made effective. Among the many organisations deploying missions are the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Council of Europe, the African Union and the Carter Center. A basic principle of any international EOM is that it can only be implemented at the invitation of the nation state holding the elections.

> "In Venezuela, electoral observation could not prevent the fraud, but it could expose the deception."

For example, in Brazil, for the second round the OAS EOM comprised 56 members of 17 nationalities who spent several weeks in the country. It was deployed in the Federal District and 15 states across Brazil's territory, as well as in four cities outside the country to observe the voting from abroad. Members of the EOM met with representatives of the two presidential contenders' campaigns, as well as with electoral and government authorities, academics, and representatives of civil society, certifying the fairness and cleanliness of the process.

Electoral observation is not new, but it has been growing in parallel with the expansion of democracy. Before the 1960s, less than 10% of the elections were monitored, whereas by the 2000s almost 80% of elections were observed. However, the quality of these missions has been under criticism because some electoral democracies are organising "friendly" observations just to validate flawed elections while others are preventing missions.

The recent case of Venezuela illustrates perfectly the potentialities and limits of electoral observation. On 28 July 2024, Venezuela conducted presidential elections. In the country, electronic voting is combined with physical records. When the voting is closed, before sending the results, a report is issued with partial figures and copies are given to the members of the voting poll. These are the famous reports (the *actas* so much mentioned in the international media), which have a QR code and the signatures of those present at the table. On the voting night, the National Electoral Council (CNE) interrupted the counting, alleging a system hack (not proven) that did not prevent, however, from announcing the victory of the incumbent, Nicolás Maduro. By 2 August, the official result – but without supporting evidence, as required by the regulations – was 51% of the votes for Maduro against 44% for Edmundo González, the candidate of the unified opposition. The opposition claims to have won by 67% to 30%, based on the more than 24,000 minutes (81% of the total) that hundreds of volunteers organised into *comanditos* (small commandos) had collected, scanned and centralised on a web page that allows to see the result of the voting table where a person is registered. This audit and total transparency are a great example of virtuous collective action backed by technology.

The guarantees of the Venezuelan voting system – the paper records – and the mobilisation of the citizenry prevented the result from being falsified. The CNE may claim victory for Maduro, but it cannot prove it. The only international independent observer present in the country was the Carter Center, which reported that the election took place in an environment of restricted freedoms for political actors, civil society organisations, and the media. Furthermore, the electoral body would have demonstrated a clear bias in favour of the incumbent. Changes in the rules, minimal public information on the voting places and arbitrariness were reported, as well as the abuse of administrative resources on behalf of the incumbent, unequal conditions between the candidates and overwhelming positive coverage of the incumbent on television and radio.

In Venezuela, electoral observation could not prevent the fraud, but it could expose the deception. The action of civil society was key to gathering and publishing evidence that proves the opposition's victory. The dictatorship was unmasked.

ARGENTINA, Buenos Aires. Protest against Nicolás Maduro and the official results that declared him as the winner of the July elections. 17 August 2024. Luciano GONZALEZ / Anadolu / AFP

ELECTIONS – WHAT FOR?

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2024: THE CORDON SANITAIRE AND THE RIGHTWARD SHIFT

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Without a doubt, the June 2024 European elections marked a significant shift, with about a quarter of the newly elected members now coming from parties further to the right than the Christian Democrats. This is the most right-leaning Parliament in EU history, raising crucial questions: will the "cordon sanitaire" – an informal arrangement that blocks these parties from legislative influence – hold, or will centre-right parties begin to openly collaborate with the far right for greater political power?

With around 350 million eligible voters across 27 EU Member States, this was one of the largest global democratic elections in 2024. The European Parliament is the only directly elected EU body, co-legislating laws and shaping the annual budget with the Council. This gives it significant influence over EU political priorities. Far-right politicians have long recognised the Parliament's potential as a platform, a trend that began with Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front in 1984.

In the 2024 elections, the far right made major gains in France, Germany, and Italy. Marine Le Pen's National Rally won 31.37% of the vote in France, prompting President Macron to call for snap elections. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in second with 15.9%, gaining seats. Giorgia Meloni's party in Italy secured 28.75% of the vote.

BELGIUM, Brussels. Poster announcing the upcoming European elections on the facades of the European Parliament buildings. iStock

"Is it democratically justifiable to exclude the Patriots for Europe – the third-largest and democratically elected group – from positions of power?"

Similar gains occurred in Austria, Hungary, and Spain, signalling a wider trend across Europe.

The Christian Democrats, represented by the European People's Party (EPP), solidified their position as the strongest political group, with a comfortable lead over the Socialists. Meanwhile, the Liberals suffered major losses in France, Germany, and Spain. The Greens faced setbacks in Germany. As a result, no majority in Parliament can be formed without the Christian Democrats, giving them a decisive role in shaping the direction of this legislature – whether by cooperating with the far right or building alliances with progressive parties to reinforce the cordon sanitaire.

The cordon sanitaire has primarily targeted the Patriots for Europe (PfE), a new far-right parliamentary group including Viktor Orbán's Fidesz, Marine Le Pen's National Rally, Italy's League, Spain's Vox, and other like-minded parties. This bloc is now the third-largest in the European Parliament, potentially giving it significant bargaining power.

Germany's AfD initially sought to join the Patriots for Europe, but after a controversial statement from AfD's Maximilian Krah about the Nazi SS, the French refused. As a result, the AfD formed its own group, Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), alongside parties such as Poland's Confederation, Bulgaria's Revival, and France's Reconquête!.

A controversy surrounds the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, led by Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy, a party known for its fascist roots. The cordon sanitaire has only been partially applied to this group. ECR also includes Poland's former ruling party, Law and Justice, which greatly undermined Poland's rule of law system, alongside the Finns Party and the Czech Republic's Civic Democratic Party. Collectively, these three far-right groups, positioned to the right of the EPP, now make up a quarter of the European Parliament – a deeply concerning number.

During the campaigning period, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said she would exclude collaborating with the far right. However, in June 2024 she delayed a critical rule of law report, which was seen as an effort to secure Meloni's support for her second-term bid. This signals potential political calculations taking precedence over core democratic values. Will the growing presence of far-right politicians in Parliament lead to their further normalisation at the EU level? And will the EPP openly collaborate with these factions to secure majorities in a Parliament characterised by shifting alliances?

During the July 2024 constitutive session, the cordon sanitaire held. The Patriots for Europe were excluded from key positions despite being the third-largest group. However, the cordon sanitaire did not apply to Meloni's ECR, which secured two Vice-President positions along with several Chair and Vice-Chair roles. This gives the ECR considerable leverage in shaping agendas and negotiations within committees and the wider Parliament.

Signs of the cordon sanitaire's weakening also appeared in September 2024, when the EPP, along with Orbán's and Le Pen's Patriots for Europe, and Meloni's ECR tabled a joint resolution on Venezuela. Though the EPP claimed the other groups co-signed later, it is clear that a coalition was formed to ensure the adoption of the resolution in plenary, indicating that cooperation with the far right is no longer taboo.

Is it democratically justifiable to exclude the Patriots for Europe – the third-largest and democratically elected group – from positions of power? This dilemma refers back to a long-standing debate among legal and political scholars: when does militant democracy itself become undemocratic? In an interview with Euronews on 16 July 2024, Daniel Freund, a prominent Green Member of the European Parliament, justified the cordon sanitaire as follows: "If your political goal is to destroy this parliament, you should not be put in charge of managing this parliament." This underscores the challenge of protecting parliamentary integrity against democratically elected parties seeking to dismantle a democratic institution from within.

RUSSIA'S VESTIGES OF DEMOCRACY

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Elections were frequent in the Soviet Union but they had a symbolic character. In a country where only one political party existed, set on achieving the "dictatorship of the proletariat", even the authorities did not entertain the idea that Soviet elections had much in common with elections in capitalist countries. Political competition in the Soviet Union was only possible within the ruling Communist Party and happened behind the scenes.

As the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, independent Russia, now led by its first president, Boris Yeltsin, chose to adopt the Western political system. Democratic elections, allowing for the competition of multiple political parties with different platforms, embodied Russia's "historic choice". Throughout the 1990s, Russia's political system, though flawed – as demonstrated, for example, by the corruption and violations that plagued the 1996 presidential election – was essentially democratic. The State Duma, the lower house of the Russian Federal Assembly, saw clashes between different politicians and their visions for the future of Russia. In parallel, the media, while controlled by oligarchs and their interests, presented diverging narratives, often critical of the Yeltsin Administration.

The system that Vladimir Putin has installed today presents a stark contrast with the burgeoning democracy that characterised 1990s Russia. Since 1999, autocratic reforms and constitutional amendments have eroded Russia's democracy. The stripping away of Russia's democratic attributes culminated in the 2024 presidential election that saw Putin gain a fourth term as president, making him the longest-ruling leader in the Kremlin since Joseph Stalin.

> "The 2024 presidential election was remarkable for the systematic discarding of the remaining and mostly symbolic vestiges of Russian democracy."

Interestingly, though, while all Russian elections in the 21st century have been flawed, the Putin regime long made efforts to maintain a semblance of electoral respectability at home and abroad. Token measures were implemented to legitimise the claim that Russia was still part of the West and different from full-blown dictatorships such as China. In the Kremlin's parlance, Russia was a "sovereign democracy", a hybrid that still claimed the shared Greco-Roman republican and democratic legacy.

Such aspects as a tolerance in presidential elections for semi-independent candidates that could aggregate the anti-Putin vote, local autonomy in the regions, a system of repression that targeted only the most active of the anti-Putin critics – and, even then, rarely jailed them – and the subsistence of opposition print and online media characterised this token democracy and, up to the late 2010s, clearly differentiated Russia from the Soviet Union.

Likewise, while election fraud remained prevalent, it was kept under control. Putin scored large victories at presidential elections, but his regime tolerated large swathes of the population voting for other candidates. Putin received 53.4% of the vote in 2000, 71.9% in 2004, 64.3% in 2012, and 77.5% in 2018. While obviously high, these numbers imply that until 2018 at least a quarter of Russian voters did not support him. The regime therefore accepted the existence of an opposition. Interestingly, the picture was even more contrasted at regional level in presidential elections. While Russia had potentate-type regions, such as Chechnya in the North Caucasus, where Putin received close to (or actually) 100% of the vote at presidential elections, other regions saw him get much less.

Held amidst the Russo-Ukrainian War, the 2024 presidential election was remarkable for the systematic discarding of the remaining and mostly symbolic vestiges of Russian democracy. Putin this time received 88.5% of the vote, an incredibly high score even by his standards. Likewise, no region awarded Putin less than 79% of the vote. In fact, even the four regions where he did not cross the 80% mark appeared as outliers. In Moscow and St Petersburg, two urban bastions of the opposition, he scored respectively 86.5% and 81.7%. For comparison, his score had been "only" 70.9% in Moscow and 75.01% in St Petersburg in the 2018 presidential election, already an incredible success for him.

Beyond this, unlike in previous elections, no token opposition candidate was allowed to compete in 2024. Boris Nadezhdin, a former State Duma deputy who voiced mildly critical opinions and campaigned on an anti-war stance, was barred from the presidential election despite clearing the difficult hurdles to register and receiving no publicity in the official media. The Kremlin side-lined him at the last minute, seemingly fearing his sudden surge in popularity.

Overall, against the background of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the 2024 presidential election was held in a much more repressive climate than before, as the Russian regime closed the remaining independent online and print media outlets and jailed large numbers of political opponents. Its most famous critic, Alexei Navalny, died in unelucidated circumstances just weeks before the election while serving a 19-year prison sentence on made-up charges in a colony in the Russian Arctic.

The 2024 presidential election represented, therefore, a watershed event in Russia. On par with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it marked a qualitative shift in the nature of the Russian regime. The Kremlin abandoned any pretence at playing by Western rules in domestic and foreign policy. Shedding its façade of respectability, albeit by then dented, Putin's Russia entered a new age in which it openly signalled to the world that it did not care about how the West perceived it. It became unapologetically authoritarian.

GERMANY, Berlin. The picture of late Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny is set up in the Church of Saint Mary (Marienkirche) before a memorial service in his honour. 4 June 2024. Ralf HIRSCHBERGER / AFP

INDIA, New Delhi. Protest against the State Bank of India (SBI) for delaying the disclosure of electoral bonds data as ordered by India's top court, the Supreme Court. 5 March 2024. Kabir JHANGIANI / NurPhoto / AFP

THE FUNDING OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS IN INDIA

Tripurdaman **Singh**
Researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy

"He who pays the piper, calls the tune." Nowhere is this old proverb truer than in the domain of electioneering and campaigning, where money and power are intertwined in the tightest of embraces. Elections and democratic processes – of which campaigns, political research, advertising, party organisations are a necessary and inalienable part – all cost money, hence the inevitable blending of high ideals with questionable practices. India is no exception. But given its size and scale, India confronts some unique challenges.

Months before the country's general election earlier this year, India's Supreme Court invalidated what are known as "electoral bonds", a financial instrument designed to facilitate anonymous donations to political parties. Under the scheme, anyone could buy a bearer bond and donate it to a political party, which would then encash it within 15 days, while keeping the donor's identity a secret. Even for a country like India, where the political economy of elections had always been notoriously murky, the egregious nature of electoral bonds had marked a new low: USD 2.1 billion had been raised by political parties through anonymous donations between 2018 and 2023 – with close to 60% going to the ruling BJP –, highlighting the galloping role of big money in political life.

As the court observed, by allowing companies to secretly donate unlimited campaign funds, electoral bonds could easily lead to relations of "quid pro quo" between ruling parties and corporate entities. Unchecked financial inflows could also lead to regulatory capture and crony capitalism, allowing corporations to wield a disproportionate influence over policy decisions. Moreover, such funds can easily be misused to influence electoral outcomes, subverting and compromising the democratic process itself. The link between political funding and political corruption is manifest. The court's verdict invalidating the scheme and forcing the banks to disclose donor identities thus came to be seen as a major victory for transparency by activists and campaigners.

Things, however, are more complicated. India's elections are exorbitantly expensive. The 2019 general election is estimated to have generated expenses of USD 8.5 billion, and spending in the 2024 election was expected to reach USD 16 billion, exceeding the American presidential election of 2020. These figures exclude elections to state assemblies or municipal bodies, where parties and candidates also spend enormous sums of money. And while the largest proportion of this expenditure goes towards regular campaigning – advertising, publicity material, wages of party workers, transport, public rallies, social media – studies indicate that around a quarter of it goes directly to voters in the form of gifts, alcohol or outright cash. Clearly, electoral bonds represent only one part of the equation of campaign finance. Their demise, while welcome, has done little to address the larger questions concerning the financing of political life.

It is an open secret that all-pervasive corruption has disfigured the arena of political competition in India in several ways. First, successful candidates tend to be wealthy and well-resourced, and the expenditure involved often deters those without access to such resources. Second, since it exceeds the limits set by the Election Commission of India, such expenditure requires illicit and unaccounted cash and makes it more likely for candidates to have criminal backgrounds or be funded by illicit activities. Third, this demand for illicit cash spurs serious malfeasance in the allocation of contracts and licences by the government. Fourth, the Election Commission has remained powerless to address the burgeoning tide of illegal money washing over political life. Fifth, the greater the number of people implicated in the entire exercise and the more vested interests appear, the harder it has become to clean things up.

The truth is that the question of political finance is closely entangled with the ogre of political corruption – and disentangling those threads requires monumental effort. Judicial intervention can only go so far. In fact, in the absence of resolute enforcement, it would be naive to rely on easy legislative or judicial remedies at all. Of course, regulatory reforms, stricter transparency laws and a better-equipped Election Commission will help. But to cut through the gordian knot of campaign finance, India needs more than that.

Opacity in political funding tends to corrode the basic tenet of accountability in democracies, fuelling discontent and disillusionment and weakening the moral taboo against corrupt dealing. In turn, the lack of moral opprobrium faced by those engaging in corruption eventually starts eroding the normative foundations of democracy itself. To regain lost ground – to push back against the normalisation of corruption, to reverse the growing role of big money, to empower the common citizen to seek accountability and to encourage political parties in a culture of transparency and scrutiny – India will also need tremendous political willpower on which, ultimately, will depend the future trajectory of Indian democracy.

"It is an open secret that all-pervasive corruption has disfigured the arena of political competition in India in several ways."

FRANCE, Le Havre. Activists from Scientifiques en rébellion and Extinction Rebellion block a lock in the port of Le Havre to protest against the creation of a floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal by TotalEnergies. 12 May 2023. Edouard MONFRAIS-ALBERTINI / Hans LUCAS / AFP

DEMOCRACY, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND POPULISM

Laura **Bullon-Cassis**
Postdoctoral Researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy

With over 70 countries holding elections and more voters than ever going to the polls, 2024 is widely regarded as an electoral year. Yet optimism about the future of democracy can be difficult to find.

Much attention has gone to potential and actual gains by the far right. The lead up to the 2024 European Parliamentary elections was filled with unease, and results were indeed sobering. The far right made significant gains, topping polls in Germany, France, and Austria, and leading French President Emmanuel Macron to call a snap legislative election. While Marine Le Pen's bid for power was eventually thwarted thanks to a left-wing coalition, it nonetheless reflects a broader trend that has echoed throughout 2024, one in which almost every key election in Europe and North America is apprehended with anxiety, with many fearing far-right populists could come to dominate in the political landscape.

This anxiety is not just about ideas and policies, but it is also about the repercussions of the right-wing parties on our political systems, with many sounding the alarm about threats to democracy. The United States in particular stands out, mired in the recent memory of the contested 2020 election, the assault of the Capitol, and blatant anti-democratic claims. 2024 has also seen a rise in far-right violence in the UK and Germany. Less blatant, but also worrisome, are restrictions to press freedom under right-wing populist governments such as Italy's Giorgia Meloni.

But 2024 saw another significant trend in disruptive activism, which differed significantly from the wave of protests that had marked the period just before and after the pandemic, which had rallied around movements such as Fridays for Future, MeToo, and Black Lives Matter. This year, activists were not only taking to the streets: they also glued themselves to airport tarmacs, occupied campuses and museums, interrupted public speeches, and performed attacks towards well-known art pieces. While largely nonviolent, they seemed more willing to create discomfort, be met with opposition, take risks, and face legal repercussions.

While civil disobedience acts can sometimes look more isolated – mobilising, for example, just a handful of activists rather than the tens or hundreds of thousands that can be rallied to protest in the streets – they should nonetheless be understood as a force in their own right. Activists – primarily either anti-war or pro-climate – belonged to a range of different movements that could appear disjointed at first, but which were in fact networked and coordinated. On the climate front, the A22 Network, for example, gathers 10 movements, including Just Stop Oil in the UK and Letzte Generation in Germany. Campus occupations by the anti-war, pro-Palestine movement, inspired by the first protests at Columbia University, were connected by their methods and demands, by millions of online followers worldwide, and by the involvement of preexisting groups such as the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions movement, Students for Justice in Palestine as well as Jewish pro-peace movements.

Climate and pro-Palestine movements emerged throughout the year, independently of electoral campaigns, in line with their disinterest for representative politics which, both movements argued, were responsible for the immense yet invisibilised violence that, for the lack of a better wording, was unfolding in the very own backyards of industrialised nations.

At stake is also their disillusion with the rhetoric of adherence to sustainability objectives purported by Western governments, which they perceive as insincere. Climate activists have indeed been met with increasingly heavy-handed treatment in countries such as Australia, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, and the US: a much-cited recent report found that these governments are imposing "lengthy prison sentences, engaging in preventive detention, and filing criminal charges for trivial offenses against climate activists".[1] With the violence so enmeshed in the fabric of our very own societies, instead of targeting electoral politics, activists are calling for institutional and behavioural change: they ask for institutions such as universities and museums to divest from worst offenders, for more stringent legislation to be passed, and for politicians to, at least, practice transparency.

It would be dangerous to draw direct parallels between these movements and the extreme right. They indeed have close to nothing in common ideologically, demographically, and sociologically. Further, social movements on the left often emerge from a sense of solidarity and idealism rather than division, and feel attached to democratic principles. Nonetheless, what they do have in common is a lack of trust in democratic politics in which they do not feel presented. On the extreme right, this was well documented after the double surprise of the Trump and Brexit wins in 2016: some analysts pointed to the role played by economic disaffection, and others to a reaction by once-predominant groups to progressive value change.

While, undoubtedly, disobedient protest is polarising and sometimes slips into more violent practices, these actions, combined with the increasing appeal of the far right, frame 2024 as not just an electoral year, but also a year that must lead to deep and profound learnings for democratic parties and systems. These must not only address the disaffection felt by those who no longer feel represented on both sides of the political spectrum, but also the causes and reach of the sometimes-invisibilised but pervasive violence that goes on within, and much beyond, the boundaries of our local or national jurisdictions. They must learn to see movements not as threats, but as the opening of an important dialogue with the law and democratic spaces as currently formulated, calling for their urgent evolution.

> "Instead of targeting electoral politics, activists are calling for institutional and behavioural change."

1 Trevor Stankiewicz, *On Thin Ice: Disproportionate Responses to Climate Change Protesters in Democratic Countries* (Climate Rights International, September 2024), available at https://cri.org/western-democracies-stop-crackdowns-climate-protesters.

L'ENSEIGNEMENT

Welcome to Our New Faculty Members

Johannes **Boehm**
Professor,
International Economics
PhD, London School of Economics

Johannes Boehm is Professor of International Economics at the Geneva Graduate Institute, as well as a research fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in London and the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) at the London School of Economics. He conducts research and teaches on topics related to international trade, industrial development, growth, and firms, as well as on macroeconomics and environmental economics. Previously, he was a professor at Sciences Po, Paris. He has held visiting positions at Princeton, Harvard, and the Institut européen d'administration des affaires (INSEAD). His current research focuses on the role that trade and trade networks play in the process of growth, as well as on policies that can both foster the development of industrial capabilities and enhance economic resilience in the face of adverse conditions, including geopolitical risk and climate change.

Claude **Raisaro**
Assistant Professor,
International Economics,
and Pictet Chair in Finance
and Development
PhD, University of Zurich

Claude Raisaro joins the Geneva Graduate Institute as Assistant Professor of Development Microeconomics and Pictet Chair in Finance and Development, affiliated to the International Economics Department and the Centre for Finance and Development, after completing his PhD at the University of Zurich. He is also affiliated to the Mistra Center for Sustainable Markets at the Stockholm School of Economics. He works at the intersection of development and behavioural economics. His research focuses on how social norms influence organisations and the functioning of markets. Additionally, he works on the economics of education and inequality. He uses field experiments and observational data to address these topics.

Dominic **Rohner**
Professor,
International Economics,
and André Hoffmann
Chair in Political Economics
and Governance
PhD, University of Cambridge

In addition to his position as Professor of International Economics, Dominic Rohner is André Hoffmann Chair in Political Economics and Governance and Co-director of the Hoffmann Centre for Global Sustainability at the Geneva Graduate Institute. He is also a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in London, CESifo, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource-Rich Economies (OxCarre), and the Households in Conflict Network (HiCN). His research on political and development economics has won several prizes and grants, including a European Research Council (ERC) grant on "Policies for Peace". He also acts as Associate Editor at the *Economic Journal*, leader of the CEPR Research and Policy Network on Preventing Conflict, and is a member of the National Research Council of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF).

L'ENSEIGNEMENT

Teaching Education Policy at the Institute

Chanwoong **Baek**
Assistant Professor of International Relations/Political Science
UNESCO Co-Chair in Comparative Education Policy
Academic Director of NORRAG

Teaching education policy at the Geneva Graduate Institute has been a profoundly enriching experience, inspiring me to further integrate global perspectives, political dimensions, and interdisciplinary exploration into my classroom.

The Institute's transnational environment, with students from diverse backgrounds across the world, has been essential to this process. I witness every day how the classroom becomes a forum where varied perspectives and experiences enrich our discussions. This diversity is not just a backdrop; it actively shapes the way I teach, bringing different standpoints as well as pertinent global challenges into our discussions on education policy. Located in International Geneva, the Institute's proximity to international organisations and NGOs also allows students to directly engage with various policy processes and deepen their understanding of how international agendas and discourse shape national education systems and vice versa.

In this context, I design courses that engage students with the global-local nexus of education policy. In "Education and Development", students critically examine questions such as, "How do programmatic conditionalities for receiving external financial assistance influence national education policies?" and "What are the implications of global monitoring and evaluation on national education systems?" Students learn to produce education sector reviews that are context-sensitive and critically reflect on externally funded education reforms, particularly in aid-dependent countries.

This investigation requires critical awareness and discussion of power and politics. Education policy involves decisions about whose and which knowledge is valued, who gets access, and how it is governed. In "Knowledge-based Governance in Comparative and International Education," we investigate the role of knowledge in today's policy processes, with a particular focus on how knowledge is produced and used across geographical, institutional, and systemic boundaries, and which actors and organisations facilitate this process.

Furthermore, the Institute offers a space for interdisciplinary and intersectoral exploration of education policy, drawing on insights from political science, sociology, history, economics, and law, as well as from sectors such as public health and environmental studies, among others. The Institute's various centres and programmes, particularly NORRAG and the UNESCO Chair in Comparative Education Policy, also provide opportunities for research, policy dialogue, and networking, enhancing both academic and practical experiences related to the study of education policy.

By critically examining the global-local nexus, power dynamics, and politics of education policy through interdisciplinary and intersectoral lenses, I hope my students come to understand and view education not just as an academic discipline, but as a foundation for social transformation.

L'ENSEIGNEMENT

Training for Faculty and Researchers

Advancing Academic Expertise

Laurent **Neury**
Executive Director of Studies and Senior Academic Adviser, Office of the Director of Studies

To support faculty members and researchers in refining their teaching methods and enhancing their research management skills, a dynamic training programme has been designed. These workshops provide participants with the necessary tools to navigate the complexities of modern academia, with a particular focus on pedagogical innovation and leadership in research.

In order to address the growing impact of technology on education, participants in the *Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Education* workshop are introduced to the fundamentals of generative AI, with an emphasis on how this technology can be integrated into teaching practices. The session also tackles the ethical considerations that come with AI, ensuring that faculty members are prepared to handle the challenges AI may pose both in their teaching and research environments.

Beyond technology, fostering an inclusive learning atmosphere is another crucial focus of the training. The *Inclusive Classrooms: Difficult Conversations and Situations* workshop provides faculty members with practical strategies for navigating sensitive discussions, addressing unconscious biases, and creating a learning environment where all students feel respected and heard. Particularly for those working in diverse or multicultural settings, this session offers valuable approaches for encouraging open dialogue and inclusivity in the classroom.

For faculty members taking on leadership roles in research, effective project management is critical to success. The *Project Management* workshop is designed for professors and assistant professors who recently joined the Institute as well as faculty members leading competitive research projects. This session delivers key insights into managing research teams, coordinating stakeholders, and maintaining clear communication, providing the skills necessary to lead complex, interdisciplinary projects with confidence.

Looking ahead, the programme will continue to expand its offerings. In particular, in 2025, the Institute will participate in the REGARD programme, which provides workshops tailored to female researchers, professors, and lecturers. In partnership with other universities in Suisse Romande, these sessions are designed to empower women in academia by addressing their unique challenges, while supporting their career advancement.

By offering these diverse workshops, the training programme equips faculty and researchers with the knowledge and tools needed to excel in their academic roles. From mastering cutting-edge teaching techniques to effectively managing research projects and creating inclusive environments, participants gain valuable skills that will not only enhance their personal academic journey but also contribute to the broader academic community. This comprehensive training empowers them to meet the evolving demands of modern academia and take a leading role in shaping its future.

LES ÉTUDIANT·ES

Researching the Normalisation of Political Violence

Interview with
Hafssa **Kouskous**
PhD Researcher in International History and Politics

What is your academic and professional background and what drew you to study at the Graduate Institute?

My academic journey has taken me across continents. I hold a Master in International Affairs from the Graduate Institute, specialising in Global Security and Power, Conflict, and Development. Before that, I earned a Bachelor in Political Science and International Relations and in Social Justice and Leadership from Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea. Another significant chapter of my education was at the African Leadership Academy in Johannesburg, South Africa. Professionally, I've had diverse roles such as interning at the Inter-Parliamentary Union, working as a consultant researcher at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, consulting for the Moroccan Ministry of Justice and the Moroccan Parliament, and serving as the Vice President of the MENA Student Initiative.

My decision to study at the Graduate Institute was driven by its reputation as a leading centre for research and education in international relations and development. The Institute's emphasis on a multidisciplinary approach and its strategic location in Geneva, a hub for international diplomacy, provided an ideal environment for advancing my understanding of global security issues and the dynamics of political violence. The opportunity to engage with scholars and practitioners from around the world further enriched my academic experience, fostering a deeper appreciation for diverse perspectives in the field of international affairs.

Tell us about your work.

I am currently pursuing a PhD in International History and Politics, focusing on the normalisation of political violence. My research investigates the historical and political processes through which acts of violence become legitimised and routinised within political systems. This involves a detailed analysis of case studies from different regions and historical periods, aiming to uncover patterns and factors that contribute to the acceptance of violence as a political tool in certain areas of the world. My work seeks to contribute to the broader understanding of how political violence can be mitigated and ultimately prevented.

What is it like to be a woman in your field?

As a woman in a field traditionally dominated by men, I often face the need to assert my credibility and expertise more vigorously. However, this position also provides a platform to highlight the contributions of women to international relations and security studies. It is an opportunity to advocate for greater gender representation and perspectives, and to inspire other women to pursue careers in this field. My experiences have taught me the importance of resilience and the value of bringing diverse perspectives to the table.

LES ÉTUDIANT·ES

Favoriser la résilience des femmes face aux changements climatiques

Rencontre avec
Sourou Aristide **Djossou**
Étudiant du master interdisciplinaire
en études internationales et du développement

Quel a été votre parcours avant de rejoindre l'Institut ?

À la suite d'une licence en agronomie option production végétale et d'une maitrise en droit des affaires et carrière judiciaire à l'Université d'Abomey-Calavi au Bénin, j'ai fait un master en droit de l'environnement et protection des ressources naturelles à l'Ocean University of China. Je cumule quatre ans d'expérience dans la conception et la mise en œuvre de projets de développement durable.

Pourquoi avez-vous postulé au master interdisciplinaire (MINT) ?

Mon inscription au MINT émane de ma volonté de joindre l'utile à l'agréable. Grâce à mon leadership sur les questions d'actions climatiques et de résilience face aux changements climatiques, j'ai été invité, en tant que Young Global Changemaker d'Afrique subsaharienne, à participer au 2020 Global Solutions Summit à Berlin. Cette expérience a renforcé mon aspiration à servir la cause commune, d'où la nécessité de me spécialiser en études de développement afin de trouver du plaisir à exercer ma profession.

Quel est votre sujet de mémoire et quels sont vos projets pour l'avenir ?

Mon mémoire porte sur la réforme de la gestion du financement public de la lutte contre les changements climatiques au Bénin pour renforcer la résilience des petits exploitants agricoles. Je compte poursuivre une carrière internationale en tant que consultant sur les politiques de développement et de renforcement de la résilience face au climat. D'ailleurs, le cours « Development Finance for the Sustainable Development Goals » que j'ai suivi à l'Institut m'a incité à fonder Climate Relief, qui a mis en place un fonds spécial exclusivement féminin pour la résilience agricole face au climat.

Qu'entendez-vous par « résilience agricole face au climat » et pourquoi votre fonds concerne-t-il les femmes ?

Les changements climatiques affectent les femmes de manière disproportionnée, principalement du fait de leurs rôles sociaux et culturels préexistants dans nos sociétés. En raison de leurs capacités financières limitées, les femmes productrices agricoles sont moins en mesure de s'adapter aux changements climatiques que les hommes. Les changements climatiques compromettent l'accès des filles à l'éducation ou l'achèvement de leur éducation, renforçant ainsi les inégalités de genre déjà présentes. Dans ce contexte, le fonds contribue à la résilience des mères productrices agricoles à travers le renforcement de leurs capacités techniques de production et la mise à disposition de ressources financières pour l'achat d'intrants agricoles (semences de qualité, fertilisants biologiques…) et les autres besoins. L'accès à ce crédit sans intérêts permet aux productrices de s'adapter aux conditions agricoles changeantes et d'éviter des retards dans l'exécution des campagnes agricoles. À court terme, les bénéficiaires amélioreront leurs profils et seront éligibles pour contracter des crédits auprès des institutions de microfinance afin d'adopter à long terme des innovations qui renforcent leur résilience. Le fonds fait aussi obligation aux mères bénéficiaires de ne pas retirer leurs filles de l'école au profit des travaux champêtres. Au besoin, elles peuvent solliciter un crédit scolaire dédié aux filles.

LES ÉTUDIANT·ES

Who Are You?

The Journey of a Third Culture Kid

Shruti **Satish**
Master Student in International Relations/Political Science

In the tapestry of identity, I find myself woven between worlds – too foreign for one culture, too familiar for another, and never quite enough for both. I embody a third identity, existing within the Indian diaspora in the United States, finding my tribe both within and beyond its borders. As Ruth Hill Useem coined, I am a "third-culture kid" (TCK): a child raised in a culture distinct from that of my parents.

Here in International Geneva, many of us share this kaleidoscopic experience. We are the offspring of adventurers, our parents who chose to immerse us in cultures different from their own. Some of us are children of expatriates, tasting the flavours of multiple worlds during our formative years.

As children, TCKs often feel uprooted, torn from familiar ground and replanted in foreign soil. We sometimes urge our parents to adapt, hoping to blend into new landscapes. This constant dance of identities can leave us feeling adrift, disconnected from our ancestral roots. Yet, in these challenges lies our strength – a resilience born from the crucible of our shared experiences.

We are the bridge builders of tomorrow, connectors spanning the chasms between nations. Our perspective is a prism, refracting the light of human experience into a spectrum that defies simple categorisation. We possess a unique ability to navigate diverse social norms, our empathy guiding us through the complexities of global interaction.

For us, home is not a pin on a map but a feeling – a sense of belonging that transcends physical boundaries and cultural divides. What once seemed a burden reveals itself as a gift: being part of a diaspora is one of life's most enriching journeys.

We are the alchemists of culture, transmuting differences into understanding. Raised in Chicago's melting pot, I learned to forge friendships across boundaries. This diversity illuminated our shared essence, making me question why I ever worried about fitting in when we were all navigating the same labyrinth of identity.

While we may feel rootless, caught between worlds, we carry within us a mosaic of cultures. We are linguistic chameleons, holiday-hoppers, and social acrobats, blending seamlessly into diverse environments while nurturing the core of who we are.

So, who are we? We are the storytellers weaving tales across continents, the travellers mapping the geography of the human heart, the adventurers charting courses through uncharted cultural waters. We are the sum of our journeys, the product of our experiences, and the architects of our own unique identities.

We are the third-culture kids – proud, resilient, and unapologetically ourselves. In our diversity lies our strength, in our adaptability our power, and in our unique perspective, the key to unlocking a more connected world.

Shruti Satish spoke about her own experiences as a TCK in "Echoes of Identities", a talk given as part of TedxGVAGrad's 2024 "Seeds of Change".

LES ÉTUDIANT·ES

Master Student Named National Geographic Society Young Explorer

Interview with
Arghadeep **Das**
Master Student in International and Development Studies (MINT)
and Vice President of the Environmental Committee

How did you first get involved with National Geographic?

After graduating from the University of Delhi, I pursued a postgraduate diploma in environmental law and policy diploma from National Law University Delhi and WWF India. In 2021, I was selected for the first cohort of the National Geographic Society and The Nature Conservancy Marine and Community Conservation Externship to spotlight local conservation challenges, which led me to biodiversity and nature conservation.

Tell us about your work in the Bengal Sundarbans.

My work in the Bengal Sundarbans started thanks to the Marine and Community Conservation Externship, when I developed a project focused on its degradation. By weaving stories of local fishermen and their lived realities with scientific research on the mangrove landscape, I created a compelling narrative that argued the need for a more intricate understanding of the multifaceted problems in the region. This experience instilled a fundamental appreciation for storytelling and audiovisual methods in me, and nurtured my brainchild project on the Bengal Sundarbans – which I eagerly hope to dive deeper into throughout my explorer journey.

How did your externship working in the Bengal Sundarbans impact the path you took in its aftermath?

The externship allowed me to put a foot in the conservation world and explore things I had always heard conservationists and researchers discuss. I jumped into focusing on the world's largest mangrove ecosystem – the Sundarbans, its gradually deteriorating character, and what it meant for the local communities who called it their home for centuries. By immersing myself in the local setting and treading through narratives, I realised the fragility of the communities at the frontlines of environmental degradation – without adequate support and protection to brave these issues. Experiencing these first-hand enabled me to not only empathise with the community but also strengthen my resolve to help tackle these issues through storytelling and policymaking – the latter of which is the focus of my studies now at the Institute.

What does it mean to be named a National Geographic Young Explorer, and what do you hope it will bring to your projects?

Being named a National Geographic Young Explorer is a profound honour that fills me with tremendous hope and optimism to continue amplifying local voices in fragile environments, seeking solutions to critical challenges, and helping preserve sensitive ecosystems for future generations. It is a privilege, a responsibility and a generous offering of our promise to the world to work together for a better future. I am determined to go into the world and create a more tangible impact in our community, especially for the voiceless and most vulnerable.

LES ALUMNAE·I

Meet Suba Umathevan

CEO of Drosos Foundation and Member of the Alumnae·i Association Committee

I vividly recall my first day at the Graduate Institute in 2007, meeting classmates at Villa Barton with its stunning views of Lake Geneva. Those first, intellectually stimulating discussions are cherished memories that set the tone for my studies. The Institute's world-class academics and the practical experiences available in International Geneva laid a solid foundation for my career. As a student, I served as a fellow at UNESCO's International Bureau of Education and worked with Soroptimist International of Europe. These experiences anchored my future work in development and humanitarian programmes. I gained invaluable grassroots experience collaborating with organisations. Additionally, I participated in UN meetings and advocacy, contributing to the Sustainable Development Goals Dialogue at Rio+20 in 2012.

After years in development and humanitarian work, I transitioned to a specialised leadership and organisational learning firm. There, I developed leadership journeys for executives, deepening my understanding of leadership. This experience prepared me for my next major role at Plan International Switzerland, where I became CEO in 2018 at the age of 35. In 2020, I took the helm at Drosos Foundation, a philanthropic organisation active in Europe and the MENA region. Assuming this role ten years after the Arab Spring in such a volatile region involved guiding the organisation through a significant transformation. Currently, we are working on the next five-year strategy for Drosos, and I am immensely proud of our team's work and our partners' contributions, which focus on addressing critical issues for young people, communities, and organisations in the region.

An additional honour for me has been joining the Assembly of the ICRC, where I am now entering my second term. Serving in this unique and meaningful organisation allows me to contribute to its governance and mission in a profound way.

The Graduate Institute was instrumental in shaping my career, equipping me with analytical tools, a global perspective, and critical thinking skills. These were honed by excellent professors and challenging experiences that helped me navigate complex international issues and understand the volatile nature of global affairs. The Institute also emphasised empathy, cultural sensitivity, and the importance of listening and understanding diverse contexts – skills that have been invaluable in my leadership roles and were fostered early on during my time at the Institute. Even 15 years after graduation, I would still choose the Institute for my graduate studies.

I joined the Alumnae·i Association Committee out of gratitude and a desire to give back to the community that has been pivotal in my career. The Institute provided me with an excellent education and a network of inspiring peers and mentors. By serving on the committee, I aim to contribute to a strong, engaged alumnae·i network that upholds the Institute's values and supports the next generation of global leaders.

Scan to learn more about the committee and its representative members.

Madeleine Zabriskie Doty

Class of 1945

Madeleine Zabriskie Doty was an American journalist, pacifist, civil libertarian, and advocate for the rights of prisoners. She highlighted inhumane conditions and proposed innovative reforms, including a system of prisoner self-government. As a journalist, she reported for prominent publications and served as the editor for the radical paper *Four Lights*, as well as for other journals. She also acted as International Secretary for the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and later, as editor of *Pax International* for the League of Nations. Doty's advocacy extended to youth education, believing in its transformative power. Her multifaceted approach to activism and journalism left a lasting impact on both local and global levels.

© Smith College Special Collections

Doty's pacifist convictions were deeply intertwined with her feminism, as she believed that issues of feminism and peace naturally go hand in hand. She can be seen on this photograph marching in a suffrage parade in the early 1910s, holding a "Lawyers" sign.

© Smith College Special Collections

Doty, alongside eminent reformer Jane Addams and forty-three other American women, attended the Women's Peace Congress in the Netherlands, representing the Women's Lawyers Association in 1915.

→ **Learn more**

Nazem al-Koudsi

Class of 1929

Nazem al-Koudsi was a statesman and visionary who left an indelible mark on Syrian history. He dedicated his life to fighting for his ideals in establishing a constitutional parliamentary democracy in Syria. His initial battle centred on ending the French mandate in Syria. Founding the People's Party, he was elected as the Constitution Committee President which established the 1950 Syrian Constitution. After the last free parliamentary election in 1961, he became the last democratically elected Syrian President on 14 December 1961. He envisioned a powerful and united Arab republic and worked towards the unification of Iraq and Syria. His journey exemplifies a relentless pursuit of noble causes, leaving an inspiring legacy of resilience, democratic values, and the pursuit of regional unity.

© Presidential Library of Dr. Nazem al-Koudsi

Being the first Ambassador of Syria to the United States, al-Koudsi was part of the delegation that signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco in 1945.

© Presidential Library of Dr. Nazem al-Koudsi

Al-Koudsi had the project to form a Federal Arab Union. In his capacity as Prime Minister, he travelled to Jerusalem in 1951 to rally support from his counterparts from the Arab League.

© Presidential Library of Dr. Nazem al-Koudsi

Nazem al-Koudsi was elected to the Syrian Parliament with the People's Party, which he founded, and became Speaker of the Parliament in 1951.

→ **Learn more**

Under Siege

The Multifaceted Pressures Reshaping Diplomacy

Interview with
Jérôme **Duberry**
Managing Director of the Tech Hub and Co-Director ad interim of Executive Education

Arnaud **Danjean**
Former Member of the European Parliament and Guest Speaker of the Diplomacy, Negotiation, and Policy Executive Programme

Diplomacy is under pressure. Jérôme Duberry (JD) and Arnaud Danjean (AD) discuss the need for more diplomacy at a time when it is increasingly challenged by actors and global issues.

Why do we need diplomacy today?

JD: In today's increasingly polarised world, where tensions slow the pace and limit the scope of international cooperation, we are confronted with a dual challenge. We must simultaneously reinvent diplomacy and address issues that cannot be solved at the state level. This requires rethinking both the rules and governance frameworks that underpin diplomacy, while also finding common solutions to common issues that impact populations unevenly across the globe. Although these challenges are interconnected, the first often overshadows the second, with disagreements on how to collaborate hindering progress on urgent issues like climate change.

The pressing need to revive international cooperation and adapt the United Nations (UN) system to current geopolitical realities has prompted the UN Secretary-General to call for a Summit of the Future that took place in New York in September. Several declarations were unveiled on this occasion. Among them is a significant push to better incorporate the voices of future generations. But the question remains: what kind of international cooperation do we need? How can we better engage highly relevant actors in global governance, such as cities? This will require more diplomacy, i.e., more peaceful collaboration between states and other actors. It will also require courage, good will and creativity, and Geneva, with its diverse ecosystem, is well placed to host some of these discussions. But diplomacy remains an option only if we succeed in reforming international cooperation to the point where all parties are willing to engage fully. Otherwise, the spectre of violence and war will continue to loom.

What are the current and emerging challenges for diplomacy and multilateralism?

AD: There is an unprecedented number of issues, since diplomacy is confronted with challenges on substance and on the way it functions. The first obvious challenge is a global one, related to the growing contest of the very organisation of the international system itself. More and more actors want not only to take a broader part in the multilateral system as we know it, but also to review its basic foundations and put into question its relevance.

One other issue, partly related to this global transformation, is the ideological extreme polarisation which seems to make dialogue almost impossible. When you portray your adversary as an existential enemy, diplomacy becomes more difficult: it is as if you not only do not speak the same language, but you can't even find basic common principles to begin the dialogue.

Finally, I would also stress the challenge posed by the technological revolution we are going through. Diplomacy was usually an area of expertise, with common rules and a timeframe. Nowadays, through media and social networks, everything is dealt with instantly, publicly and with no restraints whatsoever. Everyone becomes their own diplomat! Not the best way to handle complex international issues that require time, skills, and moderation!

How is technology transforming diplomacy?

JD: Technology has long played a pivotal role in international affairs due to its close ties to economic and military power. What is changing today is not only the rapid pace of technological innovation but also the way in which these innovations increasingly converge, creating a positive feedback loop that accelerates further advancements. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) are expected to have profound societal and geopolitical impacts in the future, adding layers of complexity and uncertainty to their role in international relations.

Diplomacy cannot remain indifferent to these shifts. Virtual embassies are being established, chatbots are employed to engage with citizens, and "digital" ambassadors are being appointed to build relationships with Silicon Valley. AI is increasingly used to assess the consequences of political decisions during complex negotiations, predict political crises, anticipate humanitarian disasters, and harness quantum computing for encryption, with implications for surveillance. However, it is essential that emerging technologies do not exacerbate the digital divide. Effective governance and regulation of these technologies are critical.

From left to right: Jérôme Duberry and Arnaud Danjean.

What are the new forms of diplomacy emerging?

AD: As new actors such as private companies, civil society activists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and non-state armed groups have been challenging nation-states as key actors on the international stage with more and more frequency, diplomacy is no longer the privilege of traditional national and multilateral apparatus dedicated to interstate relations. Each actor has their own international policy and their own diplomatic instrument.

Multinational companies and most big NGOs can be, more or less, compared with traditional national diplomatic organisations in this regard, using dedicated, professionalised people and a well-identified institutional process. What's more, they successfully interact with traditional diplomacies in a well-defined framework.

The big clash comes from the more-individualised actors emerging from civil society and whose legitimacy is based on popular support through media, social networks and specific causes, sometimes in pursuit of only one goal. They don't see diplomacy as a two-way street but more as a univocal tool to set up their own agenda, with little space for compromise. They see traditional diplomacy as a sphere of cold "realpolitik", to which they oppose transparency and popular accountability.

There is also profound transformation within traditional diplomacy, in the sense that instead of being based on dialogue and the search for mutual agreement, diplomacy becomes more and more transactional. The aim is not to find a mutually acceptable compromise enshrined in a set of rules and principles, but to get a deal done at any cost. This is also a trend affecting diplomacy and multilateralism, since it does not contribute to a sustainable and stable system.

Scan to discover our new Executive Course "Diplomacy in a New International Order".

Executive Certificate and Diploma in Advocacy and International Public Affairs

In today's complex, multi-layered policy landscape, the ability to influence decision-making is a crucial skill for professionals across sectors. The Executive Certificate and Diploma in Advocacy and International Public Affairs equip participants with the analytical, leadership, and communication expertise needed to design and execute impactful advocacy and lobbying campaigns. Whether you work in the private or public sector, as a diplomat, policymaker, or in a non-governemental organisation (NGO), this programme provides a solid foundation for navigating international public affairs effectively.

Directed by Professor Davide Rodogno and Christophe Lécureuil, who have taught the programme together since 2016, the course offers participants the unique benefit of their combined academic and professional expertise. With Professor Rodogno's distinguished academic background in international history and politics and Christophe Lécureuil's extensive practical experience as a seasoned advocate and consultant, participants gain a well-rounded, in-depth understanding of both the theoretical and practical dimensions of advocacy and public affairs.

The course helps participants master the necessary skills to influence key stakeholders, secure funding, and transform policies through persuasive communication strategies. It also provides practical tools to plan and implement campaigns in diverse environments – whether global, regional, or local – ensuring tangible results. Participants will further expand their networks by connecting with advocacy practitioners and policymakers from various sectors.

Speaking about the evolving nature of advocacy, Professor Davide Rodogno remarks: "The term advocacy gained its currency relatively recently. The practice, of course, is ancient – think of the abolitionists in the 18th century – but today, advocacy means different things to different people. The malleability of the concept, combined with the multiplicity of practices across sectors, makes it extremely challenging to teach and to master."

Ideal for mid- to senior-level professionals in advocacy, communication, fundraising, or government relations, this programme imparts essential skills and offers a prestigious qualification from a globally recognised institution in international affairs, enhancing career advancement opportunities.

Davide Rodogno is Professor of International History and Politics and Head of the Interdisciplinary Programme at the Geneva Graduate Institute.

Christophe Lécureuil is a seasoned advocate and communicator with 25 years of corporate, consulting, NGO, and institutional experience. He founded CLC Consultant in 2016, an advocacy and reputation consulting firm that advises companies, trade associations, international organisations, and NGOs on their advocacy and communication strategies.

The next edition of the programme will start on 13 March 2025. Scan for more information.

Nouvelles publications

NORRAG Series on International Education and Development 6. Edward Elgar Publishing. Forthcoming December 2024. 192 p. Available in open access.

The Rise of Knowledge Brokers in Global Education Governance

Edited by Chanwoong **Baek** and Gita **Steiner-Khamsi**

How has the surplus of "evidence" in the digital era affected the dictum of evidence-based policymaking? There is no shortage of studies, toolkits, databanks, and compilation of good practices that await update by policymakers. Given the limited uptake, however, many international organisations moved from producing and disseminating knowledge to communicating and brokering knowledge. Their metamorphosis has now become an object of academic curiosity and scrutiny.

The book editors invited scholars in the social sciences and policy analysts in international organisations, such as the OECD, Jacobs Foundation, International Development Research Centre and Global Partnership for Education, to reflect on institutional knowledge brokerage in education. How do they establish credibility and trust, in a crowded space of knowledge brokers? The edited volume attempts to remedy the overemphasis on individual brokers and replace it with investigations of institutional knowledge brokerage used by international organisations as a new tool of global governance.



Khartala. Avril 2024. 220 p.

Malheur à la ville dont le Prince est un enfant

De Macron à Le Pen ? 2017-2024

Jean-François **Bayart**

Ce livre est une démonstration de sociologie historique et comparée du politique. Certes, l'auteur prend pour focale la personne et la politique d'Emmanuel Macron. Mais il s'attache à dégager les logiques de situation dont ce dernier est le jouet consentant, à les replacer sous l'éclairage de l'historicité propre de la société politique française, et à en souligner la commensurabilité avec d'autres situations, passées ou présentes.

La France se pique d'universalité. En l'occurrence celle-ci prend surtout la forme de son ralliement à un mouvement de fond global, souvent qualifié d'« illibéral » ou, plus justement, de « libéral-autoritaire », de « national-libéral ». À son corps défendant, Emmanuel Macron est en passe d'enclencher une révolution conservatrice à la française à force de dévitaliser les corps intermédiaires, de donner des gages à l'extrême-droite identitariste, d'adopter un ton belliqueux. « Nous ne céderons rien », répète-t-il à tout propos. Au risque de devoir céder l'Élysée à Marine Le Pen.

Cambridge University Press. March 2024. 316 p.

Demystifying Treaty Interpretation

Andrea **Bianchi** and Fuad **Zarbiyev**

Demystifying Treaty Interpretation doesn't just tell you how treaties are commonly interpreted. It helps you understand the process of treaty interpretation and its outcomes. The idea that rules of treaty interpretation can guide us to the meaning of treaty provisions, in a simple and straightforward manner, is a myth to be dispelled. This book aims to capture some of the complex and nuanced processes involved in treaty interpretation. It spurs further reflection about how interpretation takes place against the background of concepts, categories, and insights from other disciplines.

A useful tool for scholars, practitioners, and researchers engaging with treaty interpretation at all levels, the book aims to enhance the readers' knowledge and mastery of the interpretive process in all its elements, with a view to making them more skilled and effective players in the game of interpretation.

International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement. No 17. Graduate Institute Publications and Brill-Nijhoff. August 2024. 290 p.

Missing Dollars
Illicit Financial Flows from Commodity Trade

Edited by Gilles **Carbonnier**, Fritz **Brugger**, Elisabeth **Bürgi Bonanomi**, Fred M. **Dzanku** and Sthabandith **Insisienmay**

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) associated with commodity trade erode the tax base of resource-rich developing countries. Curbing IFFs and reforming taxation stumbles over enhanced North-South tensions but remain crucial to help poorer countries mobilise domestic resources for development. *Missing Dollars* examines this key part of the wider agenda to restore trust in the multilateral system, calling for a more transparent, effective and equitable trade and tax framework. Its theoretical and empirical contributions shed new light on issues such as addressing push and pull factors through domestic and international policy measures, the preferences of key stakeholders for short-term fixes versus long-term policy reforms, and prescriptive approaches and other options to address tax base erosion in resource-rich developing countries.

Joint Publishing (Hong Kong). August 2024. 208 p.

Human Rights
A Very Short Introduction

Andrew **Clapham**

The second edition of *Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction* is now available in Chinese, thanks to a translation by Li Bingqing, Lecturer in Law from Shantou University School of Law, and Wei Zhang, Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Institute for Human Rights, China University of Political Science and Law.

The book covers the history and philosophy of human rights and details developments concerning rights related to torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, freedom of expression and discrimination. Issues related to lethal force through the use of drones and the so-called "right to be forgotten" are discussed, and there are sections on the rights of persons with disabilities.

The book has also been translated into Turkish, Swedish, German, Korean, Thai, Arabic, Spanish, and Portuguese.

Routledge. August 2024. 130 p.

The Forever Crisis
Adaptive Global Governance for an Era of Accelerating Complexity

Adam **Day**

This book is an introduction to complex systems thinking at the global governance level. It offers concepts, tools, and ways of thinking about how systems change that can be applied to the most wicked problems facing the world today.

More than an abstract argument for complexity theory, *The Forever Crisis* offers a targeted critique of today's highest-profile proposals for improving the governance of our environment, security, finance, health, and digital space. It suggests that we should spend less effort and resources on upgrading existing institutions, and more on understanding how they (and we) relate to each other.

The volume will be essential reading for public policymakers, NGOs and think tanks, foreign policy experts, government officials, and global decision-makers.

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

NORRAG Series on International Education and Development 5. Edward Elgar Publishing. January 2024. 190 p. Available in open access.

Achieving Equitable Education
Missing Education Data and the SDG 4 Data Regime

Edited by Marcos **Delprato** and Daniel D. **Shephard**

We have passed the midpoint of the Sustainable Development Goal agenda, but the achievement of Goal 4 (SDG 4) on "inclusive and equitable quality education" for all remains uncertain. Gaps in the education data regime are one driver of this uncertainty. Such missing data often affect contexts and groups that are being left furthest behind on the various targets outlined in SDG 4.

The chapters of this book provide a nuanced understanding of education data gaps across regions, themes, and levels of education systems. *Achieving Equitable Education* contributes to envisioning a more effective global education data regime that can better support the achievement of quality education for all.



Cambridge Scholars Publishing. April 2024. 496 p.

Economics of Undocumented Migration

Slobodan **Djajić** and Alexandra **Brausmann**

Undocumented international migration is an increasingly important political, social and economic issue. The articles collected in this volume provide a framework for the study of some key decisions that potential migrants are confronted with when considering a move abroad, such as the timing of departure, the method of financing the move, the choice between documented and undocumented modes of entry, the optimal duration of the stay abroad, or how much to save.

The various chapters illustrate how decisions of migrants are shaped not only by immigration policies and enforcement measures of the host country, but also by their own personal characteristics and the economic environment they face at home and abroad.

At the macroeconomic level, the focus is on the analysis of the effectiveness of immigration policies in controlling the inflow and the stock of undocumented aliens. The question of international cooperation between the host and transit countries is also examined.

3e édition. La Découverte. Mars 2024. 128 p.

Histoire de l'Iran contemporain

Mohammad-Reza **Djalili** et Thierry **Kellner**

Étrange pays que cet État chiite qui n'a jamais rompu avec son passé préislamique et qui, malgré son particularisme, a toujours exercé un rayonnement culturel bien au-delà de ses frontières. Curieux destin que celui de ce vieil empire aujourd'hui entouré de jeunes États, objet, pendant le XIXe siècle et le début du XXe, de rivalités entre puissances russe et britannique, et qui est aussi la première nation du Moyen-Orient à s'être dotée d'une Constitution moderne à la suite d'une révolution dès 1906.

Précurseur dans la nationalisation de ses ressources pétrolières, l'Iran est également le premier pays à avoir connu une révolution islamique qui a provoqué un séisme politique à travers le monde musulman et au-delà. Aujourd'hui, les Iraniens et les Iraniennes cherchent la voie pour sortir d'un régime despotique et misogyne sourd à leurs revendications. Le présent ouvrage a pour ambition d'initier les lectrices et les lecteurs à l'histoire foisonnante de l'Iran des deux derniers siècles (1796-2023), laboratoire politique et nation à part, du point de vue identitaire et historique.

Geneva Graduate Institute et *Le Temps*. Juin 2024. 43 p.

L'Occident et l'altérité

Fractures, valeurs, déclins et convergences

Sous la direction de Mohamed Mahmoud Ould **Mohamedou**

Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, professeur d'histoire et politique internationales et directeur adjoint de l'Institut, a invité d'éminents spécialistes, historiens, politologues, sociologues, philosophes, journalistes et écrivains à se pencher sur la double question de la place de l'Occident dans le monde et de son rapport à l'autre. Leurs réflexions, parues dans une série d'articles du *Temps* en août 2023, sont reproduites dans la présente publication conjointe de l'Institut et du *Temps*. « Cerner les dynamiques contemporaines entre l'Occident et l'altérité n'est pas affaire de mise sous infrarouges réductionnistes et clivants, de hâtives formules d'une époque impatiente ou de bons mots essentialistes et éphémères. Il s'agit plutôt de chercher, patiemment, modestement et difficilement, à démêler les fils d'une relation étagée qui a été et demeure problématique », précise le professeur Mohamedou.

La publication s'ouvre par un éditorial de Marie-Laure Salles, directrice de l'Institut, suivi d'une préface de Madeleine Von Holzen, rédactrice en chef du *Temps*.



Cambridge University Press. October 2024. 236 p.

The Peace Formula

Voice, Work and Warranties, Not Violence

Dominic **Rohner**

Economic forces play a major role in the outbreak and perpetuation of violence, but they also hold the key for positive change. Using a non-technical and accessible style, *The Peace Formula* attacks a series of misconceptions about how economics has been used to foster peace. In place of these misconceptions, this book draws on rich historical anecdotes and cutting-edge academic evidence to outline the "peace formula" – a set of key policies that are crucial ingredients for curbing armed conflict and achieving transition to lasting peace and prosperity. These policies include providing jobs (work), democratic participation (voice), and guaranteeing the security and basic functions of the state (warranties).

Investigating specific political institutions and economic policies, the book provides the first easily accessible synthesis of this work and explains how "smart idealism" can help us get the incentives of our leaders right. The stakes could hardly be higher.


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