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Paradise Lost?

The Relational Topologies and Conjunctural Paths
of Stateless Diaspora Cohesion and
Fragmentation in light of Factionalised Contention

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ABSTRACT

Intra-ethnic conflict is not only an important phenomenon in itself but it is also intimately linked to dynamics of inter-group conflict. Although a growing body of scholarship is increasingly more aware of the relevance of individual and group-level processes for the explanation of macro-level outcomes, the lack of systematic comparative assessments of intra-movement fractionalisation has led to a neglect of one sub-group's agency in particular: Since a stateless diaspora's ontological security depends on the continued existence of a united "homeland", imported schisms pose an interesting puzzle: What impact do partisan fractions have on the cohesiveness of stateless diasporas and what factors condition their behaviour? The study adopts a frame-based relational approach and deploys a sequential-mixed-methods-design combining Qualitative Social Network Analysis with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. It relies on data collected through online ethnography and the consultation of secondary sources. The thesis' main findings suggest that (a) diaspora groups rarely display high levels of factionalisation, and (b) that this is conditioned by host land related constrains and the presence of external incentives provided by transnational advocacy networks and diaspora governance policies.

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Keywords: diaspora, diaspora politics, self-determination movements, contentious politics, factionalism, statelessness, nationalism

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List of Acronyms & Abbreviations

AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
AKP	Justice and Development Party
ARCSS	Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
BDS	Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions Movement
BTF	British Tamils Forum
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
LDK	Democratic League
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organisation
GTF	Global Tamil Forum
Hamas	Islamic Resistance Movement
PD	Justice Party

KCK	Kurdistan Communities Union
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KGD	Kurdish Community in Germany
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KOMKAR	Kurdish Workers for Kurdistan
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
LLRC	Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCP	National Congress Party
NUF	National United Front
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PA	Palestinian National Authority
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
PFLP-GC	Liberation of Palestine-General Command
PIJ	Islamic Jihad
PJAK	Kurdistan Free Life Party
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
PYD	Democratic Union Party
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
QSNA	Qualitative Social Network Analysis
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-IG	SPLM-In Government

SPLM-IO	SPLM-In Opposition
SSDM	South Sudan Democratic Movement
SSLA	South Sudan Liberation Army
TCC	Tamil Coordination Committees
TGTE	Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam
TNA	Tamil National Alliance
TNPF	Tamil National Political Front
TPC	Tamil Provincial Council
TYO	Tamil Youth Organization
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency's
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
VV	Self-Determination Movement (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje)

1. INTRODUCTION

A mind not to be changed by place or time. The mind is its own place, and in itself Can make a heav'n of hell, a hell of heav'n. (Milton 2000 [1667]: l. 253-255)

The Kurds are said to be “the largest nation in the world without its own independent state” (Gunter 2004, 197). Yet, when a great majority of Iraqi Kurds voted in favour of declaring independence from Iraq in September 2017, the vote was not only opposed by the Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish government but also caused tensions between the two main parties within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), the “Kurdistan Democratic Party” (KDP) and the “Patriotic Union of Kurdistan” (PUK). Concurrently, the fracturing of the Assad regime in Syria was accompanied by the emergence of a system of local self-governance in Western Kurdistan (hereinafter, Rojava) which tentatively evaporated the arbitrary boundaries drawn by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 (Jongerden 2018, 62). However, the establishment of two state-like Kurdish entities sparked a fierce debate among competing nationalist factions that challenged pan-Kurdish unity and ultimately culminated in instances of infighting (Gunter 2018, 26). Meanwhile, on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, a concert featuring artists from across the four Kurdish regions of Turkey (Northern Kurdistan), Iran (Eastern Kurdistan), Iraq (Southern Kurdistan), and Syria (Western Kurdistan) brought together thousands of members of the Kurdish diaspora in the German city of Leverkusen in early January 2020. The aim was not only to show solidarity for Kurds in Rojava suffering from the Turkish invasion but most importantly to appear as a united front (Dag 2020).¹

For a long time, research on civil wars and intra-state conflict was designed in a way that reinforced unitary actor models of intergroup conflict thereby underestimating the enormous impact of internal frictions on contentious collective action patterns. A more recent and growing body of scholarship on rebel fragmentation has found that intra-state conflicts with highly fragmented rebel movements tend to be more violent and protracted than those with cohesive rebel groups (Bloom 2005; Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012; Cunningham 2013; Krause 2013/14; Stedman 1997; Wood and Kathman 2015). Yet, despite demonstrating a general willingness to disaggregate the units of analysis, they still presuppose that insurgent groups and their members are first and foremost interested in pursuing their own, mostly material, interests whereas identity and ideology as variables are looked at primarily in instrumentalist terms.

¹ For analytical purposes, I will, at times, resort to essentialising terms such as “diaspora”, “nation”, and “movement”. They should, however, ontologically speaking best be understood as “categories of practice” or allegorical manifestations of the very discursive topologies I intend to dismantle. The conceptual controversies surrounding these terminologies will be elaborated more thoroughly in chapter 4.

This is partly due to a widespread elite-centric bias in the study of (ethno)nationalism, and partly because insurgent groups immediately operating in the conflict zone have attracted most attention. The lack of a systematic comparative assessment of intra-movement fractionalisation processes has continuously painted incomplete pictures neglecting one sub-group's agency in particular: Since diaspora organisations can raise funds to finance continuing warfare, advocate the cause vis-à-vis their respective governments, and provide recruits, they represent powerful potential allies (Brinkerhoff 2008, 68). Yet, as illustrated by the example of the Kurdish diaspora, in contrast to nationalist factions who typically define their strategic goals in ways that accommodate the everyday needs of their respective constituency, a conflict-generated, stateless diaspora's collective identity is intimately linked to the primordial idea of an independent, single political entity or "homeland". Imported schisms within the diaspora thus pose a particularly interesting puzzle which raises the following two questions: What impact do deepening partisan factions have on the dynamics of (fractionalised) fragmentation and cohesion of stateless diasporas and what factors condition their behaviour?

The thesis seeks to tackle these questions by (a) mapping and classifying the physiognomy of five (formerly) stateless diasporas in the wake of interfactional conflict – namely, the Southern Sudanese, Kurdish, Palestinian, Tamil, and Kosovo Albanian community in the United States (US), Canada, Germany, Chile, and the United Kingdom (UK) and by (b) exploring potential conjunctural paths to their emergence. In so doing this study adds to the state of the art in four important ways:

Firstly, looking at self-determination movements that have achieved a certain degree of internal and external sovereignty while still lacking *de jure* recognition (i.e. *de facto* states) allows us to conceive of them as governmental entities rather than conglomerates of opportunistic rebels thereby overcoming the prevailing violent-actor bias. Secondly, by making diaspora organisations its primary unit of analysis it sheds light on how governance is exercised at the margins, and links debates within the peace and conflict, social movement, development, and migration literature which hitherto have failed to consider the nexus between movement fractionalisation and diaspora mobilisation. Lastly, a theoretically and methodologically innovative template for the study of intra-group conflict was developed in the form of a frame-based relational approach to group fragmentation which combines "Qualitative Social Network Analysis" (QSNA) with "Qualitative Comparative Analysis" (QCA).

The thesis is structured as follows: *Chapter 2* provides an overview of pertinent debates on the influence of politically active diasporas on conflict dynamics on the ground within the peace and conflict, development, and migration literature and links these debates to insights gained from studies on rebel fragmentation. *Chapter 3* introduces a frame-based relational approach to movement and diaspora fragmentation and outlines its socio-material conditions. *Chapter 4* then proceeds to sketch out the sequential mixed methods design that was developed to combine QSNA and QCA. In *chapter 5*, the findings of the QSNA will be presented individually before overarching

themes and their potential theoretical implications for the specific modalities of the QCA are discussed. In the following sixth chapter the findings of the bivariate and multivariate analysis of the set theoretic relationship between the seven conditions and factionalised diaspora fragmentation and non-partisan cohesion will be presented. The thesis concludes with a summarising note on the cases along with a discussion on the implications of these findings for future research.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency's (UNHCR) latest "Global Trends" report, the number of forcibly displaced persons has almost doubled over the course of the last 20 years (UNHCR 2019) and transnational communities have undoubtedly been recognised as an increasingly important actor in world politics (Adamson and Demetriou 2007). These developments have led some scholars to argue that diasporas "are the exemplary communities of the [post-Cold War era's] transnational moment" (Tötölian 1991, 4). The rise of virtual, (imagined) communities (Appadurai 1995), i.e., groups that have repeatedly been forced to de- and reterritorialise, paradoxically coincides with a resurgence of ethno-nationalist, intra-state conflicts (Sutherland 2011). The following two sections provide an overview of pertinent, partly contradictory, debates on the influence of politically active diasporas on conflict dynamics on the ground within the peace and conflict, development, and migration literature. Section 2.2. links these debates to insights gained from more recent studies on movement fragmentation and intra-group conflict which hitherto have failed to consider the nexus between movement fragmentation and diaspora mobilisation.

2.1. Diaspora Involvement in Homeland Conflicts

For a long time, "diaspora transnationalism" was theorised from a sociological and anthropological point of view. International Relations (IR) scholarship on the impact of diaspora mobilisation on peace and conflict dynamics goes back to the early 2000s, when terror attacks in Washington (2001), Madrid (2004), and London (2005) accelerated the political and academic securitisation of transnational diaspora politics (see, for instance, Adamson 2006; Byman et al. 2001; Sageman 2004). So-called "homegrown terrorists" were perceived to constitute a threat to the security of their country of residence and were thus subjected to several securitisation practices (Toivanen and Baser 2020, 48). Concurrently with rising concerns over diaspora extremism and radicalisation, conflict scholars became preoccupied with the detrimental role of diasporas in ethnonationalist civil wars.

Ethnonationalism was considered to be a distinguishing feature of both new waves of civil conflict and of mass forced migration in the post-Cold war era (Cederman et al. 2011; Martin 2013). In her seminal book on "New and Old Wars", Mary Kaldor (1999) accuses diasporic "long-distance

nationalists” of being driving forces behind the “New Wars” prelude to a new body of scholarship focusing on the role of diasporas in ethnonationalist intrastate conflict (see for instance, Baser and Swain 2008; Brinkerhoff 2006; Demmers 2002, 2007; Koinova 2011; Lyons 2004, 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2006).² Likewise, Byman et al. (2001) suggest that a plethora of non-state entities have replaced the financial and material support for insurgency by superpowers since the end of the Cold War.

As part of their influential work on “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2000, 2004), taking the proportion of migrant communities residing in the US as a proxy of the size of diasporas, found statistical evidence for a correlation between diaspora’s size and the incidence of civil wars in their respective countries of origin. According to Collier and Hoeffler’s report, diasporas can mobilise more financial resources than local actors which are then potentially being channelled to insurgent and terrorist groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 575). Cederman et al. (2008) further showed that the risk of violent conflict is particularly high when marginalised ethnic groups have external kin in adjacent states. Especially, stateless diasporas generated by conflict are said to be likely to remain involved with “homeland” affairs for the duration of the ethnonationalist struggle and beyond, due to “a trauma of displacement and a myth of return” (Koinova 2011, 334; Sheffer 2003). Basing their collective identity on a sense of historic victimhood, members of the diaspora might find the prospect of reconciliation daunting and therefore respond to mediation attempts with accusations that those who seek compromise are “traitors to the cause” (Demmers 2002; Martin 2013, 18).

In a similar vein, Anderson (1998, 74) frames “long-distance nationalism” as “serious politics that is radically unaccountable”. In practice, diasporas “may nurse grievances as a form of asserting continued belonging” (Collier 2000, 14) by maintaining transnational “networks of violence” (Adamson 2005), acting as spoilers (Lyon 2006), lobbying and fund-raising for armed factions (Collier 2000), and by recruiting fighters in their countries of settlement (Koinova 2009). Demmers (2007) argues that this dynamic is shaped by co-ethnic group formation processes in exile as well as by the availability of political opportunity structures in the host countries. However, Collier and colleagues’ work has also provoked much criticism (cf. Zunzer 2004; Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009). They do not investigate the processes and causal mechanisms behind diaspora engagement (Adamson 2013, 65) and since they rely on indicators of diaspora members residing in the US only, the external validity of their study is questionable. Moreover, negative claims about the role of diasporas often fail to take the heterogeneity of diasporas into account and demonstrate a clear bias towards extremists and radicalised individuals (Mohamoud 2005a).

² The term “long-distance nationalist” was coined by Benedict Anderson (1998) and refers to ethnonational groups residing outside territories adjacent to what they perceive as their ancestral home. Its meaning will here be broadened to also include diasporic groups and individuals who promote a civic form of nationalism (i.e., one that defines nationhood in terms of a shared political rather than ethnic identity).

To counterbalance the prevailing view that diasporas are exceptionally conflict-prone actors, others highlight their importance for peace-making, conflict resolution (Hall 2008; Smith and Stares 2007), peace-building processes (Baser and Swain 2008; Cochrane, Baser, and Swain 2009; Mohamoud 2005b) and development (Brinkerhoff 2008). Leaning towards a positive rather than negative conceptualisation of peace, these authors show that diaspora engagement ranges from remittance sending and knowledge transfer (Hoehne et al. 2010) to institution-building (Craven 2018) and local volunteering (Darieva 2017) and portray them as “agents of change” (Carment and Calleja 2018, 1271).

The simplistic notions that diasporas either perform the role of “peacemakers” or “troublemakers” was challenged by the combined findings of several scholars published in a collective volume edited by Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (2007) which delivered ample empirical evidence that the diaspora’s involvement in “homeland” conflict reconciliation or perpetuation varies from case to case, and overall, does not follow predetermined patterns. Hence, the triadic relationship between the diaspora, its “homeland”, and the country of residence as well as its underlying conditions, mechanisms, and processes need to be deeply scrutinised. In this regard, Adamson (2013, 65) rightly points out that the tendency to treat diasporas as unitary actors and independent variables has prevented us from understanding the “intervening processes of political mobilization” and advocates instead for the division of the study of diaspora-conflict involvement into two stages in which the mobilised diaspora is first treated as a dependent and subsequently as an independent variable – a procedure the mixed-method design at hand roughly follows albeit from a slightly different angle (see chapter 4).

A related problem is that both favourable and critical readings of diaspora activism tend to be based on the premise that diasporas and their “homeland” societies neatly match, and thus there remains a substantial need for empirically grounded research on a lower level of aggregation. Although a number of scholars have contributed in recent years to developing a theoretical framework to make sense of the complex relationship between diaspora, country of residence, the “homeland”, and the conflict in the “homeland”, they have hardly ever looked beyond the “master-cleavage” (Kalyvas 2003) and therefore fail to theorise and/or examine the diaspora’s response to intra-movement conflicts. For example, in her study on conflict autonomisation, Féron (2017) does treat the diaspora as a dependent variable when exploring how “cold conflicts” in the “homeland” might be imported into the country of residence to then be reinvented and adapted to the respective diasporic realities and yet, her analysis prioritises inter- over intra-group conflicts (see also McMahan and Chow-White 2011).³

³ The issue of “imported conflicts” has also been addressed by, inter alia, Skrbis (1999) and McMahan and Chow-White (2011).

As Gade et al. (2019a) point out, little attention has been given so far to the exact physiognomy and horizontal order of diaspora-movement and diaspora-diaspora alliances, that is, whom a group decides to cooperate with. Existing research on diaspora organisations has mainly been undertaken in the form of largely descriptive, single case studies, at the expense of cross-case comparative analyses suitable for theory development. Specifically, the current state of the art lacks a systematic specification of the criteria that are likely to condition the impact of fragmentation processes within the self-determination movement on individual groups within the diaspora. This thesis aims to address this gap by exploring different conjunctural paths to the emergence of specific forms of diaspora fragmentation and cohesion in the wake of interfactional conflicts.

2.2. Movement Fragmentation and Factionalised Contention

It is commonly held that in situations of inter-group conflict, perceptions of external threats to identity are likely to make the ingroup identity more salient, decrease perceived ingroup variability, instil a heightened sense of kinship, and ergo enhance the potential for mobilisation vis-à-vis an external other (Gleditsch 2007). This seems to be particularly important in the context of separatist movements whose main cause of action is to appear as and ultimately establish a unified political entity. Following this logic, dominant approaches in the study of intergroup violence tended to treat groups as unitary actors (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon 1995; Horowitz 1985; Walter 1997).

Conversely, examining the dynamics of a plethora of civil wars, Pischedda (2018, 2020) finds that insurgent groups who share the same ethnic background are particularly prone to intra-group conflict, as they see co-ethnic groups as both potential competitors and as opportunities for growth as they can expect to absorb their defeated rivals' resources. One of the most commonly mentioned causal mechanisms behind cycles of radicalisation as a consequence of ethno-political competition is ethnic or sectarian outbidding where parties adopt increasingly more extreme positions as a means to demonstrate strength and marginalise more moderate parties (Chandra 2005, 235; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1971). It is thus not surprising that studies on rebel fragmentation have repeatedly found that intra-state conflicts with highly fragmented rebel movements tend to be more violent and protracted than those with cohesive rebel groups - in particular with regards to the use of violence against civilians (Bloom 2005; Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012; Cunningham 2013; Krause 2013/14; Stedman 1997; Wood and Kathman 2015).

Linking this to questions about the effectiveness of non-violent versus violent tactics, scholars in the field of competitive violence theory propose that actors will use violence to outbid other nationalists (Bloom 2004), to gain recognition vis-à-vis an opponent, their constituency or the international community, and to challenge hegemonic factions (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012; Krause 2017; Lawrence 2010, 101; Riegl and Doboš 2017; Schlichte and Schneckener 2016, 416; Staniland 2014). Especially splinter groups that have broken away from larger organisations

are said to be more prone to violence and likely to spoil peace processes (Tarrow 1998; Hogan and Walker 1989; Stedman 1997). Consequently, intra-ethnic conflict is not only an important subject in its own right but it is also intimately linked to dynamics of inter-group conflict. In this light, understanding why movements split and determining the correlates of these splits is paramount.

Infighting has been identified as a common feature of most insurgencies (Gade, Hafez, and Gabbay 2019b). Studies addressing the conundrum of interfactional violence are located at the macro (structure), meso (groups and sub-groups), and micro (individual members) level of analysis. Scholarship on group and individual mobilisation and defection, has long focused on macro-level factors such as opportunity structures (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; Pischedda 2018), state repression (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2012; McLauchlin and Pearlman 2012), sponsorship (Salehyan 2010), concession (Seymour, Bakke, and Cunningham 2016) and weakness (Lichbach 1995), battlefield outcomes (Woldemariam 2014), (inclusiveness of) peace agreements (Cunningham et al. 2012; Plank 2017), the availability of natural resources (Fjelde and Nilsson 2012), and finally geographic conditions or external military support (Granzow, Hasenclever, and Sändig 2010, 113) when explaining meso-level fractionalisation processes and their consequences.

Among those who have scrutinised internal group dynamics, Staniland (2014) finds that weak pre-war ties among movement leaders lead to less robust organisations and McLauchlin and Pearlman (2012) demonstrate that the relative impact of state repression varies depending on how satisfied the group members are with the internal distribution of power. By the same token, using evidence from the Palestinian and Algerian anticolonial movements, Peter Krause (2017) argues that movements which are dominated by a hegemonic faction are less likely to experience internecine violence than non-hegemonic ones. Lastly, some scholars view interfactional violence as “a tool wielded instrumentally by subgroup entrepreneurs to cement the overturning of previous lines of solidarity” which can be deployed even in the absence of pre-existing cleavages (Warren and Troy 2015, 487; see also Caspersen 2008).

Moving away from explaining why rebel fragmentation occurs in the first place, several meso-level oriented studies look at dyads and the rationale behind a group’s decision to cooperate with a particular group actor. The literature on alliance formation has argued that insurgent groups merely cooperate in order to improve their performances (Lichbach 1995), form minimal winning coalitions (Christia 2012), or to establish joint control mechanisms in order to minimise operational costs (Akcinaroglu 2012). Despite demonstrating a general willingness to disaggregate the units of analysis, they still presuppose that groups and individuals alike are rationally calculating, goal-maximising entities that will mainly want to join forces with those organisations that are most likely to help them achieve their goals, while identity and ideology as a variable are only of secondary interest.

This is partly because insurgent groups immediately operating in the conflict zone have attracted most attention and the lack of a systematic, comparative assessment of intra-movement

fractionalisation processes has continuously painted incomplete pictures neglecting one sub-group's agency in particular. Since diaspora organisations can raise funds to finance continuing warfare, advocate the cause vis-à-vis their respective governments, and provide recruits, they can be important allies (Brinkerhoff 2008, 68; see previous section). Yet, diasporic groups and individuals are considered to be motivated by ideational and symbolic factors, rather than by the prospect of maintaining or gaining access to resources as they do not live in the conflict zone anymore and are generally in a more privileged financial position (Collier 2000, 4).

While purely instrumentalist perspectives on mobilisation (individual-level) and alliance formation (group-level) may thus account for strategic cooperation among insurgent groups immediately operating in a violent conflict setting, they can hardly be expected to be applicable to mobilisation dynamics within diasporic communities. Irrespective of whether the need to actively express one's national identity derives from a feeling of marginalisation in their country of settlement, the mere possibility that it will be lost without continued expression, or an increased threat on the ground (Brinkerhoff 2008, 77), group cohesion and an adherence to the primordial idea of an independent, single political entity or a "Homeland" is crucial for maintaining a diaspora's ontological security and serves as an important focal point for mobilisation in the country of residence (Lyons 2007, 542). Imported schisms within the diaspora thus pose a particularly interesting puzzle which until now has not been investigated.

A defining feature of several of the aforementioned studies is that they primarily look at violent actors and reduce intra-group conflict to the occurrence of physical, interfactional violence. Drawing from the social movement, collective action, and contentious politics literature, this thesis acknowledges that the range of behaviours composing the process of contestation is broad, and violent actions must not be regarded as *sui generis* phenomena but should be understood as part of broader political struggle (Tilly 1986, 2003; Tarrow 2015; for a detailed discussion see section 3.2). For this reason, a broad spectrum of (ethno)nationalist and diaspora organisations are examined including those that have resorted to violence when confronting factional rivals and/or third-party violence, those that have been subjected to factional and/or third-party violence, and organisations that have neither used violent means nor have been targets of violence imposed by co-ethnic factions or a third-party.

Looking at ethnonational movements that have reached a certain degree of internal and external sovereignty while still lacking de jure recognition (i.e. de facto states) allows us to conceive of them as governmental entities rather than conglomerates of opportunistic rebels thereby overcoming the bias towards military rivalry. Importantly, neither individual members of the ethnonational movement/diaspora nor the diaspora/ethnonational movement as a collective entity but formal organisations claiming to represent ethnic groups and are politically active form the primary unit of analysis. As such they can be meaningfully studied from an organisational theory and behaviour perspective (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2012, 98).

Compared to purely instrumentalist readings of the behavioural aspects of conflict dynamics, social network theory considers salient organisational features such as political, religious, or tactical orientation to be significant factors shaping network structures and could, in addition to the influence of structural factors, prove to provide valuable insights into the rationale behind alliance formation. Building on Steven Zech and Michael Gabbay's (2016) agenda for using SNA to investigate the correlates of group fragmentation, recent scholarly works have begun to pay increased attention to the impact of social ties and organisational structure on group behaviour (see for example, Gade et al. 2019 a; Gade, Hafez, and Gabbay 2019b, Gartenstein-Ross et al. 2019). While this is a rather new development, there is a broad interdisciplinary and sociological literature on the impact of social structures on group behaviour and interaction (see, inter alia, reviews in Centola and Macy 2007, and Siegel 2009). By generating a conceptual framework which allows to represent and analyse cooperative and confrontational relationships between violent and non-violent organisations within fragmented movements in generalisable terms, a largely inductive network approach can bring systematised precision as well as new insights to the study of inter-organisational relations.

3. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Much of the literature on rebel fragmentation builds on Cunningham et al.'s (2012, 266) understanding of movement cohesion as occurring along three dimensions: (1) the number of organisations, (2) the degree to which they are institutionalised, and (3) the distribution of power among them. However, counting the number of pertinent actors within a movement and assessing their relative power says little about the actual level of intra-group contention because it fails to take the nature of interorganisational relations into account and presupposes that factions are necessarily indicative of intra-group conflict. Conversely, as will be shown in chapter 5, relations between organisations and even between factions can be both cooperative and confrontational. It is thus crucial to examine the qualitative attributes of interorganisational ties; especially, as this allows us to distinguish factionalisation patterns that mirror those of their respective movements from those caused by alternative sources of friction. Considering this, section 3.1 of this chapter introduces a frame-based relational approach to movement and diaspora fragmentation which treats the relative salience and prevalence of universal-ethnonational/non-partisan and partisan (A) identity, (B) action, and (C) conflict frames as well as (D) resource and migration flows and (E) joint campaigning as proxies for the cohesive or fragmented nature of diaspora-movement and diaspora-diaspora interactions (see figure 1). Section 3.2 then outlines the socio-material conditions of diaspora fragmentation and cohesion (see figure 2).

3.1. Who am I and if so, how many? A frame-based Relational Approach to Movement and Diaspora Fragmentation

Although the theoretical pedigree of collective identity can be traced back to the canonical work of classical sociologists such as Émile Durkheim or Karl Marx, the concept fully entered the social movements literature as an early recognition of the importance of sense-making in shaping movements and their action repertoires in the 1980s. Alberto Melucci (1980, 1988), writing at a time when class-based movements were in decline and “new social movements” (e.g., peace, environmental, and feminist movements) spread across Europe, developed one of the most influential theories of collective identity in social movements. Moving away from materialist notions of social change as implicitly expressed in both resource mobilisation theory and political process perspectives as well as in structuralist theories of social change, he argued that identity rather than class consciousness is the driving force behind collective mobilisation (Flesher Fominaya 2010, 394).⁴

David Snow (2001, para. 13, 14) distinguishes three prominent perspectives on the formation and substance of collective identities: (1) primordialism, (2) social structuralism, and (3) social constructionism. According to Snow, both the primordialist and the structuralist view essentialise identities:

“From the primordialist point of view, the defining characteristic is typically an ascriptive attribute, such as race, gender, or sexual orientation, or sometimes a deep, underlying psychological or personality disposition. From a structuralist perspective, the critical characteristic is typically a kind of master social category implying structural commonality, such as social class, ethnicity, or nationality; a set of relational ties or networks suggesting structural connectedness; or a mixture of both [...].”

Both variants of the essentialist argument have been vigorously criticised, and “constructivist gestures” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 3) now dominate most discussions of (collective) identity. Constructivists view collective identity as a “process” that defies singular, homogeneous, and static identity frameworks (Melucci 1995, 1996; Anderson 1983). Emphasis is placed on the construction and maintenance of “a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly” (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 285) through series of symbolic interactions within a network of actors. Neither fully subscribing to a constructivist’s agent-centred nor a materialist’s structuralist

⁴ Proponents of the “resource mobilisation theory” such as John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977) or Alfred Cuzán (1990, 402) target the puzzle that although grievances are ubiquitous, “revolution is rare” arguing that contentious collective action has more to do “with resources, organization, strategy, and opportunities than with generalized discontent”.

perspective, I intend to incorporate a structural dimension from an interactionist perspective as will be explicated in section 3.2.

The very fabric of a community and its constituent parts constantly undergo a process of creation and re-creation through the dissemination and (re)interpretation of action and identity frames (Goffman 1963, 1974). Sociopsychological and sociolinguistic research has shown that language in general, and narratives in particular, serve as sense-making devices relating conceptions of stable selfhood to the past, the present, and the future thereby providing ontological securities and biographical continuities (Hase 2021, 3). In other words, storytelling allows the audience to place a set of propositions in causal relation to each other about which they can subsequently form a normatively grounded opinion. Narratives come in various shapes and may deal with historical or contemporary figures or events and can take a variety of literary forms. However, since collective identities and particularly those that are linked to the ethnonationalist master frame depend on the sustained maintenance of a collective memory, only those events which fit in the overall narrative, will become acceptable analogies capable of mobilising action. Narratives are therefore best understood as verbal representations (White 1987) which serve as interpretive and performative tools alike. A movement and diaspora's collective identity should then be regarded as being constituted by the totality of collective action and identity frames propagated by individual and group actors which in return are made up of selectively invoked narratives.⁵

As a “semiotic bricolage” (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996; cited in Snow 2001, para. 17), repeated symbolic interactions serve as boundary markers aimed at distinguishing in-group from out-group members. This so-called process of “othering” is widely held to foster a heightened sense of collective identity among group members. In the context of ethno-nationalist movements, ethno-nationalist frames reify the idea of the existence of (quasi-)primordial groups that, to use Max Weber's (1968, 389) definition, “entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of custom or both, or because of the memories of colonization and migration [...]” and that claim to be the “rightful owners” of a perceived historic land (see also Smith 1991). Similarly, diasporas generated by ethnonational conflict combine national and ethnic identity frames which often reflect visions of a “homeland” linked to a specific point in time when they left their country of origin (Shain 2002; Sheffer 2003). According to Safran (1991), as quoted in Martin (2013, 6), diasporic identity frames with an ethnonational, homogenising outlook are further characterised by narratives pertaining to the preservation of a “collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland”, the “wish to survive as a distinct community [...] by maintaining and transmitting a cultural and/or religious heritage derived from their ancestral home”, shared experiences of trauma and expulsion, and “a sense of alienation from their host country”.


⁵ For an extensive discussion of the difference between narratives and frames as well as their analysis, see Olsen 2014 and Aukes, Bontje, and Slinger 2020.

As Saunders (2008) as well as Tucker (2013) have argued though, collective identity operates differently within and across groups and it is crucial not to conflate movement and group-level. Just like individual participants within a movement, diaspora organisations identify with different diasporic imaginaries with varying degrees of commitment and for a myriad of reasons (Demmers 2007).⁶ Likewise, “boundary work” is going on as much between the movement and the parent-state as it is taking place between sub-groups (Flesher Fominaya 2010, 395). For example, while one sub-group may repeatedly declare the parent state to be their primary adversary and consider the success of the movement as a whole to be their ultimate goal, other sub-groups may be more concerned with preventing their co-ethnic competitors from making gains and therefore fuel ideological or tactical divisions.

Following Brubaker’s call to “think of diaspora not in substantialist terms as a bounded entity, but rather as an idiom, a stance, a claim” (2005, 12), the envisioned study moves away from static essentialist categories and recognises the need to unpack the categories of allegedly monolithic ethnonational groups and their diasporas by looking at the networks of individual actors that constitute them, and by paying attention to the heterogeneity of factions within the diaspora and their relational ties (Koinova 2017). This is in line with Elizabeth Mavroudi’s (2007, 464) understanding of diasporas as being neither entirely “nomadic/fluid (unbounded)” or “homeland-centred/ethnic-religious (bounded)” and permits to analyse the reciprocal creation and selective invocation of collective identity, action, and conflict frames based around constructions of “sameness” and the “homeland”, as well as partisan deviations thereof. For analytical purposes, I will therefore distinguish between (A) universal-ethnonational and (B) partisan identity, action, and conflict frames.

Figure 1 A frame-based relational Approach to Movement and Diaspora Fragmentation – Defining Outcomes

⁶ Only those organisations that pro-actively claim to represent (fractions of) a conflict-generated diaspora will be considered. The mere fact that a group of people shares an objectively similar experience of forced displacement is not sufficient. Importantly, the study’s primary unit of analysis are diaspora organisations and not individual members of the community.




As stated at the beginning of this chapter, and as will be further elaborated in the thesis' methodology section, "alliance" and "oppositional" structures on an aggregate (i.e., movement level) will not be assessed based on the frequency of recurrent interactions only but on the salience and directionality of each of the two types of frames. This is, because, "the difference between a pure coalition, driven by instrumental principles [...] and a movement network is given by identity playing a key role in boundary definition" (Diani 2003: 17). Notwithstanding, organisational identity is constructed at the crossroads of narrative and social interaction. Frame analysis combined with exploratory SNA, captures the significance of socio-material structures as constituted by material and ideational interaction patterns and the interrelationships therein and provides a visual image of a movement's networked physiognomy on an aggregated level. Two forms of interaction will be considered: resource and migration flows as well as joint campaigning. Resource and migration flows can include the provision of financial and material support but also the exchange of human capital (e.g., technical expertise, humanitarian personnel, or military recruits) (Adamson 2013, 72). Joint campaigning may include, among other things, the joint organisation of fundraising events, protest marches, or submission of petitions.

3.2. The Socio-material Conditions of Factionalised Diaspora Fragmentation

Identity frames do not exist in a vacuum and several organisational studies highlight that their exact shape as well as other manifestations of organisational behaviour is determined by the socio-material structures a group finds itself surrounded by and vice versa (Aldrich 2007; Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2012; Craven 2020, 2). The relation between the constraining character of socio-material structures and an actor's ability to affect them has inter alia been addressed from network

perspectives which put the “micro-macro link” at the centre of their attention and view social structure as aggregates of the group actors’ traits (Emirbayer 1997; Diani and McAdam 2003; White 1992).

Figure 2 The Socio-material Conditions of Factionalised Diaspora Fragmentation



Building on such theorising, the thesis seeks to question the assumption that dynamics of diaspora-movement interactions are solely determined by either the agential power of (diaspora) groups asserted from below or top-down structural constraints. Moreover, diaspora mobilisation is influenced by belonging to multiple places (Craven 2020). The emergence of specific frames is significantly shaped by organisational characteristics as well as their complex entanglement in specific structures of three distinct socio-material spaces: the “homeland”, the country of residence, and the transnational arena (see figure 3). In what follows, a plethora of structural and agential factors that might influence a diaspora’s attitude and behaviour towards competing partisan factions is discussed.

3.2.1 Conditions: Diaspora Physiognomy & the Country of Residence

The concept of conflict “deterritorialisation” and “reterritorialisation” was put forward by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) and refers to the process by which certain narratives are being reframed to fit into the new sociopolitical context diasporas find themselves when arriving in their respective countries of residence (Voytiv 2020). While diaspora organisations seek to foster a sustained engagement towards their “homeland”, their actions are also impacted by the social,

political, and economic conditions of their country of residence (Féron 2017; Toivanen and Baser 2020). Furthermore, understanding diasporas as mainly ethnonationalistic entities, disguises the ways in which they create social alliances beyond the ethnic bond depending on religious, political, class, and generational differences.

Generational differences: The relative emphasis groups and individuals within the diaspora place on the “homeland” culture is shaped by generational difference with younger generations being more likely to have a stronger connection to the country of origin and older generations typically identifying more with their host country (Brinkerhoff 2008; Butler 2001). “Homeland” narratives serve as sense-making devices relating conceptions of stable selfhood to the past, the present and the future thereby providing ontological security. While a fair share of the diaspora has been living abroad for decades, is fully integrated and therefore irresponsive to the primordial identity frames described above, these individuals are generally less likely to engage in the secessionist struggle than those who only partly identify with the country of residence because of marginalisation and exclusion. Yet, when it comes to the import of factionalism, one can assume that diaspora groups made up of first-generation immigrants are still more susceptible to schism on the ground than second and third-generation immigrants who mostly have hybrid identities and whose ontological security heavily depends on imaginations of a unified political entity in general, and a cohesive diaspora in particular (Alinia and Eliassi 2014).

Pre-existing Homophily: Ideological proximity has been found to be a crucial determinant of alliance composition within fragmented civil wars (Gade et al. 2019a) as it can be assumed that “agreement within those [ideological, SIC] issue areas facilitates cooperation among rebel factions”. There is evidence that homophily between units with similar ideological and social dispositions plays an important role in the initiation of collaborative interactions between sub-groups (Gabbay 2008). In terms of network structure, it can be expected that groups cluster according to diverging ideological identities – in this case, religious and political orientations. With regards to diaspora-movement interactions, this would mean that ideologically uniform diasporas are less likely to respond to intra-group conflict in a partisan way than those who are already clustered according to religious or political affinities since these clusters could easily be activated by single movement factions.

Distribution of Power: The distribution of power in a movement will typically be assessed by looking at the network from a core-periphery perspective. It can be expected that centralised movements marked by a web of strong cooperative ties around a small number of powerful groups or a single group, will allow them to repel partisan infiltration that could trigger spirals of fragmentation (Krause 2017; Zech and Gabbay 2019, 232;). Following this logic, non-hegemonic diasporas are therefore more susceptible to fragmentation than those dominated by a hegemonic group.

3.2.2 Conditions: Movement Physiognomy & the Homeland

Diaspora Governance Policies: Diaspora governance is “a practice of sending-state power based on the twin processes of selective deterritorialization and reterritorialization of national citizenship” (Dickinson 2017, 4). It is practiced through “homeland” governmental bodies and may encompass a broad variety of initiatives aimed at diaspora engagement such as heritage tourism campaigns, direct investment schemes, external voting rights, or the establishment of staffed and funded national-level diaspora institutions (see Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Bauböck and Faist 2009; Gamlen 2014). The motivation and strategy of sub-groups to reach out to diaspora groups differ from movement-level policies and institutions, and often rely on informal arrangements of diaspora engagement (Alonso and Mylonas 2017). As shown by Brinkerhoff’s (2017) study of the Coptic Orthodox Church’s decentralised policies vis-à-vis the Egyptian diaspora, such informal arrangements often prove to be more successful than attempts made by governmental institutions of the de facto state. Hence, it can be assumed that the less institutionalised a de facto state’s diaspora policies the higher the chance that single movement parties will mobilise the diaspora along factional lines.

Level of Repression by an External Adversary: It has widely been shown that repression and (effective) counterinsurgency campaigns by the parental state can increase the probability of movement fragmentation (Balsler 1997; Staniland 2014; Seymour, Bakke, and Cunningham 2016). By contrast, the shared experience of violence constitutes a core element of a diaspora’s collective identity which means that the severity of inter-group conflict in the past is likely to be positively correlated with a diaspora’s present resilience towards fragmentation.

Source of Intra-group Conflict (Tactical - Ideological): Intra-group conflict can have its roots in a variety of ideological, strategic, and tactical disagreements. Disagreement over the use of violent and non-violent means in response to state repression, for instance, significantly exacerbates the propensity of organisational schisms on the ground (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2012, 101) but can be expected to have a less significant effect on the diaspora than the propensity of divergent ideological orientations among its sub-groups. This is because goals are at the core of an organisation’s identity and ergo, more difficult to modify (Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2013, 239).

3.2.3 Conditions: The Transnational Arena

Besides the “host” and “homeland” context, diaspora organisations also mobilise as transnational actors by engaging in cross-border activities towards co-ethnic diaspora communities that have settled elsewhere (Toivanen and Baser 2020, 50) thereby creating transnational spaces which Faist (1998, 40) defines as “the combinations of social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and


organizations that can be found in at least two geographically and internationally distinct places”. Hence, “durable linkages across borders provide structural constraints and opportunities for diasporas to mobilise upon” (Koinova 2017, 8).

Level of Integration into Transnational Advocacy Networks: Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s (1998) famous “Boomerang Pattern” describes how Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) located in areas of limited statehood turn to internationally active NGOs to gain leverage against their government to address human rights violations in their own countries. Given that diaspora organisations are often located in cosmopolitan cities where they have an easier access to transnational advocacy networks than local NGOs they function as important gatekeepers (Adamson and Koinova 2013; Adamson 2013, 72). Strong coalitions between local, international, and diaspora NGOs then might exercise pressure on the de facto state as well as partisan sub-groups within the diaspora to overcome internal cleavages and can therefore be considered to be conducive to diaspora as well as movement cohesion.

4. METHODS & METHODOLOGICAL POSITIONING

The study combines “Qualitative Social Network Analysis” (QSNA) and “Qualitative Comparative Analysis” (QCA) in a sequential mixed methods design and loosely builds on the work of Yamasaki and Spreitzer (2006) and Manuel Fischer (2011) who, to my knowledge, were among the first to systematically advance this particular research design. In contrast to most mono-method designs, such an approach allows us to treat “data from different levels of analysis in an elegant way” (Fischer 2011, 30) thereby linking meso-level outcomes to macro-level conditions and vice versa. In a first step, an explorative SNA will be used to describe and subsequently classify diaspora-,movement networks at the structural level, which are then compared by using QCA in order to detect the conditions and combination of conditions that lead to the specific network structures observed in phase I. In other words, the second, consecutive phase is separate, but not independent from the first one (see figure 3).

Figure 3 Outline: Conjunctural Path



4.1. Research Paradigm & Onto-epistemological Positioning

With its focus on the discursive manifestation of fractionalisation, the research presented here has been conducted following a predominantly qualitative research paradigm with a critical realist epistemology. Like most constructivist approaches, critical realism considers social phenomena as being concept dependent and in need of interpretive understanding. Reality is conceived as an “open system” (Bhaskar 1979) wherein observable events or processes are not caused by a static set of fixed variables but a series of complex mechanisms. Hence, unlike interpretivists, critical realists do not rule out causal inferences (Zachariadis, Scott, and Barrett 2010, 4). Instead, they subscribe to the idea of complex causality understood in terms of equifinality (i.e. multiple conditions can produce

an outcome), conjunctural causation (i.e. an outcome depends on the presence of a combination of conditions), and asymmetry (i.e. the absence and presence of an outcome are distinct phenomena and need to be analysed separately) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 8). Charles Ragin's (1987) QCA is particularly suitable for analysing social complexity, as it acknowledges the contingency of social phenomena whilst allowing for an exploration of associative patterns (Byrne 2005) which is why Gerrits and Verweij (2013) put forward "critical realism as a meta-framework" for QCA.

Another important characteristic of critical realism is that it is not bound to a single methodology but endorses a plethora of methods which should be chosen depending on the research question. Being partly empirically-grounded and partly guided by theoretical considerations the study at hand seeks to reconcile the "Tale of Two Cultures" (Goertz and Mahoney 2012) in a largely abductive manner. The way in which both the QSNA and the QCA will be conducted is meant to constitute a middle-path between variable- and case-oriented methods. In this sense, this thesis presents itself as an "inherently mixed' study, in which the same data source provides both quantitative and qualitative information" (Yousefi Nooraie et al. 2020, 111; see also Bazeley 2012).

4.2. Case Selection & Scope Conditions

Since QCA combines cross-case comparison and within-case analysis, gaining in-depth case knowledge forms an integral part of the research process hence why the total number of cases is limited to five: South Sudan, Kurdistan, Palestine, Tamil Eelam, and Kosovo. The case selection was determined by theoretical considerations, the author's familiarity with the regional and historical context as well as the availability and accessibility of data. Theoretically, the thesis' scope is limited to transnationally active, conflict-generated diasporas linked to separatist movements which have achieved a certain degree of de facto, in the case of South Sudan de jure statehood, and have experienced intra-group fractionalisation where more than one nationalist vision competes over the allegiance of various diaspora organisations; as such, it resonates with middle-range theorising.

Furthermore, the reliance on online ethnographic data required that more recently active self-determination movements were chosen. Due to language constraints, only those movements were picked whose diaspora's media outlets are primarily publishing information in English, German, French, or Spanish. In order to be able to unequivocally assign a value to country of residence related conditions (Type B conditions), the thesis focuses on diaspora organisations based in the same country of residence with the exception of South Sudan where I collected data on Southern Sudanese migrant communities residing in Canada and the US due to the fact that their Type B conditions are identical and their ties are intractably linked.

I am explicitly looking at diaspora communities located abroad, i.e., not in neighbouring countries. Although forcefully displaced people are most likely to seek shelter somewhere close to their "homeland", the realities they face as refugees in a border camp setting necessitates, that the kind

of institutionalised network of diaspora activists this thesis is concerned with will hardly ever be established; ergo, the effects of factionalism on refugees settling in adjacent states is presumably fundamentally different and should therefore be examined separately.

With regards to the time frame, the envisioned study deals with dynamics which occur after independence was proclaimed or a referendum of independence was announced; this is, because previous studies have found that large-scale diasporic mobilisation for secessionism in the form of transnational coalitions building emerges only after independence has been declared irrespective of differences in the type of secessionist conflicts or diaspora characteristics (Koinova 2011). In so doing, it focuses on episodes of the self-determination movements when according to the literature incentives for interfactional competition can be expected to be particularly high (e.g., shortly before independence referenda are held, interim agreements are to be signed as well as during peace negotiations, or the first post-independence elections).⁷ It is important to keep in mind that I do not seek to explain variations in the degree of fragmentation within a single case (diaspora) over time which would have necessitated to make use of within-case comparisons using longitudinal data but rather to understand what conditions explain a diaspora's relative resilience to intra-movement fractionalisation over time by looking at cross-sectional data. Intragroup conflict should be conceived of as a process rather than an event; hence why the networks drawn as part of the QSNA do not represent specific network configurations at a single point in time but rather a relational mapping of observed trends during the observation period.

4.3. Operationalisation and Measurement

4.3.1. Qualitative Social Network Analysis

Social Network Analysis (SNA) tools are commonly used to describe the structural properties of social relations to then draw conclusions about how specific network configurations relate to the dependent variable. Conversely, Qualitative Social Network Analysis (QSNA) will here be used to operationalise different types of diaspora network configurations which then define the outcomes I subsequently wish to explain by conducting the QCA.

A social network is typically composed of nodes and ties between nodal dyads. Although various methods of data collection have been developed by scholars deploying SNA, most of them focus on computational ways of data collection and on identifying quantifiable relational properties such as intensity, frequency, and strength (Heath, Fuller, and Johnston 2009, 645). Yet, the analysis of order-generating interaction patterns does not necessarily have to be formalised in computational models nor should it solely rely on quantitative observations. Quite to the contrary, the aggregation

⁷ Better known within the social movement and path dependence literature as “critical junctures” or “transformative events”, these episodes “have the capacity [...] to change diaspora mobilisation trajectories” (Koinova 2017, 3).

of relational information allows researchers to draw conclusions about a network's topology but pays little attention to the qualitative attributes of the ties in question. Portraying movements as the sum or density of dyadic relations between its groups bears the risk of underestimating the relative importance of qualitative differences between these ties.

Due to formal SNA's presumed disregard for the contextualised nature of social relations, qualitatively oriented scholars, have generally been hesitant to adopt a network lens and steps towards mixed-methods in network research have rarely moved beyond basic data-triangulation (Bellotti 2016, 199). However, since the 1990s, several scholars influenced inter alia by the work of Harrison White and Charles Tilly, have shifted their attention towards specific discursive formations and identity frames when analysing network configurations. Qualitative, exploratory mapping is well equipped to enhance our understanding of the interdependence of relationships and distribution of agency within a set of actors (Schneider 2012, 140; Gade et al. 2019a, 2079). The analytical tools drawn on here are SNA and framing analysis as each of them touches upon different movement characteristics: the former sheds light on the relational, organisational, and structural features while the latter provides a means to unveil the substance of these relations by paying attention to their identity and ideology-related attributes (Tucker 2013). Based on these methodological premises, I will now outline the different steps involved in conducting a QSNA.

Data Collection and Coding

In a first step, a comprehensive but by no means exhaustive list of significant nodes was made. Knoke and Yang (2008) distinguish between "realist" and "nominal" strategies of drawing a network's boundary. Realist strategies rely on the identification of boundaries by the nodes themselves whereas in a nominal approach the researcher is the one to define them based on an a priori conceptual framework (ibid.). The boundaries of the five networks of interest were largely determined in a nominal way. The visibility of relevant actors at the group level was facilitated by the fact that intra-group competition forces them to publicly declare their primary targets of contentious action (conflict frame), strategic goals (action frame), and organisational identity (identity frame) (Zech and Gabbay 2016, 215).

It is worth noting that the sample is not meant to capture a random selection of members of the diaspora and thus is not representative of the diaspora community as a whole. In order to trace "the processes that produce diasporic practices, rather than assume its condition exists a priori" (Samers 2003, 353), only those civil society organisations (CSOs) and foreign organisational branches of the respective ethnonational political parties were included that are politically active

(Abramson 2013, 665).⁸ This is because, as has been elaborated in the theory section, passive members can potentially be activated, but are irrelevant for the purpose of this study as long as they do not actively engage in the actualisation of collective identities through practice and boundary work.

Contrary to most system-level examinations of insurgent networks which adopt a transnational analytical perspective by looking at ties between organisations fighting for different causes across various conflict settings (Zech and Gabbay 2016), the thesis' interest in factional politics warrants that only sub-groups belonging to the same movement will be included in the QSNA. Each of the five ethnonational movements were thus treated as an independent case.

A first selection of diaspora groups was made, and their qualities were noted. They were initially examined using the following three categories: (A) Identity framing (Diaspora) [non-partisan – partisan], (B) Collective Action Framing [non-partisan – partisan], and (C) Conflict Framing [non-partisan – partisan]. Frame analysis is a well-established tool in social movement research and was deployed to detect an organisation's dominant collective action, identity, and conflict frame. A frame can be understood as a sense making device that “condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one's present or past environments” (Snow and Benford 1992, 137). Qualitative text analysis techniques can reveal seemingly insignificant but ultimately still important frame-relevant information that would be missed by text mining tools (David et al. 2011, 331) and while the frames under scrutiny were predetermined, the list of examples that served as indicators for a specific frame were determined iteratively and are listed in the Coding Protocol in Appendix A.⁹


⁸ Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) include nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs), professional associations as well as faith-based, human rights, and charity organisations that are mobilising towards their homeland.

⁹ By using a predefined set of frames, I followed a slightly more regulated coding procedure than originally pro-posed by Erving Goffman (1974) in his initial, purely interpretivist formulation of frame analysis in order to increase intercoder reliability.

Figure 4 Network Nodes and Ties

Since diaspora organisations acting as transnational actors typically form part of “virtual communities” which constitute the “discursive, and material grounds on which memory, history, and imaginaries can find their [...] representation, and negotiation” (Witteborn 2019, 180; see also, Demmers 2002; Koinova 2009), qualitative textual analysis of a diaspora organisation’s website, social media accounts as well as official press releases and statements was employed to derive a set of said keywords. In addition to that, I also consulted secondary sources if relevant and available. A saturation sampling technique was chosen, terminating the sampling process once no new information was uncovered for a specific category of frames. The exact sample size organised by case and organisation as well as additional information on each observation can be found in the Coding Protocol in Appendix A.

For purposes of expressing the outcome in set-theoretic terms, all indicators were



transformed into categorical variables such that if a group’s membership in that category was identified in the text under examination, the text was coded as 1 for that variable, and 0 otherwise. For each of the three categories (i.e. identity, conflict, and action frames), every single group was assigned to a single dominant frame (i.e. non-partisan or partisan). The coding scheme for the analysis was designed to provide standardised guidelines for the interpretation of information across cases and can also be found in Appendix A.¹⁰

¹⁰ In addition to the three nodal characteristics visualised as part of the QSNA, further information on each organisation was gathered during the coding process in order to evaluate the QCA conditions explicated in section 4.3.2.

In a second step, a snowball strategy was used to identify the groups a particular group interacts with and the different types of behavioural ties were defined and evaluated. Separate ties were used to assess each category of intergroup interactions. An affiliation between two groups and/or factions does not require them to officially announce their alignment (direct tie). Matching collective identity, conflict, or action frames can signal an ideological or tactical alignment, and with regards to resource and migration flows as well as joint campaigning an operational one (indirect tie). If a group has multiple organisational affiliations across different factions or no (significant) affiliations, it was coded as non-factional. The open-source SNA software “SOCNETV” was used to visualise ties between organisations.

4.3.2. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

In this thesis, a Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (Fs/QCA) approach was applied since the case knowledge gained through the QSNA provides sufficient qualitative data to account for the fine-grained differences among cases. Fuzzy-sets are well-suited for the study of complex social systems such as the one under investigation because unlike crisp-set theory, fuzzy set logic allows intermediate membership degrees, which enables the researcher to deal with the contingency and ambiguity of qualitative attributes which are expected to be the result of complex causal chains (Fischer 2011, 31 Ragin 2000).

QCA offers a way to systematically compare differences and similarities across cases and aims at explaining how a certain outcome is produced by a combination of conditions. As such, it is set-theoretic in nature and allows to detect specific combinations of necessary and/or sufficient socio-material and organisational conditions that are associated with a specific network structure, that is, the types of diaspora-movement and diaspora-diaspora interaction patterns and issue-framings identified through the QSNA. This way, expectations of equifinality and asymmetry, or the possibility that multiple combinations of conditions may be associated with the outcome of interest (cohesive dynamics) and its negation (fractionalised dynamics) can be accommodated.

It is important to note, that the inferences that can be made from a Fs/QCA do not prove a causal relationship but reveal patterns of associations (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 412). Given that the number of cases under study is below the recommended benchmark of a minimum sample size of 12 cases for small-N QCAs (Greckhamer, Misangyi, and Fiss 2013, 57), its application in the study at hand clearly suffers from the problem of “many variables, small number of cases” (Lijphart 1971, 685). For this reason, QCA is used here to formalise cross-case comparisons in a way that facilitates a constant dialogue between theory and evidence through abductive, exploratory reasoning and to assess whether the selected conditions provide inferential leverage without following the conventional truth-table procedure (more on this below). It is explicitly aimed at theory-building, not testing.

Regarding the operationalisation, calibration, and measurement of the conditions of interest, I largely followed the steps recommend by Carsten Schneider and Claudius Wagemann (2012), and Patrick Mello (2021) in their respective handbooks. In a first step, seven conditions were conceptualised according to the theoretical considerations outlined in chapter 3.2. Since the number of logically possible configurations increases exponentially with each selected condition, I tried to keep the number of conditions as low as possible without oversimplifying the potential conjunctural chain. Secondly, the criteria for assessing a case’s membership in a five-value fuzzy-set through the transformation of raw data into fuzzy scores was defined and subsequently allocated to a set-membership score ranging from “fully in” (1) over “more in than out” (0.7), “neither in nor out”(0.5), “more out than in” (0.3) to “fully out” (0) (see table 1). Fs/QCA is based on a Boolean logic and relies on calibrated measures; ergo, an observation’s fuzzy membership score does not represent a probability but a truth value (Ragin 2008). Thanks to the small number of cases under investigation, it was possible to calibrate the raw data manually based on the substantive case knowledge gained from the QSNA as well as the theoretical considerations outlined in chapter 3.

Table 1 Operationalisation and Calibration of QSNA Conditions

	Condition	Operationalisation	Calibration & Anchor Points	
A1	<i>Generational differences</i>	<p><u>2./3 Generation Immigrants:</u> Individuals born in the country of residence whose parents and/or grandparents were foreign-born</p> <p>0.3</p> <p>0.5 Mixed</p> <p>0.7</p> <p><u>1. Generation Immigrants:</u> Foreign-born individuals whose parents were also foreign-born</p> <p>1 Predom. 1. Generation</p>	0	Predom. 2./3. Generation
A2	<i>Pre-existing Homophily among Diaspora Groups</i>	<p><u>Pluralistic Network Structures:</u> Dispersed interaction patterns between subgroups with diverging political and sectarian orientations</p> <p>0.3</p> <p>0.5 Mixed</p> <p>0.7</p> <p><u>Homophile Network Structures:</u> Sub-groups cluster according to ideological proximities (sectarian and political orientation)</p> <p>1 Homophile network structure</p>	0	Pluralistic network structures:
A3			0	Hegemonic
			0.3	

	<i>Distribution of Power (Diaspora):</i>	<u>Hegemonic:</u> A cluster of strong cooperative ties around a small number of diaspora groups or a single group	0.5 0.7 1	Mixed Dispersed
		<u>Dispersed:</u> Equal dispersion of cooperative ties among diaspora groups		
B1	<i>Diaspora Governance Policies (Movement)</i>	<u>Institutionalised:</u> Established staffed and funded national-level diaspora institutions which engage in at least one of the following activities: heritage tourism campaigns, direct investment schemes, or external voting campaigns	0 0.3 0.5 0.7 1	Institutionalised Mixed Sporadic
		<u>Sporadic:</u> Bilateral ad-hoc cooperation between single diaspora and movement sub-groups		
B2	<i>Level of Violent Repression by External Adversary: (Movement)</i>	<u>High:</u> Repeated Experience of Violent Counter Insurgencies by external adversary	0 0.3 0.5 0.7 1	High Mixed Low
		<u>Low:</u> No Experience of Violent Counter Insurgencies by external adversary, e.g., parent state is inactive		
B3	<i>Source of Intra-group Conflict (Tactical-Ideological) (Movement):</i>	<u>Means</u> - Self-determination through federalism, semi-autonomy, or full independence - Use of violent vs non-violent means	0 0.3 0.5 0.7 1	Tactical Mixed Ideological
		<u>Ideological:</u> - Religious vs Secular orientation - Conservative vs Progressive orientation - Communist vs Capitalist orientation		
C	<i>Level of Integration into Transnational Advocacy Networks (Movement):</i>	<u>Insular:</u> No or only very few, and predominantly short-term cooperative ties	0 0.3 0.5 0.7 1	Highly Integrated Insular
		<u>Highly integrated:</u> Presence of transnational diaspora organisations with established cooperative ties to International Non-governmental Organisations and/or International Organisational		

Thirdly, two different Fs/QCA approaches were used to analyse the “bivariate” and “multivariate” set theoretical relationships between condition/combination of conditions and an outcome in terms of necessity and sufficiency which are defined as follows: “a condition X is necessary () for an outcome Y if X is also given whenever Y is given (i.e., Y implies X; Y is a subset of X). X is sufficient (!) for Y if Y also occurs whenever X occurs (i.e., X implies Y; also, X is a subset of Y)” (Thomann and Maggetti 2020: 360).

Bivariate relationships are analysed by testing individual conditions for their necessity and/or sufficiency. Together, the three parameters of fit consistency, coverage, and relevance of necessity (RoN) were considered when testing for necessity. Consistency assesses the extent to which membership in a condition/conjunctural path is always associated with a particular outcome (i.e. is a subset of the outcome). Coverage reports the proportion of the outcome set that is consistently explained by a condition/combination of conditions (Ragin 2008).

The truth table construction forms an integral part of most QCA studies and serves to identify multivariate relationships representing configurations of conditions that are jointly sufficient for an outcome to occur. The truth table rows contain all logically possible combinations; the occurrence and non-occurrence of the respective outcome are listed in two separate columns. The main objective of the truth table procedure is to minimise the number of configurations which explain the presence and absence of the outcome through the application of Boolean minimisation algorithms (Soda and Furnari 2012: 288; Ragin 2000: 204). Unfortunately, truth table analysis treats any combination of causal conditions as equally important whether they are empirically relevant or not, and since fully saturated truth tables are very difficult to obtain, often several logically possible configurations will show no empirical instances (Soda and Furnari 2012: 288; Thomann and Maggetti 2020: 357).

This problem of “limited diversity” is particularly salient for small-N studies. The reason for running an algorithm such as the Quine–McCluskey algorithm (Ragin 1987) is to determine and subsequently eliminate redundant conjuncts. However, given that this study deals with only five cases, it can be assumed that the number of “logical remainders” (i.e. logically possible configurations of causal elements without empirical instances) will be so high that hardly any logical minimisation is possible, and the paths identified would mostly only cover one case each (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).¹¹

¹¹ A conjunct (i.e., a condition that forms part of a combination of conditions) is redundant “when two conjunctions share the outcome and all conjuncts except one. In this setting, the conjunct that varies across the two conjunctions is redundant and the two conjuncts are simplified to one that only displays all invariant conjuncts” (Rohlfing 2016, 2076).

Although methods have been developed to systematically explore logical remainders, I agree with those critiques who argue that such simulations violate constitutive features of empirical QCA studies as no immediate case knowledge is involved in the analysis of counterfactuals (Ragin 2014). Hence, a truth table analysis using conventional procedures cannot be applied to produce solution formulas that explain the sufficiency of the outcomes. Whether the observed associations should be interpreted as causal relations, will therefore only be discussed based on the insights derived from the QSNA as well as theoretical considerations in a way that contributes to theory building through the systematic advancement of potential models whose external validity needs to be tested in future large-N studies.

4.4. Limitations and Ethical Concerns

Some of the caveats of each individual method have already been elaborated in the previous two sections hence why this section will first and foremost delve into ethical concern directly linked to mixed-methods designs and pragmatic research that are not necessarily unique to this study. I will also address some endogeneity related issues.

Given the complexities of operationalising, and conducting mixed-methods research (MMR), Preissle et al. (2015: 146) rightly point out, that the lack of transparency about the research process, aggravated by a conflicting nomenclature, may become problematic. In order to achieve terminological consistency, a comprehensive list of acronyms and abbreviations was made, and key concepts and their operationalisation were introduced in the paper and defined in more detail in the coding schemes and protocols in the appendices. Moreover, acknowledging the situatedness of the researcher means that transparency through the use of reflexive practices should be part of any mixed methods study. I kept a research diary in which I documented decisions throughout the research so that I could continuously reflect on my practices and engage in self-criticism.

The so-called “new ethics” form an integral part of critical pragmatism. They demand that the research should improve socio-economic justice, promote positive peace, and is based on a reciprocal relationship with the researched community (Brewer 2016: 3). As time and financial constraints made it impossible to complement the desk and online ethnographic research with data collected from collaborative, participatory research, the study at hand fails to engage in a “dialogue of equals” with the respective diaspora communities.

Moreover, it is paramount to remember that the selected organisations only represent one specific, highly politicised sub-group of diasporic individuals who migrated from the Global South to the Global North; as such it constitutes an important phenomenon in its own right but the conclusions we can draw from looking at North-South dynamics do not necessarily apply to instances of (often temporary) displacement within the same region. Lastly, given that the study treats diaspora groups as its primary unit of analysis, individual motivations and decision-making rationales are not

considered. To avoid reducing diasporic realities to the interorganisational relations studied here, future studies should conduct microanalyses of diasporic factionalisation processes.

Due to the reliance on a mid-N number of cases and the need for in-depth knowledge of each case, QCA is fairly data-intensive. Balancing in-depth case knowledge with making generalisations about when an observation conforms to the theoretically relevant expectations indicating set-membership, can at times feel like a bad compromise; at the same time, however, it allowed me to deal with endogeneity related problems typically associated with theory-based quantitative research.

5. FINDINGS I: MAPPING THE DYNAMICS OF DIASPORA FRAGMENTATION AND COHESION IN LIGHT OF INTRA-GROUP CONFLICT

In the following section the findings of the QSNA will be presented individually before I move on to discuss overarching themes and their potential theoretical implications for the specific modalities of the QCA. For each case, a brief summary of the general characteristics of the movement and its divisions and the diaspora and its divisions (or lack thereof) is followed by a description of the observed network structure and a presentation of a couple of illustrative examples.

5.1. South Sudan

“When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.”¹²

(South Sudan Women United 2014)

In January 2011, nearly four million Southern Sudanese went to the polls and voted almost unanimously in favour of independence and secession from the Republic of Sudan (Belloni 2011: 411). The right to self-determination had been enshrined in the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement” (CPA) which formally ended Sudan’s Second Civil War between the predominantly Arab-Muslim North and the Christian South in 2005 and reaffirmed the right of the Southern population to hold a referendum of independence after an interim period of six years (Troco 2018: 66). Yet, the euphoria of the victory soon subsided in the face of an outbreak of inter-ethnic violence in 2013 which was

¹² South Sudan Women United, “Women, Children and Elderly are the Victims. Pamphlet.” <https://www.facebook.com/SSWUNITED/photos/a.391692957634320/393222354148047/>, (Last accessed: 20 May 2021).

spurred by a dispute between the then president of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, and his vice president Riek Machar.

The QSNA captures Diaspora-Movement Dynamics following the 2011 referendum up to the negotiations of the “Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan” (ARCSS) in 2015 and its aftermath focusing in particular on reactions to the outbreak of interfactional violence in 2013.¹³ This period was chosen because it saw an escalation of intra-group conflict (Zambakari 2013: 41) and due to the fact that there is only little data on political violence that occurred in the region between 2005 and 2009.

5.1.1. Movement Physiognomy

It was never set in stone that self-determination would necessarily have to take the form of full secession. In fact, the CPA stipulated that a “Government of National Unity”, predicated on a close cooperation between the “National Congress Party” (NCP) and the “Sudan People’s Liberation Movement” (SPLM), ought to be created (Belloni 2011: 411). Initially, John Garang, the figurehead of the Southern self-determination movement, promoted unity in his philosophy of a “New Sudan”. Yet, after his death in July 2005, the “New Sudan” ideology gradually lost its appeal and the long-standing division within the ruling SPLM between those who believed that Garang’s vision of a united, but secularised and democratised Sudanese state could eventually be realised and those who favoured secession resurfaced (ibid.). Debates about federalism and self-rule have shaped the political struggle between different factions in South Sudan ever since.

In a report published by the Overseas Development Institute and edited by Schomerus and Aalen (2011: 10-12), the authors identify ethnicity, on the one hand, and conflict over land and access to resources on the other hand, as the driving forces behind South Sudan’s intra-movement divisions and often also behind interfactional violence. South Sudan is ethnically diverse, and several instances of violence seem to have their roots in the rivalry between ethnic groups; especially between the country’s biggest ethnic groups the Dinka and Nuer people (ibid.: 16). The 2013 conflict was triggered by Riek Machar’s alleged plans to oust Salva Kiir as leader of the SPLM and his subsequent suspension from the cabinet. Kiir was supported by the Dinka people who have held control of the government since the end of the civil war, while most Nuer joined Machar who subsequently founded the SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO). Other important challengers include the “South Sudan Democratic Movement” (SSDM) led by David Yau Yau of the Murle nationality in the Jonglei State of the Greater Upper Nile Province, “SPLM for Democratic Change” (SPLM-DC) founded by former Foreign Minister Lam Akol, “South Sudan Liberation Army” (SSLA), and the

¹³ The ARCSS was signed on 17 August 2015 in Addis Ababa by representatives of the “Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In-Government” (SPLM-IG) and “SPLM-In-Opposition” (SPLM-IO), and was meant to bring an end to the violence that had broken out in 2013, following allegations of an attempted coup d’état.

“National United Front” (NUF) (Wassara 2015: 635; Quarcoo 2019: para. 5). In addition to that intra-ethnic tensions arouse after the death of John Garang who represented Dinka Bor and its predecessor Salva Kiir who belongs to the Dinka Bar El-Ghazal. Since then, Dinka Bor have been weary of the possible involvement of Dinka Bar El-Ghazal in Garang’s death.

When it comes to the distribution of land, traditional leaders and chiefs continue to be the main actors in the instigation of local conflicts (Schomerus and Aalen 2016: 14). The two main antagonists here are (nomadic) cattle-herder and sedentary agricultural communities – especially so between the Lou Nuer and the Murle in the Jonglei State (Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike 2013: 4). Changes related to control of resources have an impact on tribal relations because groups that feel that they have been unfairly treated may invoke their tribal identity.

Table 2 Overview of Pertinent Partisan Frames – South Sudan

	<i>Identity frames</i>	<i>Conflict Frames</i>	<i>Action Frames</i>
Ethnic Divisions (Inter):	Dinka vs Nuer Nuer vs Murle, Murle vs Dinka Bor	Tribal grievances Access to resources equitable distribution of power corruption and dysfunctional	United Sudan (Dinka) vs independence (Nour)
Ethnic Divisions (Intra):	Dinka Bahr el Ghazal vs Dinka Bor	governmental apparatus	centralised vs decentralised state
Political Divisions:	SPLM-IO vs SPLM-IG South Sudan Democratic Movement (SSDM; David Yau Yau) South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA); National United Front (NUF) SPLM for Democratic Change (SPLM-DC); FDP/SSAF (Federal Democratic Party/South Sudan Armed Forces) SSPM/A (South Sudan Patriotic Movement/Army) SSLM/A (South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) SSNMC (South Sudan National Movement for Change) SSUM/A (South Sudan United Movement/Army) NAS (National Salvation Front)		

NDM (National Democratic
Movement)
UDRA (United Democratic
Republican Alliance)
PDM (People's Democratic
Movement)

Increasingly, therefore, people argue that their particular tribe or local community should have its own “county”, “payam” or “boma” and demands for a federal system have been put forward as a counter narrative to the “One nation, one people” slogan propagated by the SPLM-led government (ibid.: 18).¹⁴ Critically, after 2011 the Southern government began to enforce loyalty to the nation through the establishment of a centralised unitary system despite the popular demand for the adoption of a decentralised federal system (Kindersley 2012; Kuol 2020: 7). While the “SPLM-In Opposition” (SPLM-IO) supported the adoption of a federal system, the Dinka-dominated “SPLM-In Government” (SPLM-IG) turned their demands down which caused communities in the Equatorial region to feel particularly excluded (Kuol 2020: 8).

5.1.2. Dynamics of Diaspora Fragmentation and Cohesion

The first (1955-1972) and second civil war (1982-2005) between the northern and southern part of Sudan have produced one of the largest populations of displaced people in the world. According to the UN Agency on Refugees (UNHCR 2020), currently 2.2 million South Sudanese refugees reside outside of the country with the majority of those fleeing South Sudan seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Most of these settlements are temporary and thus of little interest for this study. Instead, this case’s sample is comprised of diaspora organisations which are located in Canada and the US as this is where South Sudan’s largest and most established diaspora community resides.¹⁵

On an aggregate level, the diaspora displays mostly non-partisan interaction patterns (see table 3 and figure 5). Except for two organisations which show strong regional affiliations (i.e.

¹⁴ Payams and Bomas are administrative units which are often reflective of the number of ethnic groups or tribes in a region.

¹⁵ According to the Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan in Washington DC about 80,000 Southern Sudanese nationals are estimated to live in the US and Canada. See <https://www.southsudanembassyusa.org/embassys-mission/> [accessed 22 May 2021].

Equatorian) and one incident of inter-organisational conflict in December 2013 between the anti-governmental “Alliance for South Sudanese in Diaspora” and the widely non-partisan “South Sudanese Community in Alexandria”, most sub-groups stress the need to seek “unity in diversity” and urge the various factions to resolve their conflicts peacefully. Notwithstanding, the “Equatoria South Sudanese Community Association, USA” and its Canadian branch have repeatedly invited strong opponents of Kiir to speak at their events and conferences such as Joseph B. Bakasoro, Governor of Western Equatoria and a leading figure within the South Sudan National Movement for Change, in 2016 (ESSCA-Canada 2016). Likewise, the “Global Partnership for Peace: I’m South Sudan” accused “the government, under the leadership of President Salva Kiir, a Dinka by tribe” of turning “the country into a blood pool through tribal policies aiming at ridding South Sudan of its non-Dinka ethnicities [...]”.¹⁶ Although, according to Gale (2011: 4), there are more than 30 different tribes from Sudan in Maine alone, they rarely form official organisations and usually unite under umbrella groups so that there is only a very small potential for the import of tribal rivalries. While acknowledging and to some extent embodying factional tensions, most actors express their belief in the possibility of a united South Sudanese nation, and the most salient conflict frames typically refer to disunity and tribalistic rivalries as one of the biggest threats to peace and stability in South Sudan. Diversity is celebrated as a strength rather than a weakness and is often mentioned as one of South Sudan’s key identity markers. Accordingly, the diaspora holds on to the idea of a form of civic nationalism based on the principles of ethnic pluralism and a decentralised form of governance.

Table 3 Dynamics of Diaspora Fragmentation and Cohesion - South Sudan

	<i>Identity frames</i>	<i>Conflict Frames</i>	<i>Action Frames</i>	<i>Direct Alignment</i>	<i>Matching Frames</i>	<i>Resource and Migration Flows</i>	<i>Joint campaigning</i>
Movement-Level Aggregate:	0.3*	0.3*	0*	0*	0.3*	N/A [0.19]	0*
Dynamics of Fragmentation and Cohesion:							0.3*

* Rounded to the nearest fuzzy-set threshold
0=non-partisan cohesion; 1=factionalised fragmentation


¹⁶ Exemplary quotes and their sources are listed in the Coding Protocol in Appendix A.

When Salva Kiir and the SPLM-IG are criticised, then usually not in a way that would suggest that the organisation in question is aligning itself with the SPLM-IO or any other of the aforementioned opposition parties but rather that their position has been heavily influenced by the institutional landscape of their respective country of residence. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP), a Washington based, government-funded institution “devoted to the nonviolent prevention and mitigation of deadly conflict abroad”, for instance, serves as a central junction point for the South Sudanese community in North America. It has organised several workshops, the USIP Sudanese and South Sudanese Youth Leaders Program and a series of teleconferences “on Designing a Peacebuilding Dialogue” aimed at strengthening the diaspora’s ability to promote mediation and conflict reconciliation back home.¹⁷

Several external actors involved in humanitarian work on the ground seem to have a vested interest in nurturing organisations with a strong feminist profile. As a result, “South Sudan Woman United” managed to catch the attention of and subsequently build strong ties with important international actors such as UN Women, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Consequently, the international donors’ demands for more inclusivity and gender equality tended to have a greater effect on organisational identity and action frames than the partisan quarrels in their “homeland”.

Figure 5 Qualitative Mapping of Diaspora Organisations and Affiliates - South Sudan

¹⁷ For more information see: <https://www.usip.org/> [accessed 19 May 2021].



While every single organisation’s primary identity frame revolved around their Southern Sudanese origin, they also made use of Christian or Ubuntu vocabulary and imagery thereby showcasing an almost syncretic approach to nation-building.¹⁸ As can be inferred from the network visualisation in figure 5, local US-American and Canadian, Episcopal or Roman Catholic congregations played an important role in fostering biblically-inspired narratives of peace and forgiveness as well as in sponsoring charity or cultural events on a communal level. Moreover, the frame analysis revealed that several of the organisations seem to perceive of themselves as working in a longstanding tradition of non-violent resistance as they frequently quote Nelson Mandela, Mahatma Gandhi, or Martin Luther King when condemning interfactional violence. In sum, civic nationalist, liberal internationalist, and more universalist ethical belief systems (i.e., Christian, Ubuntu, or pacifist ideals) have worked in concert to produce a plethora of potent, non-partisan counter narratives.

5.2. Kurdistan

¹⁸ Ubuntu has its roots in humanist African philosophy and promotes a relational ontology. It was popularised by Archbishop Desmond Tutu who translates it as the idea that “a person is a person because of or through others” (Tutu 2004, 25-26).

A society can never be free without women's liberation. (Öcalan n.d.)

Kurdistan has been a social construct of external and domestic political actors throughout history and the Kurds are often said to be the largest nation on earth without its own independent state (Vali 2003). According to estimates, there are around 25-35 million Kurds living across five states in the Middle East: Turkey (Northern Kurdistan), Iran (Eastern Kurdistan), Iraq (Southern Kurdistan), Syria (Western Kurdistan), and Armenia.

When 92% of Iraqi Kurds voted in favour of declaring independence from Iraq in a referendum held on 25 September 2017, the vote was not only vehemently opposed by the Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish governments as well as by much of the international society but also re-invigorated rivalries between the two main Southern Kurdish parties, the “Kurdistan Democratic Party” (KDP) and the “Patriotic Union of Kurdistan” (PUK).

As demonstrated by the fierce debate following the establishment of two competing government systems in Southern Kurdistan and Rojava, Kurdish nationalism was challenged not only by the counter-nationalisms of the respective states but also by Kurdish disunity (Gunter 2018; Jongerden 2018). The QSNA captures the dynamics surrounding an episode of the history of the Kurdish national movement when greater autonomy was feasible for two out of the four Kurdish communities (2013 - 2018).

5.2.1. Movement Physiognomy

Two decades after a de facto independent region of Southern (Iraqi) Kurdistan (Kurdistan Region of Iraq, KRI) came into existence in 1991, the momentary breakdown of the central state in Syria facilitated the establishment of a local government in Western Kurdistan (Jongerden 2018: 62). Before 2011 Rojava was less of a demarcated territorial entity and more of an abstract idea in the quest for a collective identity (Sary 2016: 6). Since then, it is made up of three non-contiguous cantons: Cizîrê, Kobanê and Efrîn and in 2016, the “Federal Democratic System of Rojava and Northern Syria” declared itself autonomous. In Syria, the Kurdish movement is primarily divided between the “Democratic Union Party” (PYD) and the “Kurdish National Council” (KNC) and due to its strong economic ties to Turkey, the “Kurdish Regional Government” (KRG) under President Masoud Barzani was interested in curbing the influence of the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) and the PKK-affiliated PYD (Bröker 2016: 15).

Table 4 Overview of Pertinent Partisan Frames – Kurdistan

	<i>Identity frames</i>	<i>Conflict Frames</i>	<i>Action Frames</i>
Political Divisions	<p>KNC [KRI/KPD, PDK-S, Yekîfî, Kurdish Reform Movement, Kurdish Democratic Equality Party in Syria, Kurdish Democratic Patriotic Party in Syria, Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (el-Partî), Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria (Democratic Yekîfî), Kurdistan Democratic Union Party]*</p> <p>vs</p> <p>TEV-DEM/ PYD/YPG (PKK)*</p> <p>PUK (Talibani, PKK)</p> <p>vs</p> <p>KPD (<i>Barzani, KDP-S</i>)*</p> <p>vs</p> <p>Gorran Movement</p>	<p>KNC: Anti-PKK, accuses TEV-DEM of oppressing opposition parties; anti-ISIS</p> <p>PYD: trying to reduce the KRI's influence in Rojava; anti-ISIS</p>	<p>KNC: use of Iraqi Peshmerga in the fight against ISIS; formation of a federation within a democratic Syria</p> <p>PYD: Democratic confederalism, independence (Öcalan)</p>
Ethnic Divisions	N/A	-	-
Sectarian Divisions	N/A	-	-

*affiliated sub-groups

5.2.2. Dynamics of Diaspora Fragmentation and Cohesion

It is estimated that there are about 5-10 million diaspora Kurds and that around 800,000 of them live in Germany (Federal Ministry of the Interior 2011). According to Paasche (2020), Southern Kurdish asylum migration to Europe came in three waves [1974-1991 (elite pioneers fleeing from Saddam Hussein's state repression and as a result of the al-Anfal Campaign), 1992-1998 (second-wavers were escaping interfactional violence between PUK and KDP as well as the economic disaster caused by UN sanctions regime against Iraq), and 1999-2014 (due to family reunions and international marriages)]. Likewise, there were three waves of Northern Kurdish migration to central Europe: 1960/70s (guest workers from East Turkey), 1980s (the military coup targeted left-wing opposition groups where Kurds were disproportionately active), and 2015-present (after the peace

process between the PKK and the central government had failed) (Demmrich and Arakon 2021). Since 2015, the threat posed to Western Kurds by both the Islamic State (IS; hereinafter, Daesh) and Turkish military offensive against then Kurdish-held Efrîn, have provoked yet another wave of Western Kurdish migration.

The fuzzy-set score of 0.5 suggests, that the Kurdish diaspora in Germany is neither fully factionalised nor non-partisan. If we take a closer look at the results of the QSNA, it becomes evident that the organisations roughly fall into two camps: On the one hand, the organisations that cluster around the Kurdish Community in Germany (Kurdische Gemeinde Deutschlands, KGD) are mostly non-partisan and work in close cooperation with several national and international INGOs and CSOs as well as with different administrative bodies of the German government. They are actively involved in local community-building and seem to be deeply integrated into their respective neighbourhoods where their activities revolve around language classes and cultural events. They typically mobilise towards the homeland by collecting donations, hosting fundraising events, running awareness campaigns, and by joining forces with German opposition parties (Alliance 90/The Greens and The Left) to exercise pressure on the German government to impose sanctions on the Turkish, Iranian and to a lesser extent the Iraqi state as well as to participate more actively in military campaigns against Daesh.

Table 5 Dynamics of Fragmentation and Cohesion - Kurdistan


	<i>Identity frames</i>	<i>Conflict Frames</i>	<i>Action Frames</i>	<i>Direct Alignment</i>	<i>Matching Frames</i>	<i>Resource and Migration Flows</i>	<i>Joint campaigning</i>
Diaspora-Level Aggregate:	0.5*	0.3*	0.5*	0.5*	0.5*	N/A [0]*	0.3*
Dynamics of Fragmentation and Cohesion:							0.5*

* Rounded to the nearest fuzzy-set threshold
0=non-partisan cohesion; 1=factionalised fragmentation

On the other hand, diaspora organisations influenced by the activities and rhetoric of the “Kurdistan Communities Union” (Kurdish: Koma Civakên Kurdistan, KCK; formerly, Kongra Gelê Kurdistan,

Kongra-Gel), an umbrella group of parties promoting Abdullah Öcalan’s political ideology, share the “Kurdistan Workers’ Party” (PKK), “Democratic Union Party” (PYD), and the “Kurdistan Free Life Party’s” (PJAK) agenda of creating a pan-Kurdish entity based on the principles of democratic confederalism. According to the KCK this requires “replacing the nation-state with grassroots, self-governed communes, establishing a relationship between the sexes based on equality and respect and developing a new balance between humanity and nature.”¹⁹ Consequently, their identity and action frames are marked by feminist, anti-capitalist, and environmentalist ideals and they tend to coordinate their campaigns with other left-wing groups such as Antifa or the Blockupy movement. Irrespective of the ban of PKK-affiliated organisations in Germany, they frequently express their support for and call for the release of Abdullah Öcalan. In terms of its mobilising potential, Zarnett (2015, 216) further finds that: “[i]n contrast to pro-PKK diaspora organizations, rival organizations such as the Association for Kurdish Workers for Kurdistan (KOMKAR), which [are] tied to Kurdish social democratic parties in Turkey that oppose [...] violence and the PKK, [are] far less successful in mobilizing supporters.”

Figure 6 Qualitative Mapping of Diaspora Organisations and Affiliates - Kurdistan



¹⁹ The complete mission statement can be found here: <https://kck-info.com/> [accessed 01 June 2021].

- Strength of Association (Direct – Indirect)
 - ★ Partisan Diaspora Organisation
 - Non-partisan Diaspora Organisation
 - ◆ External Actor

Factional alliances were most clearly expressed by organisations reporting on developments in Western, Southern and Northern Kurdistan; potential fractions in Eastern Kurdistan were hardly discussed. There were only very few noticeable interactions between the more neutral and the more politicised camp. Importantly, neither sectarianism nor kinship was used as a divisive force. With regards to dominant conflict frames, statements reflecting intra-movement tensions were outnumbered by those dealing with the common threat posed by Daesh to Southern and Western Kurds, and the Turkish government to Northern and Western Kurds – particularly, in the aftermath of the alleged coup d'état against the “Justice and Development Party” (AKP) led Turkish government in 2016. The continued support for a unified “homeland” was expressed through different nationalist tokens such as the Kurdish flag or symbols related to the Kurdish Newroz celebrations. Posts or press releases that were criticising individual parties or factions were almost exclusively targeted against the at the time dominant faction in the respective Kurdish region i.e., the KDP in Southern Kurdistan and TEV-DEM/PYD/YPJ in Western Kurdistan; concerns related to the PKK’s use of terrorist means were only voiced by organisations with strong cooperative ties to and financial support by the German government. The referendum of independence in Southern Kurdistan (2017) and the declaration of autonomy in Western Kurdistan (2016) were both equally endorsed by the vast majority of diaspora organisations.

Although Kurdish nationalism is undoubtedly of a more ethnic than civic kind, several Kurdish CSOs show their sympathy for other minority groups in the Levant and stylise the master-cleavage between them and the respective parent state in a way that resonates with the grievances of other ethnic or religious communities in the region like Yezidis or Assyrians. They draw public attention to these grievances by deploying narratives that allude to genocidal events or other instances of mass atrocities in the past such as the Halabja chemical attack against Northern Kurdish people by the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein in 1988. Similarly, Bahar Başer (2019: 82) found that even Germany-based groups that were aligned with the oppositional Northern Kurdish Goran movement supported the KDP in advocating for the recognition of the al-Anfal campaign as genocide. Moreover, the historically friendly relations between the Kurds and the Israeli state translate into joint initiatives and long-standing partnerships between the two communities.

5.3. Palestine

It's not a hyphenated identity, but the fusion of two identities that belong together and have no issues belonging together.²⁰ (Meruane 2020)

The victims of Israeli aggression ask Obama: Who is the terrorist?
(Palestinalibre 2014)²¹

For more than 100 years, the conflict with Israel has been a primary marker of modern Palestinian identity so that whoever wants to gain legitimacy among a Palestinian constituency, cannot help but dedicate itself to the liberation of Palestine, or at least formally claim to do so (Løvlie 2014: 103). Consequently, major divisions within the Palestinian nationalist movement are not goal related, but rather a strategic contestation over how to achieve said liberation (ibid.). Additionally, one can distinguish between parties with a secular-nationalist and Islamic agenda.

Even though some groups have been operating across factional lines, Palestinian politics are still largely determined by the conflict between the eleven parties represented in the “Palestinian Liberation Organisation” (PLO) which dominates Palestine’s main government-body, the “Palestinian National Authority” (PA), and the “Islamic Resistance Movement” (Hamas) and other Islamic forces. The 2009 Constitution of Fatah promotes the establishment of a secular state and Hamas’s 1988 Charter envisages a religious political system; however, both their contentious actions and their rhetoric are highly inconsistent at times (Schlegel 2015: 331).

Hamas’ victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections posed a serious threat to the PLO’s monopoly of power. After the two factions repeatedly failed to reach a power sharing agreement, the conflict turned violent and the Westbank and the Gaza Strip have been ruled separately ever since. A series of Fatah-Hamas talks on inter-party reconciliation culminated in the Cairo agreement (2011) and Doha agreement (2012/renewed talks in 2014 and 2015/16) on forming a Fatah-Hamas interim unity government (Kurz 2015: 89-90). However, most of the stipulated provisions never materialised due to an unwillingness on both sides to make compromises. Concurrently, in 2013 a new round of peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine was held under the auspices of the US.

The period of interest for the QSNA spans from 2011 to 2016. This is, because during this period, the renewed peace talks between the PLO and Israel and between Fatah and Hamas as well as the UN General Assembly’s (GA) decision to upgrade Palestine’s status from a permanent UN “observer entity” to that of a permanent “non-member state observer” opened a great window of opportunity which was ultimately undermined by internal frictions (UN 2012).

²⁰ Quoted in Baroud (2020, para. 3).

²¹ Spanish original: “Las víctimas de la agresión israelí preguntan a Obama: ¿Quién es el terrorista?”.

5.3.1. Movement Physiognomy

Fatah continues to dominate much of the political scene in the West Bank. Other primarily nationalist parties include the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades” which advocate for the use of violent means against Israel as well as the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command” (PFLP-GC) and the “Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine” (DFLP), two Marxist/Marxist-Maoist groups (Pina 2005).

Hamas is Fatah’s main opponent. The Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood has traditionally allied itself with Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah, and distanced itself from the Arab secular socialism as personified by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Its military wing, the Izz Eddine al-Qassam Units, forms part of the conservative-resistance camp and has used suicide bombing as a key strategy against the Israeli state. Another important party that was influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and rejects the two-state solution is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). In recent years, Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and elsewhere, have become a fertile ground for the spread of Salafi thought. Salafi Islamist parties such as “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, and more violent jihadi groups such as “Fatah al-Islam” in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Lebanon, or “Jaysh al-Islam” in Gaza are trying to win support for their Islamist agenda (ECFR 2021). Alongside this, new secular parties, such as the “Palestinian National Initiative” (al-Mubadara), seek to present themselves as an alternative to Fatah.

Table 6 Overview of Pertinent Partisan Frames – Palestine

	<i>Identity frames</i>	<i>Conflict Frames</i>	<i>Action Frames</i>
Political Divisions	<u>PLO-Groups:</u> Fatah	anti-Israeli;	secular and left political system, more open to two state solution; no armed-struggle; renouncement of terrorism
	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	+ refuses to serve the PA; suspicious of corruption within PLO	against two-state solution; liberation of historic Palestine
	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	Suspicious of corruption within PLO	Marxist-Leninist Ideology; critical of Oslo Accords but first party to support the two state solution
	Palestine Democratic Union (FIDA)		Supports Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation
	Palestinian People’s Party (PPP)		

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF)

Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-
GC)

Fight against Syrian
opposition forces during the
civil war

NON-PLO Groups (Islamic)

Hamas

no two state solution until
2017; anti-jewish;
restructuring of the PLO

armed struggle; political Islam;
suicide bombings; since May
2017 distances itself from the
Muslim Brotherhood, and open
to a Palestinian state withing
the pre-1967 borders.

Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Hizb ut-Tahrir

no two state solution; no
diplomatic engagement with
Israel
pan-Islamic Salafi jihadism

Iran's Islamic Revolution

Salafi-jihadism; non-violent
resistance; establishment of
the caliphate by non-violent
means

NON-PLO GROUPS

Palestinian National Initiative (Al-
Mubadara)

Third Way

non-violent resistance to the
occupation. It supports peace
with Israel based on a two-
state solution, and the right of
return for refugees.

Ethnic Divisions

none

none

none

Sectarian
Divisions

(within party politics)

(within party politics)

(within party politics)

5.3.2. Dynamics of Diaspora Fragmentation and Cohesion

Chile is home to more than 500,000 people of Palestinian descent, the largest and most active Palestinian community outside the Arab world. The descendants of a pre-Nakba generation came during the late 1800s and the early 20th century and were mostly Arab Christians (Baeza 2014).²² The ethno-political consciousness of the Palestinian diaspora awoke as a consequence of the recognition of the PLO as “the sole representative of the Palestinian people” by the UN in 1974 as this allowed the PLO to open information offices across the region (ibid.).

Since most of Chileans of Palestinian descent are third or fourth generation immigrants, they do not speak Arabic and most of the organisations publish their content almost exclusively in Spanish. They nonetheless retain a connection to the homeland through music, performances of the Palestinian Dabke, food, and cultural events (Beaume 2019: 6).²³ Annual commemorations of the Nakba as well as the “Dia de la Tierra” (Land Day) bring different Palestinian actors in the region together and have become a symbol of national struggle that informs the collective memory of the Palestinian diaspora in Chile and around the world.²⁴

Table 7 Dynamics of Fragmentation and Cohesion - Palestine

	<i>Identity frames</i>	<i>Conflict Frames</i>	<i>Action Frames</i>	<i>Direct Alignment</i>	<i>Matching Frames</i>	<i>Resource and Migration Flows</i>	<i>Joint campaigning</i>
Diaspora-Level Aggregate:	0.3*	0*	0*	0*	0.3*	N/A[0]	0*
Dynamics of Fragmentation and Cohesion:							0*

* Rounded to the nearest fuzzy-set threshold
0=non-partisan cohesion; 1=factionalised fragmentation

The fuzzy-set score of 0 indicates that the diaspora’s cohesiveness is extremely high. The QSNA further reveals that the network is hegemonic and that there is no clustering: Most organisations are interconnected and directly aligned with the “Comunidad Palestina de Chile” which, despite directing

²² The 15 May 1948 is known among Palestinians as their nakba, or “catastrophe,” and refers to the expulsion of more than 700,000 Palestinians from their homes; the idea of the nakba as a collective trauma continues to define Palestinian national identity.

²³ Dabke is a folkloric circle dance which is practiced in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, and Syria.


²⁴ Land Day, Yom al-Ard, commemorates the killings of six Palestinians by Israeli forces in March 1976 during protests against the land expropriations of Arab Israelis in Galilee.

relatively more attention towards events in Gaza and showing clear sympathy for Hamas, serves as the main umbrella organisation for Palestinian diaspora groups in Chile. Other actors, such as the Palestine Bethlehem 2000 Foundation, engage mainly in charity work as well as political lobbying. The “Gazamor” fundraising campaign, for instance, was initiated by the Palestine Bethlehem 2000 Foundation in response to the Israeli military’s “Operation Protective Edge” in which more than 11,000 Palestinians were injured and 2,251 died (OHCHR 2015: 16); it was either financially supported or formally endorsed by most Chilean-Palestinian organisations. If disputes between Palestinian factions are addressed at all, which rarely happens, then in a neutral manner. In general, Israel is identified by all organisations as the primary external adversary of the Palestinian people and the Embassy of Palestine in Chile is actively encouraging non-partisan cooperation and organises heritage campaigns and Palestinian-Chilean exchange and scholarship programmes on a regular basis.

Overall, the Palestinian community in Chile, which refers to itself as “Chilestinian”. can be described as a hybrid community that is fully integrated into their host land’s socio-political culture (most sub-groups refer to themselves as Chilean-Palestinian) as well as in a broader global coalition of actors who claim to be involved in an on-going anti-colonialist struggle. Compared to the other diaspora groups discussed in this thesis, they deploy more universalistic, almost stereotypically generalising, conflict, action, and identity frames. Individual diaspora groups seem to be incapable or unwilling to take notice of more localised, intra-group dynamics and instead, repeat well-established anti-Zionist narratives in an almost habitual manner. They borrow much of their rhetoric from the “Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions” (BDS) movement.²⁵ Just like the “UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance” that was held in South Africa in 2002 constituted a fertile ground for the birth of the BDS movement (Morrison 2015), by framing the nationalist struggle in the broadest possible terms as a never ending fight against racism and (settler) colonialism, the diaspora groups speak first and foremost to a global civil society. Moreover, the Palestinian cause and its imagery has become a recurring theme in the rhetoric of Arab diaspora organisations in Chile (e.g., the Unión árabe de beneficencia) to an extent that Palestinian and Arab identity markers are used almost interchangeably

Figure 7 **Qualitative Mapping of Diaspora Organisations and Affiliates - Palestine**

²⁵ The BDS movement was established in 2005 by a group of Palestinian academics and calls on “local councils, churches, pension funds and universities” as well as all governments and “global citizens” to withdraw their “support from Israel’s apartheid regime, complicit Israeli sporting, cultural and academic institutions, and from all Israeli and international companies engaged in violations of Palestinian human rights” [Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions, “What is BDS?”, <https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds> (Last accessed: 02 June 2020)].



5.4. Tamil Eelam

In their sacrifice we find courage, and, as they did before us, in the horrors of genocide, we find the unwavering determination to continue our nation’s struggle against oppression.

There can be no reconciliation without the truth, and there will be no peace without justice. (TYO 2012)

The conflict between the Sinhalese-dominated, Sri Lankan state and Sri Lankan Tamils, emerged gradually as a result of British colonial policies which treated members of the Tamil community more favourably than the Sinhalese majority and gained momentum in the 1970s, following the electoral victory of Sinhala Buddhist parties and the subsequent enactment of the 1972 constitution which eliminated protections for ethnic minorities as well as a reaction to other explicitly Sinhala Buddhist nationalist nation building measures (Richards 2014: 10-11). Various Tamil parties and insurgent groups began to call for the creation of an independent state; in 1975, the “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam” (LTTE) was formed and soon became the most powerful Tamil separatist group in Sri Lanka.

After 1990, a number of militant Tamil separatist groups thus began to collaborate with the Sri Lankan government against the LTTE resulting in a surge in intra-ethnic violence (Stokke and Ryntveit 2000: 286). The LTTE was strictly hierarchical and was divided into a political and an armed wing which were both controlled by the “Central Governing Committee” (CGM) led by Vellupiali Prabhakaran. Ideologically, the LTTE resorted to Marxist rhetoric to characterise their struggle and aspired the creation of a separate, socialist Tamil state (Tamil Eelam) in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Shortly before its defeat in 2009, Tamils who had initially supported the LTTE were more and more dissatisfied with its autocratic command structure and its willingness to resort to violence against its own people (Subramanian 2015). The QSNA looks at network configurations during the reconciliation and rehabilitation processes following the end of the civil war (2009-2015).

5.4.1. Movement Physiognomy

The Tamil community is divided between Indian Tamils and Sri Lanka Tamils who are mostly Hindu or Catholic, and Muslim Sri Lanka Moors (Stokke and Ryntveit 2000: 288). Since the end of the civil war, political tension exists first and foremost between parties who hold on to the traditional LTTE stance on self-determination through independence and those who have dropped their separatist claims for a federalist agenda.

Table 8 Overview of Pertinent Partisan Frames – Tamil Eelam

	<i>Identity frames</i>	<i>Conflict Frames</i>	<i>Action Frames</i>
Political Divisions:	<p><u>Tamil National Alliance</u> (Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization)</p> <p>vs</p> <p>Tamil National Political Front (TNPf) and C.V. Wigneswaran</p> <p>vs</p> <p>exiled, former LTTE factions</p>	<p>traitors, puppets of the central government</p>	<p>Cooperation with the government vs strong opposition; federalism vs self-determination</p>
Ethnic Divisions:	Sri Lanka Tamils vs Indian Tamils	no factionalism	no factionalism
Sectarian Divisions:	Muslim vs Hindu vs Catholic	no factionalism	no factionalism

The “Tamil National Alliance” (TNA), a coalition of all major political parties that succeeded the LTTE, opted for a cooperative strategy vis-à-vis the central government and is open to the idea of achieving self-determination through federal autonomy. The TNA is challenged by, inter alia, the Tamil National Political Front (TNPF) which, whilst supporting federalism, rejects the notion of a homogenous, united Sri Lankan nation state, promotes a more radical stance towards the central government, and intends to establish a non-electoral political body called the Tamil Provincial Council (TPC) (Guyot 2017). Additionally, in 2013, Canagasabapathy Visuvalingam Vigneswaran, Chief Minister of the Northern Provincial Council and member of the TNA, began to adopt positions similar to those of the TNPF thereby causing internal frictions.²⁶

5.4.2. Dynamics of Diaspora Fragmentation and Cohesion

The total population of Sri Lankan Tamils residing abroad is estimated to be around one million out of which approximately 180,000 are living in the UK (Walton 2015: 962). During the civil war (1983-2009), the LTTE had a monopoly on diaspora governance and supervised most diaspora-movement interactions. To this date, Tamil diaspora organisations in the UK remain integrated in a highly institutionalised, transnational network of Tamil diaspora organisations. However, as a study by Guyot (2017) shows, with the surrender of the LTTE in 2009, this hegemonic structure has disappeared, and the many transnational sites of Tamil nationalism have become the main theatre of internal contestation.

Table 9 Dynamics of Diaspora Fragmentation and Cohesion – Tamil Eelam


	<i>Identity frames</i>	<i>Conflict Frames</i>	<i>Action Frames</i>	<i>Direct Alignment</i>	<i>Matching Frames</i>	<i>Resource and Migration Flows</i>	<i>Joint campaigning</i>
Diaspora-Level Aggregate:	0.5*	0.5*	0.5*	0.3*	0.5*	N/A[0]	0.5*
Dynamics of Fragmentation and Cohesion:							0.5*

* Rounded to the nearest fuzzy-set threshold

²⁶ Verité Research, “Mapping Sri Lanka’s Political Parties: Actors and Evolutions”, http://www.veriteresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Mapping_Sri_Lanka_s_Political_Parties_Actors_and_Evolution.pdf (Last accessed: 10 June 2021).

In 2009, the “Global Tamil Forum” (GTF) was founded in an attempt at uniting the “Tamil Coordination Committees” (TCCs), which had operated as the main diaspora coordination bodies throughout the war, with post-war national diaspora organisations under a single umbrella organisation. It was supposed to function as an alternative to the “Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam” (TGTE), a “democratically elected government of the diaspora” founded by Tharmalingam Shanmugam Kumaran, the former head of the International LTTE Secretariat. But in 2013, several member organisations left the GTF because it had begun to depart from the LTTE’s traditional stance on independence and was more and more reluctant to make use of the genocide frame within the post-war reconciliation debate so as not to risk its continued access to the UN and other international actors (Walton 2015).

Figure 8 Qualitative Mapping of Diaspora Organisations and Affiliates - Tamil Eelam



This cleavage also sparked vigorous debates among UK-based diaspora organisations over whether they should spoil or support the peace process as well as over whether they should distance themselves from LTTE affiliated groups. As displayed in figure 8, LTTE and TGTE affiliations remained in place after 2009 thanks to former leading LTTE figures who went into exile. Both the “British Tamils Forum” (BTF) and the “Tamil Youth Organization” (TYO) have close ties to the TGTE and TGTE-UK and express strong support for pro-LTTE factions (Walton 2015: 962). For them, the prospect of an independent Tamil “homeland” plays a crucial role in defining their collective identity abroad hence why the TNA’s cooperative stance provoked harsh criticisms and its leaders were accused of being traitors. Interestingly, whereas the TNA and affiliated parties on the ground seemed generally more willing to partake in the reconciliation process led by the “Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission” (LLRC), both the BTF and the TYO have repeatedly called for accountability and the establishment of an independent truth commission under the auspices of the UN. They attended several sessions of the “United Nations Human Rights Council” (UNHRC) and made frequent reference to the “UN High Commissioner for Human Rights” reports (OHCHR). In addition to that, the BTF is actively lobbying for Tamil independence and set up the “All Party Parliamentary Group for Tamils”, an informal, cross-party group of MPs, Members of the House of Lords and the three associated advocacy wings, the “British Tamils Conservative Party”, the “Tamils for Labour Party”, and the “British Tamils for Liberal Democracy” in order to systematically advance its interest.

There are also generational elements to the fragmentation of the Tamil diaspora in the UK: While the BTF is at the centre of a group of primarily post-2009 born diaspora organisations which tend to be more polarised and whose profile is tailored to lobbying activities, a second group of only loosely connected, partly state-sponsored charity and cultural organisations abstains from interfering in ongoing conflicts – partisan or otherwise. These community-oriented institutions are typically run by first-generation immigrants whereas, the new lobbying organisations seem to attract second-generation immigrants who became politically active only after the end of the war (Guyer 2017) and who believe it is now on them to continue the national struggle for independence as exemplified in the following statement made by the TYO: “The Tamil liberation flame and the aspiration for the Tamileelam ‘homeland’ it represents, is now being carried resolutely by the Tamil youth, particularly those of the Tamil diaspora [...] that is us the second generation Tamils. It is now our duty to carry this liberation flame [...] for our homeland and the sovereignty of our nation” (TYO 2013).

5.5. Kosovo

Today we are celebrating freedom. Though we must not forget that blood was shed for this day to come. Remember the martyrs who fell to never die”

(Ansampli Pavarësia Stuttgart 2012)

Following the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (NATO) military intervention against Serbia in the Kosovo War of 1998-99, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 stipulated the establishment of the “United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo” (UNMIK) and forced Serbia to cede control from Kosovo. The UN administration in concert with the US and most European Union (EU) member states geared Kosovo gradually towards independence which it formally declared in February 2008. However, tensions between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians continue to define Kosovo’s most prevalent socio-political divisions and are most visible in northern parts of the country.

The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue mediated by the EU started in 2011 and was revived in 2020. It was supposed to facilitate a normalisation of the relations between the two countries as expressed in the 2013 Brussels Agreement but has faced sustained criticism from various opposition groups ever since (UNDP 2019: 8).²⁷ This chapter’s QSNA’s time frame covers the period between 2013 and 2018 when political frictions arose in response to the implementation of the Brussels and accompanying bilateral agreements.

5.5.1. Movement Physiognomy

Internal controversies revolve around two fundamental bones of contention. The first concerns whether Kosovo’s should recognise Serbia and its commitment to the Ahtisaari Plan (International Crisis Group 2021: 3).²⁸ A second issue fuelling internal frictions regards potential “border correction” and control over the Serbian-dominated northern provinces where Belgrade’s influence persists. Tentative agreements between the two governments provoked a series of protests when the first agreement was signed in 2013 which envisioned the exchange of these provinces for Albanian-majority provinces in Serbia. A second and third protest wave followed in 2015 and 2018 in response to the “General Principles Agreement of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities” (UNDP 2019: 15-16). Oppositional forces also raised concerns over election fraud, the level of corruption, and a deficient rule of law.

²⁷ The Brussels Agreement was reached on 19 April 2013 and stipulates the conditions for normalised relations between Kosovo and Serbia as well as for EU membership provided that disputes over Kosovo’s northern municipalities can be dissolved.

²⁸ The 2007 Ahtisaari Plan proposed a formula for Kosovo’s independence that grants Kosovo Serbs the right to have their own local administrations, and privileged relations with Serbia, but within the framework of a democratic, decentralised, and multi-ethnic Kosovo.

Political disputes between the two main so-called “war-wing” parties, the “Democratic Party of Kosovo” (PDK), and the “Alliance for the Future of Kosovo” (AAK), and the centre-right “Democratic League” (LDK), who led the non-violent resistance against Serbia, melted away during the post-war period because most of them were forced to form a coalition government at some point (Beha 2017: 11).²⁹ However, after the declaration of independence, clashes between the PDK and the LDK resurfaced. The PDK and its leader, Hashim Thaçi, have been the driving force behind the dialogue with Serbia. Yet, anti-Serbian, and anti-establishment forces gained increasingly more support after 2014. The so-called “Self-Determination Movement” (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje, VV) under the leadership of Albin Kurti, wanted to terminate talks with Serbia and repeatedly criticised the Ahtisaari Plan, arguing that it would violate the right to self-determination; a position which is also shared to some extent by the AKK (International Crisis Group 2021: 12). They nurture anti-Serbian sentiments, hold on to the idea of creating “Greater Albania” and therefore reject Kosovo’s nationalistic symbols such as the anthem and the flag and replace them with Albanian ones instead.

Despite the secular character of Albanian nationalism, and consequently by default Kosovar nationalism, more fundamental interpretations of Islam took hold in post-war Kosovo and there have been visible tensions between Catholic and Sunni-Muslim communities (UNDP 2019: 21). The attempts made by secular parties at forging a secular national identity alienated a younger generation of Kosovo Albanians who began to see the Albanian and Kosovar identity as mutually exclusive and who then decided to embrace their religious identity instead. The “Justice Party” (PD), Kosovo Islamic Community, “The New Kosovo Coalition” (AKR), and the “Bashkohu” and a number of foreign faith-based organisations promote Sharia values (KIPRED 2016). Among the established parties, only the AKK took a clear stance against Islamic extremism (ibid.).

Table 10 Overview of Pertinent Partisan Frames – Kosovo

	<i>Identity frames</i>	<i>Conflict Frames</i>	<i>Action Frames</i>
Political Divisions:	LDK PDK vs AKK VV	involvement in war crimes; corruption; establishment vs anti-establishment parties; lenience vis-à-vis Serbia	recognition of Serbia; endorsement of the Ahtisaari Plan; question of border corrections
Ethnic Divisions:	no factionalism	no factionalism	no factionalism

²⁹ “War-wing parties” are parties whose leaders used to be commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the 1998/99 war.

Sectarian Divisions:	Sunni-Muslim vs Salafi Groups vs Secularism	N/A	laic political system vs moderately secular vs supportive of sharia law
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5.5.2. Dynamics of Diaspora Fragmentation and Cohesion

The exact size of the Kosovo Albanian diaspora remains unknown, but it is estimated that around 800,000 Kosovo Albanians are living outside of Kosovo, out of which approximately 270,000 and 160,000 are located in Germany and Switzerland, respectively and that every second citizen of Kosovo has at least one relative who has moved abroad (Perteshi 2020: 3). The QSNA includes Kosovo Albanian diaspora organisations located in Germany and affiliated groups.

Kosovar migrants arrived in Germany in three waves. During the 1950s/1960s mostly unskilled, seasonal workers and peasant migrated to Germany's industrial regions in search of better opportunities. The second wave of migration (1980-1999) was prompted by authoritarian and discriminatory state oppression and the outbreak of the 1998-1999 war. The third, post-2002 wave of Kosovo Albanian migration was primarily driven by economic motivations (Ibid.). The first-generation of migrants was actively involved in the fight for Kosovo's independence from Serbia. Yet, the end of the Serbian occupation in 1999, and the beginning of internationally led state-building efforts, resulted in a redefinition of the relationship between Kosovo and its diaspora (Koinova 2017: 3; Perteshi 2020: 3). This trend aggravated, after the declaration of independence in 2008. On a macro-level, the total number of active Kosovo-Albanian diaspora groups and their influence decreased. The organisations that were active between 2013 and 2018 seem rather disorganised and fragmented. However, these fragmentations do not follow factional lines as indicated by the results of the frame and network analysis presented in table 11 and figure 9.

Cooperative ties between Kosovo, and the Kosovo Albanian diaspora were maintained through a myriad of diaspora governance agencies and policies such as the "Investment Promotion Agency of Kosovo" (IPAK), or the 2013-2018 "Diaspora Strategy" (Koinova 2017: 3). The fact that Kosovo's foreign minister is called "The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora" is emblematic of the importance that is attached to the diaspora, not only by the authorities in Pristina but also by several IOs. The creation of a sophisticated diaspora governance apparatus was financially and logistically supported by the "International Organisation for Migration" (IOM) and the "United Nations Development Program" (UNDP) (IOM 2013). While the internationally backed diaspora involvement in the Kosovar state-building process served as a framework to maintain their

connection to Kosovo, it has also led to a visible depolarisation of a significant proportion of the diaspora.

Table 11 Dynamics of Fragmentation and Cohesion - Kosovo

	<i>Identity frames</i>	<i>Conflict Frames</i>	<i>Action Frames</i>	<i>Direct Alignment</i>	<i>Matching Frames</i>	<i>Resource and Migration Flows</i>	<i>Joint campaigning</i>
Diaspora-Level Aggregate:	0*	0*	0*	0*	0*	0*	0*
Dynamics of Fragmentation and Cohesion							<u>0*</u>


* Rounded to the nearest fuzzy-set threshold
0=non-partisan cohesion; 1=factionalised fragmentation

Most of the organisations were dedicated to the national cause as stipulated in the Ahtisaari plan including the obtainment of EU membership and did not take sides with regards to the normalisation of relations with Serbia. This should not be interpreted as an expression of support for the LDK or PDK though; it is rather as a testament to the lasting impact of the UN and other international actors which perceive of the Kosovar diaspora as a supposedly neutral source of direct foreign investments and remittances (Koinova 2017: 3), a sentiment the then incumbent government seemed to share. As figure 9 shows, the Consulates of Kosovo which are strategically located in Germany’s biggest financial and economic hubs, Stuttgart, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, and Berlin, serve as the central interface for diaspora engagement.

Although most of the diaspora groups continued to provide religious education, practice religious and cultural traditions, for example in the form of folkloristic dance and music, and offer Albanian language classes, their role has been reduced to being an almost apolitical actor within Kosovo’s state building process. Compared to the first-generation, second-generation Kosovo Albanians in particular turned from being an important voice during the secessionist period to being a passive provider of financial aid (Koinova 2017: 3).

Figure 9

Qualitative Mapping of Diaspora Organisations and Affiliates - Kosovo



Some have argued that this has caused an identity vacuum among “the offspring of the traditional migrant parents from the 1960s and 1980s” making them an easy prey for community-level Islamist organisations. Yet, although it is true that several of the organisations ground their identity in the realm of religion (usually either Catholicism or Islam) and that the Kosovo Albanian Islamic community which is better connected than the rest of the Kosovar diaspora in Germany, individuals rather than diaspora organisations seem to have been the preferred target of Islamic extremism and there is no evidence for group-level radicalisation.

5.6. Discussion: The Dynamics of Diaspora Cohesion and Fragmentation in light of Intra-Group Conflict

Frictions within secessionist movements are the rule rather than the exception and are a crucial driver behind the acts of contentious collective action that are visible on the macro-level. The end of the struggle with the parent state did not only deprive the five self-determination movements of their common archenemy, but also opened the way for internal divisions to resurface. Although most of the movement divisions documented in this study are of a political kind, tribal and ethnic disputes over the allocation of land in South Sudan, or the incorporation of secular or religious principles into

the more or less formalised constitutional order and the relatively young governmental apparatus in Palestine or Kosovo were also responsible for intra-group conflicts. It is interesting to note though that neither religion nor kinship led to a polarisation of single diaspora groups in the same way as political affiliations did.

Yet, the fast-paced shifts of alliances and interfactional and interpersonal rivalries we can see on the ground are not simply imported by the diaspora as they are. If anything, the results of the five QSNAs attest that diaspora organisations are rather inert actors that prove to be quite resilient to change that is happening within the “homeland” context. Two out of the five diasporas exhibit perfect non-partisan cohesiveness (Palestine, and Kosovo), and in none of the investigated cases does the diaspora show high levels of factionalised fragmentation (see table 12). On an aggregate level the Palestinian, and the Kosovar diaspora present themselves as non-partisan but for different reasons. The most intuitive conclusion would be that well-established identity narratives are sticky and that their ontological security therefore heavily depends on imaginations of a unified “homeland”, but this was only a minor contributing factor.

After the declaration of independence, several Kosovo Albanian diaspora organisations disappeared or turned from being active proponents of the national struggle into apolitical providers of financial aid and folkloristic nostalgia. Religion in a literal but also in a figurative sense, understood as an illusionary longing for a sense of belonging and truth, rather than factional affiliations, filled the void that was left by the achievement of de facto statehood, especially among the younger generation. Compared to the other diaspora’s, Kosovo’s diaspora organisations showed hardly any interest in the everyday politics of their country of origin and are ergo, devoid of partisan characteristics.

Conversely, Palestinian diaspora groups are remarkably active but do nevertheless not fracture along partisan lines except for a handful of mostly student-led organisations. They are not indifferent to developments on the ground but the intergroup conflict with Israel, coupled with historically deeply rooted anti-Zionist sentiments, have become conflict frames of a global scale and almost universal prominence. Several other, typically leftist or transnational movements such as the numerous offshoots of the BDS movement have appropriated and distorted the Palestinian national cause thereby indirectly leaving their mark on the organisational identity of the Palestinian community in Chile. To put it another way, the discursive dominance of the Israeli-Palestinian “master cleavage” overshadows intra-movement dynamics and constrains the identity and action repertoire available to Palestinian organisations when operating in their country of residence or the international arena which makes alignments with individual factions significantly less attractive. Moreover, the majority of Palestinians living in Chile are second, third, and fourth generation immigrants who barely speak any Arabic and for whom Palestine represents more of an abstract concept than a lived experience; while the ongoing conflict with Israel allows them to foster their collective identity through othering, other traditional practices associated with a Palestinian (national)

identity appear to have fallen into oblivion. This would also explain why their conflict and action frames are less partisan than their identity frame.

Table 12 Dynamics of Fragmentation and Cohesion in Comparison

Case	Dynamics of Fragmentation and Cohesion							Case Ø
	Identity frames	Conflict Frames	Action Frames	Direct Alignment	Matching Frames	Resource and Migration Flows	Joint campaigning	
Kurdistan	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	N/A [0]	0.3	<u>0.5</u>
Tamil Eelam	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.5	N/A[0]	0.5	<u>0.5</u>
South Sudan	0.3	0.3	0	0	0.3	N/A [0.19]	0	<u>0.3</u>
Palestine	0.3	0	0	0	0.3	N/A[0]	0	<u>0</u>
Kosovo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<u>0</u>
Indicator Ø	0.32	0.22	0.20	0.16	0.32	N/A	0.16	

1= factionalised; 0 = non-partisan

With an average fuzzy-set score of 0.3, South Sudan’s diaspora displays mostly non-partisan interaction patterns. Except for two organisations which show strong regional affiliations and one incident of inter-organisational conflict in December 2013, most sub-groups emphasised the need to seek “unity in diversity” and urged the various Southern Sudanese factions to resolve their conflicts peacefully. Making diversity a cornerstone of their national identity and emphasising its civic nature worked as a powerful reconciliatory device and prevented factionalised narratives from spreading among the community, not only in the Southern Sudanese but also in the Kurdish case. By the same token, diaspora groups across cases seem to perceive of themselves as freedom fighters, regularly endorse advocates of nonviolent resistance such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., or

Nelson Mandela, and seem generally well versed in playing by the rules set by the liberal international order which is yet another evidence for the hybridity of their identity.

The aggregated fuzzy score, however, says little about the degree of factionalisation of single groups within the diaspora. Indeed, in the case of Kurdistan and Tamil Eelam, the fuzzy score of 0.5 does not mean that single organisations are on average only partially divided but that half of the network abstains from “homeland” politics altogether while the other half is more vocal and is either directly affiliated with a faction or, and this is more common, shares a faction’s action and identity frames. Often this goes hand in hand with a division of labour with regards to the kind of community work and activism they engage in as well as their organisational identity and their demographic makeup. In contrast to non-profits that were founded by first-generation immigrants decades before the interfactional conflict of interest erupted and who tend to be occupied with local community work and heritage preservation, younger initiatives by second-generation immigrants or first-generation immigrants who fled only recently are more susceptible to factionalism.

6. FINDINGS II: DETERMINING THE CONDITIONS OF FACTIONALISED DIASPORA FRAGMENTATION AND NON-PARTISANS COHESION

In the following chapter the findings of the bivariate and multivariate analysis of the set theoretic relationship between the seven conditions and factionalised diaspora fragmentation and non-partisan cohesion will be presented and their theoretical implications will be discussed. The raw data that was used to determine the respective calibrated fuzzy-set values is listed in Appendix B.

6.1. Necessary & Sufficient Conditions – Bivariate Analysis

Together, the three parameters consistency, coverage, and relevance of necessity (RoN) will be calculated to test for necessity and, when applicable, for sufficiency (see section 4.3.2).³⁰ One of QCA’s fundamental principles is that of asymmetric causality which dictates that the presence and the absence of an outcome should be analysed separately. I will therefore first determine and present the measures of fit for factionalised diaspora fragmentation before I proceed in the same way with the negated fuzzy values for diaspora cohesion, applying the following formula:

Table 13 Measures of Fit

Measure of Fit	Formula	Source
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³⁰ Consistency assesses the extent to which membership in a condition/conjunctural path is always associated with a particular outcome (i.e. is a subset of the outcome). Coverage reports the proportion of the outcome set that is consistently explained by a condition/combination of conditions (Ragin 2008).

<i>Consistency</i>	$Consistency_{Necessity}(Y_i \leq X_i) = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum Y_i}$	(Ragin 2006: 297)
	$Consistency_{Sufficiency}(X_i \leq Y_i) = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum X_i}$	
<i>Coverage</i>	$Coverage_{Necessity}(Y_i \leq X_i) = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum X_i}$	(Ragin 2006: 63)
	$Coverage_{Sufficiency}(X_i \leq Y_i) = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum Y_i}$	
<i>Relevance</i>	$Relevance\ of\ Necessity = \frac{\sum(1 - X_i)}{\sum(1 - \min(X_i, Y_i))}$	(Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 236)

Given the small number of cases, conditions should pass at least 0.9 set-theoretic consistency, 0.5 set-theoretic coverage and 0.5 RoN to be considered (empirically) necessary (Mendel and Ragin 2011: 21). A condition is considered to be sufficient if it exceeds the minimum threshold of 0.75 for consistency and 0.5 for coverage. Table 14 shows fuzzy-set values for five cases across seven conditions (A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C), and the outcome as well as their corresponding measures of fit.

Table 14 Results of the Bivariate Set-Theoretic Analysis - Factionalised Fragmentation

	Conditions							Outcome
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	Factionalised Fragmentation
<i>Generational Differences</i>	<i>Pre-existing Homophily among Diaspora Groups</i>	<i>Distribution of Power</i>	<i>Diaspora Governance Policies</i>	<i>Level of Violent Repression By External Adversary</i>	<i>Source of Intra-group Conflict</i>	<i>Integr. Into Adv. Networks</i>		
South Sudan	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.3	0	0.5	0	0.3

Kurdistan	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	<u>0.5</u>
Palestine	0	0.3	0	0	0	0.5	0.7	<u>0</u>
Tamil Eelam	0.5	0.3	0.5	1	0.5	0.3	0.5	<u>0.5</u>
Kosovo	0.5	0	0.7	0	0	0.3	0	<u>0</u>
<hr/>								
<i>Consistency (Necessity)</i>	1	0.85	1	1	0.38	0.85	0.77	
<i>Consistency (Sufficiency)</i>	0.59	0.69	0.54	0.72	1	0.52	0.59	
<i>Coverage (Necessity)</i>	0.59	-	0.54	0.72	-	-	-	
<i>Coverage (Sufficiency)</i>	-	-	-	-	0.38	-	-	
<i>Relevance of Necessity</i>	0.76	-	0.70	0.86	-	-	-	

A1 (0 = 2./3. generation immigrants; 1 = 1.generation immigrants); A2 (0= pluralistic network structure ; 1= homophile network structure); A3 (0= hegemonic ; 1=dispersed) ; B1(0= institutionalised ; 1= sporadic) ; B2 (0= high ; 1= low); B3 (0=tactical; 1= ideological); C1 (0= highly integrated; 1= insular).

We can see that the conditions “Generational Differences”, “Distribution of Power”, and “Diaspora Governance Policies” pass the formal threshold of 0.9 consistency and display perfectly consistent set relations of necessity (i.e. they all have a consistency value of 1). In other words, they are supersets of the outcome “Factionalised Fragmentation”. In order to rule out that we are dealing with trivial necessary conditions, coverage and RoN were evaluated for the three conditions. Their coverage and relevance metrics indicate that while all of them surpass the conventional benchmark of 0.5 (Mello 2021: 116), the set-theoretic relationship for “Diaspora Governance Policies” seems to be the most robust one.

In the case at hand, the analysis of sufficient conditions reveals that there is no sufficient condition for the presence of factionalised fragmentation. The highest consistency values for the presence of factionalisation are given by high level of “Repression by an External Adversary” (1), a

weak institutionalisation of “Diaspora Governance Policies” (0.76), and the absence of “Ideological Proximity” (0.69). Although the condition “Repression by External Adversary” exceeds the minimum threshold of 0.75 for consistent sufficiency, its coverage score falls below 0.5 and thus suggests that its only marginally relevant. It is quite common that none or only very few conditions are sufficient on their own and it is therefore necessary to further test for joint sufficiency.

Table 15 Results of the Bivariate Set-Theoretic Analysis - Non-Partisan Cohesion*

	Conditions							Outcome
	(A)		(B)			(C)	Non-partisan Cohesion	
	<i>Generational Differences</i>	<i>Pre-existing Homophily among Diaspora Groups</i>	<i>Distribution of Power</i>	<i>Diaspora Gover. Policies</i>	<i>Repress. By External Adversary</i>	<i>Source of Intra-group Conflict</i>	<i>Integr. Into Transn. Adv. Networks</i>	
South Sudan	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.3	1	0.5	1	<u>0.7</u>
Kurdistan	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.5	1	0.5	0.3	<u>0.5</u>
Palestine	1	0.7	1	1	1	0.5	0.7	<u>1</u>
Tamil Eelam	0.5	0.7	0.5	0	0.5	0.7	0.5	<u>0.5</u>
Kosovo	0.5	1	0.3	1	1	0.7	1	<u>1</u>
<i>Consistency (Necessity)</i>	0.76	0.86	0.74	0.76	1	0.73	0.86	
<i>Consistency (Sufficiency)</i>	1	0.94	0.72	1	0.82	0.93	0.91	
<i>Coverage (Necessity)</i>	-	-	-	-	0.82	-	-	

<i>Coverage (Sufficiency)</i>	0.76	0.86	-	0.76	1	0.73	0.86
<i>Relevance of Necessity</i>	-	-	-	-	0.38	-	-

* The reported fuzzy membership scores represent the negated fuzzy membership scores of those reported in table 12 and should be read as follows: A1 (0 = 1.generation immigrants; 1 = 2./3. generation immigrants;); A2 (0= homophile network structure; 1= pluralistic network structure); A3 (0= dispersed ; 1=hegemonic) ; B1 (0= sporadic ; 1= institutionalised) ; B2 (0= low ; 1= high); B3 (0=ideological; 1= tactical); C1 (0= insular; 1= highly integrated).

Table 15 contains the negated fuzzy membership scores of those reported in table 13 in order to account for asymmetric causality as well as the results for the calculation of set-theoretic consistency, coverage, and RoN. With regards to the absence of factionalised fragmentation, i.e., non-partisan cohesion, only “Level of Violent Repression by External Adversary” meets the prescribed consistency requirements for necessity. However, its RoN score (0.38) suggests that it is of little empirical relevance. This problem might be rooted in a selection bias which renders this condition’s explanatory potential largely irrelevant. This is because, at least in its current calibration, four out of the five cases have experienced high levels of repression by their parent state in the past which means that there is too little variation in the condition to confidently draw inferences from the data.

The set-theoretic analysis of sufficient conditions shows that five out of seven conditions can account for the presence of non-partisan cohesion. This means that except for “Distribution of Power” and “Repression by External Adversary” (which should be disregarded for previously stated reasons), the findings confirm most of the theoretical assumptions set out in chapter 4. At first glance this seems to stand in stark contrast to the observed lack of sufficiency for the explanation of factionalised fragmentation. But we have to consider that no instances of fully factionalised diaspora fragmentation were documented whereas three cases displayed full or partial membership in the set “non-partisan cohesion” which is why claims about the sufficiency of specific conditions for the absence of factionalised fragmentation can be made with greater certainty than claims about its presence.


The highest consistency values for non-partisan cohesion are achieved by highly institutionalised “Diaspora Governance Policies” (1), “Generational Differences” (1), and “Pre-existing Homophily among Diaspora Groups” (0.86). Their coverage scores indicate that while all of them surpass the conventional benchmark of 0.5, just like in the case of factionalised fragmentation, the set-theoretic relationship for “Diaspora Governance Policies” seems to be the most robust. In sum, the results of

the two bivariate analyses point in the theoretically expected direction and can be seen as first indicators of potential causal paths which will be discussed in the following section.

6.2. Discussion of Potential Conjunctural Paths

The truth table construction forms a fundamental part of most QCA studies and serves to identify multivariate relationships representing sets of conditions that are jointly sufficient to produce an outcome. However, as discussed in the methodology section, a truth table analysis using conventional procedures cannot be applied here due to the limited diversity caused by the small number of cases under investigation. Moreover, the truth table approach was initially primarily meant to produce solution formulas that explain the sufficiency of binary conditions i.e., crisp sets. Although methods have been developed to systematically transform crisp scores into fuzzy scores (see, for instance, Ragin 2005), none of them allows for maximal set-theoretic ambiguity. In other words, it is impossible to transform membership scores that are equal to 0.5. Yet, not only do several of the observations take on a fuzzy score of 0.5, but the QSNA also revealed that in two out of the five cases (Kurdistan, and Tamil Eelam) the diaspora was neither cohesive nor fragmented along factional lines. This is a valuable finding in itself, and a testament to the complexity of the phenomenon at hand.

Figure 10 Summary of the combined QSNA and QCA Results



In lieu of the truth table procedure, the following last section synthesises the results of the bivariate analysis, and case-specific insights derived from the QSNA in a way that contributes to theory building through the advancement of potential causal chains whose external validity needs to be tested in future large-N studies. The relevance of the individual and conjoint conditions displayed in table 10 will be discussed relative to the role they play within and across the three socio-material localities that delineate a diaspora's field of action.

6.2.1. The Diaspora: Paradise lost, paradise restored!

The findings of the QCA suggest that host land related structural constraints and the physiognomy of the diaspora have more explanatory potential than movement and country of origin specific factors. The absence of second and third-generation diaspora groups, and pre-existing homophily are sufficient for a network to display factionalised fragmentation, and dispersed network structures and a preponderance of first-generation immigrants within the diasporic population are necessary conditions for the occurrence of non-partisan cohesion.

The effects of generational differences are not as straightforward as hypothesised in chapter 3 and are mediated by a factor which was not included in the QCA, namely, the time that has passed since the arrival of the first migration wave. The Palestinian diaspora in Chile is almost solely composed of second- and third-generation immigrants and in correspondence with the theoretical expectations did not respond to the schisms on the ground. However, in cases where there is an equal proportion of first and second/third-generation immigrants (i.e., maximal ambiguity in set theoretical terms), the role second and third-generation immigrants play is inconsistent because the susceptibility of first-generation immigrants depends on how long they have been living in the country of residence at the time the interfactional conflict in question erupts.

The Tamil diaspora's organisational landscape, for instance, is divided between community-oriented institutions run by first-generation immigrants who, unlike first-generation Southern Sudanese refugees residing in Canada, have been living abroad for decades and thus mostly identify as Chileans of Palestinian descent and a group of post-war lobbying organisations led by second-generation immigrants which are more polarised than their social welfare-oriented counterparts. Conversely, second-generation Kosovo Albanians in Germany happily play in one of the many Albanian football clubs and attend cultural events but show little interest in factional animosities.

As validated by the QCA, homophily alone does not suffice to guarantee non-factionalised network structures, yet diverse political and sectarian orientations typically coincide with factionalised fragmentation unless they are mitigated by the relative distribution of power within the community. Although it is true that pre-existing ideological clusters were activated by single movement factions, hegemonic network structures seem to prevent these clusters from emerging in

the first place and vice versa; or, to put it in regression analytical terms, it is very likely that the two conditions are intercorrelated.

Additionally, in the five cases at hand sectarian and tribal tensions were less likely to spill over than political ones just like pre-existing ideological variations among diaspora groups were usually rather linked to diverging positions on the left-right/progressive-conservative spectrum than to religious and denominational differences. Indeed, across cases, a fair share of diaspora groups showcased an almost syncretic approach to nation-building: Southern Sudanese migrant organisations in Canada and the US make use of Christian or Ubuntu imagery, Kosovo Albanian Islamic congregations in Germany wish their Christian compatriots Merry Christmas, and outspokenly secular, left-wing Palestinian and Kurdish organisations embrace inclusivity and plurality as a distinct trademark.

6.2.2. The Movement: *Homeland Calling*. Nothing but smoke and mirrors? ³¹

The QCA results indicate that the source of intra-group conflict alone does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of diaspora factionalisation. Disputes within the movement are often as much about means as they are about ends and a faction's ideological disposition will ultimately also affect their preferred type of contentious action and the two are consequently hard to distinguish from afar. If, however, there is a lack of diaspora governance policies and integration into transnational advocacy networks, ideologically motivated frictions weigh heavier than disagreements over means. In this sense, external institutional incentives mediate the effect of this condition.

Diaspora governance policies do not only fulfil a mediating role but their absence is, according to the QCA, necessary for factionalisation to occur and their presence sufficient for a network to remain non-partisan in light of intra-group conflicts. The impact of state-led diaspora involvement strategies is even stronger when it enjoys the support of IOs and INGOs as exemplified by the UN-led state-building enterprise in Kosovo where diaspora governance policies were built into the institutional set up of the newly independent state from the start. Single movement factions are in most cases aware of the importance of the diaspora and develop sophisticated outreach strategies but their target audience are individuals rather than organisations. This is, firstly, because they lack the financial and diplomatic resources internationally supported governmental bodies have at their disposal to launch cost-intensive diaspora engagement initiatives such as exchange programmes or the maintenance of representative offices abroad. Secondly, more extremist groups in particular, are sometimes proscribed as "Foreign Terrorist Organisations" (FTOs) and ipso facto banned from making an appearance on the host country's political landscape (e.g., YEK-KOM/NAV-DEM and

³¹ The condition "Repression by External Adversary" will not be discussed here due to the variation related issues explicated in the previous chapter.

numerous other PKK-affiliated groups in Germany). All in all, this supports the assumption that the less institutionalised a de facto state's diaspora policies the higher the chance that single movement parties will mobilise the diaspora along factional lines.

6.2.3. The International Arena: An amalgamation of liberalised hybrids!

The integration into transnational advocacy networks is neither necessary nor sufficient for a diaspora to get drawn into interfactional quarrels but it is a sufficient condition for non-partisan cohesion and, as mentioned above, can function as an important mediator for other conditions. Diaspora groups and individuals have to navigate their way through a complex web of actors that spans over three distinct yet overlapping socio-material spaces. The transnational arena generates “networks of violence” (Adamson 2005) as much as it allows local, international, and diaspora NGOs to form strong coalitions capable of exercising pressure on the de facto state as well as partisan sub-groups within the diaspora to overcome internal cleavages and can therefore be considered to be conducive to diaspora as well as movement cohesion.

The transnational arena continues to be shaped by liberalist ideals and a liberalist institutional order which ipso facto sets the tone for successful engagement – a reality several internationally active diaspora groups seem to have adapted too by adopting a human rights and liberal peace inspired language. They draw public attention to the grievances they have experienced in the past by deploying narratives that allude to genocidal events or other historical instances of mass atrocities in a way that resonates with the grievances of other (historically) oppressed ethnic or religious communities. In sum, civic nationalist, liberal internationalist, and more universalist ethical belief systems (i.e., Christian, Ubuntu, or pacifist ideals) often work in concert to produce a plethora of potent, non-partisan counter narratives thereby giving birth to distinct, fully transnationalised, hybrid identities.

7. CONCLUSION & AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Better to reign in Hell, than serve in Heaven.
(Milton 200 [1667], l. 242)

In 1998, the then incumbent President of the PA, Yasser Arafat, declared 15 May a national day of remembrance. Since then, Palestinians around the world come together annually to commemorate the “Nakba”, which literally translates as “The Catastrophe”, and refers to the mass exodus of about 750,000 Palestinians following the Israeli declaration of independence and subsequent forcible displacement of Arab inhabitants in 1948. According to the most recent estimate by the BADIL

Resource Center (2018: xiv), the overall Palestinian displaced population is composed of 6.7 million 1948, and 1.24 million 1967 Palestinian refugees and their descendants.

Though both communities are equally proficient in the use of identity, action, and conflict frames germane to a collectively shared diasporic experience of dispossession, alleged ethnic cleansing, and expulsion from their ancestral homeland, the realities the Palestinians face in Lebanon is fundamentally different from those of Chileans of Palestinian descent living in the Barrio Patronato in Santiago de Chile.³² While the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, the Ein El Hilweh camp, has repeatedly been the scene of factional disputes between, inter alia, forces loyal to Fatah and Salafi groups such as the “Bilal Badr group” (BBC 2017), “Chilestinians” whose ancestors left Palestine more than a century ago, appear largely as a united front.

Even though frictions within secessionist movements are the rule rather than the exception, the fast-paced shifts of alliances and interfactional and interpersonal rivalries on the ground are not simply imported by the diaspora as they are. If anything, the findings of the five QSNAs presented in chapter 4, attest that diaspora organisations are rather inert actors that prove to be quite resilient to change that is happening within the “homeland” context. At first glance, this confirms constructivist assumptions that group cohesion and an adherence to the primordial idea of an independent, and united “Homeland” will prevent diasporas from mobilising along factional lines. Yet, the findings of the QCA demonstrate that the dynamics of cohesion and fragmentation are conditioned by the presence of external institutional incentives and opportunity structures provided by transnational advocacy networks and their respective homeland’s diaspora governance policies. Moreover, the results suggest that host land related structural constraints and the physiognomy of the diaspora as well as the integration into transnational advocacy networks have more explanatory potential than movement and country of origin specific factors which once more speaks to the hybrid nature of diasporas.

Notwithstanding, it would be an oversimplification to conceive of diaspora communities as nothing but an amalgamation of liberalised hybrids. The two Palestinian communities mentioned above, for instance, represent two very distinct diasporic network configurations, each of which is confined to the specific socio-material topologies they are embedded in. This example illustrates that, even though the recent trend to think of diasporas as being embedded in a triple context constitutes an important first step towards a de-essentialisation of the concept, it is also crucial not to present diasporic trajectories as “unidirectional displacements toward peace and/or opportunities” along a North-South axis.³³ Moreover, scholars such as Nina Glick Schiller (2013) and Bruno Lefort (2021)

³² “Barrio Patronato” is a working-class borough in Santiago de Chile also known as “the Palestinian quarter”.

³³ B. Lefort, “Complex Itineraries. Towards Renewed Understandings of Diasporic Identities”, DIASCON, Available at <https://www.diascon.eu/> (Last accessed 29 May 2021).

have rightly warned that an overemphasis on the agency of organised groups may paint a distorted picture of the relationship between the movement and the diaspora.

Since the scope of this study was limited to diaspora organisations located outside of their region of origin, it can rightfully be accused of both shortcomings. This being said though, the empirical evidence that was collected as part of the QCA clearly testifies to the unique role these organisations play in shaping the dynamics of transported conflicts by simultaneously navigating and mediating between the “homeland”, the country of residence, and the transnational arena. The combination of meso- and macro-level data made it possible to link meso-level outcomes to macro-level conditions and vice versa and has generated important results which future studies should compare to (a) micro-level mobilisation patterns and individual decision-making rationales in light of intra-group conflict (e.g. based on survey data or focus group discussions) as well as (b) the relative resilience of diaspora groups and/or individuals who settle in neighbouring states.

Methodologically speaking, the QCA is only a first step in the process of initiating a dialogue between theoretical assumptions about the relationship between movement fragmentation and diaspora cohesion and its empirical manifestations. In order to be able to derive more rigorous statements about jointly sufficient set-theoretical relations, (c) a revised, medium-N QCA covering a maximum of logically possible combinations of conditions should be conducted. Given QCAs deterministic lineage, it would also be advisable to (d) test the findings’ external validity in large-N studies using probabilistic methods. Finally, as recommended by Cooper and Glaesser (2012), additional within-case process-tracing techniques should be employed to identify the mechanisms behind the observed associations in more detail.

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APPENDICES



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