

GLOBE

L'INSTITUT

Yves Oltramare
ou le goût du monde

DOSSIER

Multilateralism:
What's Next?



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L'INSTITUT

Shriya Patnaik Receives Graduate Institute Community Scholarship

Shriya is from the state of Odisha in India. She received her Bachelor in History and South Asia Studies from Cornell University. After her undergraduate studies, she pursued a Dual Master in International History from Columbia University and the London School of Economics. She is currently a PhD candidate in International History.

Having spent my formative years at a boarding school, when I went back home for vacation, my grandparents would captivate me with their stories about life under colonial rule. Growing up, I could see the visible legacy of the Empire still affecting our daily lives.

Those stories made me want to study more in depth the historic processes that led to a marginalisation of gendered minorities in the Global South, which is why I pursued a master's and now a PhD.

In addition to my academic background, I have worked extensively in the public policy and non-profit sectors. Those professional experiences allowed me to marry my passions for research with affecting concrete change on the ground. But I was always certain that my future lay in academia; I was blessed to be able to return to an institute that would allow me to combine my research, humanitarian and development interests. To that end, I am currently researching the interrelated geopolitical, socioeconomic and legal processes that brought about a marginalisation of gendered subalterns and sexual minorities in colonial South Asia.

I chose the Graduate Institute for its proximity to prominent humanitarian and development organisations in Geneva as well as its exemplary faculty. The Institute has offered me an outstanding range of resources for studying about women's rights and human rights' debates, and the guidance I have received from professors is letting me creatively unfold as I explore a wide range of ideas and correlate them to my field of study. On a personal level,

studying in London and visiting France, Spain, Germany and Switzerland during the summer has been a revelation for me. Life is refreshingly different and I am in love with Europe!

I feel privileged, humbled, grateful and hugely validated to have received the Institute's Community Scholarship. Without it, I would not have been able to undertake my PhD in Europe and benefit from the rich culture of research at the Graduate Institute. Furthermore, this scholarship shows just how seriously the Institute takes genuine social research and the contribution it makes towards global issues.

This scholarship has allowed me to fulfil a dream: to research root causes and interrelated factors that gave rise to many levels of inequality we see in the world today. I have the opportunity to learn a new language, meet seniors and colleagues from all over the world, and grow as a person. With my PhD, I genuinely hope to establish the markers that can help the world notice and avoid such future social catastrophic marginalisation.

I hope that my research will not only have an impact on the intellectual community, but that it will also be of use to social workers, policymakers and will fuel wider public discourses on women's rights and minority rights.

■ For more information on this Community Scholarship see p. 34.

L'INSTITUT

Yves Oltramare ou le goût du monde

Philippe Burrin

Directeur


Yves Oltramare est un grand monsieur, et non seulement par sa taille. Une rencontre suffit pour que sa cordialité et son urbanité innées suscitent la sympathie et, de là, l'occasion de prendre rapidement la mesure de ses qualités.

On comprend mieux les sources de ce rayonnement en lisant le livre qu'il a publié récemment et qui est le récit d'un itinéraire spirituel placé sur l'arrière-plan d'une vie¹. Du haut de ses 95 ans, l'auteur peut embrasser du regard la trajectoire d'une planète passée en quelques décennies de 2 à 8 milliards d'habitants et transformée par une série de révolutions techniques dont il a observé l'impact: de la traversée de l'Atlantique en 1950 en neuf jours de bateau au vol de trois heures et demie en Concorde trente ans plus tard, du journal attendu chaque matin à la consultation instantanée du savoir de l'humanité sur un téléphone...

Ce qui ressort avant tout de ce livre, c'est un goût profond du monde. Ce goût, Yves Oltramare le doit probablement à l'exemple d'un père médecin revenu d'Argentine qui se dévoua à l'accueil d'enfants européens en Suisse pendant et après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Lui-même a joué un rôle remarqué dans le soutien à la Genève internationale, notamment en créant avec Ivan Pictet la Fondation pour Genève et en siégeant bénévolement dans le comité d'investissement des fonds de pension du BIT et de l'ONU.

Le goût du monde se marque également dans l'intérêt qu'il porte à la culture et aux arts, de l'Europe à l'Extrême-Orient. Il se marque encore et surtout dans une quête spirituelle qui est la passion de sa vie et où il se prolonge d'une recherche du sens du monde. Né dans une famille calviniste, Yves Oltramare est tôt attiré par la spiritualité catholique et notamment par les exercices de méditation de l'ordre des Jésuites. Fondamentalement œcuménique, il conçoit la spiritualité comme une démarche qui interroge la création à toutes ses échelles, des êtres vivants au cosmos, et évite toute conclusion définitive.

Le goût du monde se manifeste encore par un engagement dans le monde qui va bien au-delà de l'activité professionnelle. Yves Oltramare est philanthrope pour traduire en actes sa solidarité avec l'humanité. La



fondation qu'il a créée avec sa femme, Inez, soutient la culture, l'art, les musées, mais aussi les déshérités de Haïti. Sa décision en 2011 de financer à l'Institut une chaire sur la religion et la politique dans le monde contemporain peut être vue comme un développement logique de cette triangulation de l'ouverture internationale, de la curiosité intellectuelle et de l'engagement philanthropique.

L'idée de faire partager à des étudiants venus du monde entier et futurs acteurs internationaux une lecture critique de l'interaction entre religion et politique était novatrice. Le défi a été relevé grâce au talent du titulaire de la chaire, Jean-François Bayart, professeur d'anthropologie et sociologie. En apportant un nouveau financement qui permettra, en partenariat avec l'Institut, de prolonger cette chaire pour vingt ans, Yves Oltramare donne aux prochaines cohortes d'étudiants la chance de mieux analyser une thématique qui restera importante dans les relations internationales et le développement des sociétés. Nous lui sommes profondément reconnaissants de son soutien bienveillant et le remercions de l'exemple qu'il nous donne par sa confiance en l'avenir.

¹ Yves Oltramare, *Tu seras rencontreur d'Homme: une voie vers l'accomplissement*, Labor et Fides, 2019, 264 p.

La rénovation du domaine Barton, patrimoine genevois et symbole d'une tradition d'ouverture

Philippe Burrin
Directeur



Les pavillons et la villa dans le parc Barton.

Le domaine Barton, qui comprend la villa du même nom et les cinq pavillons qui l'entourent, va faire l'objet au cours des deux prochaines années d'une rénovation complète. De 1938 à 2013, date de l'emménagement dans la Maison de la paix, la villa Barton a été le siège de l'Institut et le lieu où de nombreuses cohortes d'étudiants ont été formées dans un cadre mémorable. Elle accueille aujourd'hui notre formation continue, dont les besoins sont mal servis par l'état vieilli des locaux et une structuration peu fonctionnelle des espaces.

Les travaux seront menés par l'Institut, qui a conclu un contrat de droit de superficie avec la Confédération helvétique, propriétaire des lieux. Par ce contrat, l'Institut a acquis les immeubles du domaine qu'il rénovera avec le généreux soutien d'une fondation privée genevoise. Le volume intérieur de la villa sera restructuré en respectant l'enveloppe extérieure, l'objectif étant de créer des espaces modulaires se prêtant aussi bien à l'enseignement qu'à des travaux de groupe. Dans les pavillons, l'auditorium Jacques-Freymond, la cafétéria et les logements seront modernisés et dotés d'une meilleure isolation.

L'opération permettra de réhabiliter un patrimoine historique et de l'élever au niveau de qualité qu'il mérite. Elle offrira aux activités de l'Institut, en particulier de la formation continue, des espaces fonctionnels et attrayants. Enfin, elle marquera l'achèvement du Campus de la paix.

Le domaine et son histoire

Doté d'une résidence d'été et planté en jardin, verger et vignoble depuis la fin du XVII^e siècle, le domaine reçut dans les années 1830 une première construction notable, de facture néoclassique, réalisée par les époux Dunant-Gallatin. Il fut acheté en 1858 par Sir Robert Peel, fils du premier ministre britannique et ambassadeur du Royaume-Uni à Berne durant la guerre du Sonderbund. Le nouveau propriétaire agrandit et transforma la demeure en un « cottage » anglais de style néogothique et lui donna le nom de villa Lammermoor, du nom d'une propriété familiale en Ecosse. Il y installa un salon et une salle à manger créés par Jean Jacquet, maître artisan genevois du XVIII^e siècle, et transportés d'un hôtel particulier du centre-ville de Genève. Ces *period rooms*, goûtées des Anglo-Saxons à l'époque, permettaient de vivre dans l'ameublement d'une époque antérieure. Dans le même mouvement, il entoura la villa d'un parc victorien, avec des chemins en boucle et des groupes d'arbres, notamment des séquoias de Californie, et fit construire un embarcadère avec deux bassins, dont l'un servait aux bains.

En 1892, la fille de Sir Robert Peel, Alexandra, s'installa dans la villa avec son mari, Daniel F.P. Barton, consul britannique à Genève dont le goût pour le sport, la navigation et les arts a laissé des traces multiples, tel le Victoria Hall qu'il fit édifier et offrit à la ville. Personnalité remarquée pour sa culture et son entregent, Alexandra attira dans leur salon et sur leur yacht – le plus grand du lac Léman – un nombre considérable de personnalités de premier plan : des aristocrates, des artistes et des écrivains de toute l'Europe avant la Première Guerre mondiale ;



des politiques et des diplomates du monde entier après la création de la Société des Nations (SDN). Dans le milieu de la Genève internationale qui émergeait alors, M^{me} Barton joua un rôle aussi discret qu'éminent qui lui valut les titres d'« hôtesse de la SDN » et de « reine de Genève », son salon accueillant et facilitant des échanges entre premiers ministres, ministres des affaires étrangères ou diplomates des principales puissances de l'époque et responsables des nouvelles institutions internationales.

M^{me} Barton décéda en 1935, léguant le domaine à la Confédération qui le confia à l'Institut dont les locaux se trouvaient jusqu'alors dans la vieille ville, à la promenade du Pin, loin du quartier international. La villa fut rebaptisée villa Barton, le parc ouvert au public et le domaine devint un lieu cosmopolite d'enseignement et de recherche qui tendait

une sorte de miroir savant à la Genève internationale.

Le changement de fonction et l'élargissement des activités firent bientôt sentir le besoin d'une transformation qui intervint à la fin des années 1950. Elle donna à la villa son enveloppe actuelle, préserva les deux pièces d'apparat, qui furent classées, et ajouta cinq pavillons. L'ensemble devait offrir l'équivalent d'un campus à l'américaine, avec des bureaux, des salles de cours, une salle de conférence, une bibliothèque, des logements pour étudiants et une cafétéria. Cette transformation, qui anticipait à échelle réduite la réalisation du Campus de la paix, prolongeait dans le domaine de la formation une tradition d'ouverture au monde qui continue d'inspirer la vocation internationale de Genève.

Can Finance Aid the Poor? The Global Savings Glut, Finance and Development

Nathan Sussman

Professor of International Economics and Pictet Chair in Finance and Development
Director of the Centre for Finance and Development



SOUTH AFRICA,
Alexandra township.
The outskirts of
Johannesburg.
DB/UN Photo

The current era of financial globalisation that began in the 1990s has helped make the world less unequal. Nevertheless, poverty is concentrated mainly in Africa, where population growth increased the numbers of the poor with low levels of education.

In a highly visible book, *Capital in the 21st Century*, Thomas Piketty argues that financial liberalisation contributed to rising wealth and income inequality. However, it also made it possible for ordinary people to invest and build up a substantial amount of assets, notably in pension funds that manage more than USD 45 trillion.

Some argue that the increase in savings caused a savings glut and some suggest that this may partially explain low bond yields and why asset prices in the West are inflated as ever-increasing savings chase existing savings opportunities.

These two challenges – reducing poverty and finding profitable investments for our savings – have a common solution: harnessing the financial system to channel savings from the wealthy to invest in the poor. The growth

potential of lesser developed economies offers potential high returns, estimated between five percent to more than ten percent annually, compared with historical pension fund returns of less than four percent and future bond yields that currently offer returns close to zero.

A large fraction of world savings is directed to Wall Street. Only three percent of the total global investment between 1990 and 2018 was directed to Africa, where more than fourteen percent of the world's population resides. Annual capital formation in all lesser developed economies combined is about USD 250 billion; the combined investment in education is similar. These numbers should be compared to the USD 45 trillion in pension funds.

In the 19th century – the previous era of financial globalisation – the London capital market channeled development finance to the rest of the globe to build railways and infrastructure on five continents. Then, as now, the return on British bonds was two percent and a portfolio of emerging market bonds offered a return that was three times higher. Admittedly, not every investment was successful, but a diversified portfolio of these investments was. The railways of the past could be equated to renewable energy and the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure today.

The fintech industry allows more people to be connected and benefit from the financial system. Financial inclusion can go a long way in creating investment opportunities in lesser developed economies. One specific proposal is to invest in children. If a savings account were opened for every child in Africa, they could invest and share in the fruits of economic growth. These savings, which could be made available at the age of 18 and which I estimate to be from USD 3,500 to 8,000, would then allow these youths to open a business or attend college.

Implementing this solution involves overcoming many challenges: markets and new assets have to be created, regulation needs to be adjusted and legal and contractual issues have to be resolved. However, this is an opportunity that the world cannot afford to miss.



L'ACTUALITÉ

The Global Governance of Outbreaks: From Ebola to Coronavirus

Suerie Moon

Codirector of the Global Health Centre
Visiting Lecturer in the Interdisciplinary Programmes

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak reminds us that health crises can rapidly escalate into global political, economic and social emergencies. As of this writing, nearly 80,000 cases and over 2,500 deaths have been confirmed in 37 countries, with the vast majority in China but cases growing quickly worldwide. As with many outbreaks, COVID-19 has caused panic, disrupted economies, undermined political authority, sparked xenophobia and exposed societal faultlines.

The 2014–2016 West African Ebola epidemic was the last major global wake-up call, and shone a harsh light on many weaknesses in both national and global health systems. Many significant reforms ensued. These included the restructuring of the World Health Organization (WHO) to create a Health Emergencies Programme and a specialised fund to respond quickly to emergency spending needs, prioritising outbreaks in WHO's five-year work plan and creating the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board to strengthen accountability of all relevant actors.

In addition, science has progressed not only in terms of technology, but also governance. WHO's 2015 Research and Development (R&D) Blueprint provided a prioritised roadmap for R&D efforts. In February 2020, WHO convened over 300 scientists and funders to agree on a priority research agenda for COVID-19, helping hundreds of globally dispersed researchers, institutes and funders collaborate. Both actions facilitate scientific understanding of the virus and the development of health

technologies. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, a global R&D fund created in the wake of Ebola, has made very rapid investments to accelerate the development of a coronavirus vaccine. Finally, many scientific journals and researchers have been quickly sharing their results after both were criticised for delaying knowledge-sharing during the West African crisis.

While much progress has been made, the international system remains thin. Rapid, full sharing of epidemiological and clinical data is critical to understanding an outbreak and designing the best response measures, but such sharing has been slow in COVID-19. Pathogen samples should also be shared quickly, but the absence of clear international arrangements on who will get access to the benefits arising from such samples – such as drugs or vaccines – contributes to delays. Furthermore, when little is understood about a new virus, it is difficult to differentiate justifiable travel restrictions from those that inflict undue harm. National and global authorities also need to find ways to persuade their publics to cooperate in outbreak response. Finally, arrangements for predictable and adequate funding are needed so that WHO and governments are not left passing around a collection bowl mid-crisis – as is currently happening.

Outbreaks will likely become more frequent in the future. We urgently need more political and financial resource investment for a more resilient, capable global system to address them.

CHINA, Wuhan.
(Xinhua). A worker
disinfects medical
waste containers at
Wuhan Beihu Yunfeng
Environmental
Technology Co., Ltd.
in Qingshan District
of Wuhan. 5 March
2020. YANG Cai/
Xinhua



L'ACTUALITÉ

Demystifying Migration: A Call for an Evidence-based Narrative

Vincent Chetail

Professor of International Law
Head of the International Law Department
Director of the Global Migration Centre

Mass hysteria has taken over migration. As a result of the moral panic spurred by the media and politicians, emotions and perceptions prevail over facts and rationality. Migration has been polarised and instrumentalised, before being analysed and understood. Because of this disjuncture between reality and representation, everyone has an opinion about migration, but very few really know what migration actually is.

The current misperceptions say more about the vacuity of mass media and the mediocrity of politics than they do about the reality of migration. When assessed from an evidence-based perspective, the reality is the exact opposite of the prevailing stereotypes.

Three main lessons can be drawn from available data.

First, while international migration has increased and will likely continue to do so in an ever-more globalised world, this phenomenon is not a crisis of numbers. Migrants only account for 3.5 percent of the world's population, with some 272 million migrants globally (UNDESA, *International Migrant Stock 2019*, 1). Although the relative number of migrants has increased since 1990, a rise of 0.6

percent is very far from being the invasion of the Global North so frequently depicted by the media and politicians. This is even the contrary: since 2010, South-South migration has surpassed South-North migration (UNDESA, *International Migration Report*, 2017, 1–2).

Second, in contrast to the disproportionate focus on irregular migration, the vast majority of migrants are travelling in a safe and regular manner, most frequently for reasons related to work, family and study. Albeit impossible to quantify with accuracy, undocumented migrants are estimated around 10–15 percent of migrants worldwide (IOM, *World Migration Report 2010*, 29). Similarly, the myth of the male migrant from a developing country leaving his family behind in pursuit of a better life does not reflect reality. Here again, statistics speak for themselves: women account for 47.9 percent of the world migrant population, with higher percentages in Europe and North America (UNDESA, *International Migrant Stock 2019*, 2).

Third, the current narrative spread by media and political discourses hides the important contributions of migrants to their countries of destination and origin.

In contrast to what is often claimed, they are a catalyst for economic growth in their host countries, providing the labour and skills needed in critical occupations and sectors (IOM, *World Migration Report 2020*, 144). Even if this may surprise some, migrants pay more taxes and social contributions than they receive (OECD, ILO and World Bank, *The Contribution of Labour Mobility to Economic Growth*, 2015, 1). They are also drivers of entrepreneurship and innovation. In the US, they comprise nearly 30 percent of all entrepreneurs, while representing only 13 percent of the total population (*The Kauffman Index: Startup Activity*, 2017, 5). Conversely, remittances sent by migrants contribute to their own country's economy and represent more than three times the size of official development assistance (*Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook*, World Bank Group, 2018, 3).

The enduring gap between perception and reality calls for demystifying migration as the evil of the century. Migration is not a problem to be solved; it is a fact as old as humanity. While being more visible than ever, it is both a challenge and an opportunity for migrants as well as for countries of origin and destination.

However, migrants, as non-voters, are an easy target for political electioneering. They provide the perfect excuse to mask the failure of politicians in addressing the socio-economic difficulties and anxieties of voters. Although this tactic is all but new, it has gained considerable resonance

over the last years with the rise of anti-immigrant ideologies and the growing racialisation of political discourses.

Racism and xenophobia have become so mainstream that calling for an evidence-based approach to migration is viewed at best as partisan and at worst as an affront to democracy. In such a politically toxic climate, there is more than ever a crucial need to develop a pedagogy of migration. This is essential to not only better understand the normality of being a migrant, but also to inform public debate and dispel the current manipulation surrounding the dominant discourse. Developing a rational and objective narrative about migration has become a critical endeavour; otherwise, demagogues will continue to hijack democracy.

■ This article is based on the Introduction to Professor Vincent Chetail's last book, *International Migration Law*, Oxford University Press, 2019, 449 p.

SPAIN, Tarifa.
Graffiti translation:
We will open borders
We will be the voice
of justice
We will be the voice
of the oppressed
We will cross the seas
and mountains
We will break the
silence.
naeblys/iStock



L'ACTUALITÉ

Betting on Human Rights

Paola Gaeta

Professor of International Law

UNITED STATES,
New York.
Eleanor Roosevelt
holding a Declaration
of Human Rights
poster in French.
UN photo

“ When Persia was engaged in some war...
When invaders were burning down the City
And the women there were screaming
Two chess players went on playing their
endless game of chess... ”

The chess players described in this poem by Fernando Pessoa portray how we may risk spending our life: absorbed in something like a chess game, apathetic to the serious things happening all around us. This indifference has fuelled a backlash against the human rights project, particularly after the events of 11 September 2001.

The human rights project has ancient roots. It starts with natural law philosophers, stating how human beings have inalienable rights by nature, and continues with the American and French Declarations, transposing these rights into positive law. At this point, however, the rights proclaimed under natural law lost something. Immersed in the domain of positive law, they fragmented: the Declarations claimed the rights of citizens vis-à-vis the state, not of the individuals per se; plus, these existed if recognised by this or that state, not universally.

It was in the aftermath of the atrocities of the Second World War that human rights were universally proclaimed. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights – adopted on

10 December 1948 by the UN General Assembly – is the first important step in this direction, despite not being formally legally binding by states. Today binding international norms exist, enriching the scope of the rights contained in the Universal Declaration. Other international norms guarantee rights not specifically envisioned by the Declaration. Recognising new rights has been parallel to technical/scientific progress, which has brought about new threats to individual liberty that required protection. Hence, there are now also third- and fourth-generation rights, such as the right to an unpolluted environment.

Expanding the human rights' catalogue is a never-ending process, dictated by changes in society, with new rights constantly emerging like matryoshka dolls. This process cannot be limited, for rights naturally emerge every time the individual needs protection from oppression or integration in society. It is also vain to rank some rights as more fundamental than others, since rights are or are not.

Everywhere a human right is violated, new violations may always occur. The answer is not the chess players' indifference, but the bet. Those betting on human rights hope to win, but they know, as Sisyphus did, that they cannot rest, having to push a rock to the top of a mountain every day only to have it roll down again. Betting on human rights, one only needs – as Norberto Bobbio said, evoking Immanuel Kant – “fair concepts, great experience and goodwill”.



L'ACTUALITÉ

Villes sous tension ?

Dennis Rodgers

Professeur de recherche en anthropologie et sociologie

Hong Kong, Santiago, Beyrouth, Téhéran, Paris... Les villes semblent s'embraser partout. Sommes-nous entrés dans une nouvelle ère de rébellions, ou faisons-nous face à une conséquence naturelle de l'urbanisation du monde ?

Les villes sont souvent associées de manière inhérente avec la violence et l'insécurité. Cette corrélation se base sur l'idée que les contextes urbains sont des espaces densément peuplés et hétérogènes, et de ce fait intrinsèquement sujets à frictions et comportements transgressifs. Une telle vision peut être taxée de « fétichisme spatial ». L'expérience urbaine n'est pas monolithique, et il en va de même des violences urbaines et de leurs conséquences.

Prenons la guerre urbaine. Celle-ci peut prendre la forme d'une destruction du tissu urbain, tant infrastructurel que démographique. Mais les actes de guerre urbaine ne sont pas tous uniformément dévastateurs. Par exemple, les bombardements qui dévastèrent Londres pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale ouvrirent dans la ville des espaces physiques où le gouvernement travailliste d'après-guerre promulgua la construction de logements sociaux. Londres, qui était l'une des villes les plus inégales d'Europe, marquée par une ségrégation profonde entre une partie Est pauvre et une partie Ouest riche, devint ainsi plus équilibrée et ouverte, facilitant le célèbre essor des *Swinging Sixties*.

Cette même ambiguïté potentielle vaut aussi pour d'autres formes de violence urbaine. Le New York des années 1970 ou Medellín en Colombie dans les années 1980 souffrirent de fortes vagues de criminalité urbaine, mais ces périodes d'insécurité et de violence donnèrent

aussi lieu à leurs fameuses renaissances urbaines, respectivement en 1980 et 2000 après la mise en place de politiques de gouvernance urbaine holistiques pour combattre cette criminalité.

La violence urbaine peut ainsi être génératrice d'innovation et de dynamisme. Elle est rarement considérée de cette manière, en partie du fait que les formes de violence urbaine telles que la guerre ou la criminalité sont généralement conçues comme des événements temporellement bien définis, alors que pour réellement comprendre leurs dynamiques sous-jacentes, il faut les concevoir de manière plus longitudinale et systémique.

Vues ainsi, les villes se révèlent non pas tant comme des foyers naturels d'insécurité et de désordre que comme des champs de batailles à cartographier socialement, économiquement et politiquement, afin de tracer ce que nous pouvons dénommer une véritable « géopolitique de l'urbain ». Une telle approche permet de prendre conscience que les villes sont en fin de compte des épiphénomènes et que la vague actuelle de violence urbaine qui secoue le monde est le reflet d'une crise sociétale plus large.

Interview with Karl Blanchet

New Director of the Centre for Education and Research in Humanitarian Action (CERAH)



What is your background?

I started working in the humanitarian sector just after finishing my studies. In 1992–93, during the war in Bosnia, I worked in humanitarian convoys in the area of Sarajevo. In 1995 I started working at Handicap International's headquarters in Lyon, first in logistics and then as a programme coordinator involved in the response to the genocide in Rwanda, and refugee camps in Tanzania and Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge period. I then moved to West Africa as a country representative coordinating rehabilitation programmes in Togo and Benin and working at regional level for the French-speaking countries in the region. I was passionate about public health and received a scholarship to study a Master in Public Health at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). The research so fascinated me that I decided to continue my studies with a PhD while becoming the Director of Handicap International UK. In 2007, I was recruited by LSHTM as a lecturer working on health systems research. Together with other colleagues, I created the Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre at LSHTM, a centre focused on research in armed conflicts, and I worked there until I joined CERAH in late 2019. Straddling practice and research has been a great asset in my work. I understand the needs of practitioners and am able to make sure that

my research responds to their needs. I am also able to influence humanitarian professionals so that they understand the value of evidence-based decisions and programming.

How would you describe CERAH in a few sentences?

CERAH is a unique education and research centre, one of the very few institutions offering executive courses specific to the humanitarian sector and the only one located in Geneva, the capital of the humanitarian world. Over the years, CERAH has developed strong relations with many humanitarian organisations and learned how to adapt the courses to the needs of the professionals working in the humanitarian sector. Building on the great work that has been done since CERAH's beginnings over 20 years ago, today we offer refreshed, timely and relevant courses. New courses to be launched this year will cover topics related to climate change, health systems assessment in humanitarian crises, and more. In parallel to that, we are developing a new research portfolio, with several studies in public health, history and anthropology, and will continue to develop our Humanitarian Encyclopedia project, a collaborative online platform offering dialogue tools for professionals and academics.

What are the challenges for the future?

The current humanitarian landscape is becoming increasingly more complex. As humanitarians, we are dealing with several large-scale crises happening simultaneously, some because of old, unresolved issues, such as the increasing number of people living in protracted displacement, others as relatively new challenges, like the impact of climate change on humanitarian emergencies, conflicts and migration patterns.

The challenge for CERAH will be to ensure that our courses and our research are beneficial to frontline humanitarian workers who are often the first responders to these crises. For this reason, we will deliver more courses closer to the field and expand our blended learning offers.

→ www.cerahgeneve.ch

Meet Daniel de Torres

New Director of the Small Arms Survey (SAS)



What is your background?

I have had a very diverse range of professional experiences, including work at the Embassy of Spain in Washington, D.C., service in the Spanish Marines and emergency relief work for an NGO in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. I studied international development in Washington, with a focus on policy reform. I arrived at the Small Arms Survey directly from DCAF – the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance – where I led the Gender and Security Division and oversaw a broad range of research and operational projects.

How would you present the SAS in a few sentences?

The Small Arms Survey is an associated programme of the Graduate Institute. Our vision is a world without illicit small arms and armed violence. We work towards this by generating knowledge and policy-relevant recommendations on these topics. What makes the Survey unique is the way in which we combine rigorous academic and context-informed research with operational programmes on the ground. This means that we work with a diverse range of actors in the settings affected by small arms and armed violence and help them find solutions to these challenges. These actors include governments, regional organisations, think tanks, the United Nations and non-governmental organisations. Being associated with the Graduate Institute and based in Geneva, we are well positioned to support multilateral processes and to project our presence abroad to build the capacity of national and regional institutions to implement those international frameworks.

What are the challenges for the future?

With new challenges to human security capturing people's attention, we need to ensure that we do not overlook the importance of small arms issues. Small arms figure prominently in modern security matters such as violent extremism, cybercrime, urban conflicts, transnational crime, and climate change-related resource conflicts. We need to continue to explore and analyse these linkages to better inform the international community's responses to these threats, even if the current political climate is straining the multilateral system in an unprecedented way. The Small Arms Survey's support helps stakeholders

address these challenges in a well-coordinated, mutually reinforcing manner, and generates evidence-based approaches and ideas for tackling the proliferation of illicit small arms and ammunition. We marked our 20th anniversary in 2019 and we are extremely proud of how much the Survey has accomplished in the past two decades. Still, we know that much more work lies ahead and look forward to continuing the task.

→ www.smallarmssurvey.org

LE DOSSIER

MULTILATERALISM: WHAT'S NEXT?

G20 OSAKA SUMMIT
2019



JAPAN Osaka. US President Donald Trump and Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman shake hands during a G20 Summit member group photo, 28 June 2019. Brendan SMIALOWSKI/AFP



MULTILATERALISM: WHAT'S NEXT?

MULTILATERALISM IS IN CRISIS – OR IS IT?

Dominic Eggel

Research Adviser at the Research Office

RUSSIA, Moscow. A woman looks at traditional Russian wooden matryoshka nesting dolls depicting US President Donald Trump (L) and Russia's President Vladimir Putin (R). 6 July 2017. Kirill KUDRYAVTSEV/ AFP

Designed to foster cooperation among states, the multilateral system put in place after WWII is based on shared “principles of conduct” and expectations of “diffuse reciprocity” (J. Ruggie). It found expression in multiple fora such as the UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO, NATO, OECD, as well as more informal venues such as the G7 or G20. A long and imperfect work in progress, multilateralism evolved in parallel to, and was a key component of, the emerging liberal international order championed by the US for much of the second half of the 20th and the early 21st century. With

the end of the Cold War, the multilateral system gained a new momentum as global exchanges accelerated and a more inclusive multistakeholder approach allowed for the participation of new actors such as civil society organisations and private businesses.

More recently, however, it seems that multilateralism has become more akin to a faltering hot air balloon, as it has entered a state of crisis or decline. The UN and its manifold agencies have been losing their lustre, criticised for their lack of efficiency, institutional sclerosis and ideological infighting. The WTO has failed to conclude the

negotiations of the Doha Agenda started in 2001, as bilateralism and protectionism are resurging worldwide, and its dispute settlement system has stalled. The complex architecture of arms control set up at the end of the Cold War is threatened by the dismantling of the Iran nuclear deal. Multilateral efforts to address climate change have made symbolic progress at best. The governance of the internet is forfeiting its initial aspiration of a borderless knowledge society: a few private companies are misusing it to hoard data exponentially, and authoritarian states to monitor and repress their citizens.

After decades of globalisation and integration, the world thus seems to be fragmenting again, epitomised best, perhaps, by the return of geopolitics, protectionism, unilateral sanctions, treaty withdrawals, and even military and economic coercion. Pursuing an aggressive “America first” policy, the Trump administration has relinquished the traditional role of the US as herald and guarantor of the international liberal order and withdrawn from the Paris climate convention, the Iran nuclear deal, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. China, aiming to bend the multilateral system in its favour, is setting up parallel governance structures such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the China Development Bank. The EU, a traditional champion of multilateralism, is internally divided and losing influence on the international scene. Finally, the postcolonial backlash against the predominance of the West and the rising tide of populism have further contributed to delegitimise the liberal values underpinning the multilateral system.

The stakes are high as the crisis of the liberal international order comes at a time when multilateralism and concerted global action seem more necessary than ever. Pressing global issues such as major conflicts, climate change, migration flows, global economic shocks, arms control, and cybersecurity may indeed only be solved collectively.

There is, however, a different story. It has been argued that far from being on the verge of collapse, the multilateral system was merely undergoing a profound mutation – one that might even end up making it more effective and better adapted to the realities of the 21st century. Global governance has in many ways gained in complexity, flexibility and density. It now consists of a multilayered system of – often competing, overlapping or conflicting – regimes, agreements, networks, and initiatives. No longer the sole prerogative of states, it is driven by a bemusing multitude of actors (IOs, corporations, civil society organisations, advocacy groups, etc.)

that express themselves in a multitude of venues, fora, summits and platforms and produce a plethora of standards, norms, regulations, and public–private partnership (PPPs).

Multilateralism today is characterised by capillarity and variable geometry, a high degree of informality, and increased participation and inclusiveness. Elements of “smart” governance – to which the increased participation of multinationals and experts may not be extraneous – are allowing for more flexible, targeted and responsive multistakeholder initiatives. A sort of market of norms and standards has arisen

liberal order and the win-win dynamic inherent to international cooperation.

The question thus remains whether the more inclusive, flexible and patchwork type of multilateralism that is currently emerging, with its many grades and shadings and temporary alliances, will prove sustainable in the face of a marked return of power politics, nationalism, unilateralism, and trade wars on the global stage. Civil society, private or multistakeholder initiatives are blossoming but they often remain toothless and unable to eschew collective action pitfalls such as free-riding and weak enforcement. The last-

“What we may thus be witnessing is not so much the demise of global governance per se but rather the decline of one particular type of multilateralism characterised by Western liberal hegemony.”

in which declarations of intent, ad hoc solutions and voluntary participation are privileged over formal binding agreements.

What we may thus be witnessing is not so much the demise of global governance per se but rather the decline of one particular type of multilateralism characterised by Western liberal hegemony. As state actors are proving ever more reluctant to fund international organisations and engage into binding agreements, they are also forfeiting the more far-flung universalistic aspirations of the international

ing impact of the private sector on global governance remains equally questionable given multinational firms’ ingrained regulation-averseness, short-term outlook and profit orientation.

The danger, ultimately, is that without a shared normative ground for collaboration and collective action going beyond mere pragmatic alliances, global governance risks relapsing into a neo-Hobbesian state of nature characterised by a dangerous cocktail of confrontational politics, zero-sum games, and neoliberal concentration of power in the hands of a few.

BEYOND MULTILATERALISM

David Sylvan

Professor of International Relations/Political Science

Director of Research

Donald Trump is commonly considered to have carried out a generalised assault on multilateral agreements and institutions, from the nuclear deal with Iran, the Paris Agreement on climate change, various trade accords, and restrictions on the use of land mines, to the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and UNESCO. The question that obviously arises is whether, after the US election, this pattern will continue or, instead, be reversed.

Doubtless Trump has been overtly hostile to numerous agreements and institutions. Whether this hostility is greater than that of preceding presidents, who in their turn withdrew from some institutions, defunded others, and “unsigned”, scrapped, or let die different agreements, is debatable, even if Trump’s tone is considerably more caustic than that of his predecessors. However, was multilateralism really the best description of international relations post-1945?

In 1992, the international relations scholar John Ruggie defined multilateralism as “an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states *on the basis of generalized principles of conduct*: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence” (italics added).

This definition is extremely difficult to use as a criterion for judging whether any particular institution or agreement should be classified as multilateralist. If state A sets up a traveller inspection arrangement, whether aimed at terrorists or viruses, if state B then adopts most of those measures, while revising some of them, and if state C makes

additional modification, to which A and B respond by amending their original procedures, is this coordination by a group of three states?

However, coordination is easier to assess than “generalized principles of conduct” because it’s difficult to be sure what a state’s motivations are for the actions it undertakes. For example, when the US pushed most favoured nation in trade, one of Ruggie’s prime examples of multilateralism, was this because it was a generalised principle of conduct or because, believing that trade disputes could lead to wars, US leaders were determined not to get dragged into a third European war several decades down the road? If there are two or more different principles that could be cited as a basis for coordination, how are we to choose? Did NATO allies’ participation in the 1991 Gulf War reflect a norm of nonaggression, or of collective self-defence?

All of Ruggie’s prime examples of multilateralism – the Bretton Woods agreements, the United Nations Charter, and the North Atlantic Treaty – are hardly as multilateral as he claims. Two of the Bretton Woods-inspired institutions are located in Washington, one headed continuously by US citizens, the other having a weighted voting scheme favouring the US. Add the formal veto power in the Security Council, and the clear deference in NATO, and it is evident that a more accurate label for these arrangements would be “the United States and the others”.


More importantly, the formal definition of multilateralism is focused on coordinated policies by states, ignoring the point of those policies, namely actions by both state employees and by others. At Bretton Woods, one of the major issues between Keynes and White

was whether having a colonial empire meant that exporters and importers from other parts of the world would be locked out. The agreements, by answering no to that question, made it possible for multilateral, multidirectional trade flows, in which states played little part.

Similarly, the establishment of the WHO has meant that epidemics can be addressed by thousands of actors, only some of whom are state employees. In other words, the point of the most celebrated instances of multilateralism is to unlock the gates that stand in the way of cross-border transactions. To focus on multilateralism by looking primarily at states is akin to talking about elections by concentrating on the people who write and administer the rules, rather than on the parties or the candidates or the voters.

I cite the epidemics example because it illustrates a problem with the Ruggie definition of multilateralism. Certainly Trump would like to diminish or re-equilibrate many day-to-day interactions, whether those involve movements of persons or goods, and his preferred method of achieving those results is a set of bilateral deals with other states. On the other hand, the fundamentally multidirectional, nondyadic nature of those movements is not really at issue and, if anything, has increased in certain domains just in the last few years.

The implication of these remarks is that we need to start analysing many institutions and agreements in terms of day-to-day content, rather than which states were involved and how they interacted. To do so otherwise, I fear, would open us to Wolfgang Pauli’s celebrated putdown of a scientific paper: “It is not even wrong.”



“At Bretton Woods, one of the major issues between Keynes and White was whether having a colonial empire meant that exporters and importers from other parts of the world would be locked out. The agreements, by answering no to that question, made it possible for multilateral, multidirectional trade flows, in which states played little part.”

UNITED STATES, Savannah, Georgia. The intellectual founding fathers of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Harry Dexter White (L) and John Maynard Keynes (R), are pictured at the inaugural meeting of the IMF’s Board of Governors. 8 March 1946. HO/ INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND/ AFP

THE UN AT 75: RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS?

Cecilia Cannon

Researcher at the Global Governance Centre

Academic Adviser to the United Nations (UN) for its UN75 dialogues on global cooperation

Born from the ashes of a conflict that decimated nearly three percent of the world's population, the UN was established in 1945 to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". Recognising from the failings of the League of Nations that the UN could only survive as long as the major powers were at the table, the UN's founding members endowed the major powers with privileges –

member states to pay their outstanding dues – USD 1.3 billion in the year 2019 alone –, liquidity levels so low that the UN risked defaulting on staff payments. This at a time when the world faces rapidly evolving challenges that require cooperative problem-solving: from new technological risks and opportunities, to shifting geopolitical tectonic plates; climate and environmental degradation and disasters

voluntary contributions from states and private donors, and increasingly, on private-individual donations made in response to public appeals, as well as fees paid for the provision of services and goods.

While this fills a short-term financing gap, it favours bi- and unilateral decision-making over collective problem-solving by introducing new lines of accountability that steer UN agencies towards fulfilling the demands of individual states, private donors and/or UN secretariats. Research conducted at the Global Governance Centre shows that the proportion of UN agencies' outputs/activities that focus on collective member-state given mandates is subsequently diminishing.

For example, member-states mandated the UN Refugee Agency to provide refugees with: (1) protection, (2) humanitarian assistance and (3) permanent solutions. Yet as the UN Refugee Agency increasingly relies on voluntary contributions and private donations, its work now focuses on protection and humanitarian assistance, leaving permanent solutions – that require collective member-state problem-solving and burden-sharing – lacking. While the 770 pledges and approximately USD 10 billion in financial commitments made during the 2019 Global Refugee Forum support protection, employment and education of refugees and host communities, they don't produce the desperately needed resettlement visas for the 99 percent of refugees requiring them.

tied to displacement, health, conflict and insecurity; and widening inequalities within and between countries.

Two seeming solutions introduced to temper the UN's woes may be undermining the capacity for UN member-states to solve problems cooperatively.

First, facing ever-increasing budget shortfalls, the UN and many of its agencies have diversified their financing. They now widely rely on earmarked

permanent membership on the Security Council with veto rights. While the veto is lamented today for blocking the Security Council from resolving conflicts such as that in Syria, it has succeeded in keeping the major powers in some level of dialogue at the UN.

Seventy-five years after it was created, the UN survives. Just. In October 2019, UN Secretary-General António Guterres made a desperate plea for

“Disagreement amongst member states is too swiftly discredited as a failure of multilateralism rather than a necessary component of it.”



SWITZERLAND, Geneva. The Graduate Institute hosts United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres to hold a dialogue on global challenges with six young people, including two Institute students, to mark the UN's 75th anniversary. 25 February 2020. Boris PALEFROY/ Graduate Institute

Second, in times of waning support for multilateralism, reaching consensus swiftly is often prioritised over meaningful debate. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan raised this concern in 2005, stating, "consensus (often interpreted as requiring unanimity) has become an end in itself [...] it prompts the Assembly to retreat into generalities, abandoning any serious effort to take action. Such real debates as there are tend to focus on process rather than substance and many so-called decisions simply reflect the lowest common denominator of widely different opinions."

Today, disagreement amongst member states is too swiftly discredited as a failure of, or a retreat from, multilateralism rather than a necessary component of it, from which innovative, brave and meaningful solutions can be crafted. Remaining "resolved to combine our efforts" while balancing power disparities is perhaps the UN's most daunting task. But, as Dag Hammarskjöld passionately articulated in 1960, it is also the UN's *raison d'être* to defend the

principles of the UN Charter, while balancing the interests of large states and small states, of the South and the North, the East and the West, the faithful of one creed and the faithful of another, and the ever-evolving differences within and between regions.

Some progress has been made to foster healthy debate, such as the inclusive pre-negotiation consultative processes that led to the Sustainable Development Goals, the UN global compacts on migration and refugees, and the current Open-ended Working Group on cybersecurity. But additional procedural modifications, such as redesigning the three-minute intervention format to UN proceedings utilising digital technology, could go a long way towards fostering an environment of healthy debate and dialogue on tough, inherently political issues.

Amidst the despondency there are reasons to hope. First, we know that UN reform is possible, from the large-scale overhauling of the Human Rights Commission in 2006 (replaced by the

Human Rights Council with innovative mechanisms and procedures) to procedural reforms, such as increasing transparency of Security Council processes. Even the tabooed Security Council membership underwent reform back in 1965, expanding its rotating members from 6 to 10. It has been done before, and it can be done again.

Second, António Guterres has opted not to mark the UN's 75th anniversary with grand celebrations, but rather has called for a global conversation about the current and future state of global cooperation. Starting in January 2020, the UN75 campaign initiated dialogues at all levels and is conducting a mass public survey (www.un75.online), a scientifically sampled survey in 50 countries, as well as a mapping of academic and policy research to take stock of current thinking on global cooperation.

Third, the global destruction from which the UN was born should remind us that it is precisely for times like these that the UN was created.

¹ Quote from the preamble of the UN Charter.



MULTILATERALISM: WHAT'S NEXT?

INFORMAL GROUPS AND THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM

Cédric Dupont

President of Executive Education

Professor of International Relations/Political Science

FRANCE, Le Havre. Anti-G8 activists hold globes reading, "Hello G20? This is the rest of the world" as they take part in a demonstration. 21 May 2011. Damien MEYER/AFP

Since the 1970s, yearly meetings of the G7/8, and later of the G20, have become major focal points in global affairs. They are the best-known manifestations of what is often called summity in global governance—highly visible gatherings of leaders who interact directly with each other to address pressing cross-border issues and come up with jointly elaborated solutions.

Summits, as forms of management of international affairs, have long existed (think of the Concert of Europe in the 19th century, major international peace or economic conferences in the first part of the 20th century for instance) but their breadth has vastly expanded in the last 40 years with growing interdependence between countries and across domains. During those years, summits

went well beyond their historical role as catalysts or facilitators for major peace initiatives, expanding their reach into macroeconomic, environmental or social issues. In the absence of a world government, they now regularly serve to fulfil a range of functions such as launching new initiatives or providing guidance on world or regional political or economic affairs.

Illustrative of this trend, the G7/8 and G20 both originally aimed at addressing international economic difficulties, such as the stagflation that followed the oil crises in the 1970s for the G7 and the financial crisis in 2008 for the G20. This original aim is reflected in the economic weight of the groups' members, totalling more than 50% of global net wealth for the G7 alone. But

their purview has gradually expanded to cover major world issues that need the cooperation of major states to be addressed. Yearly meetings of the G7/8 or G20 are to be contrasted with meetings of the highest political bodies of many international organisations at the world or regional level, or with high-level conferences acting as agenda setters on important issues, such as the famous Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Unlike those examples, the G7/8 and G20 rely on few explicit processes and procedures and mostly consist of collections of bilateral meetings between members and a few plenary meetings. Until 2018, the end result of those meetings has been the public endorsement of a joint declaration detailing the rationale and

substance for future actions in various other forums, in particular formal international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organisation (WHO) or the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to name a few.

In 2018 in Quebec, Canada, the G7 meeting ended with the spectacular last-minute withdrawal of US President Trump's support for the carefully negotiated joint declaration. It was a clear manifestation of the questioning of the key foundations of summity in the

to react to challenges. In the middle of the great financial crisis in 2008, the G20 was upgraded from a ministerial level to a head-of-state level to give more weight to concerted plans of actions and pledges to refrain from protectionist measures. The upgraded G20 then strengthened the existing Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and transformed it into the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to promote international financial stability. The G7 reacted to the 2018 failure by producing a much less ambitious declaration after its 2019 meeting in

sector, an initiative for Business for Inclusive Growth, a plan regarding the Amazon wildfires, and a potential initiative to fight fires in sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas the adoption of specific initiatives had been a recurrent pattern in previous G7 summits, it had always been a kind of "sugar on the cake" of a joint declaration with broad scope and substantive arguments. In 2019, the cake so to speak was the set of specific agreements that did not require as broad a consensus as the joint declaration.

For international policymaking and cooperation, however, innovations in the G20 and G7 have brought no change to the ongoing dynamics away from multilateralism and the conduct of coordinated action under some collective leadership. The upgrading of the G20 and the creation of the FSB have not remedied the fragmentation of global financial governance, nor offset nationalistic temptations. In the G7, the proliferation of specific initiatives dear to some members of the group is a confirmation that fragmented action, often responding to individual leaders' pet topics, as important as they can be, is here to last. The challenges that the world is facing are complex and interventions to address them are particularly difficult to design. Informal groupings such as the G7 and G20 are not equipped to help develop and enforce such designs, as they are too dependent on the domestic political imperatives of the leaders who tend to bend the meetings' agendas in ways often inconsistent with the dire needs of the planet.

“In contrast to formal international organisations that tend to exhibit strong inertia, informal groupings are quicker to react to challenges.”

last 40 years, namely the acceptance of multilateralism as a norm for international cooperation, the understanding that the nature of problems requires joint, coordinated action under some collective leadership, and the willingness to settle to some notion of diffused reciprocity—rather than strict reciprocity.

This evolution does not mean, however, that informal groups will disappear from the landscape of global governance. In contrast to formal international organisations that tend to exhibit strong inertia, informal groupings are quicker

Biarritz—an outcome that in the past had required huge preparatory efforts at the ministerial and sub-ministerial levels months ahead of the Summit and was always subject to last-minute bargain and drama. It delivered a very short non-committal declaration and focused instead on specific initiatives. They consisted of a series of agreements on topical issues, including a charter on biodiversity, a fund for women's empowerment for entrepreneurship, a fund to support the physical and psychological recovery of victims of sexual violence, an initiative for change in the cooling

US PRESSURE ON THE WTO: A CHANCE TO REBOUND?

Joost Pauwelyn

Professor of International Law

Codirector of the Centre for Trade and Economic Integration

Trade has been topping the news headlines like never before. In most cases, the tone is sombre. Certain pundits go as far as predicting the end of the multilateral trading system. “Aggressive unilateralism” by President Trump is one reason for the current state of affairs. The key question is whether the United States is “weaponising” its tariff and market power in a push to reform, or to kill, the multilateral trading system. So far, reform seems to be the endgame. A period of

none of them addressed crucial issues such as the trade-in-agriculture concerns of developing countries, let alone the digital economy or rise of China. The monitoring arm of the WTO, centred around self-notification, is also in trouble: the notification record of most WTO members is dismal. To improve it, with both carrots and sticks, is at the top of the US (and many other countries’) reform agenda. Dispute settlement, finally, was long lauded as one of the WTO functions that truly works.

What explains the stalemate? Firstly, the WTO makes decisions by consensus of now 164 members. An increasing number of “big players” (such as the EU, the US, China, India, South Africa and Brazil) as well as mounting diversity *between* members (in particular China’s so-called “state capitalism”) make consensus to update WTO rules extremely difficult. Secondly, trade is increasingly mixed up with broader geopolitical battles including national and digital security. This further complicates deal-making and makes third-party dispute settlement highly sensitive. Thirdly, the end of US hegemony and corresponding US leadership (partly) “for free” is upending WTO mantras ranging from “diffuse reciprocity” and the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle to special and differential treatment for “developing countries”.

If US pressure, increasingly supported by other members, may be the catalyst for reform, what then could be the contours of a WTO 2.0?

Firstly, WTO rules must be updated to deal with new distortions, in particular elements of China’s “state capitalism” and restrictions as well as level-playing-field challenges linked to the digital economy, data flows, intellectual property and services. The China-US “phase one” deal and trilateral talks between the US, EU and Japan on industrial subsidies and technology transfer are promising for achieving the former; plurilateral talks

“aggressive unilateralism” may be the price to pay for breaking the impasse. In 1994, “aggressive unilateralism” eventually spawned the creation of the WTO; in the not too distant future, it may turn out to be the catalyst for a WTO 2.0.

What is the “impasse”? The negotiating arm of the WTO has been in a stalemate for over 10 years, ever since the so-called Doha Development Round, initiated in 2001, stalled. Some WTO deals were concluded (most notably on trade facilitation in 2013) but

Over time, however, dispute cases lasted years, not months; legal briefs and reports became excessively long and complex; and some countries, first the US (as early as 2001) and later more members, complained about Appellate Body “overreach”, including adjudicators “filling gaps” left open by negotiators. At the end of 2019, when the Appellate Body lost its quorum (because of a US block on appointments), the impasse touched all of the WTO’s branches: legislative, administrative *and* judicial.



SWITZERLAND, Davos. World Trade Organization Director-General Roberto Azevedo gives a speech as US President Donald Trump looks on at the World Economic Forum. 22 January 2020. Jim WATSON/AFP

on e-commerce (which include China) and domestic regulation of services at the WTO may go some way in accomplishing the latter.

Secondly, WTO reform must be guided by shared responsibility (including in limiting domestic support for agriculture) and country commitments based on issue area and topic-specific capacity, not across-the-board bifurcation between “developed” and “developing” countries. Recent announcements by Brazil, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan that they will no longer invoke “developing country” benefits in future deals are reason for optimism. The real test will be a new agreement to reduce fisheries subsidies (hopefully concluded in June 2020 at the WTO’s next ministerial) and how “special and differential treatment” is framed there.

Thirdly, the WTO’s legislative and judicial arms must be rebalanced. It would be a mistake to move from consensus to majority decision-making that binds all 164 for anything that adds new commitments (countries should only be held against rules they agreed to). Yet, smaller groups of like-minded countries must be allowed to move forward. Automatic dispute settlement must be restored. Yet, it must focus more on speedy resolution and avoiding escalation; less on win/lose litigation and creating “case law”.

Fourthly, and above all, the WTO needs to find a way to be both humble and ambitious. Humble, by scaling down the expectations it creates (the WTO’s mandate is limited) and leaving more room for domestic regulation and trust in domestic checks and balances.

Ambitious, by finding a new narrative focused *not* on “let’s trade more” but on the WTO as stabiliser and interface between a diversity of national systems, promoting fair and sustainable trade whose benefits are spread widely.

Like longstanding regimes on foreign investment and cross-border taxation or competition, the multilateral trading system is in a phase of recalibration, not demise. To address the challenges of a multipolar world, technological innovation and popular demand to “take back control”, the WTO is likely to lose some of its centrality, to the benefit of domestic policymaking and plurilateral and bilateral deals. This is not necessarily a bad thing.



MULTILATERALISM: WHAT'S NEXT?

TRANSNATIONAL POLICY NETWORKS AND CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Thomas Biersteker

Professor of International Relations/Political Science
Curt Gasteyer Chair in International Security and Conflict Studies

Although most of our theories of international or global governance have long focused on the role of formal, treaty-based intergovernmental organisations (or FIGOs), the world of multilateral governance by states is today only a part of a much larger story. There has been a significant increase in the role played by non-state actors in contemporary global governance, coupled with a surge in informal intergovernmental organisations (or IIGOs, like the G-groups) and transnational governance initiatives (or TGIs, including both public-private partnerships and multistakeholder initiatives) over

the past twenty-five years. Concurrently, states have moved away from the signing of new multilateral, treaty-based agreements and relied less on international courts. A growing and increasingly broad-based consensus has emerged that it is no longer possible to focus exclusively, or even predominantly, on states and their interactions in intergovernmental organisations to comprehend, understand, and analyse contemporary global governance. In a forthcoming edited volume, Oliver Westerwinter, Kenneth Abbott, and I have developed a typology of three forms of informal governance:

(1) informality *in* institutional form (the growth of IIGOs and TGIs), (2) informal practices *within* both formal and informal organisations, and (3) informal interactions among the individuals and networks that exist *around* the institutions of global governance.

Much of the recent literature on global governance examines the different institutional forms that operate within the arena in which informal governance occurs, in the spaces *around* formal intergovernmental organisations (our third type of informal governance). The different institutional forms that are examined in the literature – from

public-private partnerships to transnational advocacy networks, issue campaigns, and multistakeholder and transnational governance initiatives – exemplify different analytical approaches to the emergent phenomenon. With particular reference to the United Nations, this arena has been described as “the Third UN”.

An alternative concept – transnational policy networks (TPNs) – illustrates how these different institutional components are interrelated and play different functional roles in the development of global policy through the agency of individuals. The networked relationships among individuals engaged in policy formation and policy innovation in different domains of contemporary global governance build upon the concept of specialised “fields” of expertise and on sociological

In contrast to other institutional arrangements, TPNs might include individuals from NGOs, but they are more technical in orientation and less associated with advocacy. Individuals from within transgovernmental networks (TGNs) routinely engage with one another in transnational policy networks. TPNs transcend TGNs, however, by including actors other than state officials – from the private business sector, international organisations, international legal practice, or academia. TPNs are less formally contractual than most PPPs and less immediately outcome oriented. TPNs may, nonetheless, involve PPPs for the achievement of a particular purpose. TPNs are also less institutionalised than most multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) that are designed for specific monitoring or regulatory purposes.

reform. They have frequently been associated with UN reform efforts, dating back to initiatives like the Brandt and Brundtland Commissions in the late 20th century, as well as to more recent initiatives like the Global Compact and the Millennium Project. Today, they exist across the UN, particularly in emerging issue domains where the organs of governance are less well institutionalised. Rather than competing with the UN, TPNs can complement its activities, particularly given the current financial constraints faced by the UN System.

While critics of expertise raise legitimate normative concerns about the ability of TPNs to shape the priorities of FIGOs without bearing full accountability, they have in many instances reinforced, rather than weakened, existing institutions of global governance. They can mobilise expertise in areas where it is lacking in existing organisations, and they can suggest novel solutions to contemporary policy and governance challenges that might not be allowed by restrictive or inflexible institutional mandates. They are also a vehicle for the mobilisation of resources for the global public good, since most participate in TPNs without direct financial compensation. They have played important roles in issue domains as varied as the creation of codes of conduct for private military and security companies, the development of targeted sanctions, and the nascent governance of cyberspace. Given their flexible institutional characteristics, and the growing reticence of states to address contemporary governance challenges through formal institutional structures alone, TPNs are likely to become more important forms of informal governance in the future.

“TPNs have in many instances reinforced, rather than weakened, existing institutions of global governance.”

research on transnational policy communities. A TPN is constituted by a group of individuals across a variety of institutions (both public and private) who possess a common expertise, a common technical language to communicate that expertise, broadly shared normative concerns, but not necessarily agreement on specific policy goals. A shared, specialised language defines both the possibility of entry into the network and a basis for exclusion or alienation from it.

Unlike many MSIs and most TGIs, TPNs focus more on policy formation and the development and reform of policy instruments than on regulatory frameworks.

Different institutional forms tend to play different roles in global governance. TPNs are particularly important in the early phases of policy development, but can continue to play a significant role when governance arrangements lack legitimacy, fall short of performance expectations, and need

THE FUTURE OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE

Roxana Radu

Research Associate at the Global Governance Centre

“Technology is accelerating, and we, the multilateral system of the digital age, are unprepared and need to catch up [...] The systems for governance of digital technology are old, fragmented and reactive. The longer we wait to update these systems, the further we will fall behind.” These remarks of the United

billions of applications across all sectors, for purposes as diverse as educational advancement and military probing. The ideals of an open, free and secure global Internet have never seemed further away than they are today due to technical developments, new business models or advanced surveillance and weaponisation tools.

dream of the past, while data-driven business models have shown that once information is harvested, there is no limits to its repurposing, manipulation and misuse. The Cambridge Analytica scandal is a case-in-point here, widely perceived as a direct threat to electoral systems and democratic processes. More recently, the move towards a sovereigntist agenda also surfaced in the national AI strategies of about a dozen countries. While the overall involvement of civil society in global policymaking has expanded, it has been primarily in global forums with “no teeth” (non-binding outcomes).

In parallel, during the last decade, stronger national approaches to limiting access to the global Internet have emerged, whether in China, Russia or Iran. Digital censorship is on the rise. Mandated by states and implemented by private intermediaries, content controls reveal new ways of policing the cyberspace through automation and machine-learning tools, consolidating the position of a handful of tech giants. Private agreements, informal venues and “clubs” (such as G7 or G20) appear to be preferred over global, inclusive initiatives with higher levels of accountability. Alternative routes for timely decision-making are constantly sought, whether in the form of standardisation or circumvention strategies.

Under these circumstances, can global cooperation make a difference? Multilateral governance for establishing cross-border regulation goes back to 1865, when the International Telegraph Union was established to create

“Paradoxically, the ‘age of digital interdependence’ is marked by a high level of distrust in international politics.”

Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres from 10 June 2019 echo a ubiquitous concern among scholars and policymakers alike: for the digital society, is multilateralism part of the solution or part of the problem? As the UN prepares to celebrate its 75th anniversary, its role in steering global actions in technology governance is increasingly questioned. Over 4 billion people are using the Internet on a daily basis, accessing online services, backed – at least in part – by artificial intelligence (AI) systems. The Internet is a privately operated network of networks with

The tension between intergovernmental and private modes of governance, on the one hand, and more innovative multistakeholder processes, on the other hand, remains at the heart of the governance of existing and emerging technology. The unprecedented growth of tech companies, increasingly under public scrutiny, has undoubtedly changed the outlook. Online services operating across multiple jurisdictions pose challenges to traditional regulation. The high concentration of power in the hands of a few American and Chinese companies has made the decentralised Internet a



RUSSIA, Moscow. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev visits the office of Mail.Ru Group, one of Russia's biggest Internet companies. 29 March 2019. Yekaterina SHTUKINA/SPUTNIK/AFP

common standards. States have since come together in a plurality of forums, seeking ways to harmonise their approaches to Internet-related public policy. Despite a few successes, in particular at the regional level – such as the Council of Europe's Budapest Convention on Cybercrime in 2001 –, intergovernmental negotiations have often failed to deliver the expected results. Looking at the discussions of the 5th UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, in which 25 UN member states participated, progress has been stalled in 2017 when no agreement could be reached on how international law applies to cyberspace. In the ashes of this UN GGE, two new

processes towards enhancing security in cyberspace were initiated in 2019: another limited-membership UN GGE entitled “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security” and an Open-Ended Working Group to which all UN member-states and other stakeholders can contribute. The latter is, at least in part, a response to a greater demand for transparent and inclusive discussions in a traditionally opaque, national-interest arena. It is also an indication that reform is needed in multilateral practices for pressing issues that require broader participation, in particular from the Global South.

Paradoxically, the “age of digital interdependence” – to use the phrase coined by the UN High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation – is marked by a

high level of distrust in international politics. Against the grim background of trade wars and growing political instability, the governance of technology as a global common is a test case for the resilience of our global system. Cross-border rules and standards for data protection, privacy, security, surveillance and digital flows are slowly emerging as a result of state-led processes, but the global arena remains highly fragmented along enduring power imbalances between developed and developing countries. Despite the multitude of actors able to participate in global debates, the dominant position of a few influential states and a handful of private tech giants has not been altered. For the future governance of AI to be any different, a reform is urgent.



L'ENSEIGNEMENT

Moving from Practice to Academia and Keeping Both in the Classroom

Gian Luca Burci

Adjunct Professor of International Law
Academic Adviser, Global Health Centre

I am an atypical professor in that I come from an almost 30-year career as a legal adviser in the United Nations System. Even though I always cultivated an “academic” side, I was a didactic beginner and I suspect that the students of my initial courses were puzzled by my inexperience. One of my constant priorities throughout these years has been to improve my pedagogic approach and the student feedback I received has been invaluable for this.

I teach a course on international health law as well as a variety of courses on international organisations. I have also codirected executive courses in the Global Health Centre and taught a very engaging workshop on the functions of an international legal counsel within the executive LL.M. The latter has been ideal for me, as it has allowed me to capitalise on my previous career and offer case studies that enabled students to work through legal and political issues “from within” an international institution.

One of the challenges I have been facing in my health law course is its horizontal nature, which spans very different legal regimes (sometimes highly technical). In addition, some students lack either a legal background or knowledge of particular topics. This has led me to fine-tune the amount of notions I can safely transfer, and to introduce stocktaking classes to test student understanding and discuss actual cases. These are also opportunities to directly involve shy or silent students and avoid the customary monopolisation of classes by a minority of vocal students.

The diverse cultural backgrounds and intellectual approaches of the Institute’s students are amazing and a constant source of learning for me. It is also exciting to see the exchange of experiences and perspectives among students and how it leads them to explore new directions in their research and intellectual elaboration. My courses are always open to students from other disciplines, and my international organisation courses in particular benefit from the participation of Interdisciplinary Masters and International Relations/Political Science students who bring a different perspective to theories of multilateralism and global governance.

Even though the Master of International Law is an academic programme, it is clear that many students aim for a career as practitioners in international organisations or governments. The introduction of a legal clinic that I codirected with Professor Nico Krisch has been a very positive development in this direction. It enables carefully selected students to produce written reports for “client” international organisations on current practical issues and challenges them to combine their academic knowledge with the skills required of legal practitioners. Participating students have described it as one of the highlights of their study period.

L'ENSEIGNEMENT

Janne Nijman, New Professor of International Law



Why did you decide to join the Institute?

It is such an exciting place, bringing together excellent scholars and students from around the world with different backgrounds and disciplines. I see wonderful opportunities for collaboration within the International Law Department and beyond, e.g. with the International History Department. Bringing together excellent people from various disciplines makes the Institute a space where multidisciplinary dialogues can flourish in research and in teaching. That is, in my view, very attractive for students as well as for scholars and practitioners. In addition, within the Department of International Law there are excellent colleagues whose work I have held in high esteem for many years now and with whom I can see good synergies. So, I am delighted to join the Graduate Institute.

What shaped your interest in the history of international law?

One of the reasons I turned to history relates to my interest in understanding the foundations of international law. I did my PhD in the 1990s, when much of the scholarly debate was about non-state actors (NSAs) – Professor Andrew Clapham was one of the main participants in those debates – and I wondered about how we got to where we were with international legal personality. How did it emerge? Why? To address which problems? Hence my turn to history.

At that time, however, we were not well equipped to study the history of legal concepts. When I started to look for methodology, which was in itself something uncommon since lawyers did doctrinal legal research without much methodological deliberation, I found the literature of the Cambridge School. This approach to the history of political and international legal thought makes us aware of how concepts are not natural phenomena, but rather socially constructed in relation to problems or challenges.

Since then, my interest in the history of international legal thought was increasingly driven by a dissatisfaction with international law. I became interested in questioning current inherited beliefs, assumptions and understandings coupled with the possibility of change through critique and reimagination.

What are you currently working on?

I am currently working on two strands of research. One is related to the history and theory of international law and engages with current debates on why and how we do international legal history, questions that are the subject of a paper entitled “An Enlarged Sense of Possibility for International Law: Seeking Change by Doing History”.

The second strand is on the role of cities in international law and governance, and vice versa. My interest in this topic was triggered around 2005 by an article in the *International Herald Tribune* about the then Mayor of Seattle, Greg Nickels, who was disappointed that the US Senate did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. He was determined to translate and implement the norm locally. This was the starting point for my research on how the city engages more actively with for example human rights and climate justice standards.

■ Professor Janne Nijman (PhD, Leiden University) divides her time between the Graduate Institute and the University of Amsterdam, where she is Professor of History and Theory of International Law.

Capstone Research Projects Celebrate Their 10th Anniversary

The Capstone Research Projects are part of the Interdisciplinary Masters Programme, which encompasses the Master in Development Studies and the Master in International Affairs. Interview with Liliana Andonova, Professor of International Relations/Political Science, and Gilles Carbonnier, Professor of International Economics.

Professor Andonova, as Head of the Interdisciplinary Programme, could you explain the value that the Capstone Projects add to these masters?

The applied research Capstone Projects are a highly innovative aspect of the interdisciplinary curriculum. It gives students the opportunity to apply their analytical skills and deliver practical research projects with partners in International Geneva, including international organisations, the private sector and non-profits. These projects challenge students to link their studies with concrete professional experience and allow them to step out of the comfort zone of classroom instruction.

Students take ownership of their research, with guidance from professors and partners. They learn to manage professional challenges related to working as a team, communicate with partners and adapt to expectations, while simultaneously delivering research of high academic depth and quality. This supports a rigorous post-graduate education intended to build transversal skills.

The excellence of our students and their Capstone Projects has been recognised by both peers and partners. We have seen many projects earn prizes or feature in public spaces, such as RTS programmes, the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform or the UNFCCC's Conference of Parties.

Professor Carbonnier, you are at the origin of the Capstones. Why did you create them? What was their intended purpose?

Starting in 2007, we embarked on a reform of our Master in Development Studies. I collected the views of the major employers who typically recruit our master students after graduation. While employers were highly appreciative of students' academic background and skills, they were more critical of the difficulty former students had in working effectively in teams and in being action- and practice-oriented.

We thus decided to establish what was then called "Applied Research Seminars", whereby teams of students would carry out research projects mandated by Geneva-based organisations to solve "real-world, practical issues". From

the outset, it was decided that a student's ability to work effectively as part of a team would be included in the final grade, as well as their capability to manage relations with partner organisations (their "clients"). This aspect included the delivery of research outputs in a format deemed appropriate for a policy/practice-oriented organisation, while ensuring proper academic rigour when it came to methodology and analysis.

What do students gain from their involvement in the Capstone Projects?

Students gain hands-on experience conducting research dealing with real world issues for international organisations, NGOs, think-tanks, companies or governments (via their permanent mission in Geneva). They learn how to cooperate effectively within a group, drawing on the advantages that different disciplinary and cultural backgrounds, as well as linguistic and communication skills, bring to the fore. Students can also benefit from the networks they establish within International Geneva – not solely with their partner organisation, but also through interviews and



research work. At times, master students have been hired directly by their partner organisation after graduation to continue working on their Capstones.

What benefits do the Capstones bring to the Institute in general?

Now generating around 50 research reports a year, Capstone Projects have grown in number and scope. They are categorised into five thematic tracks: Environment, Resources and Sustainability; Mobilities, Spaces and Cities; Power, Conflict and Development; Global Security; and Trade and International Finance. Topics are frequently cutting-edge, enabling students to apply critical thinking to areas they will likely encounter in their early careers.

With a decade of experience in delivering this innovative approach to student-centred learning and with our network of highly valued professionals and partner organisations, Capstones have greatly helped to spread the Graduate Institute's reputation of academic excellence and relevance. Students come out of the programme able to better navigate the complex research-policy-practice nexus.

What do you see for the future of these projects?

As the Capstones begin their second decade, a rich historical archive of student research has captured the policy, politics and practice of global affairs as they have unfolded in International Geneva through the years and across the organisations.

Now, as the United Nations enters its 76th year, it has never been more important to ensure that the academic education and training of young professionals promote knowledge and skills that will ensure sustainable futures. In this, the Graduate Institute's Capstone Projects are gaining an international reputation for excellence in applied research, unique experiential learning, and a rich hub for creative thinking and professionalism. These projects will consolidate their place at the heart of the Graduate Institute's unique educational offering in international and development studies.

SWITZERLAND, Geneva. Students present findings on the gendered impacts of weather and climate at the World Meteorological Organization in Geneva (WMO). From left to right: Dr Assia Alexieva, WMO partner; Dr Claire Somerville, academic supervisor from the Graduate Institute; and students Olga Bogdan, Seulgi Yoon and McPherlain C. Chungu. February 2019.

Supporting Talented Students from around the World

Refugee Scholarship



Originally from South Sudan, **MAIWEN DOT PHEOT NGALUETH** came to Switzerland with his family as the political environment in his home country made normal life impossible. Having already spent nearly a decade working in the humanitarian sector, Maiwen is now undertaking his Master in International Affairs.

“ I would like to tell refugees like me [...] to have hope and to remember that despite all the challenges that we all go through, there are a lot of people out there who are ready to support them in achieving their goals. I would like to thank the Graduate Institute for the warm welcome at the school and for offering me the opportunity as a refugee to come and study here. ”

- The Refugee Scholarship is funded by the Institute and was created in partnership with the Graduate Institute Student Association’s Migration Initiative out of a deep concern for the magnitude of the migratory crisis and the fate of tens of thousands of people in war zones seeking refuge in countries like Switzerland.

Graduate Institute Community Scholarship

SHRIYA PATNAIK is from the state of Odisha in India. She received her Bachelor in History and South Asia Studies from Cornell University and a Dual Master in International History from Columbia University and the London School of Economics. She is currently a PhD candidate in International History.



“ I feel privileged, humbled, grateful and hugely validated to have received the Community Scholarship. Without it, I would not have been able to undertake my PhD in Europe and benefit from the rich culture of research at the Graduate Institute. Furthermore, this scholarship shows just how seriously the Institute takes genuine social research, and the contribution it makes towards global issues. ”

- Since 2013, the Graduate Institute community – the Foundation Board, administrative personnel and faculty, as well as retired professors – has mobilised to raise funds that provide a full scholarship for a student from the Global South. These funds are awarded annually as a show of solidarity with the Institute and with those students who would not be able to study in Geneva without financial aid.

→ <https://graduateinstitute.ch/fundraising>

Alumni Scholarship



Currently pursuing a Master in International Affairs, **HENRY ANYOMI** came to the Institute from Ghana. He is looking forward to researching more in-depth interreligious cooperation and international peace promotion and expects to be able to help forge strong relationships across religions, while mitigating the effects of hatred and extremism.

“ I literally envisioned myself as a part of the Institute’s diverse environment as one of its valued international students. [...] To say the least, this scholarship set me on the path to pursuing my long-held ambition of building bridges across strained international relationships, for which I am very grateful. ”

- The Alumni Scholarship was established to fund the academic and living expenses of a student in financial need for a year. Funds for the scholarship are collected through direct donations on the Alumni Scholarship webpage and also during a raffle and silent auction held at the annual Alumni Reunion, which reunites alumni from around the world each year.

Washington, D.C. Alumni Chapter Scholarship

KENNEDY MMASI moved to the United States from his home in Arusha, Tanzania, to pursue a Bachelor in Economics at Harvard University. He is currently working towards a Master in International Affairs with a focus on finance and trade. After he graduates, he hopes to work in the field of international trade, building economic policies that can enable developing countries to maximise gains from trade.



“ I chose the Graduate Institute due to its top reputation in the study of international affairs, given the top faculty and its close proximity to the major international organisations in Geneva. The Washington, D.C. Alumni Chapter Scholarship has given me the opportunity to afford an education at the Graduate Institute, allowing me to advance my interests in gaining an education in the field of international affairs. ”

- The Washington, D.C. Alumni Chapter Scholarship was created to promote awareness of the Graduate Institute in the United States, while also helping the Institute recruit graduate students of high calibre. The Scholarship is available to first-year master or doctoral students – irrespective of nationality – from American universities who wish to study at the Institute. It is awarded based first on academic achievement and secondly on economic need and funds nine months of study.

→ <https://graduateinstitute.ch/alumni>

Feminism vs. Multiculturalism: An Insight into Islamic Feminism

Merna **Aboul-Ezz**

PhD candidate in International Law



In 2013, the American anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod published her iconic book, *Do Muslim Women Need Saving?* In it she discussed how Western feminists are “obsessed” with Muslim women in a way that makes them ignore their own struggles, abuses and violence and just focus on saving Muslim female victims from their static, homogenous and sometimes accused as sexist/misogynist religion, Islam.

In addition to fighting against the paternalistic approach of Western feminists, there are also the traditional male biases of Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic law that Muslim women have to comply with and abide by in their daily lives. It was in this juxtaposition that Islamic feminism found a way to flourish; a concept that is “highly contested and firmly embraced”, as Margot Badran, an expert in Islam and feminism, put it.

Secular feminists often argue that “Islamic feminism” is a controversial, incompatible and contradictory term, endorsing a view that Islam is oppressive to women, while traditional scholars believe feminism is an imposed Western concept that does not comply with Muslim culture.

To put it simply, Islamic feminism is Muslim women attempting to have their own agency in preserving their culture and fighting for their rights. To do so, Islamic feminists tend to go back to the main source of Islamic law – the Qur’an – to provide an alternative interpretation or “un-interpretation” of the current established male-dominated

exegesis. They do so by applying the classic Islamic methodologies of *ijtihad* (independent investigation of religious sources) and *tafsir* (interpretation of the Qur’an).


Further, Islamic feminists apply methods and tools of linguistics, history, literary criticism, sociology and anthropology to help them better understand the Qur’an. In their methodology, they advocate for the importance of context when reading the Qur’an, in addition to endorsing a holistic approach where they consider the main values of human equality, harmony and justice when interpreting the verses.

Like most religious feminists, Islamic feminists tend to use a restorative approach to connect with their religion. In addition to reforming the existing interpretation and jurisprudence, Islamic feminists also study how women were treated in the early Islamic days. Tova Hartman referred to this strategy as “the way out of *is* is through the *was*”.

Islamic feminism liberates women from the ongoing struggle that Islam and feminism are incompatible, giving them a sense of harmony, rather than conflict, between their inner faith and their rights.

Hence, instead of being perceived as victims in need of saving, Muslim women decided to step-up and create their own wave of feminism that – like any other form of feminism – saves them from patriarchy and tradition rather than from their own belief or beloved/chosen religion.

■ This article is part of “Student Works”, a new series highlighting the best student papers from the Graduate Institute.



LES ÉTUDIANTS

Beating the Odds: The Improbable Life of a Chess Prodigy from Zimbabwe

Kingdom **Karuwo**

Master student in Anthropology and Sociology

My life began in the “back of beyond”, as we later called it, in the small village of Plumtree, Zimbabwe. This was a place where cowbells clanged and half-dressed boys ran to and from, or danced in the rain. As a boy, aeroplanes were such a dazzle. Looking up and chasing the aircraft as far and as fast as my peers and I could run, we often wondered, “Who is inside those planes?” “Where are they going?” “Can they drop some sweets down to us?”

From my village, imagining the far-off capital city and the whole of Africa and its beyond was something I could only dream about. It’s as if growing up in Plumtree almost sealed one’s fate to stay. By pure chance, I left. It all started because of a Rubik’s cube and later, chess.

One day, a Swedish volunteer researching near Plumtree gave me said Rubik’s cube. A week later, she was stunned to see that I had nearly solved it. She spoke with my headmaster and the next thing I knew, my primary education had been paid for in the affluent city of Bulawayo. This was the reinvention of Kingdom.

In high school, I began to compete in chess, where I won several tournaments. My classmates started to give me titles such as “sir”, “scholar”, “Nash” or “Srinivasa”. Being likened to these characters placed me on an imaginary international arena; in a sense, I saw myself growing beyond the confines of Zimbabwe.

I played chess for more than five years, and the money I won at various national competitions paid for my

schooling as well as that of my beloved sister. You see, without parents, I quickly learnt that no one else was there: it was my sister, the world and me. However, this meant that losing a chess tournament had very serious consequences: it almost meant no school and no extra money to afford small luxuries, like watching movies with friends.

After high school, I got a job that helped me afford the move to Switzerland, where I earned a Master in African Studies at the University of Basel, and enrolled to pursue another master’s degree at the Graduate Institute.

As a consequence of my mobility, I have nurtured a particular interest in researching migration and development policy in and about Africa. Small stories like mine – from places like Plumtree – carried through bodies across the globe can restore the dignity of those in villages often regarded as lacking in both talent and mastery of high competencies. For me, chess was the device with which I circumvented the village boy narrative.

As an African student abroad, I want to foster and groom an attitude of tolerance, peace, love, care, honour and dignity for Africa, using anthropological and sociological tools.

My story is nature’s anomaly and a great improbability, yet still a very beautiful story to tell. If I could choose to be born over again, I would not change my life. It has been, and still is, one heck of a ride!

LAURE WARIDEL

Doctorat en anthropologie et sociologie du développement, 2016
Écosociologue, auteure et cofondatrice d'Équiterre

« L'utopie d'aujourd'hui est la réalité de demain », écrivait Victor Hugo. L'histoire lui donne raison, sachant que les grands progrès humains ont presque toujours pris naissance dans le terreau fertile de l'idéal pour ensuite se déployer grâce à un ensemble de décisions passant du théorique au pratique et de l'individuel au collectif.

Construire une société équitable et écologique peut sembler utopique. C'est pourtant le phare qui depuis des années oriente mon parcours académique, professionnel et citoyen. C'est le sens que j'ai donné à ma vie tout en étant bien consciente du pouvoir limité de tout individu, aussi bien intentionné soit-il.

Née de parents paysans dans un petit village de Suisse romande, c'est dans une ferme au Québec que j'ai grandi. J'y ai été témoin de la vulnérabilité économique imposée aux agriculteurs par l'agrobusiness et de la fragilité des écosystèmes qui nous nourrissent. À 17 ans, un été passé au Burkina Faso m'a permis de saisir le sens du mot « inégalité ». Plus j'en apprenais sur l'histoire du monde, plus j'étais consciente de l'immense hypocrisie qui régit les relations internationales au sein d'un système économique qui carbure à l'exploitation sociale autant qu'environnementale.

Quelques années plus tard, en 1993, avec un groupe d'amis (jeunes universitaires comme moi), nous fondions Équiterre. C'est dans ce contexte que j'ai publié mon premier essai, *Une cause café* (Intouchables, 1997). J'y présentais le fruit de recherches menées dans une coopérative de café au Mexique. Cet ouvrage m'a propulsée sur la scène médiatique, nous permettant de lancer avec force le commerce équitable au Québec, jusqu'alors méconnu en Amérique du Nord. De nombreux autres projets de recherche et d'action citoyenne ont suivi. Aujourd'hui, Équiterre est considéré comme l'un des organismes environnementaux ayant le plus d'influence au Canada.

L'envie d'approfondir mes connaissances m'a amenée à l'Institut pour y faire un doctorat sur l'émergence d'une économie écologique et sociale. J'avais besoin de prendre du recul afin de mieux comprendre les processus de transition en cours, les freins autant que les accélérateurs de changement. Grâce à la qualité des enseignements reçus et l'encadrement extraordinaire de ma codirectrice de thèse, Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, je suis retournée au Québec mieux outillée pour poursuivre ma mission. Je suis maintenant professeure associée à l'Université du Québec à Montréal et membre de son Institut des sciences de l'environnement. Je suis aussi conseillère en environnement et justice sociale pour le cabinet juridique Trudel, Johnston & Lespérance, qui poursuit notamment le Canada pour son inaction en matière de changements climatiques. Je viens de publier mon dernier livre, *La transition, c'est maintenant* (Écosociété, 2019), parce que c'est aujourd'hui que nous choisissons ce que sera demain.



LES ÉTUDIANTS

L'amicale des étudiants francophones

Entretien avec Emmanuel Robert

Étudiant de master en relations internationales/science politique
et David M. Rochat

Étudiant de master en histoire internationale

Pourquoi avez-vous relancé l'Amicale des étudiants francophones ?

La reprise de l'Amicale s'explique tout d'abord par la volonté de poursuivre la longue tradition francophone de l'Institut, et d'en affirmer son empreinte par l'entremise de la vie associative. En tant qu'antichambre utile à toute vie estudiantine, le monde associatif permet l'ouverture à un espace de réflexion pour partie libéré de l'injonction académique que dictent les rendus et autres échéances semestriels. Or, il nous semblait qu'au sein du vaste et riche parterre associatif que proposait l'Institut, l'absence d'une plateforme d'échange et de partage en langue française se faisait ressentir. Entre autres encouragés par nos camarades francophones et francophiles, nous avons ainsi décidé en été 2019 de combler cette « lacune de marché » associative en faisant renaître l'association historiquement dépositaire de cette mission : l'Amicale.

Quels sont ses objectifs ?

L'Amicale a deux objectifs : d'une part, maintenir un dialogue constructif et serein avec la Direction au sujet de l'évolution du statut du bilinguisme à l'Institut, et d'autre part, stimuler et clarifier l'intérêt pour la langue française au sein du corps estudiantin, grâce à la mise en place de conférences portant sur des thématiques étudiées à l'Institut et/ou d'excursions culturelles dans un environnement francophone. Ces deux points sont reliés en ce sens qu'ils visent à réaffirmer l'importance du bilinguisme à l'Institut. Maintenant, la quasi-totalité des séminaires sont offerts en langue anglaise et la maîtrise des deux langues n'est pas complètement acquise par les étudiants lors de la fin de leur formation académique à Genève.

Comment concevez-vous la diversité à l'Institut – et ailleurs ?

En ligne avec les efforts menés par la Direction en vue d'assurer un espace de diversité à l'Institut – que celle-ci s'exprime par la distribution de bourses pour étudiants méritants ou tout simplement eu égard à la variété de disciplines proposées –, l'Amicale se donne à cœur de sensibiliser le corps estudiantin aux dimensions langagières de la diversité culturelle. Nous sommes convaincus que la langue est un filtre identitaire puissant, un signifiant culturel prégnant, dont l'enjeu se fait tout particulièrement ressentir dans l'exercice du travail scientifique. Si d'aucuns (positivistes) le contestent, la recherche en sciences sociales est nimbée de jeux poétiques dans lesquels les éléments de langage prennent une place prépondérante dans la démarche argumentative. Dans ce sens, l'épanouissement de la diversité linguistique, et tout particulièrement celle de la langue française en ce qui concerne la mission de l'Amicale, nous semble être un ferment indispensable à l'inventivité et la spontanéité en recherche.

Portrait

KOH KHENG LIAN

Diploma, 1980

Emeritus Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore

I graduated with an LLB from the National University of Malaya in Singapore and subsequently obtained an LLM and PhD. In 1963, I joined the academic staff of the Faculty of Law at the National University of Singapore, and remained there until my retirement, except for a period from 1980 to 1986 when I served as a legal officer in the secretariat of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), in Vienna.



Although my area of expertise was not part of the subjects offered at what was then the Institut de hautes études internationales (HEI), it was my firm belief that a person ought to widen the horizon of his/her education. So, during my sabbatical leave in 1972, I decided to pursue my degree in Geneva. It was an exciting year and I took courses in international economics and law of the sea as well as other subjects. My research thesis, *Straits in International Navigation: Contemporary Issues*, was published by Oceana Publications in 1982 and it was well received. It focused on the then timely controversy of the Straits of Malacca during the Law of the Sea Conference.

The module on the law of the sea has now proven to be very useful as background for my current research as a member of the Board of Governors of the International Council of Environmental Law (ICEL).

My studies at HEI not only widened my educational horizon but also gave me an opportunity to interact with students from other parts of the world. This is invaluable in a now globalised and interconnected world.

My career path spanned over five decades. Since 1990, I have focused on environmental law and was the Director of the Asia-Pacific Centre for Environmental Law at the National University of Singapore. I also held positions as a member of the IUCN World Commission on Environmental Law, and served as its Regional Vice-Chair for South and East Asia and member of its Steering Committee from 1996 to 2004.

I have over 250 publications and conference papers in a variety of areas, particularly in environmental law, and have presented papers at conferences all over the world. I was the 2012 laureate of the Elizabeth Haub Prize for Environmental Law, awarded by the University of Stockholm and ICEL. I was also inducted into the Singapore Women's Hall of Fame (SWHF) for my work as a "Pioneer in the development of environmental law in the region".

I will end with a word to the students of the Graduate Institute. Consider yourselves very fortunate to be at the Institute and make full use of the opportunity to do your best. Make a difference to the world through humanity, and bring out the best in others – that they may see your goodness, kindness and generosity.

Alumnus Elected Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Interview with Rafael Grossi

PhD, International History and Politics, 1997

What are the challenges for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and for you as director?

The IAEA has a vast mandate ranging from issues of international peace and security, like the proliferation situations in Iran or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), to nuclear medicine or climate change. The Agency is the impartial technical authority when it comes to informing the international community about the situation in certain hot spots. At the same time, we must care for those for whom our contribution comes first by curing illness or protecting crops through nuclear application techniques. Nuclear energy is growing and as we set the standards of safety and security worldwide, you can see there is quite a lot in front of me.

Were your studies at the Institute useful?

Of course! I was a young diplomat in my first post when I decided I wanted, in parallel with my professional duties, to study at the Institute; however, it was not easy. The Institute gave me an opportunity and I had top-notch professors, including its current director, Philippe Burrin, who opened my perspectives, helped me round my preparation and become a better professional. I was an unusual student – a working diplomat – but I was convinced the Institute was providing me with new tools. I will always be grateful for that.

What advice would you give to our students today?

The biggest challenge is to focus. We live in a world where access to information has been made ridiculously easy; you can do research with a smartphone nowadays. Does this mean you have it easier than we had it 30 years ago? Not at all! My impression is that today's students need to sharpen their critical eye. You are confronted with a sea of information, so your problem is having clarity in terms of your subject matter and being able to distill the important from the accessory.

I think the Graduate Institute has the big advantage of combining different academic perspectives in the best tradition of a city of international diplomacy and exchanges. This was at the heart of the creation of our alma mater and remains as valid today as it was many decades ago.




→ <https://graduateinstitute.ch/alumni>

Realising the Promise of Digitally Enabled Health

Amandeep S. Gill

Project Director, International Digital Health and Artificial Intelligence Research Collaborative (I-DAIR), Global Health Centre
Former Executive Director of the Secretariat of the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation



The first digital medical tool – the Computed Axial Tomography or CT scan – was invented nearly five decades ago in 1972. It digitally combined two-dimensional image slices into a three-dimensional body visualisation, which was earlier possible only post mortem. This technology has been a boon to diagnosticians, saving countless lives; however, despite the early and consequential invention of the CT scan, the health sector has been slow to embrace digitalisation.

Telemedicine never took off despite advances in internet connectivity and mobile telephony. Electronic medical records (EMRs), alternately called electronic health records to reflect a broader view of patient well-being beyond clinical data, were supposed to be another game changer. By replacing thick dossiers of handwritten clipboard notes, EMRs are meant to enhance the portability and efficacious use of vital personal health information. However, they remain plagued by differing standards and suboptimal use: patients still carry piles of paper around or doctors fax their clinical records.

Wearables such as Fitbit, Garmin, Apple Watch and the Oura ring seem to be riding a wave of popularity. However, these fashionable wears for the affluent few are of little use when it comes to serious health conditions or affordable health care for the masses. Half the world still does not have access to essential health services, and there is a global

shortage of 18 million health workers – no wearable can substitute for them.

Radically innovative approaches are needed for quality and affordable healthcare; the potential is there despite the hype.

Already, doctors in China and India routinely use WhatsApp or WeChat to receive and to respond rapidly to patient queries. Hospitals such as the Samutprakarn Provincial Hospital in Thailand, which I visited recently, have eliminated paperwork in admissions and payments, reduced fraud and streamlined workflow with digital technologies. In Israel the Clalit Research Institute has run predictive analytics on its health database to forecast renal failure due to diabetes years in advance. The potential of large datasets coming together in real time to help identify public-health threats, such as the ongoing novel coronavirus epidemic, is also becoming apparent.

To realise this potential, new collaborations are needed to federate data, computing capacity, algorithmic expertise and governance approaches globally. Such orchestration would require building a neutral and trusted platform that allows different constituencies – governments, international organisations, foundations, academia, private sector and civil society – to come together in a hub-and-spoke architecture dedicated to digital health. It would also require a series of collaborative analytical and research projects, “pathfinder projects”, to build up a set of questions to be answered, research and implementation problems to be solved and repositories of possible ways to cooperate and build capacity.



LA RECHERCHE

Financing Investment in Clean Technologies

Interview with Joëlle Noailly

Head of Research at the Centre for International Environmental Studies (CIES)
and Lecturer in the Department of International Economics

What is the topic of this research?

This project looks at how society can steer financing towards clean technologies (cleantech), such as renewable energy, electric cars or advanced materials. We first investigate the role of a stable and predictable policy framework to mobilise finance towards cleantech. Trump's recent rollback of environmental regulations makes companies less likely to invest in cleantech, as they do not know what the future holds. We aim to empirically test whether uncertainty about future environmental and climate regulations is negatively associated with investments in cleantech. In the second part of the project, we also evaluate the role of new financing tools, such as venture capital competitions and crowdfunding platforms, on generating cleantech financing.

What is the academic interest and broader interest in general?

We use a novel approach to quantify environmental policy uncertainty, namely a text analysis of newspaper articles using machine learning algorithms. There is a lot of academic interest for this new methodology in economics and we have recently been invited to present our results at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) conference at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Boston. Regarding the broader interest, the project is part of a Swiss National Research Programme (NRP73), which aims to provide practical solutions for developing the cleantech sector in Switzerland. We work with 10 partners from the field, ranging from business organisations and financial institutions to policy organisations both at the Swiss and international levels. Investors are particularly interested in our index as it can provide a quantifiable measure of policy risk.

What are the main results so far?

We have applied the text-mining algorithm on articles in 10 US newspapers over the last 40 years and found that our index captures the history of US environmental regulations quite well, giving us confidence about the algorithm's performance. We identified spikes around major domestic policies, such as the enactment of the Clean Air Act in 1990 or Obama's Green New Deal in 2009, as well as during important international climate policy events. At this stage, we are still refining the algorithm for the policy uncertainty part.

What did you find particularly surprising or interesting?

Research has been limited in the past because of the difficulty of building quantitative indicators but it is impressive to see how much information we can now extract from newspapers using these new text-mining techniques. We are also able to create subcategories, reflecting trends in renewable energy policy or in international climate negotiations. As news comes in daily, we can construct very detailed disaggregated datasets over several decades. This opens a lot of possibilities for future research!

■ Research team: Professor Joëlle Noailly (Graduate Institute), Professor Gaëtan de Rassenfosse (EPFL), Laura Nowzohour (PhD candidate, Graduate Institute), Matthias van den Heuvel (PhD candidate, EPFL).

→ www.financingcleantech.com



LA RECHERCHE

Les étudiants brésiliens face à la discrimination positive

Camille Giraut

Doctorante en anthropologie et sociologie

Quel est le sujet de votre thèse ?

La transnationalisation des droits humains a connu un tournant décisif dans les années 1990, avec la mise en place de politiques publiques d'*affirmative action* (discrimination positive) pour les groupes historiquement discriminés dans plusieurs pays. Au Brésil, la transformation a été particulièrement frappante, avec le passage d'une négation de la discrimination raciale à l'adoption de quotas raciaux qui s'adressent aux personnes noires (*preto*), métisses (*pardo*) et indigènes (*indígena*). Dans ce contexte, ma thèse vise à éclairer comment les étudiants brésiliens perçoivent et comprennent les différents objectifs associés à la mise en place des quotas et comment ils se situent par rapport à eux, en faisant ou non le choix d'en bénéficier lors de leur entrée à l'université.

Quel est l'intérêt académique de votre recherche, et son intérêt plus général ?

Les quotas ont permis à toute une génération de personnes socio-économiquement marginalisées d'accéder à l'université, mais cela ne va pas sans controverses, notamment autour de la définition des groupes bénéficiaires. Des accusations de « fraudes raciales » ont surgi à partir de 2016, entraînant la création de commissions dites de « vérification de l'autodéclaration raciale des candidats » dans les universités. Cela pose de nombreuses questions et conduit à une redéfinition des catégories raciales. Plus largement, le cas brésilien peut éclairer comment les politiques de discrimination positive fournissent des structures pour l'auto-identification, la mobilisation et la contestation des catégories ethnoraciales.

Quels sont à ce stade vos principaux résultats ?

Mes premières observations montrent qu'il y a une compréhension plurielle des différents objectifs associés à la politique des quotas raciaux : la réparation de l'esclavage, le fait d'activer une « conscience noire » pour rompre avec l'idéologie du métissage, le fait de lutter contre les discriminations raciales dans un sens strict, en prenant en compte seulement l'apparence de la personne concernée, etc. La plupart des étudiants rencontrés essaient de se situer individuellement à partir de leur compréhension des différents objectifs de la politique. Ils prennent en compte toute une série de critères liés à la couleur de peau, à la classe sociale, à l'environnement familial, etc., afin d'estimer s'ils peuvent légitimement bénéficier de cette politique.

Qu'avez-vous trouvé de particulièrement intéressant ?

L'arrivée au pouvoir d'un président d'extrême droite constitue une menace très sérieuse pour les acquis sociaux, et notamment pour les politiques mises en place dans le domaine de l'éducation. Cela donne lieu à de nouvelles alliances entre différents groupes militants et collectifs, y compris au sein des universités.

LA RECHERCHE

Nouvelles publications



VoxEU.org Book.
London: CEPR Press,
March 2020

ECONOMICS IN THE TIME OF COVID-19

Edited by Richard Baldwin and Beatrice Weder di Mauro

COVID-19 is spreading human suffering worldwide and that is what we should all be focused on. But COVID-19 is most definitely spreading economic suffering worldwide as well. Indeed, the virus may in fact be as contagious economically as it is medically. This free, downloadable eBook addresses key economic questions: How far and fast will the economic damage spread? How bad will it get? How long will the damage last? What are the mechanisms of international economic contagion? And, what can governments do about it?

→ <https://voxeu.org/content/economics-time-covid-19>



Il Ponte Editore. 2020.
416 p.

PALESTINESI

a cura di Lanfranco Binni, Riccardo Bocco, Wasim Dahmash e Barbara Gagliardi

This special issue of the renowned Italian journal *Il Ponte* (founded in 1945 by Piero Calamandrei in Florence) deals with the "Palestinian Question" over the past ten years, through 35 texts authored mainly by Italian and Palestinian academic researchers, journalists and activists who are living, or who have been doing fieldwork, in the Near East. Ten contributors are former doctoral and postdoctoral students of the Graduate Institute.

The volume is organised in four sections. While the first part deals with the present political, economic and juridical issues, the second section focuses on the Palestinian refugees in the region, the thorniest question of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The third part explores different forms of Palestinian cultural "resistance" through the arts: cinema, literature and architecture, but also through feminist perspectives. The last section is devoted to the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) Movement in Palestine, Europe and the US.

An English augmented edition of the volume is due to be published during the spring 2020.




The Graduate Institute, Geneva.
2019. 287 p.

BUILDING LEGAL CAPACITY FOR A MORE INCLUSIVE GLOBALIZATION *BARRIERS TO AND BEST PRACTICES FOR INTEGRATING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INTO GLOBAL ECONOMIC REGULATION*

Edited by Joost Pauwelyn and Mengyi Wang

The global economy is currently at a critical moment: international economic integration has deepened, and with it trade and investment rules have proliferated; yet the benefits of international economic cooperation have not accrued evenly to all stakeholders. Globalisation per se is not the problem. What is needed is a more inclusive globalisation. How could different economies and stakeholders more equitably benefit from globalisation in a sustainable manner? They must first have the capacity to do so. Stakeholders must be able to identify market opportunities, form and advance their positions in negotiations, and implement and enforce negotiated outcomes. The issue of capacity is thus the core of this book that examines key capacity constraints and efforts at building capacity in international economic law. Where do capacity deficits lie? What has been done to mitigate them? What are the possible future actions?

Nouvelles publications



Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press. 2019. 330 p.

POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI *THE LANGUAGE OF TRUTH IN AN EMERGING STATE*

Aidan **Russell**

Telling the neglected history of decolonisation and violence in Burundi, Aidan Russell examines the political language of truth that drove extraordinary change, from democracy to genocide. By focusing on the dangerous border between Burundi and Rwanda, his study uncovers the complexity from which ethnic ideologies, side-lined before independence in 1962, became gradually all-consuming by 1972. Framed by the rhetoric and uncertainty of “truth”, the author draws on both African and European language source material to demonstrate how values of authority and citizenship were tested and transformed across the first decade of Burundi’s independence, and a postcolony created in the interactions between African peasants and politicians across the margins of their states. Culminating with a rare examination of the first postcolonial genocide on the African continent, a so-called “forgotten genocide” on the world stage, Aidan Russell reveals how the postcolonial order of central Africa came into being.



London: Routledge.
2018. 230 p.

WORLD YEARBOOK OF EDUCATION 2019 *COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA AND GLOBAL NETWORKS*

Edited by Radhika **Gorur**, Sam **Sellar**
and Gita **Steiner-Khamsi**

Globalisation has been a central theme and a salient backdrop for scholars in social research for several decades. In educational research, the topic gained prominence among scholars associated with comparative policy studies. The period of globalisation between 1989 and 2008 was welcomed by some as an opening up of possibilities and a breaking down of boundaries, including calls to overcome “methodological nationalism” and explore new, dynamic methodologies that could cope with the movement of people, goods, ideas and money across various “scapes”.

In the field of comparative education, the sense of open borders and global imaginaries was associated with a growth of regional and global large-scale assessments, a convergence of policies, a slew of global ranking exercises and the search for “best practices”. This volume scrutinises the social and technological contexts that gave rise to big data, digital methodologies, new forms of data visualisation and computer-based learning and assessment, and reflects on the impact that these new methods of inquiry have had on comparative education research.



London: Bloomsbury.
2019.

UNDERSTANDING PISA'S ATTRACTIVENESS *CRITICAL ANALYSES IN COMPARATIVE POLICY STUDIES*

Edited by Florian **Waldow** and
Gita **Steiner-Khamsi**

This volume examines how policymakers and the media interpret the results of PISA league-leaders, losers and slippers in ways that suit their own reform agendas. As a result, a myriad of explanations exist as to why an educational system is high- or low-performing.

The chapters, written by leading scholars from Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, the UK and the USA, provide a fascinating account of why results from PISA and other international large-scale assessments are interpreted and translated differently in the various countries.

The analyses in this book bring to light the wide array of idiosyncratic projections into these international tests. In some countries, these tests are also used to scandalise one’s own educational system and to generate quasi-external reform pressure. This book offers a truly global perspective on the uses and abuses of PISA.



Cahiers genre et
développement 11.
Paris : L'Harmattan.
2019.

SAVOIRS FÉMINISTES AU SUD *EXPERTES EN GENRE ET TOURNANT DÉCOLONIAL*

Dirigé par Christine **Verschuur**

Cet ouvrage présente des analyses de l’économie globale de la connaissance dans le domaine des études féministes et de genre, à partir des perspectives du Sud global. Il aborde les thèmes de la colonialité du pouvoir et des savoirs, des épistémologies féministes et des méthodologies que la recherche féministe privilégie. Il explore le champ social des expertes en genre dans différents contextes. Il présente enfin des savoirs locaux de femmes et de féministes et le renouvellement qu’ils permettent pour l’analyse critique des programmes de « développement ».

Cette reconnaissance des savoirs des « autres » féministes, proposée par la collection des Cahiers genre et développement depuis sa création, demande à être poursuivie et amplifiée pour renforcer les capacités théoriques féministes globales et ainsi contribuer à transformer les rapports de genre, de classe, de race et géopolitiques inégaux et à construire un monde soucieux de justice sociale et de genre.



INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY *ARTICLES*

The first electronic issue of *International Development Policy* for 2020 includes **Shalini Randeria** and **Lys Kulamadayil**’s critique of *The World Development Report 2017*; an article by **Irene Musselli** and **Elisabeth Bürgi Bonanomi** on “Illicit Financial Flows: Concepts and Definition” (a “sophisticated intervention in the debate on IFFs”); “Performance-Based Financing in Mali” by **Abdourahmane Coulibaly**, **Lara Gautier**, **Laurence Touré** and **Valery Ridde** (original in French); and an article by **Larissa Kojoué** on public action against AIDS as a revelation of (non)transformations in Cameroon (original in French, English translation soon available).

→ <https://doi.org/10.4000/poldev.3224>

Any and all authors, especially young researchers, are encouraged to submit original research on international development policy-related themes. Thematic issues and articles are available online in open access. To read them and to access our authors’ guidelines, visit

→ <http://devpol.org>



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CP 1672 – CH-1211 Genève 1 | Tél.: +41 22 908 57 00 | graduateinstitute.ch

Responsable d'édition: Sophie Fleury, sophie.fleury@graduateinstitute.ch

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Couverture: SWITZERLAND, Geneva. A wide view of the room as Secretary-General António Guterres (at podium) makes remarks at the opening of the 40th session of the Human Rights Council. 25 February 2019.
UN photo/Violaine MARTIN

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