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INSTITUT DE HAUTES
ÉTUDES INTERNATIONALES
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GRADUATE INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AND
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Un monde préoccupant

Philippe **Burrin**
Directeur de l'Institut

L'état du monde est préoccupant. On l'entend, on le lit, on le pense soi-même. On ne s'étonne pas que des États restent en marge du système international ou en minent les principes par leur action. Mais on s'inquiète de voir la puissance qui a défendu et promu, au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, un système multilatéral ramifié mettre en cause certaines de ses institutions et peut-être l'esprit de la coopération internationale.

Cela se produit alors que les tensions géopolitiques reprennent de la vigueur, notamment en Asie orientale, dans l'immense ceinture qui va de l'Afrique du Nord au Pakistan, sur la frontière du monde russe et de l'Europe. Tandis qu'ont le vent en poupe nationalismes et populismes, éperonnés qu'ils sont par le changement technologique et les disparités démographiques entre régions vieillissantes et régions en forte croissance démographique.

Et l'Institut dans ce monde préoccupant ? Son rôle et sa pertinence ne diminuent pas, ils deviennent plus importants que jamais. La globalisation connaît une décélération, elle ne rebrousse pas chemin. Sauf conflit majeur, le monde maintiendra dans un avenir prévisible un niveau élevé d'ouverture, d'échange, d'intégration. Des institutions internationales seront contournées ou sommées de se réformer, d'autres naîtront ou se développeront. Sous une forme ou une autre, des enceintes de négociation et des instruments de mise en œuvre de politiques internationales seront indispensables. La conscience de leur utilité grandira au fur et à mesure que seront pris au sérieux les défis que la planète doit affronter.

L'Institut est bien placé pour répondre aux jeunes gens en quête de formation et aux professionnels voulant se perfectionner dans tout ce qui est global et international. Il est tout aussi bien placé pour fournir un savoir et une expertise dont les acteurs internationaux voient chaque jour davantage la nécessité. Sa place sera d'autant plus forte, à vrai dire, s'il sait encore mieux se profiler dans une gouvernance mondiale où la mise en réseau et en synergie des trois types d'acteurs – publics, privés, à but non lucratif – requiert la compréhension de la logique de chacun et le développement de leur collaboration.

A New Professor of International Economics

BEATRICE **WEDER DI MAURO** (Switzerland and Italy)
PhD, University of Basel

Beatrice Weder di Mauro joined the Institute in January. She is President of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), a leading network of more than 1,300 top economists mostly based in Europe. CEPR promotes research excellence with policy relevance and has had a long standing and deep relationship with the Graduate Institute: Professor Richard Baldwin was its previous President and continues to serve as Editor-in-Chief of its leading dissemination platform VoxEU.org, Professor Charles Wyplosz served as its Policy Director and now, Professor Ugo Panizza has become its Vice-President in charge of New Ventures.

Beatrice Weder di Mauro is also Research Professor and Distinguished Fellow at the Emerging Markets Institute of the Institut européen d'administration des affaires (INSEAD) in Singapore.

Why did you decide to join the Graduate Institute?

The Graduate Institute is a perfect fit for my main areas of interest in my research and policy advice, international macroeconomics and development. It has an excellent reputation in the international community and a deep relationship with CEPR because both institutions share the goal of putting research excellence with policy relevance in the service of society, globally. Moreover, I have known and respected the Graduate Institute for many years, have recommended some of my best students for programmes here and have always had a great appreciation for the excellent faculty. I also love the spirit of cosmopolitanism at the Institute. It has already started to feel like home.

What shaped your interest in macroeconomics?

My interest in international macroeconomics and financial crises was mainly shaped by my experience working at the International Monetary Fund in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. I was the economist for Kyrgyzstan. Coming out of a fully centrally planned economy, the entire monetary and fiscal system had to be re-designed. In many cases, transition economies went straight into a high-inflation crisis. I also have an interest in the development, growth and governance of emerging markets, which was triggered by growing up in Guatemala.

What have you been working on recently?

I have several work streams but I will concentrate on one about central banks and the risk in central bank balance sheets, which is joint work with Barry Eichengreen from the University of California, Berkeley, Julian Schumacher from the European Central Bank and Bernd Bartels from Scope. Central banks in advanced countries have expanded their balance sheets very significantly in the course of combatting the financial crisis. In particular, after the zero lower bound, they have embarked on non-conventional policies that involve buying securities, therefore expanding their balance sheets. They now find themselves in a situation that is quite unprecedented and that may lead to threats to their independence and consequences for monetary policy – and that is the general purpose of our research. More specifically, we investigate what is driving the risk in central bank balance sheets and whether governance rules protect them from political interference.

Un banquier au service de la Genève internationale

Ancien associé senior de la Banque Pictet, Ivan Pictet préside la Fondation pour Genève, dont la mission est de contribuer au rayonnement de Genève comme centre de coopération multilatérale. La fondation déploie une activité considérable pour renforcer la Genève internationale, notamment en faisant valoir son importance auprès des Genevois et des Suisses (en régime de démocratie semi-directe, l'opinion des citoyens compte), en facilitant l'accueil des expatriés et leur rapprochement avec les résidents, et en favorisant le rassemblement des acteurs internationaux au sein du Club diplomatique et du Cercle International.

Donnant sans compter de son temps et de son argent à la cause de la Genève internationale, Ivan Pictet en est devenu au fil des années une figure centrale. Comment expliquer cet engagement remarquable ? Du regard rétrospectif qu'il jette sur sa trajectoire, trois éléments se dégagent :

→ Une enfance cosmopolite qui le marque davantage qu'une histoire familiale étroitement liée à la vie de la cité (aucune famille n'a donné autant de magistrats). Le jeune Ivan, lui, passe une partie de son enfance à Londres avec sa mère remariée à un Britannique, revient à Genève où son père a épousé une Suédoise, puis part un an à Stockholm après le collège Calvin avant d'étudier à l'Université de Saint-Gall – un parcours qui lui a fait voir sa ville de l'extérieur et lui a appris à l'apprécier pour ce qu'elle est : une petite ville grandie par son rôle international ;

→ Une expérience de banquier où l'international, justement, a tenu une grande place. Alors que la plupart des banquiers privés se concentrent sur les pays voisins, Ivan Pictet part dès les années 1980 « ouvrir » les marchés émergents, ceux d'Asie en premier lieu, comme Hong Kong, Singapour, et surtout le Japon où il se rend plus de 150 fois – une orientation qui joue un rôle certain dans l'expansion et le succès de sa banque ;

→ Enfin, un engagement au niveau local et national dans la défense des intérêts économiques, notamment à la Chambre de commerce de Genève et à Genève place financière, deux organisations qu'il présidera pendant des années et qui lui font voir l'importance économique de la Genève internationale et comprendre combien le sort de la ville dépend du riche tissu d'acteurs internationaux présents sur la côte lémanique.

À partir de la fin des années 1990, ce « déraciné genevois », selon ses termes, s'engage dans la défense et l'illustration de la Genève internationale au sein de la Fondation

pour Genève. Appelé au conseil d'administration du fonds de pension de l'ONU, dont il sera le premier président non américain, il assume bénévolement une charge qui lui vaut une réunion par mois à New York et une conférence téléphonique par semaine. Elle lui fait rencontrer Kofi Annan, alors secrétaire général des Nations Unies, pour lequel il développera un attachement profond. À Genève, il côtoie les acteurs de premier plan du système onusien, dont certains l'impressionnent particulièrement, ainsi Sadako Ogata, ancienne haut-commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, Francis Gurry, directeur général de l'Organisation mondiale de la propriété intellectuelle, Pascal Lamy, ancien directeur général de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce, et Michael Møller, directeur général de l'Office des Nations Unies à Genève.

En 2008, Ivan Pictet affecte une partie de sa fortune à l'activité philanthropique. Intéressé par le développement de l'Institut, il donne à la fondation qu'il crée alors – la Fondation Pictet pour le développement – une double mission dont les deux composantes ont partie liée avec sa passion pour la Genève internationale. La première consiste à soutenir la création par l'Institut du Centre finance et développement et à financer ses trois chaires. La seconde est de permettre la construction d'un Portail des nations, un espace d'exposition qui présente la Genève internationale dans son ensemble et fait voir le rôle indispensable qu'elle joue dans la gouvernance mondiale. La réalisation de ce projet, qui se profile aujourd'hui sur un emplacement voisin de l'allée aux drapeaux du Palais des Nations, promet d'être le couronnement de son engagement au service de la Genève internationale.

Comment voit-il l'avenir ? Genève lui paraît conserver tous ses atouts : le cosmopolitisme, la taille critique des compétences, le cadre agréable et sûr. Les difficultés demeurent, cependant – la cherté de la vie, l'engorgement du territoire, l'endettement des finances publiques – alors que d'autres montent à l'horizon : l'autoritarisme et le protectionnisme, avec leurs pesanteurs et leur fonctionnement en silo, sont des défis que les institutions internationales doivent se préparer à relever. Mais Ivan Pictet a trop d'expérience et de hauteur de vue pour ne pas garder confiance : la planète aura besoin d'un effort continu de concertation, et la Genève internationale garde toute son importance.

PHILIPPE **BURRIN**
Directeur

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Columbia University Team Wins 2018 Geneva Challenge on Climate Change

The Geneva Challenge was launched in 2014 under the patronage of the late Kofi Annan and with the generous support of Swiss Ambassador Jenö Staehelin. This contest aims to present innovative and pragmatic solutions to address the main challenges of today's world.

The theme of the 2018 contest was to explore how challenges posed by climate change could be tackled to foster social and economic development. Out of 66 project entries submitted by 259 students from teams hailing from all over the world, 15 teams were chosen as semi-finalists. The jury then selected 5 finalist teams, one per continent (based on the location of the university), who were invited to defend their project at the Institute at the end of November.

The 2018 winner was the team from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) with their project "Data Analytics for Sustainable Herding (DASH)". "DASH will disrupt the traditional approach to international development and public policymaking by unpacking the complexity of the modern-day herding, farming, and land-use nexus", said the team. "DASH aims to create a blueprint for utilising big data and applying machine learning and artificial intelligence for better decision-making under deep uncertainty."

"We are extremely happy to bring back the first prize this year and strongly recommend SIPA students to showcase their top-tier skills in future editions of the competition", said Alonso Flores, member of the Columbia University team, currently pursuing his Master in Public Administration with a concentration in Economic and Political Development.

Other laureates included the teams from BRAC University and ETH Zürich, which were each awarded second prize ex aequo, and the teams from Kenyatta University and the University of Buenos Aires, which were each awarded third prize ex aequo.

A special prize was also attributed in partnership with the Sustainable Development Solutions Network – Youth (SDSN Youth) to the team from the University of Toronto for its project "Enhanced Sustainable Concrete: Combining Existing Technologies in a Novel Manner to Promote the Sustainable Development of Water and Concrete Industries Worldwide".

The prizes were given out by Nane Annan, the wife of the late Kofi Annan.

In his congratulatory speech, Jenö Staehelin announced the theme for the sixth edition of the Geneva Challenge: the "Challenges of Health". He stated that "many more efforts are needed to fully eradicate a wide range of diseases and address many different, persistent and emerging health issues".

THE GENEVA CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (CIDS)

Preparing Students for the Real World

Interview with Laurence **Boisson de Chazournes**
Director of the LLM in International Dispute Settlement (MIDS), a joint programme with the University of Geneva
and Thomas **Schultz**
Director of Research at the Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement (CIDS), a joint centre with the University of Geneva

As of September 2018, you were appointed Co-directors of CIDS following Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler's retirement. What are the biggest challenges facing international dispute settlement?

LBC. The world isn't exactly at peace. International disputes haven't decreased and are unlikely to. Yet the global demand for rule of law, for justice, for predictability is steadily becoming more insistent. We need ever more, and ever better, international dispute settlement mechanisms to make the world a better, safer and more just place.

TS. While a wide array of intricate and technical legal questions remain to be solved, my sense is that what international dispute settlement needs most today is to be reconnected to its broader underlying economic, political, and societal implications — to be put into context. CIDS research will work on both of these strands.

What are the main plans for MIDS and CIDS research?

LBC. International dispute settlement, as a field of legal practice, keeps growing at a rapid pace. As a result, educational programmes are sprouting all over the world. Today we have every intention of staying among the leaders of these developments.

The main plan for MIDS — whose 10th anniversary we celebrated last autumn — is to keep ensuring the programme's student diversity, its disciplinary orientation covering both public and private aspects of international law and its overall professional aims. Perhaps we will push students to be a bit more curious about some of the things that aren't quite right in the different systems they study — they must be prepared for the real world, where real challenges could shape the future of the profession.

TS. CIDS research covers three areas: academic research, outreach and continuing education. Overall, we take a broad understanding of dispute settlement and engage in interdisciplinary projects. Our field is best not seen as a silo cut off from its environment, concerned only with its own procedural mechanics. It is embedded in social contexts, with which it has relations of mutual influence.

Our research will focus on the questions we believe are the most intellectually pregnant, the ones that may influence the thinking most. With outreach we interact with society: public conferences, a named lecture series, contributions to law reforms, interactions with NGOs and the arbitration industry, and efforts to inform and help resolve practical problems. We envisage podcasts, vlogs and a public paper series. Our continuing education includes a PhD seminar series, a summer school and various short programmes for professionals working in law firms and in policymaking.

Villa Moynier, headquarters of CIDS and MIDS.

« Les cols blancs passeront à la trappe »

Richard Baldwin, professeur d'économie internationale, est l'auteur de *The Globotics Upheaval : Globalization, Robotics, and the Future of Work*, paru en janvier 2019. Il annonce un grand chambardement dans le secteur des services suite à la robotisation, la numérisation et la mondialisation dans ce domaine (voir aussi p. 37).

The Globotics Upheaval apparaît comme un suivi naturel de votre précédent ouvrage, *The Great Convergence*. Quel est votre message ici ?

Dans le dernier chapitre de *The Great Convergence*, j'évoquais le rôle de la numérisation et de l'automatisation dans le domaine des services à l'intérieur d'un pays. Jusqu'à récemment, ces deux phénomènes n'étaient pas tellement mondialisés. À travers mes recherches, j'ai découvert que cela était en train de changer et avait le potentiel de modifier totalement le futur du travail. J'en ai discuté avec beaucoup de monde, et mes interlocuteurs, qu'ils soient chauffeur de taxi, directeur d'entreprise ou responsable politique, n'ont pas mesuré l'ampleur du chambardement à venir. Ce livre devrait sonner comme un avertissement.

Vous faites penser à Jeremy Rifkin qui a publié *The End of Work* en 1995. Allez-vous dans le même sens ?

Le sociologue américain a décrit la révolution dans le monde du travail au fil des époques. Au XIXe siècle, la Révolution industrielle était liée au textile, à l'acier. À partir de 1870, les usines ont commencé à fabriquer des moteurs, des médicaments et surtout des machines. Désormais, nous sommes dans un monde où, grâce aux technologies de la communication et de l'information, la chaîne de production est automatisée, transfrontalière et maîtrisée à distance. Ce phénomène est exacerbé par la mondialisation. Pour ma part, je parle de services qui peuvent être automatisés et dont la délocalisation ne pose aucun problème.

Est-ce cela, le nouveau palier de la mondialisation ?

La chaîne de production automatisée, numérisée et transfrontalière a donné lieu à un boom des échanges internationaux et contribué à augmenter le niveau de vie de millions de personnes. Notamment en Chine, où des millions de travailleurs disciplinés, semi-formés, enthousiastes et surtout compétitifs ont trouvé un emploi. Aujourd'hui, les entreprises chinoises vont produire en Éthiopie et dans d'autres pays africains. La hausse de la production a créé un plus grand besoin en matières premières, de quoi tirer vers le haut de nombreux pays en Asie, en Afrique et en Amérique du Sud.

Et maintenant ?

Ce phénomène touche désormais les services qui comptent de plus en plus dans la richesse mondiale. Dans le domaine de l'information par exemple, le *Washington Post* et *Le Monde* publient déjà des informations générées par ordinateur. Conseils juridiques, rédaction, vérification, traduction des contrats, consultation médicale, plans d'architecture sont réalisés à distance. La traduction automatique et simultanée qui se fait avec des programmes de plus en plus performants ouvre de grandes perspectives. La digitalisation et la mondialisation ont donné lieu à la création de plateformes comme Upwork. Avec une présence dans une centaine de pays, ce fournisseur de services brasse 2 milliards de dollars par an. Je ne parle pas du travail à domicile, qui est lui-même une révolution, mais d'une armée mondiale de « télémigrants » compétents et compétitifs capables de fournir des services à l'appel. Cette fois-ci, ce sont les cols blancs qui passeront à la trappe. Pour la première fois, ils rejoindront des cols bleus qui ont vu leur emploi partir en Asie ou en Europe de l'Est. Je dois tout de suite ajouter que cela ne suffira pas d'arrêter le train de la mondialisation.

Mais ce train n'est-il pas en perte de vitesse ? On parle de *slowbalisation*…

En effet, depuis quelques années, les investissements baissent. Le commerce international ralentit. Oui, la *slowbalisation* est indéniable. Mais c'est un phénomène naturel. On aurait tort de le transformer en un synonyme de démondialisation. Cette image est fausse. Nous ne sommes pas dans les années 1930, lorsque la Grande Dépression avait paralysé le monde. Il est vrai que les États-Unis, qui prônent un certain protectionnisme, et le Royaume-Uni, qui a voté en faveur du Brexit, donnent l'impression d'un recul de la mondialisation. C'est entièrement faux. Tous les autres acteurs de la planète poursuivent une politique de libéralisation. Après le retrait des États-Unis du Partenariat transpacifique (TPP), les autres acteurs n'ont pas abandonné le projet ; au contraire, ils ont accéléré le mouvement.

Les détracteurs de la mondialisation n'ont-ils rien compris ?

Tout s'est plutôt bien passé dans les années 1990. Mais depuis une vingtaine d'années, on voit l'émergence des inégalités, l'effondrement de la classe moyenne, des licenciements. En France, les « gilets jaunes » ne sont pas un mouvement contre la mondialisation, mais l'histoire collective de personnes qui ont toutes des raisons individuelles pour se mettre en colère. La situation aujourd'hui est clairement combustible. Elle va s'aggraver lorsque les travailleurs seront encore plus en compétition avec des robots. On peut anticiper la perte de millions de places de travail. Les grands changements ne se passent jamais en douceur.

Et l'avenir, donc ?

Imaginez un peu toutes les tâches que les « télémigrants » peuvent accomplir. Dès lors il faudra de l'ingéniosité humaine pour créer de nouveaux emplois pour ceux qui seront sacrifiés. Il s'agira alors de penser à tout ce que les robots ne pourront jamais faire, par exemple dans les domaines de la créativité, des relations humaines, de l'innovation, de l'éthique, de l'empathie, de services à la communauté. À la fin, il est tout à fait envisageable de construire une société plus riche et plus bienveillante. Le problème concerne les années de chambardement, d'où le titre de mon livre. Je suis pessimiste pour le court terme, mais optimiste pour le long terme.

Ten Years after the Financial Crisis: What Have We Learnt?

Cédric **Tille**

Professor of International Economics

Academics and policymakers have learnt several insights from the crisis. Interestingly, many of these are rediscovery of issues that were understood but had been viewed as secondary.

Macroeconomic analysis needs to take account of financial markets. This was somewhat neglected before the crisis, but no longer. A rich and growing literature includes financial markets in macroeconomic models.

Fiscal policy is receiving renewed attention. While it was not central in the debate before 2007, we now understand that its effects are quite heterogeneous. It is particularly effective in crisis times when private demand is constrained. Research has developed measures of "fiscal space" to identify which countries can use this policy.

Central banks can rely on a range of tools even when the interest rate has been lowered all the way to zero: issuing large amounts of money, communicating on future policy, purchasing risky assets. These tools may have to be used quite regularly in the future. Interest rates have been low for a long time, and this reflects deep forces, such as the high demand for "safe" assets that keep their value even during major crises. The world economy faces an imbalance between a high demand for such assets and limited supply. Interest rates will likely remain persistently low, raising many questions, such as how pension funds should respond.

Financial stability matters. "Micro" measures at the level of individual banks and investors need to be accompanied by "macro" policies looking at the entire system. This is challenging as the financial sector keeps evolving. The global nature of many financial firms also requires some coordination of efforts by policymakers.

Research has identified a global financial cycle (distinct from the business cycle) that reflects the varying appetite of investors for risk as well as policy in the world's major economies. Measuring this cycle and assessing its impact on capital flows and financial conditions is the challenging object of an active body of research. The cycle may be so strong that a flexible exchange rate may not shield countries from it – although this is debated. New tools are required to prevent swings in capital flows from fueling asset price bubbles. These include limits on what borrowers can do, and restriction on what lenders can do.

We now have a better understanding of how financial conditions affect the economy. Substantial efforts have been undertaken to make banks more resilient, but we'll only know in the next recession whether this was enough. The world economy could soon enter a weak phase, leaving policymakers faced with substantial challenges in responding as interest rates are still low and the room for fiscal policy limited.

Brexit: From Bad to Worse

Cédric **Dupont**

Professor of International Relations/Political Science
Director of Executive Education

Divorces often turn sour and Brexit – the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) – is, unfortunately, a case in point. Initiated by a referendum that was an electoral promise of the British Conservative Party to address an enduring internal division within its ranks, three years later, Brexit has become the source of deeper and fiercer national divisions in Britain and a major embarrassment and irritation in the EU. How did this happen?

Fantasyland Britain

The British government has been living in a fantasyland, raising unrealistic expectations and never deflating them publicly. In January 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May laid out some firm points defining the characteristics of what would be a good negotiation withdrawal agreement for the UK: the country would seize back control over immigration and trade policy; they would be out of the single market but still enjoy it short of having to adopt EU regulatory instruments or be in conformity with them. No one with some essential understanding of what economic integration means and how the EU functions should have been fooled by such a plan but the large majority of the UK's domestic audience lacks such understanding and has indeed been fooled. When time came for a reality check (enjoying the single market means regulatory and trade policy constraints), the government did not dare to deflate expectations nor adapt its behaviour to avoid losing face and the confidence of the public.

Flawed Negotiation Setup

Europeans also share their responsibility for the current impasse: they imposed a negotiation process in two phases. The first phase focused on key principles of the withdrawal and the second on the future relationship. The flaw came with the choice to include, as a matter of principle, the absence of a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Yet, the status of the Irish border could not be settled without knowing what the future relationship would look like. Prevented by design to discuss that relationship, the two parties were thus forced to include in the withdrawal agreement the infamous backstop provision to seal off, if needed, Ireland from the British mainland, infuriating British Unionists. Pragmatism should have prevailed over a rigid, misplaced, principle.

The Reign of Confrontational Politics

With one party living in a fantasyland and the other rigidly committed to key principles, confrontation and posturing reigned during the international negotiation process. Confrontation also characterised domestic discussions in Britain: in a political system that serves a two-party autocracy, the government sought, foremost, to keep its own camp united with little or no effort to build bridges with the other camp.

All in all, there was little, if any, give and take in the process, ending in an excruciating ratification process in Britain.

Big Ben and the Houses of Parliament on the River Thames. Robert INGELHART/iStock

Women wearing full-face veils (niqabs) walk with children alongside others said to be members of the Islamic State (IS) group by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), exiting from the village of Baghouz in the eastern Syrian province of Deir Ezzor. 14 March 2019. Delil SOULEIMAN/AFP

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN THE 21st CENTURY

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN THE 21st CENTURY

ON (POLITICAL) VIOLENCE

Keith **Krause**

Professor of International Relations/Political Science
Head of the International Relations/Political Science Department

MEXICO, Monterrey.
Members of the
Ministerial Police
work at a crime
scene where five
taxi drivers were
killed by gunmen
at Solidarity City
neighbourhood,
in a poor area of
Monterrey, Nuevo
Leon State.
21 February
2012. Julio Cesar
AGUILAR/AFP

A seemingly bewildering array of forms of violence confronts us in the 21st century. Large-scale gang warfare in Central America, Western interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine, terrorist attacks in Europe, civil war in Syria, or armed militias in the Democratic Republic of the Congo — all seem to portray a world of ever-greater danger. Yet just how violent are contemporary global politics, and how — if at all — have armed conflict and political violence changed since the end of the Cold War? Three facts will help us answer the first question; the second is more complex.

To begin: most contemporary lethal violence does *not* occur in conflict zones, but in states that are not at war. Non-conflict settings such as El Salvador, Venezuela, and Honduras have higher levels of deadly violence than war zones (excepting Syria and Iraq). According to the Small Arms Survey's *Global Violent Deaths 2017* report, 560,000 people died violently in 2016, but only about 100,000 (18%) were killed in war zones. Even if this number is misleadingly low (because it omits the indirect but still lethal burden of war), it shows that war is only one piece of a larger puzzle of contemporary armed violence, much of which

is organised, non-random, and in some sense political. This contrasts sharply with the 20th century and its 60—80 million deaths by war and roughly 100 million deaths by "state violence".

How should we try to understand these diverse forms of violence? Three traditional limitations to the study of violence need first to be overcome.

The first limitation is the compartmentalisation of violence studies: interstate and civil war and organised armed actors are covered by international relations, gangs by sociology or anthropology, organised crime by criminology, and sexual and gender-based violence by gender studies.

This compartmentalisation hinders our understanding of the way seemingly different forms of violence may be linked through complex processes that escalate and exacerbate conflicts, and that may have broader impacts on human security, political and social life, state fragility, and regional order. Sexual violence in (and after) conflicts, for example, is related to other forms of violence, and this relationship is not one-way, with war *causing* higher levels of sexual and gender-based violence. There are deeper processes at work, as states with lower levels of gender equality and higher levels of gender-based violence are more likely to be involved in interstate conflicts or to initiate the use of force, and are less likely to comply with international norms. Likewise, the rituals, organisational forms, and modes of action of some South American gangs would resonate with those of West African warlords, for instance.

The second limitation is to draw a sharp distinction between political and non-political (criminal, interpersonal, economically motivated) violence. This narrowly criminological or legalistic perspective, which labels all non-conflict deaths as "homicides", is misleading. Homicide conjures up a form of interpersonal violence that is individual, unorganised, relatively random, and essentially apolitical (and very rare in advanced industrialised states). This is an inadequate way to think about the more than 50,000 violent deaths in cartel-related gang warfare in Mexico, or land-rights disputes in Yemen that claimed several thousand lives a year (and that have now escalated into full-scale war).

The question "What makes violence political?" has no simple and unambiguous answer. Most scholarship assumes that political violence

can be identified and categorised by focusing on the degree and scale of organisation of the violent actors, the meaning and motivations or purpose of the acts, or the nature of the act itself. None of these criteria by themselves are sufficient, however, without clarifying what we mean by "violence" and "political". From a holistic perspective, defining political violence as violence used for explicitly stated political ends, or violence that undermines and challenges the state's legal monopoly over the legitimate use of force, or violence that implicates the state and its repressive apparatus, may be essential for gaining insight into the causes and consequences of, and framing appropriate responses to, war and political violence in the 21st century.

The third limitation that must be overcome is an undue focus on a purely somatic understanding of violence as the intentional use of physical force to cause harm. Psychological violence, violence by deprivation, neglect or omission, and such things as systemic, structural or symbolic violence are also crucial to understanding how violent acts — such as the repression and harassment by state officials of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in a small city outside Tunis in December 2010 —

can escalate and spread to large-scale political uprisings and even civil war or transnational terrorism.

Violence prevention and reduction is at the heart of the Sustainable Development Goals. If the international community is to successfully tackle conflict and political violence in the 21st century, however, it will have to go beyond categories such as war, terrorism, gang violence, and homicide to address the wide range of sources, causes, and consequences of violence. Many of these causes, such as weak institutions, gender inequality, governance failure or state corruption, are intensely political, have national and international implications, are interlinked, and demand a holistic approach to understanding and action.

"Most contemporary lethal violence does *not* occur in conflict zones."

WHAT IS REALLY NEW ABOUT THE NEW WARS?

Mohammad-Mahmoud **Ould Mohamedou**

Professor of International History
Head of the International History Department

In his history of newness (*Novelty*, 2013), Michael North remarks that actual innovation only exists at the very crest of a wave. That is so, argues the UCLA professor, since innovation is dependent on its relative unfamiliarity to a new audience. By that reckoning, the "new wars" are no longer new. Close to thirty years later, that which could be seen to constitute a new generation of armed conflict in the early 1990s is today arguably *passé*.

To understand the nature of the alleged modulation in warfare is therefore to focus not merely on the idea of newness but rather on the characteristics of a historical moment, which marked a caesura from an older to a newer form of war.

The idea that war has changed has been opposed by several thinkers, such as Mats Berdal and J. David Singer. It was maintained, notably, that the evolving features of armed conflict do not amount to novelty per se, and that whatever complex emergencies, multi-variant warfare, small wars, low-intensity wars or wars of the third kind had materialised, these did not amount to fundamental change. To be certain, the age-old nature of war has not been the object of variation; it remains, as Carl von Clausewitz famously captured it in his 1832 work *On War*, a political act carried through the use of force to compel an enemy. Continuity in essence does not, however, preclude alteration in form.

To North's point, unfamiliarity was palpably present in the early 1990s as the world haphazardly segued into the post–Cold War era and as the architecture of international affairs moved away from bipolarity. Albeit in slow motion rather than spectacularly and in uniformity, new distinct trends in the organisation and manifestation of war did cement since, and we should not therefore dogmatically shy away from embracing the novelty they have given shape to. The novelty rests not in opposition to older forms of conflict, which would have disappeared, but in the addition of previously absent layers and perspectives. These are visible in at least three key respects.

Firstly, there has been important discontinuity in war introduced by unprecedented technological innovation, namely the magnitude of the information revolution and specifically the densification and intensification of interconnectedness. The coincidence of globalisation with a reordering of international affairs along those lines opened vast new possibilities of a faster and wider type of armed "compelling force", a type of violence ever projected under less and less predictable forms. This stood in stark contrast to here-and-now, classical army-on-army clashes.

Secondly, there has been a steady movement away from the state's centrality in war. Armed conflicts have long featured a multitude of other actors, but in the modern era they had been overwhelmingly dominated — following Max Weber's 1918 classical definition — by single state entities enjoying the monopoly of legitimate violence and their soldiers endowed with a licence to kill. The past thirty years have witnessed an ever-expanding cast of transnational armed groups populating, in variegated ways and round the world, a new grammar of autonomisation and privatisation of war. This, too, was a departure from the previous generation of conflict dominated by the dual trope of statehood

> ## "Continuity in essence does not, however, preclude alteration in form."

and monopoly. The reality is that state actors have taken a back seat to the development of war. Their response in upgrading their technology towards asymmetric threats (e.g., drone warfare, cyberwarfare) is indeed evidence of the fact that it was the non-state actors who took them down the road from battle*field* to battle*space*.

Finally, above and beyond behavioural aspects, the new wars are in and of themselves evidence that our academic gaze on war had long been scientifically incomplete and culturally skewed. To think of war in the same continuous mode is, in effect, to insist on the dominance of a single, classical, major powers-driven, state-centric tradition immune to the influence of others — a perspective on global affairs akin to Eurocentrism. "Decolonising

war", to use Tarak Barkawi's phrase, spells intellectual recognition that the earlier conceptualisation of war was in effect excluding actors and modes of force projection organised differently than the post-Napoleonic European concert of nations.

To historicise war is to document today the emergence, persistence and fleshing out of fluidity, open-endedness, de-statisation, privatisation, fragmentation and hybridity playing out from Bosnia to Yemen by way of Mali and Ukraine. If sabotage has always existed, malware and hacking are new kinds of weapons. If mercenaries have always been there, Blackwater stepped up the game patrolling New Orleans and Baghdad and contemplating full-fledged privatisation of the Afghanistan war. In the

next phase, we need to pay further attention to how war is now choreographed and staged ever confusingly (social media themselves have become a tool in modern warfare) and how *moments of war*, rather than a linear temporal sequence, are more often the norm.

SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A NEW WEAPON OF WAR?

Elisabeth **Prügl**

Professor of International Relations/Political Science
Director of the Gender Centre

Horrifying stories of sexual violence perpetrated in the context of armed conflict have become ubiquitous. The issue first burst on the international agenda with the rape camps reported from Bosnia in the 1990s. Infamous reports of sexual exploitation and abuse from UN peacekeepers trailed these stories of systematic rape. Reliable statistics of the extent of such violence and abuse are difficult to establish. However, neither issue has gone away, and there is a sense that sexual violence in conflict has become a standard repertoire of warfare. Sexual violence against women and girls in Yemen, South Sudan, and Iraq,

Yazidi women in Northern Iraq, and Rohingya women and girls fleeing the Myanmar military all seem to point to the new normality of such practices. Increasing evidence shows that sexual violence targets also men, and there have been reports of significant levels of such violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Syria, Sri Lanka, Peru, and Bosnia. Sexual violence against men differs in form (e.g. it includes castration in addition to rape, forced prostitution and other violations women experience), and it is more often perpetrated in situations of detention (such as for example at Abu Ghraib).

Whether or not sexual violence is effective as a strategy of war, it has clear effects on its victims. The psychological costs are immeasurable as it demolishes a basic sense of security; for men it often in addition puts in question their masculinity. Costs to communities include the destruction of trust and social cohesion. Moreover, groups that are selectively targeted may decide to leave an area rather than risk becoming the victims of violations.

International policies affirm the weapon-of-war character of sexual violence. It was recognised as a war crime and a crime against humanity in the statutes of the International Criminal

Court in 2002. Moreover, in a series of resolutions since 2008, the UN Security Council has condemned the practice and sought measures to counteract it, including the deployment of Women's Protection Advisors in its peacekeeping missions, the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and the creation of UN Action, a programme to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence. But there is concern that the new visibility lent by this normative framework to sexual violence also has inadvertently normalised it as a standard weapon of war.

"Empirical evidence contradicts the common sense that conflict-related sexual violence is ubiquitous."

Yet, empirical evidence contradicts the common sense that conflict-related sexual violence is ubiquitous. Research shows that there are significant variations in its prevalence and is beginning to discern some patterns. Some suggest that sexual violence may be more common in ethnic conflicts such as that in the former Yugoslavia, where it supported a genocidal agenda. However, in other ethnic conflicts, such as the one in Sierra Leone, such violence was rampant but did not involve specific ethnic targeting, contradicting the idea that it was a strategic instrument of genocide. One explanation is that gang rapes there may have served as a means of socialising militia members. Indeed, there is evidence that such rapes are more common in militias that forcibly recruit their members, often young boys. In contrast, sexual violence is less common among leftist insurgents, as was the case in El Salvador and Peru; and although there are documented cases of such violence in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), these are far outstripped by the level of sexual violence perpetrated by the paramilitaries.

Framing sexual violence as a weapon of war has served to mobilise governments and the UN but it is also problematic because it assumes that warring groups obey a hierarchy of command where soldiers follow orders to rape. Studies show that this is not always the case, and there are considerable problems of command and control in undisciplined armed groups. More typically, armed groups provide a permissive environment. Indeed, research with perpetrators in the DRC shows them complaining that they often go without pay and thus cannot either buy sex or marry and therefore feel that rape is justified. Orders from command play less of a role in this than expectations of masculinity and a sense of male entitlement.

Framing sexual violence as a weapon of war is also problematic because it draws an artificial line between such violence perpetrated in war and outside war. Against this, some feminists have argued that sexual violence itself needs to be considered an act of political violence enabled by patriarchal structures, institutions, and values. They worry that establishing conflict-related sexual violence as something qualitatively different from sexual violence more broadly disregards the conditions that make it possible. It is indeed difficult to think of societies rent by sexual violence as peaceful. Conversely, definitions of war based purely on battle deaths ignore the experiences of women, as sexual violence often continues long after the guns have been silenced.

Framing conflict-related sexual violence as strategic and thus different from such violence outside armed conflict problematically obscures that "peace" typically is built on a patriarchal bargain. The new visibility of sexual violence may therefore lead us to begin to question the distinction between war and peace and recognise the pervasive harm done to populations gendered "other" in the wars that constitute their everyday lives.

HUMANITARIANS AS TARGETS OF VIOLENCE?

Gilles **Carbonnier**

Professor of International Economics

Vice-President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

The prevailing narrative portrays humanitarian workers as increasingly targeted by deliberate attacks. Historical evidence, however, tells us that there has never been a golden age in which humanitarians were immune from such attacks.[1]

The *Aid Worker Security Database*, which covers security incidents since 1997, reports that the total number of those incidents dramatically increased since the turn of the millennium: from 29 in 2001 to 265 in 2013, affecting 475 aid workers. Since then, incidents decreased to 158 in 2017, hitting 313 aid workers, 90% of whom were national and 10% international staff.

Over the same period, the humanitarian market has boomed and the number of aid workers operating in war-torn countries has soared in parallel. Yet, without accurate data on the number of humanitarians in the field, we do not know the extent to which the probability of an individual aid worker suffering a security incident has increased globally. Besides, the situation varies greatly depending on the organisation and the context. Over the past ten years, the majority of security incidents took place in a few countries such as Afghanistan (422 incidents), followed by South Sudan (211), Somalia (173) and Syria (159).

Why this surge in the absolute number of security incidents since 2001? The multiplication of humanitarian organisations on the ground – and hence greater risk exposure – together with enhanced media coverage of security incidents and better reporting are part of the explanation. But the evolving nature of warfare is also key. The *Aid Worker Security Report 2017* (published by Humanitarian Outcomes) argues that while states were responsible for the highest number of aid worker fatalities, most incidents were attributed to the proliferation of decentralised non-state armed groups (NSAGs). The increasing fragmentation of such groups, coupled with rapidly shifting alliances, makes it harder for humanitarian organisations to obtain and maintain solid security guarantees. Nearly half of today's conflicts involve between 3 and 9 opposing forces while 22% of them have more than 10. In the Libyan city of Misrata alone, over 230 armed groups were registered by October 2011.[2]

Urban warfare intensified in recent years. The use of heavy weapons and explosives in densely populated areas (e.g. Mosul, Aleppo) – combined with targeted attacks on healthcare facilities – has increased the risk of civilians and aid workers being injured or killed. This is the result of disregard for the protection of civilians and the medical mission, as well as difficulty in abiding by the principles of precaution and proportionality when hostilities rage in urban environments.

> "Recorded kidnappings rose from 7 in 2003 to 66 in 2013."

The rise in security incidents is also linked to the blurring of lines between politically and economically motivated violence. Recorded kidnappings rose from 7 in 2003 to 66 in 2013, often with demands ranging from monetary ransoms to political concessions such as the release of prisoners, or a commitment to refrain from attacking specific locations over a given timespan.[3]

What can be done about it? Staff security must of course be a top priority

all the way from field offices to headquarters, at all levels. The protection of healthcare workers and facilities is being promoted through advocacy and diplomatic efforts. The capacity of humanitarian workers to conduct frontline negotiations is being strengthened. Each serious security incident has to be carefully analysed in order to identify the specific underlying causes and the lessons to be drawn and shared. There is also a concern to build and nurture a solid security culture within humanitarian organisations as a key element of a broader security policy. Every aid worker operating has a stake in security management. An inappropriate act or misbehaviour can affect the security of other colleagues.

For an impartial, neutral and independent humanitarian organisation like the ICRC, it is critical to be accepted by all actors with influence on staff security, and to ensure adequate security guarantees from the parties to the conflict. Maintaining close physical proximity to the affected population – which can today increasingly be complemented with digital proximity – is essential to securing broad acceptance, not only of the type of humanitarian action undertaken, but of its actors and purpose. Often, this entails making sure that humanitarian action is understood to be aimed at saving lives, alleviating suffering and protecting human dignity – not at transforming societies and polities, or winning the hearts and minds of specific groups for a political agenda.

The presence of criminal groups in war is nothing new, and conflict financing is as old as war itself. Yet the blurring of lines between political and economic agendas in war raises the question of how feasible it is to get security guarantees from criminal groups primarily driven by the pursuit of profits from the war economy, or of how far it is necessary to avoid encounters with them altogether (e.g. moving by air rather than by road).

In specific circumstances, resorting to armed escorts or armoured vehicles may be required. Such measures can offer temporary options for assisting and protecting people in war, but should never be the long-term nor default solution. "Bunkerising" humanitarian action reduces proximity and may feed distrust and reduce acceptance. "Digital proximity" with people affected by armed conflict can offer a way to keep interacting and maintain two-way communication even as insecurity temporarily prevents field presence.

[1] See e.g. M. Junod, *Warrior without Weapon* (Geneva: ICRC, 1982).
[2] ICRC, *The Roots of Restraint in War* (ICRC, 2018), p. 13.
[3] G. Carbonnier, *Humanitarian Economics: War, Disaster and the Global Aid Market* (Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2016).

THE MORPHOLOGY
OF URBAN CONFLICT

Ravi **Bhavnani,** Professor of International Relations/Political Science
and Mirko **Reul,** PhD Candidate in International Relations/Political Science

BRAZIL, Rio de Janeiro. Residents flee the conflict area during a raid by Brazilian security forces in the Complexo do Alemão shantytown, where 500–600 drug traffickers were holed up and refused to surrender. 28 November 2010. Jefferson BERNARDES/AFP

During the Cold War, civil conflict had a rural bent which research mirrored. Urban environments were traditionally viewed as undermining identifications that provide an impetus for fighting, too well protected as the home bases of elites and even prohibitive to rebel operations. As the world population grows and increasingly clusters in urban spaces, we argue that conflict will be redirected – whether purposefully or unintentionally – to cities. Results from several recent

studies provide substantial support for a nascent urban propensity towards conflict – an emerging "urban shift".

One may attribute the shift to a number of factors. Cities are natural targets because of their political, economic, symbolic and logistical significance, which ensures that they are vital nodes to control in relation to trade, transportation, and communications. Accelerated social and economic changes in cities cause political instability, inequality and unemployment,

resulting in alienation, dislocation and the articulation of demands that previously would have been unthinkable. Crime is another major factor contributing to human insecurity in cities. It is contingent on opportunities for predation combined with low risk of incarceration, and is often perceived as having become "the raison d'être of the new wars". Urban areas with high population densities further heighten opportunities for geographically concentrated groups to organise. It follows

that cities frequently become the repositories of organised and unorganised violence by non-state actors as well as the state.

The Lens of Urban Morphology

As armed conflict and violence shift to urban areas where a majority and growing share of the world's population resides – a trend we expect to be more pronounced in the coming decade – the very nature of conflict is undergoing a transformation. The specific lens of *urban morphology* employed

where individuals navigate multiple dimensions of their identities in close proximity to a myriad of others, and where the distinction between civilian and combatant is increasingly blurred.

– *Control*. Complete territorial control is difficult to attain in urban areas. A monopoly of violence is necessary for control, and society effectively becomes a battlefield as rival actors compete for the support and allegiance of civilian populations.

– *Conflict*. In urban settings, multiple conflicts and forms of violence

densely populated cities makes collective punishment more probable as armed actors vie for control – inflicting casualties, disrupting rival attempts at governance, and destroying civilian-occupied buildings, enclaves, and infrastructure in the process. The interconnectedness of urban services exacerbates the problem. As the number of independent actors vying for control in an urban area increases, humanitarian access to these areas becomes decidedly more complicated, with emergency service provision often hinging on negotiations with competing factions or *de facto* recognition of violent political orders.

And even in cities where armed actors revive economic life and public services, it is difficult to distinguish between voluntary civilian support and forced compliance for fear of punishment. Where military authority over relatively unpopulated areas offers few opportunities for dissenters to act collectively, cities facilitate the emergence of micro-political orders, partially controlled by civilian actors. Moving forward, complete military, economic and social control over densely populated urban areas appears less and less feasible, even in the aftermath of civil conflict.

"We argue that conflict will be redirected – whether purposefully or unintentionally – to cities."

here accentuates the evolving interactions among the dimensions of structure, identity, control and conflict that alter the circumstances and influence the outcomes of urban conflicts and affect one another in an endogenous manner:

– *Structure*. Essential to structure is the physical and demographic landscape. Cities vary in terms of size, scale and shape, reflecting different levels of accessibility or local/global integration, as well as different spatial signatures or "city fingerprints" and residential settlement patterns.

– *Identity*. Today's conflicts are characterised by multiple groups, shifting allegiances, and resulting changes in group boundaries and balances. Identity complexity is further amplified in cities,

– spanning the gamut from homicides and crime to terror, protests, riots, and pogroms, to outright rebellion and warfare – can coexist. This "profile" can shift with changes in the urban landscape or be (re)framed to suit prevailing agendas, making interrelated events of this nature inherently difficult to record, let alone forecast with precision and reliability.

The Future of Armed Conflict in Cities

As cities emerge as the dominant sites for civil conflict, international organisations and governments are faced with situations that differ markedly from rural locales. For one, the humanitarian situation for civilians is likely to be dire. The structure of

The heterogeneity of factors associated with urban conflict, including complex patterns of causation and interdependence, requires us to move beyond narrow categorisations and conceptualisations. In such systems, a single factor may change, but the intricate links between causal factors make the eradication of violence extremely difficult. In order to study the micro-dynamics of urban conflict, fine-grained data from multiple sources, including geo-coded, social media and survey data, is required, as are methods to explore the interplay between *structure*, *identity*, *control* and *conflict* – the lens of *urban morphology* proposed here.

THE FOG OF CRIME
Gang Transformation and the Unpredictability of Violence in Central America

Dennis **Rodgers**
Research Professor of Anthropology and Sociology

"So, what's new in the news today?", Adilia asked as I put down the newspaper I'd been reading.

"Nothing much", I answered, "just more of the same as usual – crime, violence, and fear in *Nicaragua, país de las maravillas…*"

"*Ay*, *Dios mio*, what new barbarity are they writing about now?"

"Well, in *El Nuevo Diario*, you can choose between a murder at the Oriental Market where the victim was killed for the food he was bringing back home for his kids, or a gang war in Ciudad Sandino, while in *Barricada*, there's an article about a workshop on crime and delinquency at the Central American University, where they presented the results of a study carried out in the 18 most violent neighbourhoods in Managua, and which says that their inhabitants live in a virtual state of siege. That's the title of the article – '*Vivimos en un virtual estado de sitio*' – it's a quote from one of the study participants."

"*Pues*, that's exactly how it is here in our neighbourhood", Adilia responded, "we're living nothing less than a permanent siege because of all the crime and delinquency."

It has become common to state that the end of the Cold War led to a fundamental transformation in the political economy of violence in Central America, with the most visible expressions of brutality no longer stemming from ideological conflicts, but from more prosaic forms of criminal violence. The fact that this shift has been associated with an increase rather than a decline in insecurity in the region is often deemed surprising due to the perception that the conventional military and guerrilla forces responsible for past violence were better equipped, more organised, and better trained than the gangs or drug trafficking organisations that dominate today. This however overlooks the fact that the transformation of 21st century Central American violence has consequences that go beyond its level or intensity. Gangs – known variably as *maras* or *pandillas* in Central America – are not anarchic and disorderly social forms. Rather, they respond to particular logics and dynamics that relate to fundamental human endeavours, such as the exercise of power or capital accumulation. At the same time, gangs are highly volatile in nature, and this has particular implications for the experience of insecurity.

Central American gangs have evolved enormously over the past three decades. In Nicaragua, for example, post–Cold War *pandillas* initially originated as vigilante gangs that attempted to impose a sense of local social order before transforming into economically motivated drug dealing gangs when cocaine began to flow through the country around the turn of the century. These drug dealing gangs were subsequently muscled out by more professional and internationalised drug trafficking organisations in the late 2000s. Similarly, in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, the *maras* evolved from initially hybrid local groups combining traditional *pandilla* culture with US gang culture imported by deportees in the early and mid-1990s, into two territorially disembedded "federations" – the *Barrio 18* and the *Mara Salvatrucha* – who fought each other over spaces of extortion and racketeering. The *Mara Salvatrucha* then morphed into a drug and migrant trafficking organisation, however, and now dominates the *Barrio 18* gang, which has re-localised and is mainly involved in small-scale extortion.

The everyday consequences of such transformations are immense. The exchange with Adilia reproduced above took place in 1996. Although she decried the "state of siege", it was also a form of violence that she understood and was able to cope with, having lived through sieges during the Sandinista insurrection in 1978–79. A decade later, however, when the neighbourhood was dominated by a drug trafficking organisation known as the *cartelito*, the logic of its violence was not well understood, something which caused major anxiety, as the following extract from my November 2009 field diary describes:

" Tonight, I was helping Adilia to bring a motorcycle into the house and lock the front door, when a motorcycle with two men suddenly surged out of the darkness, and the man on the back seat pulled up a shotgun and pointed it at us. We threw ourselves to the ground screaming, but the driver shouted "*No, no, está no, la próxima*" [no, no, not this one, the next one], and they drove on to the next house, into which they shot two rounds. Nobody has any idea who they were – but everybody says they were *cartelito* – or why they shot in into the neighbour's house, but it has left everybody involved – including myself – shaken and on edge in a way that past episodes of violence never did – including those perpetrated by the gang, even when they were highly brutal. "

"The logic of its violence was not well understood, something which caused major anxiety."

Carl von Clausewitz referred to war as being wrapped in a "fog" of uncertainty. Yet much of the uncertainty of war in practice actually constitutes "known" uncertainty. Most military conflicts involve clear ideas as to who the enemy is, what the rules of engagement are, and why confrontations occur. Gangs and drug trafficking organisations, on the other hand, are highly volatile social forms and the nature of their violence can change very rapidly. Situations of chronic criminal violence in post–Cold War Central America are therefore characterised by "unknown" uncertainties, which fundamentally transforms the lived experience of insecurity in ways that are inherently contingent, unpredictable, and contradictory. This makes what might be called the "fog of crime" far more pernicious than the so-called "fog of war", thereby constituting putatively "peaceful" post–Cold War Central America as an ongoing and brutal tragedy.

Professor Susanna Hecht Awarded the David Livingstone Centenary Medal

Susanna Hecht, Professor of International History, was awarded the David Livingstone Centenary Medal from the American Geographical Society (AGS). The prestigious prize was bestowed on Professor Hecht during the AGS' Annual Fall Symposium held at Columbia University in New York on 16 November 2018.

BRAZIL.
Deforestation in the
Amazonian forest.
luoman/iStock

Professor Hecht is widely recognised as a preeminent authority on forest transitions and sustainable agriculture and her work represents a remarkable integration of the humanities, including the history of ideas, social and environmental history and the social sciences of development, into the dynamics and sciences of tropical and planetary change. As one of the founding thinkers of the field of political ecology, she has consistently carved out new analytic terrain through highly active tropical and archival research, focusing largely on land-use change in the Latin American tropics.

Professor Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, Chair of the International History Department, said: "This is an important and fully deserved international recognition of Professor Hecht's pioneering work. Not only has Professor Hecht opened new avenues of research in international history, in which many have followed suit, but she has also continued to unceasingly refine those insights and develop theoretical and practical linkages to other disciplines, making her work essential to development studies and contemporary global affairs."

"Susanna's work on the Amazon exemplifies geography's contributions to changing tropical conditions", said Dr Deborah Popper, Vice-President of AGS and Chair of its Honors and Exploration Committee. "She understands how economics, culture and land use operate in a society to reflect and change the environment. On top of that, Susanna has a gift for sharing her findings with a wide audience."

In addition to her teaching and research in the Department of International History at the Graduate Institute, Professor Hecht is also Professor of Urban Planning in the Luskin School of Public Affairs at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Her book *The Scramble for the Amazon and the "Lost Paradise" of Euclides da Cunha* won the Melville Award for the best book in environmental history from the American Historical Association and the Carl O. Sauer Award from the American Association of Geographers.

The David Livingstone Centenary Medal was named after the great African traveller David Livingstone and bestowed "for scientific achievement in the field of geography in the southern hemisphere". The American Geographical Society – the oldest professional geographical organisation in the United States and viewed worldwide as a pioneer in geographical research and education – established the award in 1913 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the birth of its namesake.

LES PROFESSEURS

Contributing to a Healthier World

The Director of the Global Health Centre, Ilona Kickbusch, reflects on the 10th anniversary of the Global Health Centre.

You created the Global Health Centre (GHC) in 2008. What are the reasons behind its creation?

At the time, health was becoming an increasingly important global issue; it was moving out of the medical and public health sphere and becoming an issue of foreign policy and diplomacy. Also, the interface with other policy sectors, such as trade, was becoming more significant and the involvement of many stakeholders, including the private sector, was gaining ground. Many of the international organisations relevant to the governance of global health – the World Health Organization (WHO), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI), the World Trade Organization, the Human Rights Council – are situated in Geneva. It became clear that a global health centre in Geneva and at the Graduate Institute with a strong interdisciplinary profile could play an important role in research, executive training and as a health platform.

How has global health evolved during the last 10 years and what are the current and future challenges?

Global health has become even more important recently and its political nature is increasingly understood. Health is central to the Sustainable Development Goals and it is now a key issue at G7, G20, BRICS and AU summits. It is also debated at the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly. Global health security has moved into focus due to the Ebola outbreaks, putting a spotlight on the need to strengthen health systems in all countries. The increase of non-communicable diseases throughout the world has put a spotlight on the role of commercial determinants of health; the digital transformation is providing new opportunities but lacks governance; the challenges of climate change are becoming part of the global health debate; access to medicine is becoming an even more pressing issue. Many of the present challenges are political: Will the strong support for global health funding continue? How will geopolitical shifts influence global health governance? Should WHO play a new, more prominent role?

What are the centre's main contributions and how should it position itself in the future?

The GHC has been at the forefront of discussions, research and debates at the Institute. It also advises international organisations and other stakeholders. Its global health diplomacy executive courses in Geneva and around the world have already influenced an entire generation of global health negotiators.

In the future, the GHC will position itself as a leader in cutting-edge social science research on global health governance and serve as a platform where key intersectoral challenges are debated. In looking forward, the GHC aims to identify and discuss trends in global health as they emerge.

When Teaching Is a Privilege

Anna **Leander**

Professor of International Relations/Political Science

Teaching at the Graduate Institute is a privilege. Some of the reasons are obvious and straightforward: the diverse backgrounds, manifold experiences and varied ambitions of our students make discussions rewarding and all participants, including instructors, can learn from them. Moreover, for International Relations (IR) scholars such as me, it matters that Geneva attracts students interested in international politics, often to change it for the better. Being in Geneva also opens doors to internships and practical experiences that turn our students into well-informed insiders prone to pursue relevant research questions. And lastly, it is difficult to overlook the advantage of Graduate Institute teaching in a world of efficient, understaffed mass-universities that squeeze hundreds of students into their lecture halls and engage them through videos, interactive websites and blended learning. At the Institute, teaching mainly takes place in relatively small groups of postgraduate students, mostly in seminars and with space for personalised supervision. When arriving in Geneva in January 2018, I needed no special introduction to teaching here to see the attraction of this environment for myself and, more importantly, for the students.

One aspect of teaching at the Institute has nonetheless surprised me: its openness and flexibility with regard to the content and form. I have long worked, indeed struggled, to promote and advance these characteristics in teaching and in academia. From my perspective, the core challenge of academia is to avoid reproducing and perpetuating established power-knowledge relationships that are problematic not only in the classroom, but politically and societally. How can it be avoided? The answer is complex but an important part of it involves resisting the policing of entrenched academic boundaries as well as the disciplining of academic work. While it is common for IR scholars to dismissively qualify the discipline as "derivative" because it draws inspiration from elsewhere, I think such dismissals misrecognise the crucial place of boundary transgressions for all knowledge production. The open embrace of it is one of IR's strengths and one of the reasons I continue to identify with it. I also think that much may be gained by adopting the kind of pragmatic, problem- and action-oriented approach that is prevalent in professional schools, including at the Copenhagen Business School where I worked before joining the Institute. Thus, even if I share Sheldon Wolin's

concern that fetishising innovation and change for the sake of change may devalue any and all deepening of knowledge, I don't think this is the core problem for teaching. Rather, I am more concerned that the stifling defence of tradition – often masquerading as a safeguarding of theoretical and methodological rigour – is the problem. This is not to say that theory and method are unimportant or that "anything goes"; on the contrary, it is a plea for the rigorous work required to teach (also theory and method) in the open and flexible manner necessary to foster innovative thinking. For the plain and obvious reason that this kind of rigorous work challenges abuses of academic power and privilege, it is exceedingly difficult to put into practice. Perhaps I should therefore say that I am genuinely impressed, rather than just surprised, that the Institute has managed to nurture and protect teaching that reflects such openness and flexibility.

The practical implication for my teaching at the Graduate Institute has been momentous, allowing me to work with ideas about the content and form of teaching that push the boundaries of my non-disciplinary approach to the IR discipline. Last term, for example, I taught "Qualitative Methods" for IR in a hands-on manner to reflect with the students on how the wealth of methods at their disposal can be used in imaginative combinations as "heuristic devices" to develop and transform (rather than replicate) IR. I also co-taught a course in "Visual Global Security" with Riccardo Bocco, a colleague from the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, and Jonathan Austin, the lead researcher on the "Violence Prevention – VIPRE" project that the three of us are working on. The aim was to reflect on the significance of the fact that security is – to a steadily increasing extent – communicated through online images. For this course, students could opt to write conventional academic papers or, alternatively, develop films, websites, installations or games. We included the latter media because they are both commensurate with the course content but also because we wanted to provide those interested – and that proved to be the entire class – with an opportunity to develop and experiment with their visual literacy and expression. Neither course worked flawlessly; however, in spite of the substantial challenges, the student engagement made it amply worthwhile. In that sense, the obvious privileges of teaching at the Institute play into and reinforce the less obvious ones.

The unexpected space for experimenting with teaching is interesting to explore because of the privilege of working with motivated students in a thriving environment and under excellent conditions.

Supporting Talented Students from around the World

The Graduate Institute strives to support talented scholars from around the world.
A number of special scholarship opportunities are available to students with consideration to both financial need and academic merit.

Refugee Scholarship

Originally from the Gaza Strip, HAFEZ **ABUADWAN**'s path towards higher education was filled with obstacles, including barriers to exiting his homeland. After a six-month wait to obtain a visa to study abroad, he is now working toward a Master in Development Studies.

" The Gaza Strip, as many may know, is the biggest open-air prison in the world. My family and I, like many others, have had near-death experiences […]. With the shifting geopolitics of the Middle East, I decided to pursue studying [abroad] [and] this scholarship allowed me to [undertake] a master at the Institute. "

■ The Refugee Scholarship is funded by the Institute and was created in collaboration with the Graduate Institute Student Association's Migration Initiative, out of a deep concern about the magnitude of the migratory crisis and the fate of tens of thousands of people in war zones seeking refuge in countries like Switzerland.

→ **http://graduateinstitute.ch/support-us-1**

Community Scholarship

INDIRA **URAZOVA** came to the Graduate Institute from Uralsk in Western Kazakhstan. She studied political science at the American University in Bulgaria, where she became interested in international political economy and development, leading her to undertake a Master in Development Studies, an area of study she cares about deeply.

"As I come from a family with modest financial means, it made a world of difference to me: I would not be able to attend the Institute without this scholarship, so I am forever grateful for this life-changing opportunity."

■ Since 2013, the Graduate Institute community – the Foundation Board, administrative personnel and faculty, as well as retired professors – has mobilised to raise funds that provide a full scholarship for a student from the Global South. These funds are awarded annually as a show of solidarity with the Institute and with those students who would not be able to study in Geneva without financial aid.

Alumni Community Scholarship

Currently pursuing her Master in Anthropology and Sociology, RIDDHI **PANDEY** came to the Institute from Lucknow, India. When she finishes her education, she would like to work on the welfare, rights and social movements with rural and indigenous communities in India.

"I value the scholarship not only because it takes care of my present expenses, but also because it liberates me from future liabilities, [which] is empowering because it allows me to pursue the fields of my interest freely, without having to compromise on my academic or professional choices."

■ The Alumni Community Scholarship is a unique scholarship financed by the generous donations of former Graduate Institute students to relieve the academic and living expenses of a student in financial need for a year. Funds for the scholarship are collected through direct donations on the scholarship's webpage and also during a raffle and silent auction held at the annual Alumni Reunion.

Professor
Mohammad-
Mahmoud Ould
Mohamedou with
Julia Jäckle (left)
and Amanda
Germanio.

Regulating Social Media in Democracies

Two Students Win a Prize for Their Applied Research Seminar (ARS) Capstone

In a time of an epidemic of fake news and the questioning of social media, Amanda Germanio and Julia Jäckle, two students working toward the interdisciplinary Master in Development Studies, developed, in collaboration with Radio Télévision Suisse (RTS), an Applied Research Seminar (ARS) Capstone project on the regulation of social media in democracies.

The ARS Capstones, part of the interdisciplinary masters' curricula, allow Graduate Institute students to conduct real world research in conjunction with the Institute's partner organisations and under academic supervision. They give participants the possibility to work on concrete subjects and familiarise themselves with the realities of the professional world all while expanding their conceptual knowledge and analytical capacities.

Julia Jäckle and Amanda Germanio explained that "social media presented itself as a democratic tool during the Arab Spring; yet its image completely degraded after the Cambridge Analytica scandal. This was the reason the *Géopolitis* team asked us to analyse the impact of social media on democracies, and whether it was necessary to regulate it or not".

"We began with the idea that social media constituted a business model, with the objective of assembling user data but with a capitalistic logic", they added. "Since, in democracies, social media plays an agora-like role, the culture of communication and debate and the way to obtain information subject people themselves to this capitalist logic. We then concluded that to promote equality and protect democracy, a regulatory system – simultaneously monitored by different actors – was necessary."

The research done by Ms Jäckle and Ms Germanio won first prize under the Power, Conflict and Development track of the ARS Capstone project, placed under the direction of Professor Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou. About the students' work, Professor Mohamedou said that it was "remarkable both for its rigour and its relevance. The students went above and beyond the well-known aspects of issues raised more frequently by social media in democracies (surveillance, interference, control, etc.) to confront, in an innovative way, ethical questions and the inequalities that social media's own economic model produces and encourages."

Julia Jäckle was invited by Marcel Mione to be a guest on his show, *Géopolitis*, which aired 20 January 2019 and covered the theme of fake news.

→ **http://pages.rts.ch/emissions/geopolitis/10058964-fake-news.html**

Changer le monde ?

Flora **Demaegdt (Leturcq)**

Étudiante de 2ᵉ année de master en études du développement

Crise des migrants, famines, désastre écologique, rupture du multilatéralisme, violences faites aux femmes… les défis sont colossaux et je crois que nous, jeunes bientôt diplômés et sensibles aux questions du monde, en sommes conscients et consternés. Ces défis constituent en effet le cœur même de nos études du développement. Bien que tentés de nous résigner à penser qu'il est trop tard ou trop compliqué de changer les choses, nos lectures, les enseignements de qualité, nos rencontres avec des professionnels et nos discussions avec des experts nous encouragent au contraire à croire qu'il existe des leviers d'action.

Tout juste mariés, Pierre et moi décidions de dédier trois mois de notre été au service d'une communauté œcuménique à Antsirabe, dans les hauts plateaux malgaches. Une expérience qu'il m'est difficile de résumer en quelques lignes… S'efforcer d'« être » plus que de « faire », de garder un cœur joyeux en jouant avec les enfants malgré leurs corps torturés par la malnutrition, et d'accepter avec humilité le sentiment d'impuissance, ce sont autant de défis qu'une vie entière – j'en suis consciente – ne suffira pas à relever.

Mes missions principales consistaient à donner des cours d'anglais dans une école, aider au soutien scolaire organisé pour 250 enfants deux fois par semaine, visiter les familles du quartier pour prendre des nouvelles, organiser des activités pour les mineurs d'un centre de redressement et superviser une colonie de vacances pour 600 enfants. La première épreuve fut d'essayer de taire mes réflexions et mes pensées moralisantes. « Penser le développement » et affûter son esprit critique – fruits de l'enseignement reçu à l'Institut – ne sont pas des qualités suffisantes pour rencontrer l'autre et intégrer une action sociale. Pour autant, des questions me revenaient continuellement. Pourquoi agissent-ils comme cela ? Pourquoi l'État est-il totalement absent ? Comment voulez-vous que la situation s'améliore tant qu'il y aura de la corruption ? Mes jugements initiaux, panneaux classiques de l'Occidentale qui part « faire de l'humanitaire », n'étaient en fait que le résultat d'une bonne dose d'incompréhension, de choc culturel, de manque de connaissance – et d'un soupçon d'orgueil.

L'expérience humaine commença alors à prendre tout son sens avec la rencontre personnelle de l'autre, avec tout ce qu'il porte de souffrances et de richesses. En avançant avec et vers les enfants du quartier, j'ai réalisé que des compliments simples, des sourires généreux et une multitude de petits gestes du quotidien peuvent permettre à l'autre de recouvrer une partie de sa dignité. Ces enfants m'ont appris que si des changements sont nécessaires, ils le sont avant tout du point de vue de la relation humaine. Vouloir changer le monde, c'est d'abord accepter de se déplacer et de se laisser transformer par l'autre.

Vulgariser les connaissances pour servir le débat citoyen

Victor Santos Rodriguez, doctorant et assistant d'enseignement au Département de relations internationales/science politique, a répondu à nos questions sur la tribune indépendante *Jet d'encre*, dont il est le cofondateur et le président.

Quelle est l'idée à l'origine de *Jet d'encre* ?

Jet d'encre est mû par l'idée fondatrice selon laquelle une démocratie digne de ce nom doit s'appuyer sur des citoyens bien informés et un débat public sain. Ceci suppose que, d'une part, les voix de ce corps démocratique soient entendues dans leur pluralité et que, d'autre part, les sujets d'intérêt public soient traités avec la rigueur que leur importance commande. Nous cherchons ainsi à proposer un espace d'expression et de réflexion, éloigné du diktat de l'immédiateté, au sein duquel l'échange d'arguments et d'idées est encouragé dans les limites du respect de chacun. Les contributions se retrouvent dès lors moins autour d'une ligne thématique prédéfinie que d'un esprit partagé, à la fois critique et analytique.

Ces deux objectifs – ouverture au plus grand nombre et qualité de contenu – sont parfois en tension. Et c'est là que nous, en tant que comité éditorial, accomplissons une de nos missions sociales cardinales, à savoir accompagner, par le biais d'attentives relectures, celles et ceux qui désirent s'exprimer mais n'ont pas toujours les armes à l'écrit pour le faire efficacement.

Dans quelle mesure cette démarche est-elle liée à votre activité académique ?

Un autre objectif primordial à nos yeux est celui d'assurer la diffusion d'un savoir académique cloisonné qui revêt pourtant le potentiel de contribuer positivement à la délibération publique. Trop souvent, les universitaires en sciences sociales ne peuvent pas mettre leurs savoirs au service du débat citoyen (démarche académiquement peu valorisée), ou ne souhaitent guère le faire (postulat selon lequel « c'est trop compliqué » pour le grand public). À notre modeste échelle, nous voulons bousculer cet état de fait en favorisant la dissémination et la vulgarisation des connaissances développées dans des contextes savants. Si une telle défiance existe aujourd'hui vis-à-vis des « élites », c'est aussi parce que ces dernières – dont les universitaires font partie – n'ont pas toujours eu l'humilité d'entamer un dialogue horizontal avec le plus grand nombre.

Des membres de l'Institut ont-ils entamé ce dialogue ?

Oui, c'est précisément dans cet esprit que nous avons eu la chance d'accueillir des contributions sous la plume de jeunes chercheurs et chercheuses de l'Institut, mais aussi de mener des entretiens avec des professeurs tels que Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou et Jean-François Bayart. Par ailleurs, en décembre 2018, j'ai eu l'opportunité de concevoir un dossier de fond visant à sensibiliser les citoyens à la situation des sans-papiers en Suisse, une population sous-étudiée et méconnue dont je me préoccupe au quotidien dans le cadre de mes recherches à l'Institut.

Portrait

APOLLINE **PIERSON**
Master in International Affairs, 2018
Project Manager, Denis Mukwege Foundation

For as long as I can remember, I have always strived to push myself outside of my comfort zone, and before coming to Geneva at age 22, I had already lived in Taiwan, Canada and Hong Kong. Today, I work as a project manager for the Dr Denis Mukwege Foundation in Bukavu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The Mukwege Foundation is an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) whose mandate is to eradicate the use of rape as a weapon of war worldwide. The organisation has an office in Maison de la paix, and with help from the Graduate Institute's Career Services, I got an internship there at the outset of my master's degree. That internship eventually turned into a traineeship and finally, a full-time position. While working at the Mukwege Foundation, I became passionate about the issue of conflict-related sexual violence – a topic that requires a multidisciplinary lens to fully grasp, for which I believe the Master in International Affairs prepared me well.

Through events organised by the Mukwege Foundation, I have had the chance to meet with several survivors from all around the world. Their resilience and strong voices became the inspiration for my master's thesis, entitled "Listening to Victims' Voices When Awarding Reparations to Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Eastern DRC", for which I spent two months conducting field studies.

Following its completion, my thesis went on to form the basis of one of our projects at the Mukwege Foundation – the creation of a "Global Reparations Fund" for survivors of sexual violence. Survivors rarely receive any type of justice or recognition for the harm they suffered – this project aims to ameliorate this. In the coming months, the Mukwege Foundation will initiate a reparations fund pilot project in the DRC. I feel fortunate to be part of the team leading its implementation and in doing so, I have the unique opportunity to put into practice the recommendations I made in my thesis.

Working with the Mukwege Foundation has been a very enriching and challenging experience, allowing me to engage closely with survivors in Guinea, Central African Republic, Nigeria and the DRC, as well as with Dr Mukwege, now a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. I had the chance to go to Oslo for the Award Ceremony last December and worked closely with Dr Mukwege to help organise strategic advocacy meetings across Europe to build upon the momentum.

The two years I spent at the Graduate Institute, immersed in a multicultural and challenging environment, were instrumental in preparing me for my current line of work. The Institute is also where I found some of my closest friends, who continue to support me from every corner of the globe.

→ **graduateinstitute.ch/alumni**

Le genre, une catégorie non seulement utile mais nécessaire

Entretien avec Christine **Verschuur**

Chargée d'enseignement et de recherche en anthropologie et sociologie, récemment partie à la retraite

BRÉSIL, Vale do Ribeira. Christine Verschuur (au centre) avec le collectif de femmes As Perobas durant son terrain de recherche dans le *quilombo* Terra Seca.

Comment la thématique du genre a-t-elle évolué à l'Institut ?

Depuis mon arrivée en 1995, j'ai été convaincue que la manière de faire comprendre la valeur heuristique du genre consistait à développer des recherches inspirées des épistémologies féministes, sur des thématiques diverses et pertinentes, et de mieux faire connaître les résultats de ces travaux. J'ai pu mener des recherches et ouvrir des espaces pour encourager le dialogue des savoirs féministes, entre personnes engagées dans des centres de recherche et universités, des mouvements sociaux, des ONG et des organisations internationales. Ces espaces ont permis de diffuser la richesse des apports théoriques féministes des chercheures de diverses origines, notamment des pays du Sud, dont les travaux sont souvent moins répandus et reconnus.

L'Institut est considéré comme un pionnier pour la constitution d'un champ d'études critiques en genre et développement dans les pays francophones ; il a contribué à stimuler la recherche et l'enseignement en genre dans les pays africains francophones. Les recherches menées illustrent la pertinence de cette catégorie d'analyse. Il ne s'agit pas d'« ajouter les femmes et secouer » *(add women and stir)*, mais de transformer le regard sur des questions de société, de mieux comprendre comment les inégalités de pouvoir se reproduisent.

À l'Institut, le genre est désormais une catégorie non seulement utile mais nécessaire, et permet de renouveler la pensée critique. Concrètement, il y a plus d'enseignements et de professeures, de thèses et mémoires, de projets et réseaux de recherche et de collaboration qui s'inspirent des théories féministes et les alimentent, avec un Centre genre et des initiatives étudiantes. Cet élan est nécessaire, car n'oublions pas que le retour de manivelle est toujours possible, comme certaines attaques contre l'enseignement du genre l'ont déjà montré, par exemple à l'Université d'Europe centrale à Budapest.

Et chez les étudiants, avez-vous constaté une évolution dans leur perception du genre et leur engagement ?

Alors qu'il y a quelques années, il me semblait que les jeunes étudiantes et étudiants considéraient les luttes et théories féministes comme *has-been*, j'observe maintenant un engagement croissant dans la cité, des initiatives au niveau de l'Institut, une demande pour plus d'enseignements sur ces thématiques et un intérêt pour inclure cette dimension critique dans leurs questionnements. Le genre n'est plus vu comme une injonction provenant des organismes internationaux, mais comme une catégorie permettant d'analyser les inégalités persistantes de pouvoir qu'ils et elles observent dans le monde professionnel, politique, médiatique, dans la sphère domestique, etc. Ce renouvellement date d'avant #MeToo et les mouvements vilipendant la prétendue « idéologie de genre ». Il est peut-être lié au fait que nous avons des étudiants et étudiantes venant de pays où les mouvements féministes sont vigoureux et où les inégalités de genre, qui se croisent avec les inégalités de classe, de caste, de race ou d'ethnicité, sont persistantes, voire s'approfondissent. Il y a également une plus grande conscience que ces inégalités existent partout, y compris dans les pays dits du Nord.

Nouvelles publications

THE GLOBOTICS UPHEAVAL
GLOBALIZATION, ROBOTICS, AND THE FUTURE OF WORK

Richard **Baldwin**

This book argues that "globots" will build a better future, but will create explosive social challenges along the way. Digital technology is allowing "white-collar robots" to displace many service-sector workers and professionals while at the same time enabling "telemigration" where talented, low-cost workers sitting abroad displace domestic office workers.

If displaced office workers join with already displaced factory workers, the result could be a destabilising upheaval. To avoid this, Richard Baldwin asserts that governments must use the tools they have to slow the pace and make the competition from globots seem fairer.

RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL HEALTH LAW

Edited by Gian Luca **Burci** and Brigit **Toebes**

This *Research Handbook* provides a critical conceptualisation and definition of the growing field of global health law. It forms the first comprehensive study on the treatment of health issues in international legal regimes and explores the role of international law in addressing the most prominent global health challenges.

The editors have consciously adopted a holistic approach by including "soft" norms and informal law-making processes in the *Handbook*'s scope to give a realistic account of the normative framework that shapes contemporary global health. Despite following a predominantly legal perspective, the *Handbook* also adopts an interdisciplinary approach by looking at health from a governance perspective and using insights from international relations scholarship in forecasting possible future developments surrounding health law.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW

Vincent **Chetail**

International Migration Law provides a detailed and comprehensive overview of the international legal framework applicable to the movement of persons across borders. The role of international law in this field is complex and often ambiguous as there is no single source for the international law governing migration. This textbook cuts through this complexity by clearly demonstrating what the current international law is and assessing how it operates.

The book brings together and critically analyses the disparate set of international legal norms on a broad variety of issues: irregular migration, human trafficking, refugee protection, labour migration, non-discrimination, regional free movement schemes and global migration governance. It also offers a particular focus on important migrant groups — namely migrant workers, refugees and smuggled migrants — and maps the current status of the law governing their movement, providing a thorough critical analysis of the various stands of international law which apply to them and how the law may continue to develop in the future.

Nouvelles publications

London: Allen Lane. 2018. 368 p.

EUROPE
A NATURAL HISTORY

Tim **Flannery**

A place of exceptional diversity, rapid change and high energy, Europe has literally been at the crossroads of the world ever since the interaction of Asia, North America and Africa formed the tropical island archipelago that would become the continent of today.

In this unprecedented evolutionary history, Tim Flannery shows how for the past 100 million years Europe has absorbed wave after wave of immigrant species; taking them in, transforming them, and sometimes hybridising them. Flannery reveals how, in addition to playing a vital role in the evolution of our own species, Europe was once the site of the formation of the first coral reefs, the home of some of the world's largest elephants, and now has more wolves than North America.

This groundbreaking book charts the history of the land itself and the forces shaping life on it – including modern humans – to create a portrait of a continent that continues to exert a huge influence on the world today.

Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 2018. 520 p.

RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Edited by Marcelo **Kohen** and Mamadou **Hébié**

Analysing the history, theory and practice of international law applicable to the assessment of territorial claims and the settlement of related disputes, this *Research Handbook* provides a systematic exposition and in-depth discussions of the relevant key concepts, principles, rules and techniques.

Marcelo Kohen and Mamadou Hébié unite a multinational group of contributors to provide a go-to resource for the settlement of territorial disputes. Chapters discuss the process through which states establish sovereignty over a territory, and review the different titles of territorial sovereignty as well as the relevance of state conduct, the impact of fundamental principles of international law such as the principle of territorial integrity, the right of self-determination and the prohibition of the threat or use of force in relation to territorial disputes. Finally, technical and evidentiary rules that are crucial for the assessment of territorial claims are presented.

Bern, Peter Lang. 2018. 378 p.

WICKHAM STEED, GREATEST JOURNALIST OF HIS TIMES

Andre **Liebich**

Hailed as "the greatest journalist of his time", Henry Wickham Steed (1871–1956) was editor-in-chief of *The Times* after World War I, having been its foreign editor since 1914, and, previously, its correspondent in Berlin, Vienna and Rome. "Spiritual godfather" of the post-Habsburg new states, he was long acknowledged as the world's greatest authority on Central Europe. In the 1930s, he stood at the forefront of the anti-appeasement camp and, in World War II, was the BBC's Overseas Services Chief Broadcaster. Contemporaries remarked upon Steed's impressive appearance, prodigious command of foreign languages, and extraordinary network of connections in high places. He was also a paradoxical personality of a liberal outlook and conservative disposition, torn too by complex personal relationships. Lionised abroad but denounced at home, Steed remained an outsider even as he reached the pinnacle of success in his chosen profession and exerted a significant influence on his times.

Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press. April 2019.
224 p.

NARRATIVES OF HUNGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
FEEDING THE WORLD IN TIMES OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Anne **Saab**

This book explores the role that the language of international law plays in constructing understandings – or narratives – of hunger in the context of climate change. The story is told through a specific case study of genetically engineered seeds purportedly made to be "climate-ready". Two narratives of hunger run through the storyline: the prevailing neoliberal narrative that focuses on increasing food production and relying on technological innovations and private sector engagement, and the oppositional and aspirational food sovereignty narrative that focuses on improving access to and distribution of food and rejects technological innovations and private sector engagement as the best solutions.

The book argues that the way in which voices in the neoliberal narrative use international law reinforces fundamental assumptions about hunger and climate change, and the way in which voices in the food sovereignty narrative use international law fails to question and challenge these assumptions.

Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar Publishing.
2018. 208 p.

THE STATE, BUSINESS AND EDUCATION
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS REVISITED

Edited by Gita **Steiner-Khamsi** and Alexandra **Draxler**

Businesses, philanthropies and non-profit entities are increasingly successful in capturing public funds to support private provision of schooling in developed and developing countries. Coupled with market-based reforms that include weak regulation, control over workforces, standardisation of processes and economies of scale, private provision of schooling is often seen to be convenient for both public authorities and businesses. This book examines how the public subsidisation of these forms of private education affects quality, equality and the realisation of human rights.

The State, Business and Education sheds light on the privatisation of education in fragile circumstances. Using case studies from Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India and Syrian refugee camps, it illustrates the ways in which private actors have expanded their involvement in education as a business and shows the influence of policy borrowing on the spread of for-profit education.

Special issue,
*European Journal of
Politics and Gender* 2,
no. 1. February 2019.

GENDER EXPERTS AND GENDER EXPERTISE

Special issue edited by Elisabeth **Prügl** and Rahel **Kunz**

One of the remarkable outcomes of the feminist movement of the late 20th century has been the development of gender expertise, i.e., specialised and policy-focused knowledge about gender relations. As international organisations and governments adopted gender mainstreaming, gender equality laws required compliance and organisations of all kinds embraced ideas of gender parity, they also created a demand for experts to help them realise their objectives. Gender experts around the world have responded to this demand and defined a new body of knowledge together with a new profession.

This special issue brings together insights developed in the context of a research project funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation on "Gender Experts and Gender Expertise in International Governance". In seven articles and an introduction it addresses (a) the way gender expertise is structured as a social field and market; (b) its varied impacts on policies and the way experts negotiate the dangers of cooptation; and (c) feminist conundrums in researching the phenomenon and in practicing expertise.

Nouvelles publications

International Development Policy. Issue 11, online and in print (Brill Nijhoff). Forthcoming May 2019.

THE ILO @ 100
ADDRESSING THE PAST AND FUTURE OF WORK AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

Edited by Christophe **Gironde** and Gilles **Carbonnier**

Marking the centenary of the International Labour Organization (ILO), this 11th special issue of *International Development Policy* explores the Organization's capacity for action, its effectiveness and its ability to adapt and innovate. The collection of 13 articles, written by 26 authors from around the world, covers three broad areas: the ILO's historic context and contemporary challenges; approaches and results in relation to labour and social protection; and the changes shaping the future of work.

The articles highlight the progress and gaps to date, as well as the context and constraints faced by the ILO in its efforts to respond to the new dilemmas and challenges of the fourth industrial revolution, with regard to labour and social protection. Several of the contributors are based at the Graduate Institute: Thomas Biersteker, Filipe Calvão, Gilles Carbonnier, Christophe Gironde, Velibor Jakovleski and Christine Verschuur.

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
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