

Global Governance*

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Global governance is a permissive concept. Like globalization, with which it is often associated, the frequency with which global governance is invoked in the scholarly literature and in policy practice far exceeds the number of times it is precisely or carefully defined. As a result, the term ‘global governance’ is applied to a wide variety of different practices of order, regulation, systems of rule, and patterned regularity in the international arena. It is permissive in the sense that it gives one license to speak or write about many different things, from any pattern of order or deviation from anarchy (which also has multiple meanings) to normative preferences about how the world should be organized.

This essay will begin, therefore, with an attempt to provide a general definition of the concept of global governance, with particular reference to the governance of security affairs. It will then consider Inis Claude’s classic three-fold typology for addressing the subject of power and international relations (Claude 1962), in which he distinguished analytically between balance-of-power systems, collective security arrangements, and world government. It will illustrate the application (and complex integration) of these general analytical frameworks, with specific reference to different historical periods of order and global governance over the course of the past two centuries. Next, it will discuss how global governance is managed, from the international society of states (Bull

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1977), to arguments about the importance of hegemony for order and governance (Gilpin 1975, 1981), international regimes (Keohane and Nye 1977), institutions (Keohane and Martin 1995, Martin 1992), international law (Abbott and Snidal 2000), global norms (Katzenstein 1996, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), or private authority (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999a, Hall and Biersteker 2002). The essay will conclude with a consideration of the increased salience of different institutional actors, particularly non-state actors, involved in contemporary global governance, and a comparison of different bases of governance.

DEFINING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Global governance is often defined in terms of what it is not – neither a world government nor the disorderly chaos and anarchy associated with a Hobbesian ‘state of war of all against all.’ In one of the pioneering studies of global governance published in 1992, James Rosenau defined global governance in general terms as ‘an order that lacks a centralized authority with the capacity to enforce decisions on a global scale’ (Rosenau 1992b: 7). His conception of global governance was that of a purposive order that exists for the management of interdependence in the absence of a global state. His definition is very broad and has relatively little to say about who or what makes decisions, or precisely how enforcement takes place.

Governance is derived from the Latin word *gubernator*, which is described both as a person who steers, and as a ‘self-acting contrivance for regulating’ to ensure an even and regular motion (Oxford English Dictionary 1971: 1182). This is an important

distinction, and we will return to these two different aspects of how governance is accomplished in the discussion below. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines governance as: (1) the idea of controlling, directing or regulating influence, as well as being subject to the control of another (a relational aspect); (2) the office, function, or power of governing; (3) the manner in which something is governed or regulated; and (4) the general conduct of life or business, demeanour, and ‘discrete or virtuous behaviour,’ which adds a normative component to governance (Oxford English Dictionary 1971: 1181f.).

Drawing on the origin of the concept and the different aspects of governance identified above, it is possible to define global governance in general terms. Global governance requires first, some form of *patterned regularity* or order at the global level. Patterned regularity is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for global governance.

Second, following Rosenau, and with acknowledgement of Hedley Bull’s important contribution (Bull 1977), global governance must be *purposive* and/or oriented toward the achievement of some goal or goals. In this sense, and integrating it with the first element, global governance is order, plus intentionality, at the global level.

Third, governance connotes a *system of rule*, or rules. These rules can either be formal and embodied within formal institutions, or they can be informal and reside inter-subjectively among a population or a set of key institutional actors. Global governance entails decisions that shape and define expectations (‘controlling, directing, or regulating influence’) at the global level. There can be different degrees of

institutionalization associated with different forms of governance, and there is much debate about whether formal or informal institutions are necessary for governance.

Fourth, the system of rule implied by global governance is *authoritative*, in the sense that there is a social relationship between the governed and some governing authority. Governance requires acceptance by a significant portion of some relevant population and therefore is ‘as dependent on inter-subjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters’ (Rosenau 1992b: 4). Governments can persist without widespread popular support, but governance requires performance of functions necessary for systemic persistence. Governance should not be equated with government, but with the functions of government.

Fifth and finally, as indicated above, given that the word governance is derived from the Latin word *gubernare* (both ‘to steer’ and ‘to regulate’), it connotes some agent who *steers* the process, and it also allows for *self-regulation*. In this sense, a market or set of market mechanisms can be said to govern.

Thus, global governance is an inter-subjectively recognized, purposive order at the global level, which defines, constrains, and shapes actor expectations in an issue domain. It is a system of authoritative rule or rules (with varying degrees of institutionalization) that functions and operates at the global level. In order for a system of authoritative rules to operate at a global level, it is not required that they be universally practiced or universally recognized as legitimate. It merely requires that they

be widely shared and practiced on a global scale (on multiple continents) by relevant and important actors (Alker, Amin, Biersteker, and Inoguchi forthcoming).

TYPES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS IN SECURITY AFFAIRS

In *Power and International Relations*, Inis Claude differentiated between three heuristic ways to manage power in international relations – balance of power systems, collective security arrangements, and world government (Claude 1962). He placed the three alternatives on a continuum, ranging from the least formally institutionalized arrangement (balance of power) on one end of the spectrum, to the most formally institutionalized (world government) on the other. Collective security arrangements were placed in the middle of the continuum. Each of the ideal types he sketched provides a basis for global governance of security affairs. They each entail an inter-subjectively recognized, purposive order at the global level, which shapes and defines actor expectations. Each is a system of authoritative rule or rules that functions and operates at the global level. They differ primarily according to their degrees of formal institutionalization.

In his analysis of the evolution of international society, Adam Watson developed a similar continuum to describe the spectrum of international systems, from absolute independence of individual states at one end of the spectrum to absolute empire at the other (Watson 1992: 13). Following in the tradition of Hedley Bull, Watson argued that order promotes peace, but it does so at the price of independence and constraints on

freedom of action of states (due to its association with greater degrees of institutionalization). Independence, however, also has its price, in terms of economic and military insecurity and as a result, states must form and rely upon alliances to provide for their security. Hegemony – where some power (or small group of powers) is able to ‘lay down’ the law – and suzerainty – where members of international society accept that hegemony as legitimate – are intermediate forms of global governance. Dominion and empire exist at the other end of Watson’s continuum.

The principal basis for differentiation in both of these conceptions is the degree of institutionalization entailed in the governance arrangement. They are also differentiated by the principal mechanism of governance. Thus, both balance-of-power systems and state independence as arrangements for global security governance at one end of the continuum have relatively low levels of formal and informal institutionalization and are essentially regulated by a form of market mechanism. They are governed or regulated principally through the separate actions of individual state actors pursuing their own security interests. Kenneth Waltz, in *Theory of International Politics*, draws an explicit analogy to the market mechanism when he describes states interacting in the international system as analogous to firms in a market (Waltz 1979: 90f.). Like firms, states are in constant competition with one another, and pursue individual survival in a system without hierarchy, which he defines as anarchy.

At the other end of the continuum – whether it is in the form of dominion, empire, or a world government – the systems of governance are essentially hierarchical, top-down, and highly institutionalized. They entail governance principally by governments (a

single state in cases of dominion or empire, or a unitary government, in the case of the world state). In dominion, imperial authority determines the internal government of other communities, but they maintain their identity. Empire exists when the direct administration of others is carried out from a unitary imperial centre. Both require high levels of institutionalized authority. The same would obviously be true of world government.

In between these two extremes of complete state independence and world government are a large variety of informal institutions, complex combinations of formal and informal institutional arrangements, and a wide range of different social networks. Rather than being regulated principally by market mechanisms or hierarchical institutions, these systems of governance are regulated by networks composed of key institutional actors, who share a common concern with a particular issue domain, but not necessarily a common approach or method for addressing it. Their authority is sometimes contested, and different governance arrangements can often contradict one another. Networks are ideally 'forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 8), but there are also aspects of hierarchy in many networks. The recent popularity of the idea of public/private partnerships in global governance constitutes one contemporary form of network governance.

The period of US hegemony immediately following World War II was an example of a form of global governance situated in the space between state independence and formal hierarchy. In this case, a single power was able to shape and mould the primary

institutions of global governance for most of the world, many of which persist, in revised form, to this day. Hegemony can be provided by a single state or by a relatively small group of states, such as the P-5, G-7, G-8, or G-20, which have adapted and extended the system originally developed under US hegemony over the course of the past 60 years. As will be discussed in more detail below, hegemony is only one basis for this intermediate form of global governance between independent states and a world state.

Hierarchical governance is probably the most efficient, but it is actually relatively rare in the international system. Market governance is more widespread, but less guided, steered, or reliable. Network governance is the most common form of contemporary global governance, but its effectiveness and reliability are also highly variable and uncertain. Figure 1 summarizes this analytical framework for characterizing different global governance arrangements.

Figure 1: Analytical Framework for Characterizing Types of Global Governance Arrangements

Inis Claude	Balance of Power Systems	Collective Security Arrangements	World Government
Adam Watson	Independent States	Hegemony Suzerainty	Dominion Empire
Degree of Formal and Informal Institutionalization	Low	Medium	High
Principal Mechanism of Governance	Market	Network	Hierarchy

Different periods in time may be associated with the general predominance of one or another of these forms of global governance. At a very general level, balance of power systems (in at least two different forms) are often associated with the 19th century (Schroeder 1989), while collective security arrangements are associated with the 20th century, from their initial articulation and introduction immediately following WWI in the League of Nations to their broadened institutionalization after WWII in the form of the collective security mechanisms of the UN Security Council. This characterization is highly over-simplified and can be somewhat misleading, however. In any given period, there is a complex blend of overlapping forms of global security governance, with different systems and elements of different systems co-existing in complex, and sometimes contradictory, ways.

Thus, the balance-of-power systems of the 19th century should be differentiated by their degree of informal institutionalization. The Concert system of the first half of that century with its periodic meetings and assemblies of representatives of the Great Powers was far more institutionalized than the competitive balance-of-power system that emerged at the end of the century (Schroeder 1989). The post-WWI period cannot be equated with the idea of collective security, since several major powers used the League of Nations for maintaining the post-war distribution of power and never fully accepted its mechanisms for collective security (Wolfers 1966). Similarly, the post-WWII period is best characterized as a fusion of elements of institutionalized collective security (the UN Security Council and its mandate to maintain international peace and security) with balance-of-power considerations that acknowledged power differentials at the time of its creation (the designation of Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and the

veto power granted to them). Because of its institutionalization of balance-of-power considerations, the UN did not operate as it was originally intended to function in the security domain – as an effective institution of collective security imposing sanctions and authorising peacekeeping operations – until after the end of the Cold War, when the bipolar confrontation between the US and Russia came to an end.

DIFFERENT BASES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Global governance in the security domain exists largely within the broad area between market-regulated systems of balance of power (with sharply articulated state independence) and formal hierarchical systems associated with empire or world government. Much of the theoretical and policy debate about forms of global governance revolves around the different (and often interconnected) bases of governance: the society of states, hegemony, international regimes, institutions, international law, global norms, or private authority. Indeed, much of the scholarly literature in international relations is devoted to debates about the bases of global governance. Below, the broad outlines of each are briefly sketched.

The international society of states

For Hedley Bull, the principal basis of global governance is to be found in the evolving institution of the *society of states*. He terms this ‘the anarchical society’, because its core units are independent states co-existing in a situation of anarchy (defined as the absence of a central authority). He draws on the work of Hugo Grotius to argue that ‘that states

and the rulers of states in their dealings with one another were bound by rules and together formed a society' (Bull 1977: 72). The definition of global governance presented above is built on the foundation provided by Bull. He defined order in terms of a relationship, pattern, and regularity and stressed its purposive nature (that is, the way it promotes certain primary goals and/or values).

Global governance for Bull refers principally to the system of informal diplomatic rules and practices that regulates inter-state interaction. The existence of inter-state communication and diplomatic envoys does not constitute international society.

International society requires reciprocal recognition of rules and of like rights and duties, such as diplomatic recognition, diplomatic immunity, and the exchange of ambassadors. The society of states is differentiated from the system of states in that it involves more than states in regular contact with each other. Rather, it entails states in regular contact, but also conscious of, and bound by, common interests, values, and/or rules in their relationships (Bull 1977: 16).

Christian Reus-Smit develops Bull's concept of the international society of states (Reus-Smit 1997), arguing that contractual international law and multilateralism constitute deep structural elements underlying contemporary international society. Constitutional structures at the international level originate within the domestic cultures of dominant states (like the US after World War II), but once embedded in the practices of other states, the values inherent within those constitutional structures condition the behaviour of all states and provide a basis for global governance. For Reus-Smit, 'constitutional structures' (1997: 556) are coherent ensembles of inter-subjective beliefs, principles,

and norms that define both what constitutes a legitimate actor and the basic parameters of rightful state action. They incorporate three inter-subjective normative elements: (1) beliefs about the moral purpose of the state, (2) an organizing principle of differentiation (sovereignty), and (3) a norm of pure procedural justice (Reus-Smit 1997: 566ff.).

The principal goals of the society of states are to preserve the society of states, maintain the survival, independence, and sovereignty of the individual states that constitute the society, limit state violence, and provide for global public goods, such as the protection of property rights. The form of global governance provided by the society of states does not require formal, international institutions, but international law plays a central role as an institution of international society. The international society of states is historically grounded in Western Europe, and one of its principal contemporary challenges is the expansion of international society to the rest of the world (Bull and Watson 1984).

Hegemony

State *hegemony* provides the basis for another form of global governance. Both the hegemony of England in the 19th century and the hegemony of the US in the 20th century provided global leadership and underwrote the provision of collective goods, backed by their considerable political, economic, and military resources. State hegemony is a relatively hierarchical basis for global governance, maintained by structural power (Strange 1986), indicated by leadership, and occasionally operating with ideological hegemony, where direct coercion is rare and the leadership of the

hegemon is widely accepted by other states (Cox 1987). Thus, hegemony has three facets of meaning: capabilities, leadership, and ideological dominance.

For Charles Kindleberger, writing about the governance of the global economy (Kindleberger 1973), and for Robert Gilpin, who extended Kindleberger's conception to the governance in the global security domain (Gilpin 1981), the essence of hegemony is political leadership of the hegemonic state and is indicated by its willingness to underwrite the costs of maintaining the governance of the economic, political and/or military order. Among the different things a hegemon can do in the security domain is to use coercion (based on a predominance of power), employ persuasion (with credibility), provide leadership in the form of public goods, and subsidize transaction costs. In the economic sphere, the hegemon is expected to prevent others from constructing trade and investment barriers, manage the world economy, and perform as an engine of growth for the rest of the global economy.

Hegemonic stability theory developed in the context of a widely shared consensus in the 1970s that the US was in relative decline from its position of global hegemony established in the immediate aftermath of World War II. There was a broad concern among hegemonic stability theorists that as a hegemon declines, the order and global governance it provided would naturally begin to break down (Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin, 1975; Gilpin 1981).

Because of its central focus on power and power relations, looking to hegemony as the basis for global governance has special appeal for analysts in the tradition of political

realism. As Gilpin and others associated with hegemonic stability theory clearly realized, however, relative power distribution is constantly undergoing change (both in perception and in reality). The difficulty of accurately gauging the significance of US decline in the 1970s was emphasized by critics in the 1980s (Strange 1986; Nau 1990), and the idea of US hegemonic decline seemed almost anachronistic following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. In addition, as liberal institutionalists argued, international regimes could provide an alternative basis for global governance, even after hegemony.

International regimes

The concept of international regimes cannot be fully understood outside the context of the debate about hegemonic decline and hegemonic stability. While Robert Gilpin worried about the consequences of US decline and/or the potential temptation for the US to become a rogue hegemon, liberal institutionalists like Robert Keohane argued that international regimes could persist even without a hegemon (Keohane 1984). Processes of path dependence ensured that once the institutions of global governance had been created under hegemonic authority, it would take a great deal to dismantle them. As long as the demand for regimes was sustained, they would continue. It is easier to maintain existing international regimes than to create new ones, but it was possible to imagine that new regimes could also be created to govern different issue domains, even after hegemony.

Regimes are defined as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area

of international relations' (Krasner 1983b: 2). Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Violation of norms is frowned upon, even though they are occasionally broken. They are not inviolable, but there is a general sense that they ought to be followed. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action, and decisionmaking procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choices. International regimes tend to be far broader in scope than individual international organizations because they entail norms, legal conventions, general beliefs, a variety of different practices, and the presence of other institutional actors.

International regimes are widely associated with the governance of the global economy, but the concept has been extended into the security domain, with consideration of the non-proliferation, arms control, peacebuilding, and counterterrorism regimes.

International organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), may institutionally embody many of the central concepts, norms, and practices associated with the non-proliferation regime, but they cannot be equated with it.

There has been a great deal of debate about the direct and indirect influence of international regimes, measured principally in terms of their effects on individual states (Haggard and Simmons 1987). They are said to function by lowering the costs of cooperation, providing a forum for bargaining, increasing information, providing linkages that enable trade-offs (for example, trade access for alliance participation), and affecting the reputation of states. Regimes constrain states by increasing the costs of

defection from agreements enforced by regimes, and they therefore provide an institutionalized basis for global governance.

Institutions

Institutions are closely related to the operation of international regimes, and when defined broadly (Keohane 1988; Young 1992), they are nearly identical to them. Robert Keohane defines institutions as ‘related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time’ (1988: 383). Institutions provide a system of authoritative rules at the global level and can provide a basis for governance by defining, constraining, and shaping actor expectations in different domains.

Individuals associated with the tradition of political realism contend that institutions have no direct effect on state behaviour and operate largely at the margins of international relations (Mearsheimer 1994: 7). Institutions are viewed as the product of the most powerful states, and they tend to reflect the prevailing distribution of power in the world. States choose to obey them, if they wish.

Institutionalists argue that institutions provide an important basis for global governance. Institutions such as multilateralism can provide solutions to a variety of different dilemmas of strategic interaction (Martin 1992: 766). States demand institutions because they solve collective action problems. One of the best indicators that institutions matter to states is that governments continue to invest in them (Keohane and Martin 1995: 40f.). Institutionalists do not restrict their claims to the international

political economy and argue that the division between security and economics is largely specious (Keohane and Martin 1995: 43f.). Institutions play a critical role in providing information in both domains. The salience of relative gains is contextual – it depends on the number of major actors in the system and on the question of whether military advantage favours offence or defence. Institutions reduce incentives for states to cheat, lower transaction costs, link issues, and provide focal points for cooperation.

International law

Although they are widely viewed as principal components of international regimes, both international law (which represents a formalization of rules) and global norms (which approximate informal rules) can serve as bases for global governance.

International law represents a codification of rules governing the behaviour of major institutional actors, particularly that of independent states. In their work on law in international governance, Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal distinguish between what they term ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law (Abbott and Snidal 2000). Hard law refers to legally binding obligations that are precise and restrict behaviour and sovereignty. EU human rights law, which is backed by the European Court of Justice, is an example of hard law. Soft law refers to a weakening of hard law along one (or more) of three dimensions: obligation, precision, or delegation (Abbott and Snidal 2000: 422). If obligation, precision, and/or delegation are absent, as they often are in practice, there is still a form of legalization present. Abbott and Snidal make this distinction not only to illustrate the variety in degrees of legalization, but also to illustrate how widespread legalization has

become globally. The UN Charter's injunction against state aggression, the international Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the activities of the International Criminal Court are all examples of soft international law that govern the security domain.

Legalization is a distinctive form of institutionalization. It is also one of the principal methods by which states increase the credibility of their commitments to each other. Powerful states can resist international law, but they often have a significant stake in (and benefit from) hard legalization. They can also benefit from soft legalization because contracting costs can be lowered, sovereignty costs can be limited, uncertainty can be reduced, bargaining problems can be eased, compromises can be achieved over time, and compromises can be facilitated between strong and weak states.

Global norms

Global norms are another central component of international regimes. They constitute the ideational or normative underpinnings for governance. Adherence to norms is one of the best empirical indicators of the presence of global governance. Norms are standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Finnemore and Sikkink distinguish between different categories of norms: regulative, constitutive, and prescriptive. Regulative norms both order and constrain behavior and are most closely associated with conceptions of global governance. Constitutive norms create new actors, interests, identities, or categories of actors. Prescriptive norms establish what 'ought' to be done. Neta Crawford makes a

distinction between norms as common practice and normative beliefs based on ethical prescriptions, but she also notes that ‘international relations theorists frequently use “norms” to denote both senses’ (Crawford 2002: 40).

Norms can provide a basis for global governance, because they define, constrain, and shape actor expectations in an issue domain. If norms are internalized within major players, they become an authoritative base for a system of rules that operate at the global level. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that norms emerge at the global level through a multi-stage process: from the phase of norm emergence, where norm entrepreneurs frame issues and use organizational platforms to articulate norms, to the phase of norm cascade, where imitation, threshold points, contagion, peer pressure, conformity, and self-esteem all play a role in norm dissemination. Once norms develop to a stage where they are taken for granted, where they become naturalized or unquestioned, where institutions embody them in their rules and structures, and where they take on the force of law, they can be said to be internalized (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895).

International norms are widespread and increasingly visible in the governance of the security domain – from justifications for the use of force and proportionality in war (derived from just war theory and practices) to proscriptions against the use of torture, norms against the first use of nuclear weapons, and in support of the idea of sovereign responsibility to protect. These norms are often contested and reside at different places in Finnemore and Sikkink’s three-stage process described above. Even before they are

internalized, however, they provide a basis for global governance (considered as an inter-subjectively recognized, purposive order at the global level).

Private authority

Most of the forms of global security governance considered up to this point (with the possible exception of global norms), are based on relations between states or evaluated exclusively in terms of their influence on state behaviour. Private sector actors also provide forms of governance, typically in association with states, but occasionally on their own. Private authority in the global political economy has received the most attention, from self-binding codes of conduct and standards setting schemes to coordinated lobbying efforts, independent rating and assessment agencies, and private regimes (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999a). These are all instances where private-sector actors take the lead in establishing norms, rules, and institutions that guide (or steer) behaviour (Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999b: 4).

The idea of private authority in global governance has also been extended into the global security realm (Hall and Biersteker 2002, Avant 2005). A great variety of non-state actors are engaged in multilateral global governance, from advocacy networks like the International Campaign to Ban Landmines to public policy think-tanks, private military companies, militia groups and warlords, transnational movements engaged in the commitment of acts of terrorism, and in some instances, even mafias and vigilante groups. They can be said to be authoritative because they establish standards, provide social welfare, enforce contracts, maintain security for certain populations, and offer an

alternative basis for global governance. Authority requires both the consent of, and recognition by, a part of the population governed by that authority. It entails a social relationship.

Advocacy networks and think-tanks establish their authority through the operation of transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and through the authority of their expertise (Hall and Biersteker 2002: 14). Transnational movements committing acts of terrorism on a global scale also legitimate themselves on the basis of their claims of 'expertise' in interpreting different religious texts. Private military companies typically have authority delegated to them by states (Avant 2005: 87), though there can be instances when they operate without it. Militias and warlords function at times like quasi-states or emergent states, taxing local populations and providing public goods like security. Vigilante groups and criminal organizations operate in the shadowy world between coercion and legitimate authority. It is often difficult to draw the line between them, but the extent to which vigilantes and criminal organizations provide public security, reinforce contracts, and create employment opportunity provides a base from which they can establish public recognition and consent.

Private authority in the security domain emerges when states delegate it, enable it, or passively allow it to develop. It can also develop in spaces where the state has abdicated from its responsibilities, and in some instances, it can be seized from the state. Although private actors are increasingly playing authoritative roles in the security domain, their role in global governance is most apparent in transnational advocacy networks and the articulation of an alternative basis for global governance.

CONCLUSION

Although the realm of global governance has traditionally been occupied predominantly by states and inter-governmental organizations, a variety of different institutional actors, particularly non-state actors, are increasingly playing a salient role in contemporary global governance. They articulate alternative forms of governance, play active roles in formulating the agenda, and create spaces where a purposive order of authoritative sets of rules can be articulated and established. They are altogether absent in the form of governance provided by the international society of states and largely invisible in the governance provided by state hegemony, but they are principal players in the production of international norms and obviously in the realm of private authority. Other bases of governance – regimes, institutions, and international law – tend to be composed of a mixture of the two, with states predominating in most.

With regard to the mechanisms of governance, there is again a range – from hierarchy in hegemonic systems to networks in governance by global norms and international society. Private authority, international law, regimes, and institutions as bases of governance tend to be governed by a combination of both hierarchy and network.

With regard to degree of formal institutionalization, there is again wide variation, both between different bases of governance and within them. International society and private authority operate with relatively low levels of formal institutionalization at the global level, while most forms of hegemony are associated with high degrees of formal

institutionalization. Regimes, institutions, law, and norms tend to operate at an intermediate level of formal institutionalization, with a mix of formal and informal institutional arrangements. Figure 2 compares and contrasts different bases of global governance.

Figure 2: Comparing different Bases of Global Governance

What Governs?	International Society	Hegemony	Regimes & institutions	Law & norms	Private authority
Who Governs?	States (exclusively)	State(s)	States (primarily)	States & NGOs	Firms, NGOs, Non-State Armed Groups
Principal Governance Mechanism	Network	Hierarchy	Hierarchy & Market	Hierarchy & Networks	Networks & Hierarchy
Degree of Formal Institutionalization	Low	High	Medium	Medium	Low

The variety of different bases for identifying and comprehending forms of contemporary global security governance – the society of states, hegemony, regimes, institutions, law, norms, and private authority – illustrate well the complexity of the subject, as well as the range of institutional players involved. Global governance in most issue domains is provided by a complex combination of these different bases, rather than by any single one of them. In spite of all of the disorder and complexity associated with global security issues, however, there is a great deal of purposive and authoritatively rule-governed order present in the contemporary international system. It is not always a very a just or efficient system of governance, but it is governance

nevertheless, and is central to any understanding of attempts to address contemporary security challenges.

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