Professor
Emily Meierding
Description
This course provides an overview of political scientists’ understandingsof pathways to international conflict and cooperation.It explores how system structure, domestic politics, and leaders’preferences can lead to international violence, as well as examiningwar as a bargaining process and the stakes of inter-stateconflict. The course also explores how modifications of thesepreferences and causal pathways can prevent international contention.In addition, it presents some of the tools governmentsuse to promote cooperation, including alliances, integration,organisations, and regimes. To examine these issues, the coursewill introduce the fundamentals of game theoretic analysis andrationalist frameworks, as well as the limitations of theseapproaches. This course provides a basis for further study ofinternational institutions and security issues.
Access to readings:
Book sections are in a polycopié, while articles are available online.
Expectations:
The central goals of the course are threefold: to enhance participants’ knowledge of core texts, promote critical engagement in the classroom, and develop political science writing skills. The class assignments reflect these aims.
Class Participation: 25% of grade
This is a seminar course. While I may lecture briefly, most of the course will consist of class discussions. You are expected to attend class regularly and complete all of each week’s required readings prior to class, so you can participate fully.
Memos: 10% for the first, 12.5% each for the second and third = 35% total
Over the course of the semester, each student will write three brief memos (3-4 pages each) responding to the week’s readings. The aim of these memos is to demonstrate your abilities to recognize and critically analyze authors’ arguments and make and support your own. Memos are due at the beginning of the class in which we are discussing the reviewed readings. You have some flexibility in the weeks you choose, but your memos must be distributed across the following time periods:
• Weeks 3-6
• Weeks 7-9
• Weeks 11-14
Final Exam = 40%
The final exam will cover the entire semester’s readings. It will consist of an in-class exam and a short take home portion.
Week 1: February 22
Introduction: the International System
• Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Anarchic Structure of World Politics,” in International Politics, Art and Jervis, eds. pp. 49-69. [in polycopié]
Week 2: March 1
Conflict and Cooperation: Definitions and Approaches
• Robert Keohane (1984) After Hegemony, pp. 51-54. [in polycopié]
• Thomas Schelling (1960) The Strategy of Conflict, Chapters 1-4, pp. 3-118. [in polycopié]
• David Lake and Robert Powell (1999) Strategic Choice and International Relations, Chapter 1, pp. 3-38. [in polycopié]
Week 3: March 8
Power
• Thomas Schelling (1966) Arms and Influence, Chapters 1-3, pp. 1-125. [in polycopié]
• Stephen D. Krasner (1976) “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics, 317-347.
• Duncan Snidal (1985) “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39(4): 579-614.
Week 4: March 16
CLASS CANCELLED: will be replaced with extended class session in week 6.
Week 5: March 22
Interests
• Arthur Stein (1982) “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” International Organization 36(2): 299-324. [read before Axelrod]
• Robert Axelrod (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation, Chapters 1-3. [in polycopié]
• Robert Keohane (1982) “The Demand for International Regimes,” International Organization 36(2).
• Charles Lipson (1984) “International Cooperation in Security and Economic Affairs,” World Politics 37: 1-23.
Week 6: March 29 [extended class]
The Limits of Cooperation?
• Robert Jervis (1978) “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30(2): 167-214.
• Joseph Grieco (1988) “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” International Organization 42(3): 485-507.
• Duncan Snidal (1991) “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 85(3): 701-726.
• John Mearsheimer (1994/95) “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19(3): 5-49.
• Charles Glaser (1994/95) “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19(3): 50-90.
Recommended:
• Stephen Krasner (1991) "Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics 43: 336-366.
• Lloyd Gruber (2000) Ruling the World, Chapter 3, pp. 33-57. [in polycopié]
Week 7: April 5
Ideas
• James March and Johan Olsen (1998) “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization 52: 943-969.
• Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie (1986) "International Organization: A state of the art on the art of the state." International Organization 40: 753-775.
• Alexander Wendt (1999) Social Theory of International Politics, Chapter 6, pp. 246-312. [in polycopié]
• Barry Buzan (1993) “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School,” International Organization 47: 327-352.
Week 8: April 12
Bargaining
• James Fearon (1995) “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49(3): 379-414.
• Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner (2002) “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War,” American Journal of Political Science 46(4): 819-837.
• Robert Powell (2006) "War as a commitment problem," International Organization 60: 169-203.
• Stacie Goddard (2006) “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,” International Organization 60(1): 35-68.
• Thomas Risse “Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 54: 1-39.
Recommended:
• James Fearon (1998) “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization 52(2): 269-305.
Week 9: April 19
Domestic Politics
• Robert Putnam (1988) “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-level Games,” International Organization 42(3): 427-460.
• Helen Milner (1997) “Introduction” to Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations, pp. 3-29. [in polycopié]
• Emanuel Adler (1992) National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control” International Organization
• Brett Ashley Leeds (1999) “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation,” American Journal of Political Science 43(4): 979-1002.
Recommended:
• Andrew Moravscick (1997) “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51(4).
Week 10: April 26
NO CLASS (Spring Break)
Week 11: May 3
Alliances
• Stephen Walt (1987) The Origins of Alliances, Chapters 1 and 2, pp. 1-49. [in polycopié]
• Randall Schweller (1994) “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19(1): 72-107.
• Dan Reiter (1994) "Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," World Politics 46(4): 490-526.
• Michael Barnett and Jack Levy (1991) "Domestic sources of alliances and alignments: the case of Egypt, 1962–73,” International Organization 45: 369-395.
Recommended:
• Stephen David (1991) “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics 43(2): 233-256.
Week 12: May 10
Arms Races
• Colin Gray (1971) “The Arms Race Phenomenon,” World Politics 24(1): 39-79.
• Robert Jervis (1976) Perception and Misperception, Chapter 3, 58-113. [in polycopié]
• Dana Eyre and Mark Suchan (1996) “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: an Institutional Theory Approach” in Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security, pp. 79-113. [in polycopié]
• Charles Glaser (2000) “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races,” Annual Review of Political Science 3: 251-276.
Recommended:
• Michael Colaresi and William Thompson (2005) “Alliances, Arms Buildups, and Recurrent Conflict: Testing a Steps-to War Model,” Journal of Politics 67(2): 345-364.
Week 13: May 17
Crisis and Rivalry
• Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld (1982) “Crises in World Politics,” World Politics 34(3): 380-417.
• Russell Leng (2000) “Escalation: Crisis Behavior and War” in Vasquez, ed. What Do We Know about War? pp. 235-258. [in polycopié]
• Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl (1993) “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,” International Studies Quarterly 37: 147-171.
• William Thompson (2001) “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 45(4).
Week 14: May 24
Geography/Territory
• Paul Diehl (1991) “Geography and War: a Review and Assessment of the Empirical Literature” International Interactions 17(1): 11-27.
• Harvey Starr and Benjamin Most (1976) "The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research," International Studies Quarterly 20(4): 581-620.
• Douglas Lemke (1995) “The Tyranny of Distance: Redefining Relevant Dyads” International Interactions 21(1): 23-38.
• John Vasquez (1995) “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality,” Journal of Peace Research 32(3): 277-293.
• David Newman (1999) “Real Spaces, Symbolic Spaces: Interrelated Notions of Territory in the Arab-Israeli Conflict” in Diehl, ed. A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict, pp. 3-34. [in polycopié]
Week 15: June 1
FINAL EXAM
