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The Study of International Politics II: International Political Economy (E583)

Course Organization

Time & Location:
Wednesday, 12:15-14:00, S4

 

Professor:
Cédric Dupont
Office: Rigot 34
Office hours: Tuesday, 10:30-12:00
Telephone: 022 908 59 50
Email: dupont@hei.unige.ch

 

Teaching Assistant:
Andrew Prosser
Office: Rigot 35
Office hours: Wednesday 16:15-17:30
Telephone: 022 908 59 48
Email: prosser0@hei.unige.ch

 

Course Description

The aim of this conference is to give students a solid grasp of the politics of international economic relations. The course examines how domestic and international politics influence national economic policies and the flows of goods and capital over national borders. It emphasizes current or longstanding theoretical debates in the field and tries to put current problems in historical perspective.

 

Requirements

This class is designed for MIS/DEA/PhD students in political science. DEA and PhD students from other disciplines may be accepted upon seat availability (max number of participants is 25). An economics or quantitative method background is not required, but a willingness to tackle occasional readings with game theoretic or statistical methods is mandatory. The instructor takes for granted that students have had prior exposure to some basic theoretical approaches in the study of international politics. Substantive background is not required but those without any knowledge of the evolution of international economic flows in the last 100 years should have a look at the following books.

  • Eichengreen, Barry 1996. Globalizing Capital. A Short History of the International Monetary System . Princeton: Princeton University Press (french version L'expansion du capital . Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997).
  • Grieco, Joseph M. and G. John Ikenberry 2003. State Power and World Markets. The International Political Economy. New York: W.W. Norton.
  • Irwin, Douglas A. 1996. Against the Tide. An Intellectual History of Free Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press .
  • Ravenhill, John, ed. 2004. Global Political Economy . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Spero, Joan, and Jeffrey Hart. 1997. The Politics of International Economic Relations . London: Routledge.


As for requirements, students must write two discussion papers and write one final exam in class (open book) on June 6. The discussion papers are short papers (between 1000 and 1250 words) on the readings (or a subset of them after discussion with the instructor) for one class session (from the March 28 session until the May 30 session included). Students should briefly review the main points found in the readings and then discuss them critically, either on an abstract level or in connection with empirical developments.. Discussion papers are due at the beginning of the class on the given session. The exam aims at evaluating your ability to: a) make links between various theoretical and empirical issues covered in class and in the readings; b) develop your own thinking about some current developments. Grades for the class will be determined as follows: 25% for each discussion paper and 50% for the final exam.

 

Outline and readings

You will learn the most from this course if you do the reading on each topic before coming to class. It is important for you to assimilate from the reading not just facts but concepts, ideas, and arguments. The readings are available for purchase in a course kit that you must order and pre-pay to Imprimerie Minute. Two sets will be on hold at the library.

Readings marked with one asterisk are background readings in economics. They are not included in the reading package but are on reserve at the library.

Introduction (March 14)

  • Gilpin, Robert. 2001. Global Political Economy . Princeton: Princeton University Press (chap. 2).

 

Part I: Three General Approaches
  • Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations . Princeton: Princeton University Press (chap. 3, 7).


A. Neo-liberalism: Markets, Regimes and States (March 21)

  • Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy . Princeton: Princeton University Press. (chap. 1-7)


B. Structuralism: Markets and State Power (March 21, 28)

  • Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. World Politics 28(3): 317-347.


C. World Systems: Core, Periphery, and Dynamics of World-
    Empires and World-Economies (March 28)

  • Chase-Dunn, Christopher K. 1989. Global Formation. Structures of the World Economy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell (chap 10 and 11). .
  • Wallerstein, Immanuel 1974. Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy. African Studies Review 17(1): 1-26.
  • Wallerstein, Immanuel 1976. Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis. Theory and Society 3(4): 461-483.

 

Part II: Trade Policy and Transactions


A. Demands on trade policy: Economic Actors' Preferences
    and Public Attitude (April 4)

  • Beaulieu, Eugene, Ravindra A. Yatawara and Wei Guo Wang 2005. Who Supports Free Trade in Latin America. World Economy 28(7): 941-958.
  • Grieco, Joseph M. and G. John Ikenberry 2003. State Power and World Markets. The International Political Economy. New York: W.W. Norton (chap. 2).
  • Hathaway, Oona A. 1998. Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection. International Organization 52(3): 575-612.
  • Hiscox, Michael 2006. Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes Toward International Trade and the Curious Effect of Issue Framing. International Organization 60(3): 755-780.
  • Hiscox, Michael. 2001. Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade. International Organization 55(1): 1-46.
  • Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. American Political Science Review 81 (4):1121-1137. (reprinted in David A. Lake, ed. The International Political Economy of Trade, vol. I, Aldershot: Elgar.).
  • Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl 1991. Lessons in Lobbying for Free Trade in 19th Century Britain: To Concentrate or Not. American Political Science Review 85(1): 37-58.


* Krugman, Paul R., and Maurice Obstfeld. 2000. International Economics: Theory and Policy . 5th ed. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley (chap. 8)

B. Institutional Filters and Policy Outcomes (April 18)

  • Aggarwal, Vinod K., Robert O. Keohane and David B. Yoffie 1987. The Dynamics of Negotiated Protectionism. American Political Science Review 81(2): 345-366.
  • Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy. Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. World Politics 49 (3):309-338.
  • Hiscox, Michael. 1999. The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization. International Organization 53 (4):669-698.
  • Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International Organization 56(3): 477-513.
  • Milner, Helen V. and Benjamin Judkins. 2004. Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left Right Divide on Trade Policy? International Studies Quarterly 48(1): 95-119.
  • O'Reilly, Robert F. 2005. Veto Points, Veto Players, and International Trade Policy. Comparative Political Studies 38(6): 652-675.


C. International Power Distribution and Trade Flows (April 25)

  • Conybeare, John A.C. 1984. Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemma and the International Political Economy. International Studies Quarterly 28 (1):5-22. (reprinted in David A. Lake, ed. The International Political Economy of Trade, vol. I, Aldershot: Elgar.).
  • Goldstein, Judith, and Lisa L. Martin. 2000. Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note. International Organization 54 (3):603-632.
  • Gowa, Joanne. 1989. Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory. World Politics 41 (3):307-324.
  • Gowa, Joanne and Edward Mansfield 2004. Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade. International Organization 58(4): 775-805.
  • Reinhardt, Eric 2001. Adjudication Without Enforcement in GATT Disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45(2): 174-195.
  • Zeng, Ka. 2002. Trade Structure and the Effectiveness of America's Aggressively Unilateral Trade Policy. International Studies Quarterly 46(1): 93-115.

 

Part III: Monetary Policy and Monetary Transactions


A. Monetary Policy Tools and Sources of Pressure (May 2)

  • Grieco, Joseph M. and G. John Ikenberry 2003. State Power and World Markets. The International Political Economy. New York: W.W. Norton (chap. 3).
  • Henning, C. Randall. 1994. Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan . Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics (chap. 1 & 2)
  • Frieden, Jeffry A. 1994. Exchange Rate Politics: Contemporary Lessons from American History. Review of International Political Economy 1 (1):81-103.
  • Frieden, Jeffry A. 2002. Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration. International Organization 56 (4): 831-860.
  • Scheve, Kenneth 2004. Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking. International Organization 58(1): 1-34.


* Krugman, Paul R., and Maurice Obstfeld. 2000. International Economics: Theory and Policy . 5th ed. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley (chap. 13, 14 and 17)

B. Institutional Filters and Policy Outcomes (May 9)

  • Bearce, David H. 2003. Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes. International Organization 57(2): 373-410.
  • Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. 1999. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate commitments. International Organization 53 (1): 71-97.
  • Bernhard, William and David Leblang 2002. Political Parties and Monetary Commitments. International Organization 56(4): 803-830.
  • Broz, J. Lawrence 2002. Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes. International Organization 56(4): 861-887.


C. International Monetary Developments and State Power
    (May 16)

  • Dooley, Michael P., David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber 2003. An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System, NBER Working Paper 9971d
  • Hardie, Ian 2006. The Power of Markets? The International Bond Markets and the 2002 Elections in Brazil. Review of International Political Economy 13(1): 53-77.
  • Henning, C. Randall. 1998. Systemic Conflict and Regional Monetary Integration: The Case of Europe. International Organization 52(3): 537-573.
  • Stasavage, David and Dominique Guillaume 2002. When are Monetary Commitments Credible?Parallel Agreements and the Sustainability of Currency Unions. British Journal of Political Science 32: 119-146.
  • Vreeland, James Raymond (2003). Why Do Governments and the IMF Enter into Agreements? Statistically Selected Cases. International Political Science Review 24(3): 321-343.

 

Part IV: Global Institutions: Two selected Foci


A. Between Power and Law (May 23)

  • Bordo, Michael D. and Harold James 2000. The International Monetary Fund: Its Present Role in Historical Perspective. NBER Working Paper 7724.
  • Pauwelyn, Joost 2005. The Transformation of World Trade. Michigan Law Review 1004(1): 1-65
  • Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus based bargaining in the GATT/WTO. International Organization 56(2): 339-374.
  • Thacker, Strom C. 1999. The High Politics of IMF Lending. World Politics 52 (October): 38-75.
  • Woods, Ngaire and Domenico Lombardi 2006. Uneven Patterns of Governance: How Developing Countries Are Represented in the IMF. Review of International Political Economy 13(3): 480-515.


B. The Debate on Accountability (May 30)

  • Grant, Ruth W. and Robert O. Keohane 2005. Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics. American Political Science Review 99(1).
  • Kahler, Miles 2004. Defining Accountability Up: the Global Economic Multilaterals. Government and Opposition 39(2): 132-158.
  • Kenen, Peter, Jeffrey Shafer, Nigel Wicks and Charles Wyplosz 2004. “International Economic and Financial Cooperation: New Issues, New Actors, New Responses”, Geneva Reports on the World Economy 6, London: CEPR (chap.6).
  • Scholte, Jan Aart 2004. Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance. Government and Opposition 39(2): 211-233.


FINAL EXAM IN CLASS ON JUNE 6

Conclusion: Taking Stock of IPE & Wrap-Up, Exam correction (June 13)

  • Eichengreen, Barry 1998. Dental Hygiene and Nuclear War: How International Relations Looks from Economics. International Organization 52(4): 993-1012.
  • Mastanduno, Michael 1998. Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship. International Organization 52(4): 825-854.
  • Ruggie, John Gerard 1998. What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge. International Organization 52(4): 855-885.

 

Syllabus-International-Political-Economy.pdf (55 Kb) Jan 28, 2008