Course Organization
Time & Location:
Monday, 16:15-18:00, Rigot
Instructor:
Professor Urs Luterbacher
Office: Rigot 25
Office hours: Wednesday 15:15 - 16:00 or by appointment
Telephone: 022 908 59 40
Email: luterbac@hei.unige.ch
Teaching Assistant:
Thorsten Wetzling
Office: Barton B203
Office hours: Tuesday 10:00 - 12:00
Telephone: 022 908 59 51
Email: wetzlin2@hei.unige.ch
Course Description
International environmental trade and human rights problems raise particular issues for international cooperation. Usually, global environmental change problems are characterized as commons where the relevant metaphor is in terms of a resource to which everybody has free access and thus an incentive to use as much of it as possible without regard to what the other users are doing. If every user has the same attitude, the resource is rapidly depleted and the environment to which it belongs is no longer sustainable. This conclusion is also valid for global resources such as the atmosphere or the oceans which have therefore been referred to as global commons. Trade and Human rights issues present sometime different sometimes similar structures. Game theoretical ideas and concepts have been applied to several critical issues:
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Determining the incentives of various relevant actors (states, corporations, individuals) concerned by commons under different conditions. |
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Solving conflicts generated by commons issues in which often actors see each other as preying on exhaustible or slowly renewable resources. How can such conflicts be solved? |
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Elaborating policies that would appear to be optimal to avoid the problems raised by commons. |
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Negotiating the regulation of the international environment. In these complex negotiations among international actors, governments are often caught between international and domestic pressures on these issues. The metaphor of two level games has been introduced by Putnam to analyze political situations characterized by such cross-pressures. |
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Accommodating different requirements of parallel environmental regimes. Environmental regulations and accords can create potential conflicts with other types of international arrangements such as for instance trade and financial regimes. How can such situations be avoided? |
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To what extent are trade issues of a different nature? |
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What are the game theoretical structures that characterize human rights issues? |
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This seminar intends to give students a survey of game theoretical concepts, ideas, and methodologies and of the ways these can be applied to the issues of coping with commons problems, environmental bargaining negotiations, and agreements at the international level. Particular attention will be given to bargaining of agreements about resource use, ozone layer protection and climate change with some emphasis on the latest developments such as the Kyoto protocol of the Framework Convention on Climate Change and their implications for the general problems linked to international cooperation.
Requirements
2 Game Theoretical exercises and 1 essay applying game theory to a concrete problem: environment, trade, confllict in general.
Course Organization and Work Schedule
Most readings on the following list are required. Supplemental or optional readings are indicated by an *. The excellent book by Martin Osborne called An Introduction to Game Theory presents a readable review of game theoretic concepts and ideas presented in simple ways that most anybody familiar with a bit of algebra can master. I will use it as a textbook to accompany the course.
October 30, 2006,
General Introduction to Course: Substance, Organization, Requirements
November 6, 2006,
Substantive Introduction: Overview of Questions
- Hardin, Garret, (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, 162:1243-48.
- Taylor Michael (1987) The Possibility of Cooperation Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, Chapt. 1(Introduction)
November 13, 2006,
The Problem of the Commons
- Dasgupta, P.S. and G. M. Heal (1979) Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources. The Cambridge economic Handbooks, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2 (11-21), and 3.
November 20, 2006,
Representing actors incentives
- Osborne, Martin J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory New York ,Oxford: Oxford University Press: Chapt. 1 (Introduction).
November 27, 2006,
Rational Choice and Decision Theory under Uncertainty: Histrory and Methodology
- Bernstein, Peter (1998) Against the Gods Introduction, Chapt. 6 and Chapt. 7
- Fishburn, Peter (1990) Utility Theory and Decision Theory. In John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, Utility and Probability, The New Palgrave, New York: W.W. Norton and Co. pp. 303-312.
December 4, 2006
Perfect Information: Equilibrium Notions
- Osborne, Martin J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory New York ,Oxford: Oxford University Press: Chapt. 2 plus glance at Mathematical Appendix, Chapt. 3: 3.1, 3.3, 3.4
December 11, 2006,
Mixed Strategies and Extensive Games
- Osborne, Martin J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory New York ,Oxford: Oxford University Press: Chapts. 4, 5, 6 : 6.1, 6.3. Chapt. 7: 7.3, 7.4.
December 18, 2006,
Multilateral Questions, Coalitional Games and the Core
- Osborne, Martin J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory New York ,Oxford: Oxford University Press: Chapt. 8: 8..1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.6, 8.8.
- Luterbacher, Urs(1994) International Cooperation: The Problem of the Commons and the Special Case of the Antarctic Region, Synthese 100: 413-440.
- Eyckmans Jon and Henry Tulkens (2003) Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climat change problem Resource and Energy Economics, In press.
- Greif, Avner (1993) Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, The American Economic Review, 83, 3, 525-548.
- Barrett, Scott (1998) A Theory of International Co-operation, Working Paper, Johns Hopkins University School of Avanced International Studies.
Christmas vacation, December 23, 2006 to January 8, 2007
January 8, 2007,
Imperfect Information and Evolution
- Osborne, Martin J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory New York ,Oxford: Oxford University Press: Chapt. 9: 9.1-9.5. Chapt. 10: 10.1-10.5, 10.8, 10.9, Chapt. 13: 13.1, 13.2.
January 15, 2007,
Bargaining
- Osborne, Martin J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory New York ,Oxford: Oxford University Press: Chapt. 16
January 22, 2007,
The Environment, Trade and Human Rights: Two Level Problems
- Putnam R.D. (1988) Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games. International Organization 42: 429-460.
- Pahre, R. and A Papayoannou (1997) Using Game Theory to Link domestic and International Politics Journal of Conflict Resolution. 41, 1: 4-11.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Milner Helen V. and Peter Rosendorff “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade” Amercian Political Science Review, June 2000.
January 29, 2007,
Equity Problems, Conflicts between Regimes, Trade and Human Rights Issues, Application to concrete situations I
- Barrett, Scott (1992) Acceptable Allocation of Tradable Carbon Emission Entitlements in a Global Warming Treaty. In Combating Global Warming: Study on a Global System of Tradable Carbon Emission Entitlements. Geneva: UNCTAD, RDP/DFP/1: 85-113
- Chichilnisky, Graciela (1997) Development and Global Finance: The Case for an International Bank of Environmental Settlements, UNDP Discussion Paper Series.
- Muller, Benito (1998) Justice in Global Warming Negotiations. Oxford, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Ms.
- Wiegandt Ellen (2001) “Climate Change, Equity and International Negotiations” in Luterbacher Urs and Detlef Sprinz International Relations and Global climate Change Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 127-150.
- “The Organization of World Trade and the Climate Regime” in Luterbacher Urs and Detlef Sprinz International Relations and Global climate Change Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 279-295.
February 5, 2007,
Application to Concrete situations II
