International Organizations

Course Organization

Professor:
Stephanie Hofmann

Course Description

The number and scope of international organizations continues to expand so that there are few areas of international politics that are not regulated in some way by an international institution, whether informal norms or formal organizations. Why do states establish institutions and what determines their design and change? Do these institutions merely reflect underlying power and interests? These are some of the questions we will be asking in this course. This seminar will introduce theories of international institutions, assess the value and limitations of these theories for understanding why and how world politics gets organized, and examine applications in security, economic, and environmental policy areas.

Course Requirements 

Students are required to prepare two “memos” and a polished research paper that they will present on the last day of class. The grade will be based on the memos, student participation and the research paper according to the following breakdown:

I expect the readings to provoke questions that we can discuss in class. Of course, this requires completing the readings before class. Needless to say, one cannot participate if absent.

Discussion papers - 30%

Twice during the semester each student will write a discussion paper or “memo.” The first memo should either present all the strengths or all the weaknesses of the readings for a given week.

The second memo should discuss the empirical evidence in relation to the argument of the articles, evaluate whether the author succeeds in his/her goals, and draw connections to other seminar themes.

The memo writers will serve as “resident experts,” opening up the issues for the class. You can be called on to explain or clarify questions other students or the instructor may have about the readings.

Discussion papers should be distributed to all class members by 2 pm on Monday, the day before we meet.  The papers should be sent by email attachment and also within the body of an email message in case there are problems reading the attachment. They should be the equivalent of 2-3 double-spaced pages.  Students are required to read their colleagues’ papers before the seminar meets. Reading the papers in advance is essential for the seminar to function properly. This system precludes the acceptance of any late papers.

Long Paper - 50% (15% for presentation, 35% for paper)

The format is 20-25 pages including references and bibliography, using both course materials and other sources. The paper written for this course will address explicit theories of international organization. The paper may be in the form of review essay of a few recent books (World Politics style) or an extended discussion of some theoretical issues in the field.  It is not intended to be a research paper but should present an original argument.

In the last two weeks of class, students will present their papers to the class. The presentation can be based on a draft version of the paper. The expectation is that the class provides useful comments on how to improve the paper. Presentations should be no more than 10 minutes long.

Syllabus

Week 1: September 15, Introduction

• Hall, Peter and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. “Political science and the Three New Institutionalisms.” Political Studies 44: 936-57.

Part I. Theoretical Tools and Concepts

Week 2: September 22, Definitions

• Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. 1997. “Conceptual Issues: Defining International Regimes.” In Theories of International Regimes.  Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, Ch. 2 (pp. 1-22).
• Caporaso, James A. 1992. “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations.” International Organization 46, 3: 599-632.
• Duffield, John. 2007. “What are International Institutions?” International Studies Review 9, 1: 1-22.

Week 3: September 29, Theories on the Creation and Effect of International Institutions, Part I

• Keohane, Robert. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chps. 4-7 (pp. 49-132).
• Abbot, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. “Why States Act through Formal Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, 1: 3-32.
• Mearsheimer, John. 1994/95. “The False Promise of International Institutions” International Security 19, 3: 5-49.

Week 4: October 6, Theories on the Creation and Effect of International Institutions, Part II

• Shanks, Cheryl, Harold K. Jacobson and Jeffrey H. Kaplan. 1996. “Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992.” International Organization 50, 4: 593-627.
• Young, Oran. R. 1991. “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society.” International Organization 45, 3: 281-308.
• Barnett, Michael N. and Martha Finnemore. 1999. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.” International Organization 53: 699-732.
• Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2001. “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments.” International Studies Quarterly 45, 4: 487-515

Week 5: October 13, Theories of Institutional Design and Compliance

• Simmons, Beth. 1998. “Compliance with International Agreements.” Annual Review of Political Science 1: 75-93.
• Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” International Organization 50: 379-406.
• Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” International Organization 55, 4: 761-799.

Week 6: October 20, International Law and Cooperation

• Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 1993. “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda.” The American Journal of International Law 87: 205-239.
• Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 2000. “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.” International Organization 54, 3: 421-456.
• Reus-Smit, Christian. 2003. “Politics and International Legal Obligation.” European Journal of International Relations 9, 4: 591-625.

Week 7:  October 27, The Nexus Between Domestic and International Institutions

• Kelley, Judith. 2004. “International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions.” International Organization 58, 3: 425-457.
• Mansfield, Edward and Jon Pevehouse. 2006. “Democratization and International Organizations.” International Organization 60, 1: 137-167.
• Grigorescu, Alexandru. 2003. “International Organizations and Government Transparency: Linking the International and Domestic Realms.” International Studies Quarterly 47: 643-667.

Part II. Institutionalized Regions and Issue Areas

Week 8: November 3, The European Union

• Tsebelis, George and Geoffrey Garrett. 2001. “The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union.” International Organization 55, 2: 357-390.
• Burley, Anne-Marie and Mattli, Walter. 1993. “Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration” International Organization 47, 1: 41-76.
• Parsons, Craig. 2002. “Showing Ideas as Causes: Origins of the European Union.” International Organization 56, 1: 47-84.

Week 9: November 10, International Trade and Monetary Policy Institutions

• International Trade
• Goldstein, Judith, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. “Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade.” International Organization 61, 1: 37-67.
• Gowa, Joanne and Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. “An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of GATT 1950-94.” World Politics 57, 4: 453-478.
• Monetary Institutions
• Simmons, Beth. 2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” American Political Science Review  94, 4: 819-835.

Week 10: November 17, Environment

• Haas, Peter M. 1989. “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control.” International Organization 43, 3: 377-403.
• Young, Oran and Marc Levy. 1999. “The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes.” In Oran Young ed., The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 1-32.
• Mitchell, Ronald. 1994. “Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance.” International Organization 48: 425-458.

Week 11: November 24, Sanctions and Human Rights

• Drezner, Daniel. 2000. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?” International Organization 54, 1: 73-102.
• Moravcsik, Andrew. 1995. “Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe.” European Journal of International Relations. 1, 2: 157-189.
• Hathaway, Oona. 2002. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” The Yale Law Journal 111: 1935-2041.

Week 12: December 1, Security Institutions and Alliances

• Gelpi, Christopher. 1999. “Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control.” In Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander, eds. Imperfect Unions. Securit Institutions over Time and Space.. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, pp. 107-139.
•  Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press, Chapters 1 and 2.
•  Barnett, Michael N. and Jack S. Levy. 1991. “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73.” International Organization 45, 3: 369-395.
•  Wallander, Celeste A. 2000. “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War.” International Organization 54, 4: 705-35.

Weeks 13 & 14: December 8 and 15, Paper presentations