Professor

Cédric Dupont

Description

The main aim of this seminar is to provide students with basic game theoretic tools that they can readily apply in their own research. The focus is therefore not only on giving the tools but also on helping students develop research designs amenable to the use of game theory. On the theory side, in addition to providing an introduction to game theory, the course will cover some intermediary topics in game theory (such as Bayesian games) but will not deal with more advanced topics (such as sophisticated equilibrium refinements, mechanism design, stochastic games, or evolutionary game theory). On the application side, the class will review recent research that uses game-theoretic tools to highlight selected features of major international events or processes in different sub-fields of international relations (security, international political economy and environment).

Syllabus [SECOND VERSION ; FINAL VERSION DELIVERED DURING FIRST CLASS ]

Prerequisite and requirements

This class is designed for MIS/ PhD students in political science but is open to MDEV and MIA students upon seat availability (max number of participants is 25). There are no prerequisites for this course but we expect students to have had some exposure to basic algebra (derivatives). Given the focus on applied game theory, students will have to develop their own models throughout the class without however delving into advanced abstract elaboration.

As for requirements, students must write two short research papers, one using a game-theoretic setting with either perfect or complete information (due at the beginning of class on Nov. 16 with short presentation during that session) and one using a setting with incomplete information (it can, but need not, be an extension of the setting used under perfect or complete information) due no later than Dec. 31.  Each paper should be between 3000 and 5000 words. Grades for the class will be determined as follows: 50% for each research paper.

Readings

There is no required textbook to purchase for this class although it is recommended to get the following two books:

Binmore, Ken 2007. Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, Oxford University Press: a very useful, and cheap (!), synthesis of major concepts and issues in game theory.

Dixit, Avinash K. and Barry J. Nalebuff 2008. The Art of Strategy. New York, Norton: a brilliant, ingenious, and (above all) fun book that you will continue to enjoy for a long time. I simply wish I could one day write such a book! It is a major revision, and extension, of Thinking Strategically first published in 1991.

Course material, available for purchase in a course kit that you must order and pre-pay to Imprimerie Minute, and in-class presentations and discussions will borrow from the two books above but also from the following range of major textbooks, written both by political scientists and economists:

Dixit, Avinash K. et al. 2009 (3rd ed). Games of Strategy. New York, Norton.
Gibbons, Robert 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gintis, Herbert 2009 (2nd ed). Game Theory Evolving. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
McCarty, Nolan  and Adam Meirowitz 2007. Political Game Theory. An Introduction. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Morrow, James D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Osborne, Martin. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Course material also includes some recent articles in the field of international relations that use game-theoretic settings.

Given the “methodological” orientation of this class, I do not expect students to do a comprehensive reading of the material before coming to class but to have a first look at the readings before class and go back to them after class.

Course schedule, topics and required readings [PRELIMINARY]
 
1. Introduction: How to start thinking strategically and applying it? (Sept. 21)

Dixit, Avinash, and Barry Nalebuff. 2007. The Art of Strategy. New York: Norton, chap. 1

Dixit, Avinash K. et al. 2009 (3rd ed). Games of Strategy. New York, Norton, chap. 1.

Allan, Pierre, and Cédric Dupont. 1999. International Relations Theory and Game Theory: Baroque Modeling Choices and Empirical Robustness. International Political Science Review 20 (1):23-47.

Munck, Gerardo L. 2000. Game Theory and Comparative Politics: New Perspectives and Old Concerns. World Politics 53 (2):173-204.

2.  Utility, Preferences and Game Representations  (Sept. 28)

Morrow, James D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap 2-3

McCarty, Nolan and Adam Meirowitz. 2007. Political Game Theory. An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 4.

Further reading.

Gintis, Herbert 2009 (2nd ed). Game Theory Evolving. Princeton, Princeton University Press, chap. 1 and 2

3. Solving Dynamic Games of Perfect Information and Static Games of Complete Information (with applications) (Oct. 5)

Kreps, David M. 1990. Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chap. 3

Morrow, James D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap 4-5

Further reading:

Bodea, Cristina 2010. "Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks: A Correlated Choice of Imperfectly Credible Institutions." International Organization 64 (Summer): 411-442.

Osborne, Martin. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press (chap. 2, 4 and 5).
 

Dixit, Avinash K. et al. 2009 (3rd ed). Games of Strategy. New York, Norton (chap. 4-5).
 

Thompson, Alexander 2009. "The rational enforcement of international law: solving the sanctioners' dilemma." International Theory 1(2): 307-321.
 

4 and 5. Solving Static Games of Complete Information (continued), Dynamic Games of Complete Information (repeated games) (Oct. 12 and 19)

Dixit, Avinash K. et al. 2009 (3rd ed). Games of Strategy. New York, Norton (chap. 6-8).

McCarty, Nolan and Adam Meirowitz. 2007. Political Game Theory. An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 9, pp. 251-263.

Morrow, James D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap 9.

Further readings:

Gibbons, Robert. 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 82-102 (repeated games), pp. 115-129 (SPNE)

Gintis, Herbert 2009 (2nd ed). Game Theory Evolving. Princeton, Princeton University Press, chap. 9

Osborne, Martin. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chap. 14, 15)

Urpelainen, Johannes 2010. "Enforcement and capacity building in international cooperation." International Theory 2(1): 32-49.
 

6. Applications of complete information games (Oct. 26; class begins at 14:30)

Osborne, Martin. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chap. 3.

McCarty, Nolan and Adam Meirowitz. 2007. Political Game Theory. An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 9, pp. 263-274.

Aggarwal, Vinod K., and Cédric Dupont. 1999. Goods, Games and Institutions. International Political Science Review 20 (4): 393-409.

Aggarwal, Vinod K. and Cédric Dupont 2002. Goods, Games, and Institutions: A Reply. International Political Science Review 23(4): 402-410.

Aggarwal, Vinod K. and Cédric Dupont 2003. Comment on 'Common Goods, Matrix Games and Institutional Response'. European journal of International Relations 9(3): 475-478.

Dixit, Avinash K. et al. 2009 (3rd ed). Games of Strategy. New York, Norton (chap. 12)

Further reading:

Dixit, Avinash, and Barry Nalebuff. 2007. The Art of Strategy. New York: Norton, chap. 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10)

7. Applications of complete information games (continued) with specific emphasis on students' own work (in preparation of the first research paper) (Nov. 2)

Drezner, Daniel W. 2007. All Politics is Global. Princeton: Princeton University Press (chap. 2)

Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." International Organization 52 (2): 269-305 (complete information game only)

Sandler, Todd 2004. Global Collective Action. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (chap. 2 and 3).

Further reading:

Gintis, Herbert 2009 (2nd ed). Game Theory Evolving. Princeton, Princeton University Press (chap. 5-6).

NO CLASS ON NOVEMBER 9 (TO BE RESCHEDULED DURING WEEK NOV. 29 – DEC. 3)

8. Presentation and discussion of students’ first research paper (Nov. 16)

9 and 10. Solving Static and Dynamic Games of Incomplete information (Bayesian and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria) (Nov. 23 and 30)

McCarty, Nolan and Adam Meirowitz. 2007. Political Game Theory. An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 6.

Morrow, James D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap 6

Further readings:

Osborne, Martin. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chap. 9.

Gibbons, Robert. 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. 4

Gintis, Herbert 2009 (2nd ed). Game Theory Evolving. Princeton, Princeton University Press, chap. 8.

11. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information (Perfect Bayesian Equilibria and Refinements) (between Nov. 30 and Dec. 7)

Morrow, James D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap 8

Osborne, Martin. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chap. 10 (10.1-10.5).

Further readings:

Dixit, Avinash K. et al. 2009 (3rd ed). Games of Strategy. New York, Norton (chap. 9)

Gibbons, Robert. 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap 4

McCarty, Nolan and Adam Meirowitz. 2007. Political Game Theory. An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 8.

12. Applications of Incomplete Information Games (Dec. 7)

Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." International Organization 52(2): 269-305 (incomplete information extension)

Morrow, James D. 1994. Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information. International Organization 48 (3): 387-423.

Slantchev, Branislav L. 2010. "Feigning Weakness." International Organization 64(Summer): 357-388.

Tarar, Ahmer and Bahar Leventoglu 2009. "Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining." International Studies Quarterly 53: 817-839.
 

Further reading:

Dixit, Avinash K. et al. 2009 (3rd ed). Games of Strategy. New York, Norton (chap. 15)

Osborne, Martin. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chap. 10 (10.6-10.9).

13. Bargaining (Dec. 14)

Dixit, Avinash K. et al. 2009 (3rd ed). Games of Strategy. New York, Norton (chap. 17).

McCarty, Nolan and Adam Meirowitz. 2007. Political Game Theory. An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 8

Further reading:

Dixit, Avinash, and Barry Nalebuff. 2007. The Art of Strategy. New York: Norton, chap. 11.

Osborne, Martin. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chap. 16.

14. Multi-person games, coalitions and power (Dec. 21)

Dixit, Avinash K. et al. 2009 (3rd ed). Games of Strategy. New York, Norton (chap. 19)

Kelly, Anthony 2003. Decision Making Using Game Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 8.

Osborne, Martin. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chap. 8.

Further readings:

Stone, Randall W. and Branislav L. Slantchev 2008. "Choosing How to Cooperate: A Repeated Public-Goods Model of International Relations." International Studies Quarterly 52: 335-362.