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Bandera: memorialization and commemoration†

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This article examines the current heroization of Ukrainian nationalist leader, Stepan Bandera, as manifested in monuments and commemorative practices. It offers a topographic survey that reveals the extent and variety of modes of Bandera heroization. It examines the esthetic and historical controversies that surround Bandera memorialization. It enquires into the personal motivations and political strategies that underlie the effort to project the chosen image of Bandera upon the public space in highly visible terms. It suggests that the campaign in favor of memorializing Bandera can best be understood in performative terms. It is in depicting Bandera as a hero of Ukraine that Bandera becomes a hero of Ukraine.

Keywords: Stepan Bandera; monumentalization; memorialization; commemoration; heroization; Lieux de Mémoire; memory politics

Sarti: “Unglücklich das Land, das keine Helden hat”
Galileo: “Nein. Unglücklich das Land, das Helden nötig hat”

On January 13, 2011, the L’vivs’ka Oblast’ Council, meeting at an extraordinary session next to the Bandera monument in L’viv, reacted to the abrogation [kasuvannya] of Viktor Yushchenko’s order about naming Stepan Bandera a “Hero of Ukraine” by affirming that “for millions of Ukrainians Bandera was and remains a Ukrainian Hero notwithstanding pitiable and worthless decisions of the courts” and declaring its intention to rename “Stepan Bandera Street” as “Hero of Ukraine Stepan Bandera Street.” This was not the first re-christening of a major artery that had known many names over time. It was surely the most defiant, even though there is no evidence that the name change was actually carried out. The gesture of the L’vivs’ka Oblast’ Council continues to reverberate throughout the country. In June 2012, a member of the city council of Zdolbuniv justified the erection of the first monument to Bandera in Rvinens’ka Oblast’ as “our response to the

†The research for this paper was carried out as part of an international (DACH) project on “Nation, Region and Beyond. An Interdisciplinary and Transcultural Reconceptualization of Ukraine” directed by Professor Ulrich Schmidt, University of St. Gallen. Field research was carried out by Oksana Myshlovska and the preliminary findings on which this paper is based were presented at a project workshop at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, September 2012. A first version of this article was presented at the ASN Conference, New York, April 2013. Appendix 1 provides a brief biography of Bandera and a short review of contemporary historiography.
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anti-Ukrainian policies of the authorities, in particular, the shameful abrogation of Bandera’s title of ‘Hero of Ukraine.’”6

This article suggests that the gesture of the Oblast’ Council and, indeed, the proliferation of Bandera monuments and commemorative practices throughout Western Ukraine can best be understood as what linguists have called “performatives.” As Austin (1962, 5) who developed the term has argued, some statements are not statements of fact or even of prescription. Rather, they create the reality to which they refer. Austin cites several striking examples: “I do take this woman (or this man) to be my lawfully wedded [spouse]”, as uttered in a marriage ceremony; or “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth”, when smashing a bottle against the stern. In the same manner, it is naming Stepan Bandera a hero of Ukraine that makes him a hero and it is erecting monuments to Bandera as hero that further validates this status. Austin asks “can saying make it so?” The answer is: perhaps not entirely, but when saying is buttressed by stone and bronze one has gone beyond words to create reality.7

Understanding the proliferation of Bandera monuments and rites in terms of their performative meaning also responds to the observation made by Musil (1978, 506, AL’s translation) and recently quoted by Rogers Brubaker (2006, 146):

What is most striking about monuments is namely that one does not notice them. There is nothing in the world as invisible as monuments. They are undoubtedly erected to be seen, indeed to attract attention, but, simultaneously, something immunizes them against attention, like water drops on an oilcloth cover, not even staying for a moment.8

Musil’s categorical statement is not entirely accurate, as even Musil (1978, 507) himself promptly recognizes and we shall see it selectively refuted further on in this paper. Musil acknowledges that some monuments transform the landscape and that others – he mentions the Bismarck monuments in Germany – constitute an ensemble (Verein) which imprints itself upon the mind by repetition. Musil’s main point does, however, re-enforce the argument that a monument performs its task simply by being. By occupying space, monuments, even when they are not noticed, objectify memory, pre-empt alternative conceptions of the past, and offer, when required, a rallying point for shared cultural practices. Monuments may be invisible, at times, to some people. This does not mean that they are not there or that they can be wished away.

In this paper we propose to consider the heroization of Bandera, as currently promoted in Ukraine and as reflected in monuments and commemorative practices. We shall begin with a topographic survey, then attempt to interpret the data inventoried, and, finally, consider the politics that underlie and surround this phenomenon.

### Topography of Bandera commemoration

As of early 2014 there are 46 full-sized statues or busts of Stepan Bandera9 plus 14 plaques,10 all located in L’vivs’ka, Ivano-Frankivs’ka, and Ternopil’s’ka Oblast’s as well as most recently in Rivnens’ka and Volyns’ka Oblast’s far from what is often referred to as the Banderivs’kyy kray.11 All have been erected since 1990 and construction has continued at a steady pace. There are only five years (1993, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004) when no monuments appeared. Several years (1992, 2007, 2008) have each seen four new monuments and the pace appears to be accelerating with five new monuments in 2011 and seven in 2012 (Table 1). Although the time lag between the decision to build a monument, find funding, have it conceived by a sculptor, and have plans carried out makes it difficult to pinpoint dates, the tendency toward proliferation appears clear, well beyond what the press has reported.12 The peak of construction in 2011 and 2012
can be seen as a reaction to and a protest against the “anti-Ukrainian Yanukovych regime” involved in the abrogation of Bandera’s title of “Hero of Ukraine” mentioned above.

The monuments range from the very big to the very small. The Bandera monument in L’viv measures seven meters in front of a 30-meter arch; presumably, the 30-meter size was dictated by the fact that the Soviet-era Monument Slavy, one of two major Soviet war memorials still standing in the city, is also 30 meters tall (Rossolinski-Liebe 2009). The Bandera monument in Ivano-Frankivs’ka Oblast may not be huge in itself but it is set in a space of 4.8 hectares. At the other extreme, one finds a modest statue and bust set, respectively, in the villages of Horishne (L’vivs’ka Oblast’) and Uzyn (Ivano-Frankivs’ka Oblast’) with their populations of 701 and 927 souls. Some of these monuments are located in the very center of town, such as that in Velyki Mosty’s (L’vivs’ka Oblast’) Proshcha Nezalezhnosti, formerly Lenin square; others such as that in Buchach or Pidvolochys’k (Ternopil’s’ka Oblast’) stand on the periphery of the town (Figures 1–3). Commentators have criticized the fact that the L’viv Bandera monument stands beside, and higher than, the former Polish Roman Catholic cathedral of St. Elżbieta, a provocation, it is said, given the extremely negative meaning that Bandera has for Poles (one respect in which Polish and Soviet historiography coincide) (Narvselius 2012, 479). One commentator even maintains that the monument was placed “in the most Polish place in L’viv – next to a Catholic [Roman Catholic] church facing a Polish school where the most radical activists were educated.”

The decision to erect the monument to Bandera on Kropyvnyts’koho square, adjacent to Bandera Street, a main artery leading from the railway station to the city, was taken by the L’viv City Council in 1993 (Mel’nyk and Masyk 2012, 279). In the sculptor’s view, the square is a perfect location for the monument because it is “a gateway to L’viv.”

Some in Ukraine have criticized the location for “a total non-correspondence between the monolithic single style of the monument’s ensemble and the heterogeneity of the

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Table 1. Number of monuments to Bandera.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of monuments</th>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table does not include the two monuments to Bandera erected in the birthplace of Bandera, Staryy Uhyrnyv, in 1990 and 1991 which were destroyed in the year they were built.

Source: Compiled by O. Myshlovskaja.
architectural space of the square.\textsuperscript{15} The monument is also critically assessed in a book on the monuments and memorial plaques of L’viv:

This construction in the traditions of the totalitarian architecture of Adolf Aloisovych [Hitler] resembles a comb from afar; it does not look in harmony with a neo-gothic cathedral of St. Elisabeth in the background. What’s more, one pillar which would symbolize the struggle of UPA and OUN, in which Stepan Bandera participated, is missing. (Mel’nyk and Masyk 2012, 279)

In addition to these constructions, over 100 streets have been renamed after Bandera, even beyond the area containing monuments.\textsuperscript{16} As a measure of what Hrytsak and Susak (2003, 140) have called the “symbolic codification of contested urban space in national terms,” renaming a street is easier than building a statue, although, as we have seen in the L’viv case cited above, name changes also require administrative expenditure. Inasmuch too as street name changes are frequent, the identification of a street with its new name may be fragile.\textsuperscript{17} In some places, people continue to call streets by their earlier names and advice visitors to use those names as new ones are little known. This may be true though primarily for relatively neutral names, such as “8th of March Street”, a communist holiday, to be sure, but one that continues to enjoy respect as “International Women’s Day.” According to a large-scale sociological survey carried out in April 2013, the most celebrated holiday in Ukraine is indeed the 8th of March. Only in six oblast’s is it slightly overtaken by other holidays such as Victory Day, the 9th of May, in the city of Sevastopol’ and Poltavs’ka Oblast’, and by Independence Day, the 24th of August, in Ternopil’’ska, Rivnens’ka, L’vivs’ka, and Ivano-Frankivs’ka Oblast’s.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, in the case at hand, there is no street sign indicating the new (or old) name of the street.\textsuperscript{19}

Besides the monuments, there are five Bandera museums, established between 1990 and 2010, in places connected with phases in Bandera’s life.\textsuperscript{20} The layout of the museums, their exhibitions, their conception of their subject, and, above all, the reaction of visitors are subjects eminently worthy of further study but ones which we are not able to delve into here. Intuitively, one might suppose that these museums are likely to serve as shrines, replete

Figure 1. The map of the monuments, busts, plaques, and museums to Bandera. Source: Designed by O. Myshlovskaya.
Figure 2. Monument to Bandera in L’viv.

Figure 3. Monument to Bandera in Uzyn.
with relics, more intimate and warmer than stone or bronze monuments. It is in these terms too
that one may consider the excursion offered by the L’viv travel agency “Vidviday,” “In the
paths of Stepan Bandera” from the cycle “The Country of Heroes.”21 This one-day tour of the
“Banderivs’kyy kray,” at a price of 150 hryvna (approximately 20 USD), would seem to be a
sort of secular pilgrimage. Here heroization (for this would be a variant thereof) takes on the
connotations of a secular religion: awe before a monument turns into piety as one retraces the
stations of the hero’s life (Figure 4). It may be noted too that in 2012, the L’vivs’ka Oblast’
created a “Hero of Ukraine Stepan Bandera Prize” to be awarded, on the day of Bandera’s
birth, the 1st of January, to an individual or organization who has contributed to the devel-
opment of the Ukrainian national state.22

Interpretation of post-Soviet public memory

In conformity with trends in Western historiography, the topic of post-Soviet public
memory, including monumentalization and commemoration as encountered in Western
Ukraine, has already attracted a good deal of scholarly discussion (Hrytsak and Susak
2003; Marples 2006, 2007; Rossolinski 2007; Portnov 2009; Rossolinski-Liebe 2009;
Sereda 2009; Amar 2011). An important aspect of this debate is the relation of recent initia-
tives to the Soviet and, specifically, Leninist heritage.

Figure 4. Advertisement of a one-day excursion “In the paths of Stepan Bandera” offered by the L’viv
travel agency “Vidviday.”
Source: L’viv travel agency “Vidviday.”
Amar (2011, 3) and Bechtel (2008) have crossed swords over the meaning of contemporary public memory in L’viv. Amar has taken Bechtel to task for affirming that “Soviet propaganda has merely been replaced by another, opposite, Ukraino-centric [propaganda].” Amar’s argument is that, for the first time, L’viv has been able to foster its own memory rather than partake of a larger Soviet and Soviet Ukrainian narrative:

... substantially more of Lviv’s culture of memory is now in fact Lviv’s own and not the mere reflection of its larger contexts, and it is also produced with substantially more local input from the public sphere than under Soviet rule. (Amar 2011, 373)

At the same time, according to Amar, the fact that L’viv has developed a local version of memory does not mean that it became more pluralist or less nationalist.

With respect to the Bandera monuments of concern here, it is a fact that only a few monuments in Western Ukraine have directly replaced Soviet monuments. In Drohobych, Velyki Mosty, and Turka, Bandera was erected on the spot where Lenin formerly stood. In Berezhany, Bandera replaced Dzerzhinsky. In Ivano-Frankiv’sk, he stands in place of a Soviet tank, in Sambir, in place of a monument to the victims of the Second World War, and in Staryy Sambir, Bandera replaces a woman worker. In contrast, in L’viv, the first city in the Soviet Union to take down its Lenin monument, Lenin was succeeded, on the same street, not by Bandera but by Taras Shevchenko. Faute de mieux, suggests Catherine Wanner, with respect to this last case (Figures 5 and 6).

Figure 5. A monument to Bandera in Velyki Mosty.
Source: Photographed by O. Myshlovska, 2 June 2012, Velyki Mosty.
It would thus appear that Bandera monuments have generally not directly replaced Soviet-era monuments on a one-to-one basis, but the persistence of a Soviet and even specifically Leninist heritage in esthetic terms has been widely noticed and has aroused concern, although Adam Michnik’s sarcastic suggestion that ex-socialist workers had only been trained to manufacture statues of Lenin, which nobody wanted to buy any more after 1989, does not appear to hold (Kalb 2002, 319). The sculptors commissioned to draw up plans for the new Bandera monuments have mostly been mature artists, not compromised by association with Soviet commemorative structures. Public opinion was therefore all the more astonished to find that a number of Bandera monuments were Lenin-look-alikes. Perhaps people should not have been all that surprised, given other borrowings from the Soviet repertory, such as “Orders of Hero of Ukraine” and patriotic ceremonies oddly reminiscent of the bombast of the Brezhnev era. Nevertheless, one sculptor at the unveiling of the Bandera monument he had designed suffered a heart attack upon seeing the final outcome of his conception. Consternation at the apparent, non-ironic revival of the Lenin image put into the shade numerous other criticisms, such as complaints about the disproportionate size of the monument in L’viv or about the assembly-line-like repetitiveness of some portrayals or even about the legless statue of Bandera in Truskavets’ which made the hero appear to be an amputee (Figures 7 and 8).

The sculptors themselves defended their works in telling terms. Mykola Posikira shrugged off the criticism: “If a person saw only Lenin in her/his entire life, s/he continues to see him [Lenin] everywhere.” Yaroslav Loza, creator of the monument in Dublyany, declared that he wanted to convey decisiveness, courage, onward movement. The hand on the heart (a trait common to this monument and many others, both of Bandera and Lenin – AL/OM) signifies that he is giving it to

Figure 6. A monument to Lenin in Velyki Mosty replaced by a monument to Bandera. Source: Tronko (1978, 606).
Ukraine. As for the resemblance to Lenin, only art specialists remark on this. Because this is the style. I worked in the realistic manner. I wanted the sculpture to be close to ordinary people, as it was built at public expense.30

Ivan Samotos was even more straightforward. When asked, cautiously, about the Lenin resemblance in his work, he answered:

you are right. The whole issue is one of stereotypes. Lenin was considered a leader, a helmsman \textit{[kermanych]}, who organized and rallied the popular masses. In his figure appeared the dynamics of revolution, revolt, transformation. Stepan Bandera is the leader of the nation. He too calls to struggle, because many people are still guided by old stereotypes. (Rupnyak 2012, 4–5)

Also striking is the sculptors’ realization, sometimes belatedly, that the diminutive and frail Bandera was himself hardly of heroic stature.31 This did not prevent them from portraying him in a heroic pose and the most recognizable available prototype of heroism was Vladimir Illich Lenin.

Popular reaction, beyond the passionate debate that the issue evoked in the press, echoed some of these concerns.32 One woman expressed her disappointment that the local Bandera monument portrayed a miniscule figure rather than the “manly” image she expected. She went on to add though that her mother had explained to her that there had been no corpulent men during the war years.33 Others, both an elderly, Russian-speaking former military man and a young businessman, complained, predictably, that the money would have been better spent on improving the local roads or sewage systems.34
What these reactions also indicate is the extent to which Bandera is not so much a flesh-and-bones historical personage as a symbol, all the more valued for being, personally, unknown. After his imprisonment in Poland in 1934, Bandera may never have set foot in Ukraine again (he was, possibly, there briefly in 1939 and again, perhaps, for a few days in 1941). From 1939, Bandera was, first, in the General-Gouvernement under German occupation, then, as of 1941, in Germany as a prisoner, later as a collaborator, and finally, in the post-war years, as a political exile. Nevertheless, his name became a symbol of a generation of young nationalists who had led the liberation struggle, even though he led it from afar and his actual achievements fell short of the legend surrounding him. In Soviet times, Bandera represented a counter-memory, a name whose cult grew in proportion to Soviet denunciation and one which was fostered particularly in the diaspora (Rudling 2011); hence the shock value of the Braty Hadyukiny singing, be it ironically, “My Khloptsi z Bandershtadtu [i.e. L’viv]” [We’re the lads from Bandera town] at the Chervona Ruta festival in 1991 (Wanner 1998, 130).

Rituals and politics of commemoration

To construct a monument to Stepan Bandera in heroic mode already establishes Bandera as a hero. Once in place, however, a monument reiterates this status. It lends itself to recitation, ritual observance, and regular, or even occasional, commemorative appropriation. In contrast to what Robert Musil has written, the monument is not invisible or, at least, not always invisible. Bandera monuments do not appear to have become the backdrops for wedding party pictures, as Lenin monuments once were and as the Shevchenko monument in
L’viv has become (Wanner 1998, 187). In keeping with the pathos they proclaim, Bandera monuments have, however, emerged as the focus for commemorative celebrations on defined days. In fulfilling this role they have also served as props for self-promotion of individuals, politicians, social organizations, and political parties.

The most frequent commemorations held at Bandera monuments throughout Western Ukraine are those related to Bandera’s birthday on January 1. The weather may be inclement at that time but the arrival of the new year, worth celebrating in any case, provides an additional motivation to gather around the local Bandera monument. The next most frequent date for celebration is October 14, a date which fortuitously brings together the date of Bandera’s assassination and the date of the founding of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) with which he is so closely associated; the date is also only one day away from the feast of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin. Interestingly, what might be termed syncretic commemorations also take place on May 9, the anniversary of the end of the Second World War or the Great Patriotic War as it was known in Soviet times.35 On this occasion, gatherings are held side by side at both the Bandera monument and the Soviet war memorial, often adjacent to each other; the latter memorials are, for the most part, still standing, even in L’viv where efforts to do away with the “Monument Slavy” have been stymied by court order.36 Respect for the dead, on whichever side, tends to stifle sectarian passions to such an extent that, in the town of Skole, for example, there is a common grave to the victims of Ukrainian nationalists called “Skorbna Maty” [grieving mother] standing next to the Bandera monument. Even though the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) men are buried there, the grave has not been touched.37 The juxtaposition of Soviet-era monuments and those of Bandera heightens the legitimacy of each, though it is likely that the juxtaposition works in favor of Bandera as his proponents are thus able to draw on established patterns and symbols.

The initiative for building Bandera monuments most often comes from “below” or from what might be properly called civil society organizations, such as local branches of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)–UPA Brotherhood, Rukh, or the Union of Political Prisoners. In some cases, personal or opportunistic considerations lie behind the construction of Bandera monuments and they do not require the validation offered by commemoration even as they draw on the heroic legitimacy Bandera provides. In Skole, the monument to Bandera was initiated and financed by Andriy Lopushans’ky, a former deputy chairman of the national oil and gas company of Ukraine, Naftohaz Ukrayiny, and a member of parliament in 2006–2007, as part of the 2012 parliamentary election campaign (which he lost).38 In Kremenets’ a local businessman, Volodomyr Chuba, put up a Bandera statue as a token of corporate responsibility in front of the building that houses his former insurance company.39 In Dublyany, Volodymyr Snityns’ky, rector of the L’viv State Agricultural University where Bandera studied from 1930 to 1933, initiated a statue and commemoration ceremonies for Bandera. He also had an iconic-like painting of himself commissioned where he is seen placing a cornerstone of the future monument to Bandera.40 In these instances, simply putting up a Bandera statue may be enough. As various respondents put it in an informal survey, “having a monument in one’s village is a sign of civilization” or “other places have a Bandera monument, why shouldn’t we?”41 Like a grand piano in a bourgeois salon, its presence alone stands as testimony to one’s culture and proof of “keeping-up-with the Joneses” (Figure 9).

Bandera monuments, and indeed the Bandera myth, have also been exploited to the hilt by political groupings, notably the VO Svoboda party. VO Svoboda takes its origin from a right-wing party, the Social-National Party of Ukraine, founded in 1991 in Western Ukraine
inspired by OUN ideology. With an aspiration to enter national politics, it assumed its current name, changed the party’s branding, expelled some radicals from the party, and nominated young and dynamic Oleh Tyahnybok as party leader in 2004. The party has been criticized for its ultra-nationalistic anti-Russian, anti-Soviet, anti-Polish, and anti-Semitic pronouncements (Olszański 2011; Shekhovtsov 2011) as well as for the “instrumentalization of history and the official rehabilitation of the ultra-nationalists of the 1930s and 1940s” (Rudling 2013, 228).

A search on the party’s website returns 1520 entries concerning Stepan Bandera. It is therefore not surprising that VO Svoboda leaders have capitalized on the building of Bandera monuments even when the initiative for construction has come from civil society, as has often been the case. In fact, two-thirds of Bandera monuments have been built since 2005 after the reconstruction of the VO Svoboda party. VO Svoboda representatives have made a point of funding the construction of Bandera monuments (Figure 10), attending unveilings of new monuments, and holding commemorations, themselves often linked to Bandera-related anniversaries, at the foot of Bandera monuments. It was VO Svoboda L’vivs’ka Oblast’ councilors too who made the proposition to rename “Stepan Bandera” streets “hero of Ukraine Stepan Bandera” streets as mentioned at the outset of this article.

After having done exceedingly well in regional elections in 2010, with a majority of votes in the Banderivs’kyi kray, at the national elections in October 2012 “Svoboda took the Ukrainian political scene by storm, entering parliament for the first time with 37 seats out of 450” (Parusinski 2012). Commentators speculated as to whether this change of status would push VO Svoboda toward the middle of the political spectrum, to leverage the foothold it had gained in Kyiv and to capitalize on the anti-corruption platform and the consistent oppositional stance toward the Yanukovych régime that had helped
it to break out of its narrow identification as a strictly nationalist party. At present, such speculations do not seem to have been borne out. The torchlight processions that have been a feature of VO Svoboda activity, lately even in Donets’k, and for several years in Kyiv on Bandera’s birthday, with rising numbers of participants, have not relieved the party’s frustration (Figure 11).

Whereas the cult of Bandera has made substantial inroads in Western Ukraine, as we have seen in this article, an anti-Bandera narrative also prevails at different levels. Vadym Kolesnichenko, a member of parliament from the Party of Regions and chairman of the “Human Rights Public Movement ‘Russian-speaking Ukraine,’” has been an ardent critic of Ukrainian nationalism and of Stepan Bandera as one of its leaders. In 2011, in response to the rise of VO Svoboda at the local level and the growing cult of Bandera, he initiated the International Anti-Fascist Front which aims to counteract the heroization of Nazi collaborators [posobniki natsyzma], the rebirth of neo-Nazi, Fascist, and xenophobic ideologies in society, and the distortion of history of the twentieth century. In 2013, Kolesnichenko submitted a draft law “On the Prohibition of Rehabilitation and Heroization of the Persons and Organizations that fought against the Anti-Hitler Coalition” which remains under consideration in the parliament.

In a blog post published on the anniversary of Stepan Bandera’s birth on January 1, 2013 in reaction to the annual Bandera marches under VO Svoboda auspices Kolesnichenko expressed his unequivocal view about the nationalist leader:
Stepan Bandera is a collaborator of Nazi Germany, the leader of the radical rightwing organization OUN and its armed wing, UPA, who collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War in the fight against the anti-Hitler coalition. Stepan Bandera and the organization he headed are guilty of the crimes against humanity: they directly supported and contributed to the Holocaust (the extermination of more than 2 million Jews and Roma) on the territory of Ukraine, planned and carried out the genocide of about 160 thousand unarmed Polish population of Western Ukraine (“Volyn massacre”) and organized terror against the civilian Ukrainians on political and ideological grounds.48

Dmytro Tabachnyk, Minister of Education of Ukraine, presented a new concept for history school textbooks in 2010 in which OUN and UPA and their leaders, Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych, were to be depicted as nationalists and organizers of mass murders and “will be forever tainted by collaborationism.”49

In the absence of Bandera monuments in central and eastern Ukrainian cities, VO Svoboda has chosen to rally around Shevchenko monuments as a *pis aller*. What it considers intolerable, however, is to find itself in a landscape dotted with Soviet monuments, mostly dating from the Soviet era but including some more recent ones.50 VO Svoboda refers to research according to which there are four times as many Lenin streets as Shevchenko streets and there are some 1344 Lenin monuments in Ukraine as well as thousands of other nominal remnants of the communist era.51 The response has been the inauguration of a campaign of disfiguration of such monuments by party activists that has drawn significant media attention.52 Hardly surprisingly, retaliation measures against Bandera monuments have been prompt to follow.53 Such methods of expressing outrage are by no means new. The first two monuments to Bandera erected in his home village of Staryy Uhryniv in the early 1990s were blown up, plaques to Bandera were desecrated with a Nazi swastika in Sokal’ and Zdolbuniv,54 and monuments to Stalin in Zaporizzhya55 and Lenin in Kyiv56 were damaged or desecrated with paint.

Figure 11. Results of VO Svoboda in the October 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine. Source: Vasyl’ Babych via Wikimedia Commons.
One may console oneself with the thought that as long as confrontation between the pro- and anti-Bandera camps expresses itself in attacks on monuments rather than people, some measure of social peace reigns. Nevertheless, the tendency toward polarization with regards to the politics of history remains unmistakable.

Conclusions

In terms of the categories proposed at the outset of this paper, monuments play a variety of roles. Monuments are performatives in the sense that they create the reality that they pro-claim. Statues of Bandera in a heroic pose authenticate Bandera as a hero. Monuments may remain unnoticed and “unseen” until they are enlisted to serve as props for social and political events. Finally, monuments act as lightning rods for the expression of political antagonisms, receiving the blows that otherwise might fall on people. “Bandera zhyvyy” is a slogan one hears in the mouths of his followers, unconsciously imitating the earlier “Lenin zhiv [Lenin lives!].” Literature has its cohort of statues coming to life, be it the Commandatore or the Bronze Horseman. Who is to say that with regards to Bandera, life does not imitate art?

Notes

1. Sarti: “Unhappy the Land that has no heroes”
Galileo: “No. Unhappy the Land that needs heroes” (Bertolt Brecht, Life of Galileo)


5. City authorities invoked technical reasons, notably, the cost of re-registering addresses. See “Pere- menuvannya vulyts’ potyahnetsya nezruchnosti ta vytraty dlya l’viv’yan – chynovnitsya.” April 1, 2011. http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?peremenuvannya_vulyts’_potyagne_nezruchnosti_ta_vytraty_dlya_l’viv’yan--chynovnitsya&objectId=1126173. Note too that only the intention to rename was taken (see “Bandera i Shukhevych vidbulysya yak heroi v uyavi lyudey, – mer L’vova.” April 5, 2011. http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?bandera_i_shuhevych_vidbulysya_yak_geroi_v_uyavi_lyudey__mer_lvova&objectId=1126401). Now the question is still being “investigated by a group of experts.” Other municipalities have followed the urging of the L’viv Oblast’ Council to rename their Stepan Bandera Street to Hero of Ukraine Bandera Street, as well as their Roman Shukhevych streets, for example in Zolochiv (both Bandera and Shukhevych) “U Zolochiv na L’vivshchyni budut’ vulytsi Heroyiv Ukrayiny Bandery i Shukhevycha.” January 30, 2011. http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?u_zolochevi_na_lvivshhini_budut_vulitsi_geroyiv_ukrayini_banderi_i_shuhevicha&objectId=1121723. And proposals to rename streets have been made in Sambir (both Bandera and Shukhevych) “Notatky iz sesiyi mis’koi rady.”


7. Note too that a sign “Hero of Ukraine” was also attached to several monuments to Bandera, namely in Berezhany and Ternopil’. Local authorities in Zalishchyky told one of the authors (OM) that they would add the same sign because for them Bandera was indeed a hero. Interview with a representative of the city council, May 21, 2012, Zalishchyky.

8. The bibliographic reference to Musil in the references section is inaccurate.

9. 22 in L’viv’s ka Oblast’ (Boryslav, Chervonohrad, Drohobych, Dublany, Hordyna, Horishne, Kam’yanka-Buz’ka, Krushel’nytsya, L’viv, Morshyn, Mostys’ka, Mykolaiiv, Sambir, Skole, Sosnivka, Starry Sambir, Stryy, Truskavets’, Turka, Velyki Mosty, Velykosilky and Volya-Zaderevats’ka), 12 in Ternopil’s ka Oblast’ (Berezhany Buchach, Chortkiv, Kozivka, Kremenets’,Pidvolochys’k, Romanivka, Strusiv, Terebovlya, Ternopil’, Verbiv and Zalishchyky), 11 in Ivano-Frankivs’ka Oblast’ (Chornyy Lis [Black forest], Horodenka, Hrabivka, Ivano-Frankivs’k, Kalush, Kolomylya, Mykytyntsi, Pidpechery, Seredny Bereziv, Staryy Uhryniv and Uzyn), and one in Rivnens’ ka Oblast’ (Zdolbuniv).

10. Eight in L’viv’s ka Oblast’ (Dublany, L’viv (2), Sokal’, Stryy (2), Volya-Zaderevats’ka and Urych), two in Ivano-Frankivs’ka Oblast’ (Ivano-Frankivs’k and Yezupil), two in Rivnens’ ka Oblast’ (Zdolbuniv and Rivne), one in Ternopil’s ka Oblast’ (Kobyvoloky), and one in Volyns’ ka Oblast’ (Kivertsi).

11. “Banderivs’kyy kray” is used in this article to denominate places related to Stepan Bandera’s life in Ukraine, i.e. the places where he was born, lived, and studied (currently in Ivano-Frankivs’ka, L’viv’s ka, and Ternopil’s ka Oblast’s) (Figure 1). The term has been used to refer to the entire Western Ukrainian region as the center of radical Ukrainian nationalism. It has also been used to denominate only the place where Bandera was born, the village of Starry Uhryniv in Kalush region. The Historical Memorial Stepan Bandera Museum in Starry Uhryniv publishes a journal entitled “Banderivs’kyy kray.”


16. We have used the database of the Central Electoral Commission for the 2012 parliamentary elections, which lists all streets belonging to single-seat 33646 electoral districts. http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2012/wp030?PT001F01=900#. According to the database, there are 51 Bandera streets in L’viv’s ka Oblast’, 51 in Ivano-Frankivs’ka, 42 in Ternopil’s ka, 26 in Rivnens’ ka, 7 in Volyns’ ka, 4 in Chernivets’ka, 2 in Zakarpats’ka. In all likelihood, there are other ones as well, as yet unregistered.

17. Among the new Bandera streets are ones that were previously “Pershotravneva” and before that “Trzciego maja” or “Pilsudskiego” then “Lenina” then “Ukrayins’ka.” See also the example given in note 4. It would be worthwhile to carry out a study as to how inhabitants themselves refer to these streets. In Paris, we are convinced that only tourists would refer to “Place Charles de Gaulle” whereas for Parisians it is and always has been “Place de l’Etoile.”

18. The survey was carried out on behalf of the DACH project “Nation, Region and Beyond” credited at the outset of the article.


Family Estate-Museum in Stryy (2010). There are also plans spearheaded by VO Svoboda to open a Bandera museum in L’viv.

21. The advertisement of the excursion on the website of the travel agency reads: ‘If you respect your glorious ancestors who gave their lives for our freedom, you are invited to participate in a one-day excursion “Following in Stepan Bandera’s steps from the series “the country of heroes””,’ which includes visits to Staryy Uhryniv, Stryy, Vołyňa-Zaderevats’ka and Kalush. http://www.vivididay.com.ua/%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%BA%D0%BD%D0%BC%D0%BB_%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BD%0_%D0%B1%0%D0%B0%0%D0%BD% D0%B4%0%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B8%0%D0%B8%0_ua_829prod.html.


23. Citation as translated by Amar and emphasis added by him.

24. Wanner (1998, 181) cites an observer: “If you respect your ancestors, who gave their lives for our freedom, you are invited to participate in a one-day excursion “Following in Stepan Bandera’s steps from the series “the country of heroes”,” which includes visits to Staryy Uhryniv, Stryy, Vołyňa-Zaderevats’ka and Kalush.”

25. Sculptors who have each designed several Bandera monuments are Mykola Posikira (born 1946), Ivan Samotos (born 1933), Roman Vil’husyn’sky (born 1963) and Vasyl’ Vil’shuk (born 1946).


28. The sculptor was Ivan Samotos. He is also the author of the monuments to Bandera in Staryy Sambir, Turka, and Skole.


31. Mykola Posikira: “People are used to pictures where Bandera is young with a wide forehead. In reality, he was short, with an elongated face. To create Bandera’s portrait I used his death mask. I wanted to emphasize his resoluteness, a feature of every revolutionary,” see “Mykola Posikira: tse politychnyy pam’yat’ak, a ne prosto skulpturny portret Bandery.” October 22, 2007. http://www.ukrnationalism.org.ua/interview/?n=64. Also, Samotos interview (Rupnyak 2012, 4–5).


33. Turka (population 7114), L’vivs’ka Oblast’, where a monument was inaugurated in October 2012. Interview by O. Myshlovska, April 5, 2013, Turka.

34. Interview by O. Myshlovska, April 5, 2013, Turka.


Soviet-era Monument Slavy are located sufficiently far from each other to avoid the need to carry out joint celebrations.

37. Interview with an employee of the Skole rayon administration, O. Myshlovska, April 6, 2013, Skole.


40. The painting executed by a painter from L’viv, Mykola Horda, is located in the Bandera museum at the University.


43. The proposals were made by VO Svoboda local representatives in L’viv, Zolochiv, Sambir, and Dolyana.

44. It may be noted that Andriy Lopushans’ky, see above, lost his election campaign to the brother of VO Svoboda leader, Andriy Tyahnybok.


46. The website of the International Anti-Fascist Front. http://www.antifashyst.org/?page_id=301. It is interesting that the Front aims to be an international movement, but its website is only in Russian.


References


Stepan Bandera was born on 1 January 1909 in the village of Staryy Uhryniv in the region of Kalush in Ivano-Frankivs’ka Oblast’. His father was a Greek-Catholic priest. Bandera studied in Stryy and Dublyany (both in Lvivka Oblast’). In 1927, Bandera joined the Ukrainian Military Organization and in 1929 the OUN. As regional head of OUN, Bandera organized terrorist and sabotage actions in the Second Polish Republic. In 1934, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for assassination of the Polish Interior Minister Bronislaw Pieracki. Released from prison in September 1939 and, following a split in OUN in 1940–1941, Bandera became the leader of the radical OUN (B) (OUN-Bandera). This organization declared the independence of Ukraine on 30 June 1941 in Lviv when German troops entered the city. From September 1941 until September 1944, Bandera was a prisoner in Germany. After the Second World War, Bandera lived in Munich under the pseudonym Stepan Popel. He was killed there by a KGB agent Bohdan Stashinsky on 15 October 1959. He is buried in Munich’s Waldfriedhof cemetery.

As a leader of the nationalist movement in Ukraine from the 1930s to the 1950s, Bandera is a controversial figure. He became regarded by his followers as a symbol of the fight for Ukrainian state independence. Soviet and some post-Soviet sources described him as a bourgeois nationalist, fascist, and Nazi collaborator (Andreev and Shumov 2005; Kozlov 2008), leading some to argue that Bandera’s popularity is a reaction to Soviet propaganda.

Myth-making about Bandera, OUN-B, and UPA was undertaken by the Ukrainian diaspora, often associated with the OUN-B, after the Second World War (Mirchuk 1961) following the lines of earlier OUN propagandistic materials. The myths were re-exported to Ukraine at the end of the 1980s and became reinterpreted in a positive and exculpatory light in the contemporary nationalistic historiography (Havryliv 2012; Posivnych 2008a, 2008b; Vyatrovych 2011) and in the popular literature (Hor-dasevych 2008; Fedoriv 2008; Perepichka 2006; Svatko 2008).

Some Western scholars have been severely critical of what they have seen as the totalitarian, anti-Semitic, and fascist nature of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and they have deconstructed the myths associated with it (Rossolinski-Liebe 2010; Himka 2011; Snyder 2010; Marples 2006, 2007; Motyka 2013; Rudling 2011). A number of Ukrainian scholars has also done so in a somewhat milder way (Hrytsak 2004; Kas’yanov 2004; Zaytsev 2013; Portnov 2013).

For Rudling (2011, 3), “The OUN shared the fascist attributes of antiliberalism, anticonservatism, and anticomunism, an armed party, totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, Führerprinzip, and an adoption of fascist greetings.” Rossolinski-Liebe (2010, 3) offers a similar critical view: “…Bandera became the main symbol of the OUN-B and the UPA although he himself did not participate in the atrocities of the OUN-B and the UPA…” such as “…collaboration with the Nazis and their involvement in the Holocaust, the ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943/44, and the massacres of civilian Ukrainians who supported or were accused of supporting Soviet power in Western Ukraine between 1944 and 1951.”

Furthermore, Timothy Snyder (2010) has referred to Bandera as “a fascist hero” in a blog post published shortly after the conferment of the status of “Hero of Ukraine” upon Stepan Bandera by President Yushchenko and he has assessed the latter’s legacy in negative terms: “Bandera aimed to make of Ukraine a one-party fascist dictatorship without national minorities. During World War II, his followers killed many Poles and Jews.” Finally, Himka has exposed the participation of Ukrainian nationalists in the Lviv anti-Jewish pogroms in 1941 (Himka 2011).
Appendix references