The Study of International Politics I: Dynamics of Conflict and Cooperation (E560)

Course Organization

Professor: Urs Luterbacher
Office: Rigot, No. 25 
Office Hours: Wednesday 14.00-16.00 
Tel.: 908 59 40

Assistant: Andrew Prosser
Office: Rigot, No. 35
Office Hours: Thursday 16.00-17.30
Tel.: 908 59 48

Presentation

This course, which is part of the required teachings in Political science at the Graduate Institute has two goals:

• First the course wants to provide epistemological and methodological foundations for the use of central concepts used in political science and international relations in a rigorous way. In order to do that the course will insist on the closeness of economic and political approaches in the use of rational choice analysis and game theory particularly in their dynamic and evolutionary aspects. The importance of productive processes and of basic demographic and resource bases for the understanding of international politics will also be emphasized.
• Second, it wants to give students an overview of basic concepts that are used in the political analysis of International relations and of their recent theoretical developments. Among those concepts are the basic notion of actor and system in International relations, decision-making bargaining, escalation and crisis, deterrence and stability. The course also intends to cover issues in International cooperation such as alliances and coalitions, collective goods, and international institutions.

Course Requirements

Students are expected to write a short critique (5 pages maximum) of two works (articles or selections from a book) which treat the same topic using analytical tools from class lectures and assigned readings. The paper is due on April 15 . A comprehensive test of the course will be given on May 27 . The paper will count 1/3 while the test will be worth 2/3 of the grade for the course.

Readings for sessions from February 19 to May 27, 2008

February 19: Foundations of Knowledge: Sociological, Cognitive, and Rational Choice

Approaches

• Popper, Karl R. (1961), The Poverty of Historicism , New York, Harper & Row, Chapters I, III and pp.105-147.
• Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , 2nd edition, Chicago, Chicago University Press, pp. 23-43, 52-76, 174-210.
• Sugden, Robert (1991), “Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions From Economics and Philosophy,” in The Economic Journal , No. 101, pp. 751-785.
• Harsanyi, John C. (1977), Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-2.
• Taylor, Michael (1987) The Possibility of Cooperation . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1.

February 26: Basic Methodological Issues

• Schrodt, Philip (1985), “Adaptive Precedent-Logic and Rational Choice: A Comparison of Two Approaches to the Modelling of International Behaviour,” in Urs Luterbacher and Michael D. Ward (eds.), Dynamic Models of International Conflict , Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
• Wagner, Harrison (1992), “Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory”, in Journal of Theoretical Politics , Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 115-141.
• Luterbacher, Urs (1984), “Last Words About War”, in Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 165-182.

March 4

Structure of Authority : States and the International System

• Mithen, Steven (1999) The Prehistory of the Mind. New York: Thames and Hudson: 217-226.
• Diamond, Jarred (1998) Guns, Germs, and Steel . New York: Random House: 165-292.
• Diamond, Jarred (1992) The Third Chimpanzee. New York: Harper Collins: 180-191.
• Johnson , Allen W. and Timothy Earle (2000) The Evolution of Human Societies , Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press: 245-329.

March 11: Classical Theoretical Approaches to International Politics

• Kant, Immanuel (1993), Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Proposal (1795) , translated by Helen O'Brien with an introduction by Jessie H. Buckland, London, Peace Book Company, pp. 19-43.
• Hume, David (1994), “Of Balance of Power”, in Knud Haakmonssen (ed.), Political Essays , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 154-160.
• Cobden, Richard, (1886), The Political Writings of Richard Cobden , London, Cassell, Chapter 3.

March 18: Recent Theoretical Approaches to International Politics

• Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979), Theory of International Politics , Reading, Addison-Wesley, Chapters 5-6.
• Keohane, Robert O. (1993), “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War,” in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate , New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 269-300.
• Luterbacher, Urs (1997), “Political Rationalities East and West: Are there Fundamental Oppositions?” Paper Presented at the State of the Discipline Session on Conflict and Cooperation IPSA XVIIth World Congress, Seoul, Korea.
• Haas, Peter (1990), “Obtaining International Protection through Epistemic Consensus,” in Millenium , Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 347-363.
• Wendt Alexander (1992) “ Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics” International Organization , Vol. 46, No. 2: 391-425.

Easter Break:

April 1: International Systems: The Concept revisited

• Hirshleifer, Jack (1988) “The Analytics of Continuing Conflict” Synthese 76:201-233
• Hirshleifer, Jack (1989) “Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio vs. Difference Models of Relative Success” Public Choice 63: 101-112.
• Hirshleifer, Jack (1995) “Anarchy and its Breakdown” Journal of Political Economy , 103, 11: 26-50.
  • Konrad Kai A. and Stergios Skaperdas (1997) The Market for Protection And The Origin of The State . Manuscript, Free University of Berlin and University of California, Irvine.
• Skaperdas Stergios, (1992), "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights", American Economic Review 82: 720-39.
• Usher Dan (1989) “The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State” American Economic Review, 79: 1031-1044.
• Greif Avner , Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast (1994) Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The case of the Merchant Guild The Journal of Political Economy, 102, 4: 745-776,

April 8: Strategic Issues: Deterrence and Stability

• Schelling, Thomas (1966), Arms and Influence , New Haven, Yale University Press, Chapter 7 (Introduction is useful).
• Snidal, D. and Achen, C. (1989), “Rational deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” in World Politics , Vol. XLI, No. 2, pp. 143-169.
• Zagare, Frank C. and Kilgour, Marc D. (1993), “Asymmetric Deterrence,” in International Studies Quarterly , Vol. 37, pp. 1-27.
• Fearon James (1995) “Rationalist Explanation for War” International Organization , 49, 3: 379-414.

April 15: Escalation Processes and Crisis

• Jervis, Robert (1976), Perception and Misperception in International Politics , Princeton, Princeton University Press, Chapter 3.
• Brams, S. and Kilgour, M. (1987), “Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game Theoretical Analysis,” American Political Science Review , Vol. 81, No. 3, pp. 833-850.
• O'Neil, Barry (1985), “The Dollar Auction as a Model of International Escalation,” in Urs Luterbacher and Michael D. Ward (eds.), Dynamic Models of International Conflict , pp. 220-226.
• Wagner, Harrison R. (1989), “Uncertainty, Rational Learning, and Bargaining in the Cuban Missile Crisis”, in Peter C. Ordeshook, (ed.), Models of Strategic Choice in Politics , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, pp. 177-205.

April 22: The Evolution of Warfare and Formal Representations of Combat and Arms Races

• Deitchman, S.J. (1962), “A Lanchester Model of Guerilla Warfare” in Operations Research, Vol. 10, No. 6, pp. 818-827.
• McGinnis, M.D. (1991), “Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races,” in Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 443-473.
• Lambelet, J.-C., Luterbacher, U., Allan, P. (1979), “Dynamics of Arms Races: Mutual Stimulation vs. Self-Stimulation,” in Journal of Peace Science , pp. 49-66.

April 29: Domestic International Linkages revisited: Two Level Approaches and Internal Conflict

• Putnam R.D. (1988) Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games. International Organization 42: 429-460.
• Milner, Helen and B. Peter Rosendorff (1997) “Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations” The Journal of Conflict Resolution , 41, 1: 117-146.
• Fearon James, (Fall 2000) "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identities." (co-authored with David Laitin),  International Organization
• Grossmann, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. Protection for Sale. American Economic Review 84, no. 4. 1994.

May 6: Coalition Formation and Alliance Structures

• Caplow, Theodore (1962), “A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad”, in American Sociological Review , Vol. 21, pp. 489-493.
• Snyder, Glenn H. (1991), “Alliances, Balances and Stability,” in International Organization , Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 121-142.
• Riker, William H. (1962), The Theory of Political Coalitions , New Haven, Yale University Press, Chapters 1-3.

May 13: Systemic Stability Problems

• Deutsch, Karl W. and Singer, David J. (1964), “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” in World Politics , Vol. 16, pp. 390-406.
• Waltz, Kenneth N. (1964), “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” in Daedalus , Vol. 93, pp. 881-908.
• Mearsheimer, John (1990), “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” in International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 5-56.

May 20: General Theories of International Cooperation

• Axelrod, Robert and Keohane Robert O. (1985), “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in World Politics , Vol. 38, pp. 226-254.
• Snidal, D. (1991), “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” in American Political Science Review , Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 701-726.
• Dupont, Cédric and Vinod K. Aggarwal (1999), “Goods, Games, and Instituttions”, in International Political Science Review .
• Dai Xinyuan (2007) International Institutions and National Policies . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-32, 140-151.

Test: to be administered on May 27, 2008