The Study of International Politics I: Dynamics of Conflict and Cooperation (E560)
Time & Location:
Tuesday, 16h15-18h00, S2
Professor Urs Luterbacher
Office: Rigot 25
Office hours: Wednesday 14:00-16:00
Telephone: 022 908 59 40
Office: Rigot, No. 35
Office hours: Wednesday 16:15-17:30
Telephone: 022 908 59 48
This course, which is part of the required teachings in Political science at the Graduate Institute, has two goals:
||First, it wants to give students an overview of basic concepts that are used in the political analysis of International relations and of their recent theoretical developments. Among those concepts are the basic notion of actor and system in International relations, decision-making, bargaining, escalation and crisis, deterrence and stability. The course also intends to cover issues in International cooperation such as alliances and coalitions, collective goods, and international institutions.
||Second, the course wants to provide epistemological and methodological foundations for the use of these concepts in a rigorous way. In order to do that the course will insist on the closeness of economic and political approaches in the use of rational choice analysis and game theory particularly in their dynamic and evolutionary aspects. The importance of productive processes and of basic demographic and resource bases for the understanding of international politics will also be emphasized.
Students are expected to write a short critique (5 pages maximum) of two works (articles or selections from a book) which treat the same topic using analytical tools from class lectures and assigned readings. The paper is due on May 8. A comprehensive test of the course will be given during the week of June 18-22. The paper will count 1/3 while the test will be worth 2/3 of the grade for the course.
Politics and the Structure of Authority : States and the International System
- Mithen, Steven (1999), The Prehistory of the Mind. New York: Thames and Hudson: 217-226.
- Diamond, Jarred (1998), Guns, Germs, and Steel . New York: Random House: 165-292.
- Johnson , Allen W. and Timothy Earle (2000), The Evolution of Human Societies , Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press: 245-329.
Foundations of Knowledge: Sociological, Cognitive, and Rational Choice Approaches
- Popper, Karl R. (1961), The Poverty of Historicism , New York, Harper & Row, Chapters I, III and pp.105-147.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , 2nd edition, Chicago, Chicago University Press, pp. 23-43, 52-76, 174-210.
- Sugden, Robert (1991), “Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions From Economics and Philosophy,” in The Economic Journal , No. 101, pp. 751-785.
- Harsanyi, John C. (1977), Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-2.
- Taylor, Michael (1987), The Possibility of Cooperation , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1.
Basic Methodological Issues
- Schrodt, Philip (1985), “Adaptive Precedent-Logic and Rational Choice: A Comparison of Two Approaches to the Modelling of International Behaviour,” in Urs Luterbacher and Michael D. Ward (eds.), Dynamic Models of International Conflict , Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
- Wagner, Harrison (1992), “Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory”, in Journal of Theoretical Politics , Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 115-141.
- Luterbacher, Urs (1984), “Last Words About War”, in Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 165-182.
Classical Theoretical Approaches to International Politics
- Kant, Immanuel (1993), Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Proposal (1795) , translated by Helen O'Brien with an introduction by Jessie H. Buckland, London, Peace Book Company, pp. 19-43.
- Hume, David (1994), “Of Balance of Power”, in Knud Haakmonssen (ed.), Political Essays , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 154-160.
- Cobden, Richard (1886), The Political Writings of Richard Cobden , London, Cassell, Chapter 3.
April 6 - April 15
Easter vacation - No class
Recent Theoretical Approaches to International Politics
- Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979), Theory of International Politics , Reading, Addison-Wesley, Chapters 5-6.
- Keohane, Robert O. (1993), “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War,” in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate , New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 269-300.
- Luterbacher, Urs (1997), “Political Rationalities East and West: Are there Fundamental Oppositions?” Paper Presented at the State of the Discipline Session on Conflict and Cooperation IPSA XVIIth World Congress, Seoul, Korea.
- Haas, Peter (1990), “Obtaining International Protection through Epistemic Consensus,” in Millenium , Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 347-363.
- Wendt, Alexander (1992), “ Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization , Vol. 46, No. 2: 391-425.
Characteristics of the International Actor, Linkages between Internal and foreign Policy Processes and Fundamental Bargaining Processes Among Nations
- Allison, Graham T. (1969), “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in American Political Science Review , Vol. 63, No. 3, pp. 689-718.
- Arrow Kenneth J. (1974), The Limits of Organization, New York: W.W. Norton, Chapters 1, 3-4.
- Schelling, Thomas (1960), The Strategy of Conflict , Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Chapters 1-3.
Labor Day - No Class
Strategic Issues: Deterrence and Stability
- Schelling, Thomas (1966), Arms and Influence , New Haven, Yale University Press, Chapter 7 (Introduction is useful).
- Snidal, D. and Achen, C. (1989), “Rational deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” in World Politics , Vol. XLI, No. 2, pp. 143-169.
- Zagare, Frank C. and Kilgour, Marc D. (1993), “Asymmetric Deterrence,” in International Studies Quarterly , Vol. 37, pp. 1-27.
- Fearon, James (1995), “Rationalist Explanations for War” International Organization , 49, 3: 379-414.
Escalation Processes and Crisis
- Jervis, Robert (1976), Perception and Misperception in International Politics , Princeton, Princeton University Press, Chapter 3.
- Brams, S. and Kilgour, M. (1987), “Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game Theoretical Analysis,” American Political Science Review , Vol. 81, No. 3, pp. 833-850.
- O'Neil, Barry (1985), “The Dollar Auction as a Model of International Escalation,” in Urs Luterbacher and Michael D. Ward (eds.), Dynamic Models of International Conflict , pp. 220-226.
- Wagner, Harrison R. (1989), “Uncertainty, Rational Learning, and Bargaining in the Cuban Missile Crisis”, in Peter C. Ordeshook, (ed.), Models of Strategic Choice in Politics , Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, pp. 177-205.
The Evolution of Warfare and Formal Representations of Combat and Arms Races
- Deitchman, S.J. (1962), “A Lanchester Model of Guerilla Warfare” in Operations Research, Vol. 10, No. 6, pp. 818-827.
- McGinnis, M.D. (1991), “Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races,” in Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 443-473.
- Lambelet, J.-C., Luterbacher, U., Allan, P. (1979), “Dynamics of Arms Races: Mutual Stimulation vs. Self-Stimulation,” in Journal of Peace Science , pp. 49-66.
Domestic International Linkages revisited: Two Level Approaches and Internal Conflict
- Putnam R.D. (1988), “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games,” International Organization 42: 429-460.
- Milner, Helen V., and B. Peter Rosendorff (1997), “Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution , 41, 1: 117-146.
- Fearon, James (Fall 2000), “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identities” (co-authored with David Laitin), International Organization , Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 845-877.
Coalition Formation and Alliance Structures
- Caplow, Theodore (1962), “A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad”, in American Sociological Review , Vol. 21, pp. 489-493.
- Snyder, Glenn H. (1991), “Alliances, Balances and Stability,” in International Organization , Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 121-142.
- Riker, William H. (1962), The Theory of Political Coalitions , New Haven, Yale University Press, Chapters 1-3.
Systemic Stability Problems and General Theories of International Cooperation
- Deutsch, Karl W. and Singer, David J. (1964), “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” in World Politics , Vol. 16, pp. 390-406.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. (1964), “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” in Daedalus , Vol. 93, pp. 881-908.
- Mearsheimer, John (1990), “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” in International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 5-56.
- Axelrod, Robert and Keohane Robert O. (1985), “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in World Politics , Vol. 38, pp. 226-254.
- Snidal, D. (1991), “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” in American Political Science Review , Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 701-726.
- Dupont, Cédric and Vinod K. Aggarwal (1999), “Goods, Games, and Institutions”, in International Political Science Review .
- Greif Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast (1994), “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The case of the Merchant Guild”, The Journal of Political Economy, 102, 4: 745-776.
Test: to be administered during the week of June 18-22, 2007.