Armament and Disarmament in a Changing Security Environment (E277)

Course organization

Schedule
Friday, 12:15–14:00
Room S4 (Villa Barton)
Changes in the schedule will be notified in advance

Office and office hours
Dr Jean Pascal Zanders
Voie-Creuse 16 (Office 329)
CH-1202 Genève
Switzerland
Tel: 022 908 5837
Fax: 022 908 6277
Email: jpzanders@bwpp.org
Office hours: Friday, 10:00–12:00 (or by appointment)

Assistant
Nell Marie Williams
Office: Rigot 26
Tel: 022 908 59 41
Email: nell.williams@graduateinstitute.ch
Office hours: Thursday, 14:00–16:00

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, some analytical parameters with regard to weapon programmes changed fundamentally. One of the more dramatic shifts was that from arms control and disarmament to non-proliferation. Bi- or multilateral arms control and disarmament have objective goals, namely the limitation or elimination of a category of weapons as stipulated in international treaties. These agreements often contain verification or transparency-enhancing mechanisms in order to monitor the compliance by other treaty partners. In principle, the rights and obligations of all parties to such an agreement are equal. They are cooperative security regimes.

In contrast, proliferation analysis is strongly influenced by enemy images and it is therefore highly subjective (e.g., the greater concern about Iran’s presumed nuclear weapon programme than about Israel’s). Moreover, there is no single non-proliferation policy (e.g., the constructive engagement with regard to North Korea versus the isolation of Iran and the sanctions and war against Iraq; the lack of meaningful sanctions against India and Pakistan for having detonated nuclear devices). Most importantly, the proliferation threat never disappears: a successful non-proliferation policy with respect to one state does not affect the other states of proliferation concern and other states may become a future proliferation concern. In addition, all technologies have a potential for dual-use application and their diffusion must therefore be controlled (e.g., export controls). As non-proliferation policies are unilateral (a state or group of states versus another state) they often carry the seeds of confrontation. These conflicts need not necessarily be military: developing countries often view the restrictions on their access to technology in terms of their economic and societal security. However, the war in Iraq and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which involves preparations for future interdictions of transfers of unconventional weapons and related materials and equipment, seem to underscore the centrality of military force in current thinking. Counter-proliferation policies may seriously challenge international law.

Are arms control and disarmament regimes under duress? Since the mid-1990s the Conference on Disarmament of the United Nations has been unable to agree on a new agenda. The negotiation of a legally-binding protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention collapsed in 2001 and today the states parties are still struggling to find ways to take the treaty forward. The review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty failed in 2005; before that North Korea had withdrawn from the convention and supposedly detonated a nuclear device. The United States abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty in 2002 in order to be able set up missile defences; Russia stepped out of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement because the USA wishes to set up ballistic missile defences in East Europe, ostensibly to counter a perceived threat from Iran. While the security policies pursued by one or more countries appear to explain the dramatic shifts in international security relations (and hence the perceived need for new arms and lack of interest in controlling arms buildup), several underlying structural forces may also undermine the perceived relevance of arms control and disarmament to national security.

In addition, in the mid-1990s terrorism with chemical, biological, radiological, and perhaps even nuclear weapons entered the security debate as a proliferation threat. After 11 September 2001 it has become a cause that justifies military intervention in other countries. The belief that another country may be seeking unconventional weapons reinforces this justification. The sense of vulnerability to the threats posed by proliferation—both on the state and sub-state levels—combined with a need for strong defences against the threats and, if need be, military preemption, challenges the utility of existing and future arms control and disarmament treaties.

This course investigates why particular weapon categories have gained renewed prominence after the end of the Cold War and how the new threat perceptions affect the security behaviour of states. It offers a theoretical framework to analyse armament and proliferation dynamics (assimilation model) and integrates it with the theories of international relations in order to build a complex model to understand the motivations of states to join (or leave) armament and disarmament treaties. The model rests on various aspects of international relations and security studies, such as gains theories, regional security complexes, levels of security (e.g., economic, societal, environmental, political security, and so on). The course also discusses the rapidly changing security parameters in the light of the events in 2001 and their implications for the future of arms control and disarmament.

Attendance policy

Students should attend all regularly scheduled classes and participate actively in the discussions. Most of the material that will be discussed in class cannot be found in text books, so that non-attendance will have a negative impact on examination. Students are expected to have read the assigned literature in advance as it provides the theoretical foundation or necessary background to the issues discussed in class.

Examination

The examination consists of a written analysis and an individual in-depth discussion on the subject of the written analysis.


Written analysis
The purpose of the written analysis is to test whether the students understand the concepts and methodologies introduced in the course and are able to apply them in practice. Students are welcome to criticize or suggest modifications to the analytical model based on their findings.

Students will write an individual analysis on one of the following topics:

• No chemical or biological weapons were found in Iraq. Did Iraq have a CBW capability before the US-led invasion?
• There have been several calls to free the Middle East from unconventional weapons. So far, they have remained unanswered. What are the future chances of success?
• Transnational terrorism has led to the re-nationalization of security at the expense of collective security. How does this affect the debates on arms control and disarmament?
• What is the likelihood of a terrorist attack with nuclear materials?
• It is argued that Iran’s nuclear programme is intended to achieve a nuclear weapon capability. Are there plausible, alternative explanations for Iran’s nuclear programme? If so, may these alternative goals nonetheless contribute to future weapon capabilities?
• China, Russia and the USA have not joined the Anti-Personnel Landmines Treaty. Discuss underlying reasons for their position.
• With the growing concern of the proliferation of unconventional weapons (biological, chemical, nuclear and their delivery systems) we have seen the emergence of counter-proliferation strategies, which include the option of pre-emptive military action. Discuss how this affects or may affect opportunities for arms control or disarmament.
• Are export controls an efficient policy measure to prevent the proliferation of dual-use technologies that may contribute to biological, chemical, nuclear weapon development?

Students take great care that the presented material and arguments are fully referenced in foot- or endnotes. A bibliography of consulted literature at the end of the paper is insufficient.
The written analysis is 7,500–10,000 words long (including references). Papers that exceed the length will be marked down or in excessive cases refused.
Students will submit their selected topic by no later than 2 May 2008. A submitted choice cannot be changed, so students are encouraged to discuss their selection in advance.
The written analysis is due by noon on Monday, 19 May 2008 (electronically or in hard copy). Late submissions are not accepted.
Plagiarism will be dealt with in the harshest possible way!


In-depth discussion
The in-depth discussion is an individual oral test, which focusses on some of the arguments the student has raised in the written analysis.
Its main purpose is to review the written analysis and to test how familiar the student is with the terms and concepts explained in the course and the supplementary literature.
The in-depth discussion takes place during the last week of the course (26–30 May 2008). It is expected to last about 30 minutes.
Students make an appointment for the in-depth discussion.

Grading

Marks on participation in class, the written analysis and the in-depth discussion are given out of 20. The final grade (out of 6) is based on the combined weighed value of these components (rounding to the nearest quarter of a point):
- Active participation (attendance + discussion): 20%
- Written analysis: 50%

• Quality and relevance of references (10%)
• Use of empirical data (10%)
• Argumentation (30%)

- In-depth discussion: 30%

Course outline

Part 1: The dynamics of armament

Week 1
General introduction to the course

• Review of core concepts and issues
• armament – arms control / disarmament
• armament – proliferation
• arms control / disarmament – non-proliferation
• absolute versus relative gains
• global versus regional security

Literature:

• Buzan, B., An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (Macmillan, Basingstoke (UK), 1987), chapters 14, 15 & 16.
• Lewis, P. and Thakur, R., ‘Arms Control, Disarmament and the United Nations’, Disarmament Forum, no. 1 (2004), pp. 17–28.
• Thee, M., ‘Arms Control: The Retreat From Disarmament The Record to Date and the Search for Alternatives’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 14, no. 2 (1977), pp. 95-114.
• Tulliu, S. and Schmalberger, T., Coming to Terms with Security: A Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building (UNIDIR: Geneva, 2003), Chapter 2: ‘The big picture on “Security by other means”’, in pp. 5–11.

Week 2
Introduction to the main armament theories

• The action-reaction model (realism and neo-realism)
• The bureaucratic or institutional imperative model
• The technological imperative model

Literature:

• Brauch, H. G., ‘Military Technology - Armaments Dynamics - Strategic Stability: Implications for Arms Control and Disarmament’, in Brauch, H. G. (ed.), Military Technology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament. (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 3–38.
• Buzan, B., An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (Macmillan, Basingstoke (UK), 1987), chapter 2.
• Frederking, B., ‘Resolving Security Dilemma’s: A Constructivist Explanation of the Cold War’, International Politics, vol. 35 (June 1998), pp. 207–32.
• Glaser, C. L., ‘The Security Dilemma Revisited’, World Politics, vol. 50, no. 11 (1997), pp. 171–201.
  Herz, John H., ‘The Security Dilemma in International Relations: Background and Present Problems’, International Relations, vol. 17, no. 4 (2003), pp. 411–16.
• Powell, R., ‘Nuclear deterrence theory, nuclear proliferation, and national missile defense’, International Security, vol. 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 86–118.
• Tertais, B., ‘Do Arms Races Matter’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 45–58.
• Thee, M., ‘Military Technology - A Driving Force behind the Arms Race and an Impediment for Arms Control and Disarmament’, in Brauch, H. G. (ed.), Military Technology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament. (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 39–66.

Week 3
Problems with the traditional armament theories

Literature:

• Zanders, J. P., ‘Theoretical Approaches to the Armament Dynamic’, (2004, unpublished), about 85p.

Week 4
Constructing the assimilation model to explain the armament dynamic

Literature:

• Zanders, J. P., ‘A Verification and Transparency Concept for Technology Transfers under the BTWC’, WMD Commission, Stockholm, 17 December 2004, 43pp.

Week 5
Proliferation processes

• Defining proliferation
• Supply and demand in proliferation processes
• Proliferation viewed as an armament dynamic
• Application of the assimilation model to proliferation processes

Literature:

• Blackman, A., The Economics of Technology Diffusion: Implications for Sustainable Development (Resources for the Future: Washington, DC, August 2002), 6p.
• Buzan, B., An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (Macmillan, Basingstoke (UK), 1987), chapters 3 & 4.
• Carr, V. H., ‘Technology Adoption and Diffusion’ (April 1999), available through Future Studies & Future Conflict Studies, Air University Center for Strategy and Technology, URL <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/innovation/adoptiondiffusion.htm>
• Montgomery, A. H., ‘Proliferation Networks in Theory and Practice’, Strategic Insights, vol. V, no. 6 (July 2006), URL <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Jul/montgomeryJul06.pdf>.
• Ogilvie-White, T., ‘Is there a theory of nuclear proliferation? An analysis of the contemporary debate’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 43–60.
• Powell, R., ‘When is Nuclear Proliferation Dangerous?’, Harvard International Review, 11 February 2007, URL <http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1474/>.
• Waltz, K. N., ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better’, Adelphi Paper, no. 171 (Autumn 1981), 32p.
• Zanders, J. P., ‘A Verification and Transparency Concept for Technology Transfers under the BTWC’, WMD Commission, Stockholm, 17 December 2004, 43pp.

Week 6
Application of the assimilation model

• Case study: Terrorism with chemical and biological agents

Literature:

• Zanders, J. P., ‘Assessing the risk of chemical and biological proliferation to terrorists’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 6, no. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 17-34.
• Zanders, J. P., Karlsson, E., Melin, L., Näslund, E., and Thaning, L., ‘Risk Assessment of Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons’, SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000), pp. 537–59.

Part 2: The dynamics of disarmament

Week 7
Arms control and disarmament

• Origins and current status of arms control and disarmament
• Global and regional levels of security
• Functional equivalence and security deficits: the pursuit of relative and absolute gains
• Consequences for arms control and disarmament treaties:
  - the need for positive and negative security guarantees
  - the need for non-security clauses

Literature:

• Dahlitz, J. ‘The role of customary law in arms limitation’, in Dahlitz, J. and Dicke, D. (eds.), The International Law of Arms Control and Disarmament (United Nations: New York, 1991), pp. 157–178.
• Andemicael, B. and Mathias on, J., Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction (Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2005), Chapter 1 ‘The structure and logic of the WMD ban regime’, pp. 3–26
• Feldman, David, ‘The place of arms control and disarmament in the system of international law’, in Dahlitz, J. and Dicke, D. (eds.), The International Law of Arms Control and Disarmament (United Nations: New York, 1991), pp. 35–43.
• Jasentuliyana, N., ‘The process of achieving effective arms control law’, in Dahlitz, J. and Dicke, D. (eds.), The International Law of Arms Control and Disarmament (United Nations: New York, 1991), pp. 179–200.
• Zanders, J. P. and French, E. M., ‘Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Between irrelevance and indispensability’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 20, no. 1 (April 1999), pp. 56–85.
• Zanders, J. P., ‘Challenges to disarmament regimes: the case of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention’, Global Society, vol. 15, no. 4 (October 2001), pp. 361-385.
• Zanders, J. P., ‘The Chemical Weapons Convention and Universality: A Question of Quality Over Quantity’, Disarmament Forum, no. 4 (2002), pp. 23–31.

Week 8

• History of chemical and biological warfare
• Science and technology and their impact on the choice of weaponry
• The control of chemical and biological warfare
• The control of other weapon categories and modes of warfare

Literature:

• Andemicael, B. and Mathias on, J., Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction (Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2005), Chapter 2 ‘Evolution of the WMD control regime’, pp. 27–57
• Schmitt, M. N., ‘The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare’, Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal, vol. 2 (1999), 15p. (Electronic edition).
• Simpson, J., ‘The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Back to the Future’, Disarmament Forum, no. 1 (2004), pp. 5–16.
• Stephens, D., ‘Human Rights and Armed Conflict—The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case’, Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal, vol. 4 (2001), 24p. (Electronic edition).
• Zanders, J. P., ‘International Norms Against Chemical and Biological Warfare: An Ambiguous Legacy’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, vol. 8, no. 2 (2003), pp. 391–410.

Week 9
Functional equivalence revisited

• The achievement of functional equivalence according to the assimilation model
• The impact of functional equivalence on opportunities for arms control and disarmament
• Linking armament theory with international relations theory (the impact of domestic processes on international cooperation and vice versa)

Literature:

• Zanders, J. P. and French, E. M., ‘Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Between irrelevance and indispensability’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 20, no. 1 (April 1999), pp. 56–85.
• Zanders, J. P., ‘Challenges to disarmament regimes: the case of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention’, Global Society, vol. 15, no. 4 (October 2001), pp. 361-385.

Week 10
General review and discussion of concepts and processes (in the light of the written analysis).

Part 3: The present and future of arms control and disarmament

Week 11
Long-term implementation of arms control and disarmament treaties

• Intrinsic and extrinsic challenges to security regimes
  - Changes in the international security environment
  - Technological and scientific progress
• The ability of treaties to meet those challenges
• Case study: the failure to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Literature:

• Dando, M., ‘Scientific and Technological Change and the Future of the CWC: The Problem of Non-Lethal Weapons’, Disarmament Forum, no. 4 (2002), pp. 33–44.
• Hart, J.; Kuhlau, F.; Sutherland, R. and Zanders, J. P., Maintaining the Effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention, SIPRI Policy Paper (SIPRI: Stockholm, October 2002), 19p.
• Lennane, R., Blood, toil, tears and sweat: the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention since 2001’, Disarmament Forum, no. 3 (2006), pp. 5–16.
• Simon, J., ‘Ensuring long-term adherence to the CWC: problems and perspectives’, paper presented at the conference on Chemical Weapons and Disarmament Perspective towards the CWC’s Fourth Year, Forum for the Problems of Peace and War Florence, Italy, 4 December 2000, 9p.
• Sims , N., ‘Strengthening structures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: options for remedying the institutional deficit’, Disarmament Forum, no. 3 (2006), pp. 17–26.
• Zanders, J. P., ‘The Chemical Weapons Convention and universality: A question of quality over quantity?’, Disarmament Forum, no. 4 (2002), pp. 23–31.
• Zanders, J. P., ‘On the eve of the 6th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention’, Chaillot Paper, no. 93 (November 2006), pp. 33–61.
• Zanders, J. P., ‘Verification of the BTWC: Seeking the impossible or impossible to seek?’, Chaillot Paper, no. 93 (November 2006), pp. 11–31.
• Zanders, J. P.; Hart, J. and Kuhlau, F., Biotechnology and the future of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, SIPRI Fact Sheet (SIPRI: Stockholm, November 2001), 12p.

Week 12
Current issues in security studies

• Non-proliferation versus arms control and disarmament
• Levels of security (global, regional, local)
  - How do they affect arms control and disarmament?
  - How do they affect non-proliferation policies?
  - How do they affect verification and compliance monitoring of international agreements?
• Sub-state security challenges

 Literature:

• Buzan, B., People, States and Fear (Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991), chapter 5.
• Frederking, B., ‘Resolving Security Dilemma’s: A Constructivist Explanation of the Cold War’, International Politics, vol. 35 (June 1998), pp. 207–32.
• Perkovich, G., ‘The End of the Nonproliferation Regime?’, Current History (November 2006), pp. 355–362.
• Stevenson, J., ‘How Europe and America Defend Themselves’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 2 (March–April 2003), pp. 75–90.
• Tkacik, M., ‘Policy and Nuclear Proliferation: How Arms Control Encourages Proliferation’, International Politics, vol. 39 (March 2002), pp. 53–74.
• Yuan, J., ‘The Future of Export Controls: Developing New Strategies for Nonproliferation’, International Politics, vol. 39 (June 2002), pp. 131–51.

Week 13
The aftermath of 11 September 2001

• New threat perceptions and security issues
• Emerging security policies
• Implications for armament and disarmament
• Conclusions: On the nature of future security regimes

Literature:

• Bracken, P., ‘Thinking (Again) about Arms Control, Orbis, vol. 47 (Winter 2004), pp. 149–59.
• Castillo, J. J., ‘Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters’, Current History (December 2003), pp. 426–31.
• Ellis, J. D., ‘The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and US National Security’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 115–33.
• Gottemoeller, R., ‘Arms Control in a New Era’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 45–58.
• Guoliang, G., ‘Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 135–45.
• Hanson, M., ‘Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to International Security’, International Relations, vol. 16, no. 3 (2002), pp. 361–79.
• Roberts, B., ‘The Road Ahead for Arms Control’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 219–32.

Week 14
Examination: In-depth discussion

(Students may make an appointment for their individual exam at any time between 8am and 6pm during this week.)